ÿWPCÇ ‰î쫾ž§š¬šÆÎE8>ŸHˆæóGS(Ûwê*š,*× ¾ åg¼†¦Ò§o’QÂÈ«B=â+Ñ€wóнF±]ÔàmM–ÉS*þìü¤Y‚Ô7N¸Ê¸S2<¦å#’ó÷%c{Ú²›7ötòõ¤xÃ5dàÝ—œ#»O2Ê,F6˜“2›j¼Œª-Z(3 cµ©´¦ÇsVTÅz¼w÷è+­9Žñ´óšè÷Wq¦ Ëoª¹µà³?Æ(ýÉÕÕôɹº¡õ˜°Îäc¿²Ê €|¦ˆº•ábW ^zNºÊÖ=qMF50Ƚ¬á± nüùžR”:Lß)°K•ib °?£µPôî¾T¤Äƒ–zwu÷Å\‡ŠÑöLÀ¼æ€”êJýC¿»Vf´jUb×zm kÙß(‘3“ýr$Mœ1u/®åY;‘+= Ì0n9 t?(2Ý1t˜ b½ðŽ™ .ŠÖ3˜×ªX¹n8¬@ûó4…·ÅKGlÉú qýw}±ÿA³k X¦;|¼“Ä}Qø¯ÐR7üÝÓÓ¸vd„D6Öš\{o$©ã®>ã# $2¨aÔ)¿cïš¹F(ŒP,œ•"´É $s¾U\B² %ôÖú 0tÐ 0uD 0m¹ 0[& 1u ö nT 0rZ Ì 1uÔ w@I4‰ mŸ ¶ 0ŽÂÆP 0e 0w{ 0}ò 0_oUBÎ#!U:1NkUNm^ »ô\  `*Times New RomanTTô' Ï  BOARDÀÀS ANALYSIS 2 .Preferred Customer"0Board of Law .   h††ÿÿ:Default ParaDefault Paragraph FontÔ€XXXÔÔW€ô\  `*Times New RomanTTWÔÔ  ÔÔ  ÔÔ  ÔÔ  ÔÔ€ôôôÔÔW€ô\  `*Times New RomanTTWÔ8$ÿÿ,TitleTitleÓ  ÓÔ  ÔÔ  Ôò òó óÔ  ÔÔ  ÔP”‰ÿÿ8Body Text 2Body Text 2Ó  ÓÔ€XXXÔÔW€ô\  `*Times New RomanTTWÔÔ  ÔÔ  Ôò òó óÔ  ÔÔ  ÔÔ€ôôôÔÔW€ô\  `*Times New RomanTTWÔD‘†ÿÿ2SubtitleSubtitleÓ  ÓÔ€XXXÔÔW€ô\  `*Times New RomanTTWÔÔ  ÔÔ  ÔÔ  ÔÔ  ÔÔ€ôôôÔÔW€ô\  `*Times New 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ÝÔ€X_ÏXõô©ÔJULY€1999€MARYLAND€BAR€EXAMINATIONÐ ° ÐBOARD€ANALYSISó óÐ  ð ÐÝ‚ÿŠƒ ÝÔ  ÔÔ  Ôñgñó óó óñgñÝ  ÝÓ  ÓÌÝ‚ÿÿÿÝÓ  ÓÔ€X_ÏXXX_ÏÔÔ€X_ÏXXX_ÏÔÔ  ÔÔ  ÔÝ  Ýà@¥¥ ìàò òPART€A€€„€ó ó€ò òQUESTION€Ió óˆÐ €Ð ÐÝ‚ÿÿÿ ƒ ÝÔ  ÔÔ  ÔÔ€X_ÏXXX_ÏÔÔ€X_ÏXXX_ÏÔÝ  Ýà@ìì*ìàˆÌÓC€  ÿÿ$# CÓÓB.ÜÜ4` Œ ä <”ìDœôL¤ü!°œXBÓò ò(a)à0  àó óSoggy€Dough€Inc.€(ð ðÔ_ÔSDIÔ_Ôðð)€is€liable€for€the€payment€of€rent€to€Super€Mall.€€Two€officersÐ ` ° Ðof€Ô_ÔSDIÔ_Ô€signed€the€lease€on€September€20,€1998,€before€Ô_ÔSDIÔ_Ô€was€actually€formed.€€SectionÏ1„206€(a)€of€the€Corporations€and€Associations€Article€states€that€charter€documents€ofÏcorporations€are€effective€when€accepted€for€filing€by€the€State€Department€ofÏAssessments€and€Taxation€(ð ðÔ_ÔSDATÔ_Ôðð).€€However,€Alice€and€Barry€signed€the€lease€withÏSuper€Mall€on€behalf€of€Ô_ÔSDIÔ_Ô,€representing€to€Super€Mall€that€they€were€officers€of€Ô_ÔSDIÔ_ÔÏand€that€they€had€authority€to€do€so.€€Super€Mall€entered€into€the€lease€agreement€relyingÏon€the€credit€of€Ô_ÔSDIÔ_Ô,€and€not€on€the€credit€of€Alice€and€Barry,€individually.Ð (#(# ÐÓH+Ü Ü4Œ ä <”ìDœôL¤ü!ÜÜ4‚,ä ‰XHÓà0  àÐ (#(# ÐÓ?+Ü Ü` Œ ä <”ìDœôL¤ü!ÜÜŒX?Ó€€€€€€€€€€€€Ô_ÔSDIÔ_Ô€will€not€be€able€successfully€to€assert€that,€because€the€corporation€was€not€properly€€€Ï€€€€€€€€€€€€formed€at€the€time€that€the€lease€was€signed,€Ô_ÔSDIÔ_Ô€has€no€liability€on€the€lease.€€Although€€€Ï€€€€€€€€€€€€Maryland€does€not€recognize€òòdeóó€òòfactoóó€corporations,€its€courts€have€adopted€the€doctrine€€€€€Ð ° Ѐ€€€€€€€€€€€of€corporation€by€estoppel.€€Under€corporation€by€estoppel,€Ô_ÔSDIÔ_Ô€should€be€found€to€be€€€€€€€Ï€€€€€€€€€€€€liable€for€payment€of€five€monthsðð€rent€at€Super€Mall,€plus€any€other€sums€for€which€Ô_ÔSDIÔ_Ô€€Ï€€€€€€€€€€€€can€be€held€liable€under€the€terms€of€the€lease.€€It€is€clear€from€the€facts€that€Ô_ÔSDIÔ_Ô€ratified€€€€Ï€€€€€€€€€€€€the€lease€by€accepting€its€terms,€moving€into€Super€Mall€and€operating€as€a€business€after€€Ï€€€€€€€€€€€€Ô_ÔSDATÔ_Ô€accepted€the€Ô_ÔSDIÔ_Ô€Articles€of€Incorporation€for€filing.Ìà0 4 àÐ 4(#4(# Ѐ€€€€€€€€€€€With€respect€to€the€liability€of€the€individual€officers€on€the€lease,€Alice€and€Barry€signed€Ï€€€€€€€€€€€€the€lease€as€officers€of€Ô_ÔSDIÔ_Ô.€€Super€Mall€believed€at€all€times€that€it€was€dealing€with€Ô_ÔSDIÔ_Ô,€Ï€€€€€€€€€€€€not€Alice€and€Barry€individually,€and€there€appears€to€have€been€no€fraud,€since€Alice€and€Ï€€€€€€€€€€€€Barry€believed€that€the€corporation€had€been€formed.€€In€òòÔ_ÔCransonÔ_Ô€v.€International€Ð ` Ðóó€€€€€€€€€€€€òòBusiness€Machines€Corp.óó,€234€Md.€477,€200€A.2d€34€(1964),€the€Court€of€Appeals€held€€€€Ð P Ѐ€€€€€€€€€€€that€the€corporationððs€president€was€not€liable€for€payment€for€equipment€purchased€for€€€€€Ï€€€€€€€€€€€€the€corporation€before€the€corporationððs€articles€were€accepted€for€filing€because€the€€€€€€€€€€Ï€€€€€€€€€€€€president€of€the€corporation€did€not€personally€guarantee€the€purchase€or€otherwise€€€€€€€€€€€€Ï€€€€€€€€€€€€assume€any€individual€liability€for€payment.€€Chris€may€have€ratified€the€signing€of€the€€€€€Ï€€€€€€€€€€€€lease€by€acquiescing€to€Ô_ÔSDIÔ_Ôððs€possession€of€the€premises,€but€Chris€neither€signed€the€€€€€€€€Ï€€€€€€€€€€€€lease€nor€made€any€representations€to€Super€Mall€when€the€lease€was€signed.€€Therefore,€€€Ï€€€€€€€€€€€€it€appears€that€there€is€no€basis€for€individual€liability€of€Chris€for€the€Ô_ÔSDIÔ_Ô€debt€on€the€€€€€€€Ï€€€€€€€€€€€€lease.€€In€addition,€the€individual€officers€will€not€be€personally€liable€under€the€lease€€€€€€€€Ï€€€€€€€€€€€€unless€they€guarantied€payment€under€the€lease.Ìà0 4 àÐ 4(#4(# ÐÝ‚ÿÿÿÝÓ  ÓÔ€X_ÏXXX_ÏÔÔ€X_ÏXXX_ÏÔÔ  ÔÔ  Ôò òÝ  Ýó ó€€€€€€€€€€€€In€addition€to€the€above€analysis,€discussions€of€(Ô_ÔiÔ_Ô)€promoter€liability,€(ii)€partnership€€€€€€€€Ð P( #& Ѐ€€€€€€€€€€€formation€and€(iii)€partner€liability€could€have€been€addressed€in€the€question.ÌÝ‚ÿムÝÔ  ÔÔ  ÔÔ€X_ÏXXX_ÏÔÔ€X_ÏXXX_ÏÔñgñó óó óñgñÝ  ÝÓE+Ü Ü4Œ ä <”ìDœôL¤ü!ÜÜ` Œ ŠXEÓà0  àÐ (#(# ÐÌÐ ,`'* ÐÔ_ÔÓB.ÜÜ4` Œ ä <”ìDœôL¤ü!ÜÜŒXBÓò òÌÌÌ(b)ó óà0  àÔ_ÔSDIÔ_Ô€and€Alice€will€defend€themselves€by€maintaining€that€a€valid€and€binding€contractÐ €Ð Ðdid€not€exist€with€Kitchen€Corp.€(ð ðKCðð)€because€a€requirement€of€the€bylaws€was€notÏsatisfied.€€The€bylaws€require€the€agreement€and€signature€of€two€officers€for€anyÏcorporate€obligation€in€excess€of€$10,000.00.€€Alice€clearly€informed€KC€that€Alice€didÏnot€have€the€requisite€authority€to€sign€on€behalf€of€the€corporation,€and€that€theÏagreement€and€signature€of€another€officer€would€be€required€to€form€a€valid€contract€Ð (#(# Ðà0  àobligating€Ô_ÔSDIÔ_Ô€to€pay€for€the€equipment.€€Apparently,€KC€made€additional€inquiry€andÏAlice€stated€that€she€would€seek€the€necessary€approval€for€the€purchase.€€However,€KCÏdid€not€wait€to€receive€that€approval,€but€rather,€processed€the€order€without€theÏadditional€signature.€€KC€proceeded€to€perform€under€the€contract€even€though€it€had€noÏbasis€for€a€good€faith€belief€that€a€contract€had€been€formed.€€Under€these€circumstances,Ïthere€can€be€little€doubt€that€KC€understood€that€it€was€proceeding€at€its€own€peril,€andÏchose€to€do€so.€€Neither€Ô_ÔSDIÔ_Ô,€Alice€nor€any€of€the€directors€of€Ô_ÔSDIÔ_Ô€should€be€liable€forÏpayment€for€the€equipment.Ð (#(# ÐÓC€  ÿÿ$$CÓÓH+Ü Ü4Œ ä <”ìDœôL¤ü!ÜÜ4‚,ä ‰XHÓÌà@—— ìàò òPART€Aó 󀄀€ò òQUESTION€IIó óˆÐ à ÐÌÓB.ÜÜ4` Œ ä <”ìDœôL¤ü!ÜÜŒXBÓà0  àLawyer€Smart€would€object€to€Aliceððs€testimony€as€hearsay.€€Hearsay€is€defined€inÏMaryland€Rule€5„801(a)€as€ð ða€statement,€other€than€one€made€by€the€Ô_ÔdeclarantÔ_Ô€whileÏtestifying€at€the€trial€or€hearing,€offered€in€evidence€to€prove€the€truth€of€the€matterÏasserted.ðð€€€If€Alice€attempted€to€testify€that€KCððs€representative€made€statements€to€herÏand€those€out€of€court€statements€are€used€to€prove€the€truth€of€a€matter€asserted,€thenÏthey€would€be€excluded€as€inadmissible€hearsay€unless€the€statements€are€either€non„¼hearsay€or€are€covered€by€an€exception€to€the€Rule.Ð (#(# ÐÓH+Ü Ü4Œ ä <”ìDœôL¤ü!ÜÜ4‚,ä ‰XHÓÌÓ?+Ü Ü` Œ ä <”ìDœôL¤ü!ÜÜŒX?Ó€€€€€€€€€€€€In€this€case,€Aliceððs€testimony€should€be€admissible€under€one€of€two€theories.€€First,€€€€€€€€€Ï€€€€€€€€€€€€Lawyer€Fox€could€argue€that€Aliceððs€testimony€concerning€the€KC€representativeððs€€€€€€€€€€€€Ï€€€€€€€€€€€€statement€is€admissible€because€it€is€non„hearsay€ð!ð€the€admission€of€a€party.€€Since€the€€€€€€Ð Ð  Ѐ€€€€€€€€€€€KC€representative€was€authorized€to€enter€into€contracts€on€behalf€of€KC,€the€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ï€€€€€€€€€€€€representativeððs€statements€bind€KC.€€Second,€Lawyer€Fox€could€argue€that€the€statement€€Ï€€€€€€€€€€€€is€admissible€under€one€of€the€exceptions€to€the€Rule,€òòi.e.óó€Aliceððs€then„existing€mental€€€€€€€Ð  #ð! Ѐ€€€€€€€€€€€condition.€€Under€Maryland€Rule€5„803€(b)€(3),€Lawyer€Fox€could€argue€that€the€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ï€€€€€€€€€€€€statement€of€the€KC€representative€to€Alice€was€a€manifestation€and€adoption€of€Aliceððs€€€€Ï€€€€€€€€€€€€intent€at€the€time€that€she€signed€the€contract€with€KC.€€Lawyer€Fox€would€argue€that€the€€Ï€€€€€€€€€€€€statement€could€be€admitted€to€show€its€effect€on€the€hearer,€Alice,€who€intended€not€to€€€€€Ï€€€€€€€€€€€€enter€into€a€contract,€but€to€begin€a€process€that€could€only€be€concluded€with€the€proper€€€Ï€€€€€€€€€€€€ratification€by€another€officer.€€Alice€should€be€allowed€to€testify€about€both€her€own€€€€€€€€€Ï€€€€€€€€€€€statements€and€actions€at€the€time€of€the€meeting€with€KCððs€manager€and€those€of€the€KC€€Ï€€€€€€€€€€€€representative€in€connection€with€establishing€the€intent€of€the€parties€at€the€time€of€the€€€€€Ï€€€€€€€€€€€€meeting.ÓE+Ü Ü` Œ ä <”ìDœôL¤ü!ÜÜ` Œ ŠXEÓÐ ,`'* ÐÔ_Ô‡€€€€€€€€€€€€The€ð ðstatementðð€in€this€case€is€the€KC€managerððs€nod€when€Alice€informed€the€manager€€€€Ï€€€€€€€€€€€that€an€additional€signature€would€be€needed€to€make€the€contract€valid.€€A€nod€is€not€€€€€€€€€Ï€€€€€€€€€€€hearsay,€since€it€is€a€statement€of€which€the€party€has€manifested€an€adoption€or€belief€in€€€€Ì€€€€€€€€€€€€its€truth.€€See,€òòMolesworth€v.€Brandonóó,€341€Md.€621,€672€A.2d€608€(1996).€€In€this€case,€€€Ð €Ð Ѐ€€€€€€€€€€€the€managerððs€nod€acknowledged€Aliceððs€statement€that€a€second€signature€would€be€€€€€€€€€Ï€€€€€€€€€€€€necessary€to€form€a€valid€contract.ÌÓE+Ü Ü` Œ ä <”ìDœôL¤ü!ÜÜ` Œ ŠXEÓÌ€€€€€€€€€€€€Furthermore,€the€Rule€does€not€prohibit€discussion€of€further€conduct€or€actions€taken€by€€Ï€€€€€€€€€€€€another,€so€Alice€may€testify€that€KCððs€representative€continued€to€contact€her€to€get€an€€€€Ï€€€€€€€€€€€€additional€approval€for€the€contract€or€that€KC€processed€the€order€and€delivered€the€€€€€€€€€€Ï€€€€€€€€€€€€equipment.€€The€Rule€is€intended€to€exclude€inherently€untrustworthy€or€tainted€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ï€€€€€€€€€€€€testimony.€€In€this€case,€the€contemporaneous€statement€(the€nod)€of€KCððs€representative€€€Ï€€€€€€€€€€€€helps€to€establish€KCððs€intent,€and€KCððs€subsequent€conduct€is€sufficient€to€establish€the€€€Ï€€€€€€€€€€€€fact€that€KC€continued€to€obtain€approval,€which€was€an€acknowledgment€of€Aliceððs€lack€€Ï€€€€€€€€€€€€of€unilateral€authority€to€bind€SDI€to€the€contract.ÌÓE+Ü Ü4Œ ä <”ìDœôL¤ü!ÜÜ` Œ ŠXEÓÌà@ppìàò òPART€Aó 󀄀€ò òQUESTION€IIIó óˆÐ ° ÐÌà0  àLawyer€Fox€might€raise€two€objections€to€introduction€of€the€testimony€ð!ð€confidentialÐ à Ðmarital€communications€privilege€and€inadmissible€hearsay.€€The€confidential€maritalÏcommunications€privilege€is€found€in€Section€9„105€of€the€Courts€and€JudicialÏProceedings€Article,€which€provides€that€a€spouse€is€not€competent€to€disclose€anyÏconfidential€communication€between€the€spouses€occurring€during€the€marriage.€€In€thisÏcase,€Lawyer€Smart€could€question€whether€the€communication€was€ð ðconfidential,ðð€whichÏis€not€defined.€€Lawyer€Smart€will€not€be€able€to€assert€successfully€that€theÏcommunication€was€not€privileged€because€Mr.€A€waived€the€privilege€byÏcommunicating€the€information€to€a€third€party,€his€barber.€€The€privilege€was€Aliceððs€toÏwaive,€not€her€spouseððs.€€If€Alice€intended€the€communication€to€remain€confidential,ÏAliceððs€objection€that€Mr.€A€is€not€competent€to€testify€about€his€revelation€to€the€barberÏwill€be€upheld.€€See,€òòColeman€v.€Stateóó,€281€Md.€538,€380€A.2d€49€(1977).€€If€Lawyer€FoxÐ à0 Ðrelies€exclusively€on€a€hearsay€objection,€Lawyer€Smart€could€argue€that€the€statementÏwas€a€statement€of€the€declarantððs€then„existing€state€of€mind.€€In€addition,€if€disclosedÏbefore€trial,€Lawyer€Smart€could€assert€that€the€statement€is€admissible€because€it€is€anÏð ðexceptional€circumstanceðð€under€Maryland€Rule€5„803€(b)€(24),€a€statement€not€coveredÏby€another€exclusion€but€which€is€(A)€offered€as€evidence€of€a€material€fact;€(B)€moreÏprobative€of€the€fact€for€which€it€is€offered€than€any€reasonably€available€evidence;€andÏ(C)€offered€to€best€serve€the€interests€of€justice.€€In€this€case,€Lawyer€Smart€will€argue,Ïthere€is€no€reasonable€alternative€to€the€testimony€of€Mr.€A,€who€has€already€breachedÏany€marital€confidence€by€sharing€his€wifeððs€statement€with€his€barber.€€This€catchallÏexception€to€the€hearsay€rule€is€only€applied€in€the€most€extraordinary€of€circumstances.€ÏBoth€of€Lawyer€Foxððs€objections€to€the€testimony€of€Mr.€A€will€most€likely€be€sustained,Ïand€the€testimony€will€not€be€admitted.Ð (#(# ÐÐ  ,`'* Ðò òà@ÜÜ!ìàPART€B€„€QUESTION€Ió óˆÐ ° ÐÌà0  àI€would€tell€Allison€that€Paulaððs€claim€is€barred€by€the€three„year€statute€of€limitations€atÏthis€juncture€and€she€may€not€be€able€to€file€suit€against€Driver.€€Maryland€Courts€andÏJudicial€Proceedings€Code€Annotated,€Section€5„201(a);òò€Hartford€Accident€&Ð pÀ ÐIndemnification€Co.€v.€Scarlett€Harbor€Associatesóó,€109€Md.€App.€217,€674€A.2d€106Ð ` ° Ð(1996).€€However,€June€was€a€minor€at€the€time€of€the€accident€and€may€be€able€toÏproceed.€€Maryland€Courts€and€Judicial€Proceedings€Code€Annotated,€Section€5„201.€€Ð (#(# ÐÌà0  àEven€if€neither€claim€is€barred,€the€facts€raise€an€issue€of€liability€on€Paulaððs€part.€€PaulaððsÏnegligence€arguably€may€not€be€imputed€to€June,€and€the€doctrine€of€parent„child€tortÏimmunity€may€bar€her€claim€against€Paula.€€òòRenko€v.€McLeanóó,€346€Md.€464,€697€A.2dÐ P  Ð468€(1997).€€However,€June€may€find€herself€in€the€position€of€having€to€testify€againstÏher€mother.€€€Since€Rule€1.7€of€the€Maryland€Rules€of€Professional€Conduct€generallyÏprecludes€a€lawyer€from€representing€a€client€if€the€representation€will€be€directly€adverseÏto€another€client,€I€would€advise€Allison€to€not€represent€both€unless€she€fully€discussesÏthis€aspect€of€the€case€and€garners€their€consent.Ð (#(# ÐÌà0  àAdditionally,€Allison€may€not€have€the€requisite€competence€to€represent€either€client€andÏshould€not€accept€representation€if€such€competence€cannot€ð ðbe€achieved€by€reasonableÏpreparation.ðð€€Comment€To€Maryland€Rules€of€Professional€Conduct,€Rule€1.1.€Ð (#(# ÐÌÝ‚ÿÿÿÝÓ  ÓÔ€X_ÏXXX_ÏÔÔ€X_ÏXXX_ÏÔÔ  ÔÔ  ÔÝ  Ýà0  àFinally,€the€fee€arrangement€set€by€Allison€runs€afoul€of€Maryland€Rules€1.5€and€1.8.€Ð P  ÐRule€1.5€mandates€that€a€lawyer€set€a€reasonable€fee,€determined€by€the€time€and€laborÏrequired,€novelty€and€difficulty€of€the€question€involved,€experience€of€the€attorney,€theÏamount€involved€and€the€results€obtained,€and€similar€factors.€€Arguably,€the€fee€chargedÏPaula€is€not€reasonable€given€Allisonððs€lack€of€experience€in€this€area€of€the€law,€and€theÏfact€that€the€suit€may€be€barred€because€it€was€brought€too€late.€€Rule€1.8€precludes€aÏlawyer€from€accepting€compensation€for€representation€of€a€client€from€one€other€than€theÏclient€unless:€the€client€consents;€there€is€no€interference€with€the€lawyerððs€independenceÏof€professional€judgement€or€with€the€client„lawyer€relationship;€and,€the€lawyer€canÏmaintain€the€confidentiality€requirements€set€forth€in€Rule€1.6.€€I€would€tell€Allison€thatÏshe€could€continue€suit€on€behalf€of€June€if€she€discusses€the€fee€arrangement€with€herÏand€if€she€no€longer€represents€Paula.Ð (#(# ÐÝ‚ÿÿÿá8ƒ ÝÔ  ÔÔ  ÔÔ€X_ÏXXX_ÏÔÔ€X_ÏXXX_ÏÔÝ  ÝÝ‚ÿÿÿÝÔ& À ÔÓ  ÓÔ€X_ÏXXX_ÏÔÔ€X_ÏXXX_ÏÔÔ  ÔÔ  Ôò òÝ  ÝÓ  ÓÔ  ÔÌÓ  ÓPART€B€„€QUESTION€IIó óÐ €%Ð # ÐÔ ©>ÔÓ·>ÓÌÝ‚ÿ>€€€€ÝÔ  ÔÔ  ÔÔ€X_ÏXXX_ÏÔÔ€X_ÏXXX_ÏÔÔ'À$!>Ôñgñó óó óñgñÝ  Ýà0  àAlthough€a€defendant€has€the€privilege€to€be€sued€in€the€county€of€his€residence,€aÐ `'°"% Ðnonresident€of€the€State€may€be€sued€in€any€county€of€the€State€if€service€of€process€isÏaccomplished.€Maryland€Courts€and€Judicial€Proceedings€Code€Annotated,€Section€6„Ð (#(# ÐÝ‚ÿÿÿÝÔ& ð ÔÓ  ÓÔ€X_ÏXXX_ÏÔÔ€X_ÏXXX_ÏÔÔ  ÔÔ  Ôò òÝ  Ýó óÝ‚ÿâ@dencÝÔ  ÔÔ  ÔÔ€X_ÏXXX_ÏÔÔ€X_ÏXXX_ÏÔÔ'ð0*ò@Ôñgñó óó óñgñÝ  ÝÓ  Óà0  à202;€òòZouck€v.€Zouckóó,€204€Md.€285,€104€A.2d€573€(1954);€òòMedina€v.€Meilhammeróó,€62€Ð0*€%((#(# Ðà0  àMd.€App.€239,€489€A.2d€35€(1985).€òòòòSee,óó€Leung€v.€Nunesóó,€354€Md.€217,€729€A.2d€956Ð  +p&) Ð(1999)€(Nonresident€plaintiff€can€choose€where€to€file€suit,€and€a€motion€to€transferÐ ,`'* Ðshould€only€be€granted€when€the€balance€weighs€strongly€in€favor€of€the€moving€party.)€ÏAdditionally,€upon€motion€of€any€party€ð ðan€action€may€be€transferred€to€any€other€circuitÏcourt€where€the€action€might€have€been€brought€if€the€transfer€is€for€the€convenience€ofÏthe€parties€and€witnesses€and€serves€the€interests€of€justice.ðð€Maryland€Courts€andÏJudicial€Proceedings€Code€Annotated,€Section€2„327.€€It€appears€that€Driver€provided€noÏinformation€as€to€why€the€balance€of€convenience€weighs€in€favor€of€a€transfer€toÏBaltimore€City.€€Accordingly,€the€court€should€not€grant€the€motion€for€change€of€venue.Ð (#(# ÐÌÔ‡ô©õXX_ÏÔÝ‚ÿÿÿÝÔ& º ÔÓ  ÓÔ€X_ÏXõô©ÔÔ€X_ÏXXX_ÏÔÔ€X_ÏXXX_ÏÔÔ  ÔÔ  ÔÝ  ÝÔ  Ôò òPART€B€„€QUESTION€IIIó óÔ ÍFÔÐ 0 € ÐÝ‚ÿÿÿ%Fƒ ÝÔ  ÔÔ  ÔÔ€ô©õXX_ÏÔÔ€ô©õõô©ÔÔ€ô©õõô©ÔÔ'º0 5FÔÝ  ÝÓ  ÓÌÔ#†X_ÏXõô©F#Ôà0  àOn€a€motion€for€summary€judgment,€the€movant€must€clearly€show€the€absence€of€anyÐ ê :  Ðgenuine€issue€of€material€fact€and€entitlement€to€judgment€as€a€matter€of€law.€€MarylandÏRule€2„501(a).€€Given€the€facts€provided,€Dave€Driver€may€not€be€able€to€make€such€aÏshowing.Ð (#(# ÐÌà0  àUnder€the€doctrine€of€res€judicata,€or€claim€preclusion,€ð ða€judgment€between€the€sameÏparties€and€their€privies€is€a€final€bar€to€any€other€suit€upon€the€same€cause€of€action,€andÏis€conclusive,€not€only€as€to€all€matters€that€have€been€decided€in€the€original€suit,€but€asÏto€all€matters€which€with€propriety€could€have€been€litigated€in€the€first€suit.ðð€€òòRowland€v.Ð jº ÐHarrisonóó,€320€Md.€223,€229,€577€A.2d€51€(1990).€€The€doctrine€of€collateral€estoppel,€orÐ Zª Ðissue€preclusion,€precludes€re„litigation€of€a€matter€that€has€actually€been€litigated€andÏdecided.€€Its€elements€are€identity€of€parties;€actual€litigation€of€an€issue€of€fact€or€law;Ïessentialness€of€the€determination€to€the€judgement;€and€the€appealability€of€thatÏdetermination€by€the€party€against€whom€issue€preclusion€is€being€asserted.€òòEsslinger€v.Ð j ÐBaltimore€Cityóó,€95€Md.€App.€607,€622€A.2d€774€(1993).€€Ð Z(#(# ÐÌà0  àUnder€either€doctrine,€a€prong€is€not€satisfied€since€Cyndi€may€not€have€been€in€privityÏwith€the€City€because€she€was€not€a€party€to€the€earlier€suit;€had€no€direct€interest€in€theÏsubject€matter€of€the€Cityððs€suit€(i.e.,€the€damage€to€the€vehicle);€and€lacked€any€controlÏover€the€Cityððs€case.€€òòSeeóó,€òòWarner€v.€Germanóó,€100€Md.€App.€512,€524,€642€A.2d€239Ð º  Ð(1994).€€Accordingly,€the€Court€should€deny€the€motion.€€€€Ð (#(# ÐÔ‡ô©õXX_ÏÔÌÔ#†X_ÏXõô©ýN#ÔÐ  d"´  Ðò òÔ‡Xô)XXX_ÏÔà@ìì*ìàˆÌó óà@++!ìàò òPart€Cà@@ìì*ìàó óÔ#†X_ÏXXXô)XO#ÔÔ‡Xô)XXX_ÏÔ€„€Ó Ü„XÜÜŒXÓò òQUESTION€IˆÐ  ð Ðà@ìì*ìàˆÌó óÔ#†X_ÏXXXô)áO#ÔÔ‡Xô)XXX_ÏÔÓ  Óà0  àBecause€the€parties€were€married€and€they€acquired€the€Harford€County€home€theyÐ €Ð Ðwould€have€held€title€as€tenants€by€the€entireties.€€(There€is€no€fact€to€indicateÏotherwise.)€€The€separation€agreement€states€that€Al€was€to€convey€his€interest€in€theÏproperty€to€Bev.€Prerequisite€to€making€a€loan€to€Charles€a€deed€must€be€prepared€(inÏaccordance€with€the€separation€agreement)€conveying€title€to€Bev.Ð (#(# ÐÓ" ÜÜŒXÜ„XP"ÓÌà0  àThe€District€Court€Judgment€is€only€recorded€against€Al.€€As€long€as€the€parties€heldÏproperty€as€tenants€by€the€entireties€this€judgment€would€not€be€a€lien€against€theÏproperty.€€However,€immediately€upon€the€parties€divorce€on€June€15,€1999,€the€partiesÏheld€title€to€the€property€as€tenants€in€common.€€Thus,€the€District€Court€Judgment,Ïeven€though€it€is€only€against€Al,€is€also€a€lien€against€his€interest€in€the€property.Ð (#(# ÐÌà0  àThe€right€of€way€in€favor€of€the€next€door€neighbor€does€not€indicate€it€is€binding€onÏhis€heirs,€successors€or€assigns€and€does€not€otherwise€indicate€that€it€runs€with€theÏland.€€Since€Jones€has€sold€the€property,€the€right€of€way€is€no€longer€an€encumbrance.Ð (#(# ÐÔ#†X_ÏXXXô)~P#ÔÔ‡Xô)XXX_ÏÔÌÔ#†X_ÏXXXô)°U#ÔÔ‡Xô)XXX_ÏÔà0  àThe€judgment€recorded€on€January€5,€1986,€against€both€Al€and€Bev€is€unenforceableÐ €Ð Ðdue€to€limitations.€€The€second€judgment€is€an€enforceable€lien€against€the€propertyÏwhich€must€be€released€in€order€for€the€mortgage€to€be€a€first€lien.Ð (#(# ÐÌà0  àThe€suit€filed€by€EZ€Furniture€has€not€yet€been€reduced€to€a€judgment€and€thereforeÏis€not€a€lien€against€the€property.€€Recordation€of€a€mortgage€or€a€deed€of€trust€fromÏCharles€to€Second€National€prior€to€entry€of€a€final€judgment€in€favor€of€E€Z€Furniture,Ïwould€give€Second€NationalÔ#†X_ÏXXXô)óU#ÔÔ‡XH"XXX_ÏÔððÔ#†X_ÏXXXH"ƒX#ÔÔ‡Xô)XXX_ÏÔs€lien€priority€over€E€ZÔ#†X_ÏXXXô)ÉX#ÔÔ‡XH"XXX_ÏÔððÔ#†X_ÏXXXH"#Y#ÔÔ‡Xô)XXX_ÏÔs€judgment.€€While€the€pendingÐ ` Ðsuit€does€not€constitute€a€lien€on€the€property,€€a€prudent€title€examiner€would€mentionÏthe€existence€of€the€suit€in€his/her€title€report.Ô#†X_ÏXXXô)iY#ÔÐð@(#(# ÐÌò òÔ‡Xô)XXX_ÏÔà@ ìàPart€C€„€QUESTION€IIó óˆÐ Ð  ÐÌà  àIssues€raised€involve€dual€agency;€the€determination€and€resolution€of€independent€¼à0  àcontractor„agency€relationship;€availability€of€the€equitable€remedy€of€rescission;€andÏliability€of€a€principal€for€the€negligent€or€fraudulent€conduct€of€an€agent.Ð (#(# ÐÌà  àGenerally,€a€principal€is€responsible€for€the€acts€of€an€agent€acting€within€the€scope€ofÏhis€à0  àemployment,€whether€negligent€or€fraudulent.€€The€rule€differs€in€agency€situations.€Ð `'°"% ÐIn€these€cases,€one€principal€is€not€civilly€liable€to€another€for€the€tortuous€acts€of€anÏagent€who€acts€for€both€parties€with€their€consent,€unless€the€principal€in€some€mannerÏparticipates€in€the€wrong.Ð (#(# ÐÌà  àAn€independent€contractor€is€normally€viewed€as€one€who€acts€independently€without€Ð ,`'* Ðà0  àsignificant€control€by€the€hiring€person€in€matters€such€as€scope€of€work,€hours€worked,Ïmethods,€etc.€€A€determination€of€the€issue€of€agency„independent€contractor€dependsÏon€the€substance€of€the€relationship€between€the€parties€and€not€on€the€gloss€which€theyÏchoose€to€place€on€their€relationship.€€Ð (#(# ÐÌà  àOn€these€facts,€Alan€was€not€an€independent€contractor€but€an€agent€of€BPI.€€Paul€metÏAlan€à0  àas€a€representative€of€BPI€when€he€responded€to€the€advertisement€placed€by€BPI.€Ð P   ÐAlan€worked€for€BPI.€€Alan€purporting€to€act€on€behalf€of€BPI,€and€using€its€name,Ïfacilities€and€resources,€brokered€the€sales€transaction€between€Paul€and€Carl€.€€HeÏobtained€the€listing€contract€with€Carl€in€the€name€of€BPI€and€obtained€a€commissionÏfor€BPI.€€The€facts€fairly€establish€AlanÔ#†X_ÏXXXô)ŒZ#ÔÔ‡XH"XXX_ÏÔððÔ#†X_ÏXXXH"Âa#ÔÔ‡Xô)XXX_ÏÔs€agency,€both€actual€and€apparent.€€Ð` (#(# ÐÌà  àThe€facts€also€establish€that€Alan€was€acting€in€a€dual€agency€capacity€with€the€consentÏof€à0  àPaul€and€Carl.€€He€was€working€for€Paul€in€an€attempt€to€locate€a€suitable€smallÐ à0  Ðbusiness.€€He€also€analyzed€the€financial€statements€of€CarlÔ#†X_ÏXXXô)b#ÔÔ‡XH"XXX_ÏÔððÔ#†X_ÏXXXH"¤c#ÔÔ‡Xô)XXX_ÏÔs€business€and€advisedÐ Ð  ÐPaul€as€to€the€profitability€of€that€business.€€Clearly,€by€obtaining€the€listing€contractÏfrom€Carl€and€providing€for€a€commission€to€BPI,€Alan€also€was€acting€as€an€agent€forÏCarl€in€this€transaction.Ð (#(# ÐÌà  àThere€is€evidence€that€Carl,€as€a€principal,€had€no€knowledge€of€the€representationsÏmade€by€à0 ` àPaul€by€Alan,€nor€did€Carl€participate€in€any€way€which€would€make€himÐ pÀ Ðculpable.Ð ` (#` (# ÐÌà  àAlanÔ#†X_ÏXXXô)êc#ÔÔ‡Xô)XXX_ÏÔððÔ#†X_ÏXXXô):f#ÔÔ‡Xô)XXX_ÏÔs€misrepresentations€are€not€attributable€to€Carl€because€he€was€unaware€at€theÐ @ Ðtime€it€à0 ` àwas€made€and€did€not€subsequently€ratify€or€adopt€AlanÔ#†X_ÏXXXô)€f#ÔÔ‡Xô)XXX_ÏÔððÔ#†X_ÏXXXô)pg#ÔÔ‡Xô)XXX_ÏÔs€representations.€Ð 0€ ÐTherefore,€Carl€is€not€liable.€€As€to€rescission€and€restitution,€Paul;€mañhñdñhññiñyñiñ€beÏentitled€to€rescind€the€contract€with€Carl.€€Equity€permits€rescission€of€contractsÏbased€on€fraudulent€misrepresentations€by€an€agent€even€if€his€principal€isÏentirely€innocent€in€participation€of€the€wrongdoing,€on€the€theory€that€oneÏshould€not€benefit€from€the€fraud€of€another.€€However,€rescission€is€availableÏonly€if€the€parties€can€be€restored€to€the€positions€they€held€prior€to€theÏtransaction.€€If€CarlÔ#†X_ÏXXXô)¶g#ÔÔ‡XH"XXX_ÏÔððÔ#†X_ÏXXXH""j#ÔÔ‡Xô)XXX_ÏÔs€position€is€materially€changed€before€knowledge€of€theÐ À! Ðmisrepresentations,€rescission€and€restitution€would€not€be€an€appropriateÏremedy.€€Ð ` (#` (# ÐÌà0  àRegarding€Alan,€he€is€personally€liable€for€monetary€damages€directly€attributable€toÏhis€misrepresentations,€whether€fraudulent€or€negligent,€if€they€were€relied€upon€byÏPaul€purchasing€the€business.€€Regarding€BPI,€despite€the€independent€contractorÏagreement,€BPI€can€be€held€liable€for€damages€attributable€to€AlanÔ#†X_ÏXXXô)hj#ÔÔ‡XH"XXX_ÏÔððÔ#†X_ÏXXXH"­l#ÔÔ‡Xô)XXX_ÏÔs€Ð P( #& Ðmisrepresentations.€The€facts€establish€that€Alan€was€an€agent€of€BPI€and€not€anÏindependent€contractor.€€Ð (#(# ÐÔ#†X_ÏXXXô)ól#ÔÐ   +p&) ÐÔ‡X0XXX_ÏÔà@ØØ!ìàà@@››%ìàò òPART€D€„€QUESTION€Ió óˆÐ ° Ðà@ìì*ìàˆÌà0  àAn€analysis€of€liability€must€always€begin€with€a€determination€of€those€persons€who€haveÏa€duty€to€prevent€the€occurrence.€€In€our€question,€those€persons€are€Whitley,€Jane€and€ABCÏbank,€Blink's€Security,€Inc.€and€Jerry.€Whitley€has€a€duty€because,€he€was€hired€as€a€securityÏguard€with€a€primary€duty€to€prevent€the€harm€that€actually€occurred.€€Jane€and€ABC€bankÏassumed€a€duty€by€hiring€Blink's€Security,€Inc.€to€provide€a€security€guard€to€prevent€theÏharm€that€occurred.€Blinks€Security,€Inc.€assumed€the€duty€by€hiring€Whitley€and€placing€himÏin€the€bank€to€prevent€the€harm€that€occurred.€Jerry's€duty€consisted€of€not€harming€anyoneÏby€his€actions.€Ð (#(# ÐÌà0  àAfter€identifying€those€persons€with€a€duty,€we€must€determine€which€of€them€breached€theirÏduties€to€the€injured€party.€Whitley€breached€his€duty€because€the€fact€that€his€weapon€wasÏnot€loaded€prevented€him€from€preventing€the€harm€that€occurred.€€ABC€bank,€by€its€agent,ÏJane,€breached€its€duty€because€it€allowed€Whitley€to€perform€his€duties€with€a€weapon€thatÏwas€not€loaded.€€Since€there€is€no€evidence€that€Blinks€Security€was€aware€that€WhitleyÏperformed€his€duties€with€an€unloaded€weapon,€we€cannot€say€that€it€breached€its€duty€unlessÏwe€can€show€that€it€should€have€known€about€his€habit€and€took€no€steps€to€prevent€it.€€Jerry,Ïof€course,€breached€his€duty€of€not€causing€injury€to€others€by€his€actions€by€shooting€Susie.Ð (#(# ÐÌà0  àThe€next€issue€to€be€decided€is€was€the€breach€of€duty€by€the€breaching€parties€the€proximateÏcause€of€the€injuries€suffered€by€the€injured€parties.€€Clearly,€had€Whitley's€weapon€beenÏloaded,€he€might€have€been€able€to€prevent€Jerry€from€shooting€Susie.€€Had€Jane€and€ABCÏbank€not€allowed€Whitley€to€perform€his€duties€with€an€unloaded€weapon,€he€might€haveÏbeen€able€to€prevent€the€injury€to€Susie.€€And,€if€Jerry€had€not€fired€his€weapon,€Susie€wouldÏnot€have€been€injured.Ð (#(# ÐÌà0  àThe€injured€persons€are€Susie€and€her€husband.€€The€fact€of€their€injuries€is€not€in€doubt,€norÏis€the€fact€that€their€injuries€were€caused€by€the€negligence€of€Whitley,€Jane€and€ABC€bank,Ïand€the€intentional€actions€of€Jerry.Ð (#(# ÐÌà0  àTherefore,€I€would€advise€Susie€and€her€husband€that€they€could€file€a€suit€for€negligenceÏagainst€Whitley,€Jane€and€ABC€bank,€and€a€suit€for€the€intentional€tort€of€assault€and€batteryÏagainst€Jerry.€€Each€suit€should€also€include€a€count€for€loss€of€consortium€on€behalf€ofÏSusie's€husband.Ð (#(# ÐÌà@±± ìàò òPART€D€„€QUESTION€IIó óˆÐ à%0!$ ÐÌÝ‚)ÞÿÝÝ  ÝÝ‚)Þ³xÝÚƒÚ1Ú  Ú.à0  àÝ  ÝThe€defendants€may€be€charged€with€the€following€crimes:݃)Þ³xÎxÝۀیи'#&(#(# ÐŒÝ  Ýà  àÌ(a)€€€€€Solicitation:€A€criminal€solicitation€is€the€act€of€advising,€urging€or€inducing€another€to€¼à0  àcommit€a€crime€and€that€the€crime€be€either€a€felony€or€a€breach€of€the€peace€misdemeanor.€ÏJoe,€now€deceased,€had€urged€Frank€and€Barney€to€commit€a€felony€by€asking€them€to€joinÐ h+¸&* Ðhim€in€robbing€the€convenience€store€and,€had€he€lived,€could€have€been€charged€withÏsolicitation.ò òМì(#(# ÐÌó ó(b)à0  àAiding€and€Abetting:€€Aiding€and€Abetting€requires€that€the€defendant€be€present€when€theÐ tÄ Ðcrime€is€committed€and€that€heñjñ,ñjñ€by€some€act,€willfully€participated€with€the€intent€to€makeÏthe€crime€succeed.€€There€is€no€question€that€Frank€aided€and€abetted€Joe€in€the€attemptedÏrobbery€because€he€was€actually€present€in€the€store€at€the€time€that€the€crime€was€attempted.€ÏBarney€is€also€guilty€for€aiding€and€abetting€because€he€provided€the€gun€used€in€theÏattempted€robbery€and,€although€he€was€not€present€in€the€store,€he€was€near€enough€toÏprovide€assistance.Ð (#(# ÐÌ(c)à0  àAccessory€Before€the€Fact:€€In€order€to€convict€the€defendant€of€this€crime,€the€state€mustÐ Ô$  Ðprove€that€the€felony€was€committed€by€another,€and,€before€the€crime€was€committed,€theÏdefendant€aided,€counseled,€commanded€or€encouraged€the€commission€of€the€crime€withÏthe€intent€that€the€crime€succeed.€€An€accomplice,€one€who€knowingly€and€with€commonÏcriminal€intent,€participated,€cooperated,€aided€or€abetted€the€principal€offender,€may€beÏconvicted€either€as€a€principal€or€an€accessory€before€the€fact.€Therefore,€under€the€facts€ofÏthe€question,€Frank€and€Barney€may€be€convicted€as€accessories€before€the€fact.€Ð (#(# ÐÌ(c)à0  àConspiracy:€€Conspiracy€is€an€agreement€between€two€or€more€persons€to€commit€a€crime.€Ð 4„ ÐJoe€and€Frank€certainly€conspired€to€commit€the€robbery,€and€therefore,€the€charge€regardingÏFrank€is€rather€clear.€€The€charge€regarding€Barney€is€a€bit€more€difficult.€€However,Ïmembership€in€a€conspiracy€may€be€inferred€on€the€part€of€one€who€has€a€stake€in€theÏoutcome€as€demonstrated€by€a€knowledge€of€the€conspiracy,€coupled€with€providing€goodsÏor€services€necessary€for€the€crime.€€The€fact€that€Barney€had€knowledge€of€the€conspiracyÏbetween€Frank€and€Joe,€provided€the€gun€actually€used,€and€may€have€stood€to€gain€theÏbenefit€of€the€proceeds€makes€him€a€member€of€the€conspiracy.Ð (#(# ÐÌ(d)à0  àAttempted€Robbery:€€Attempt€is€a€substantial€step,€beyond€mere€preparation,€toward€theÐ €Ð Ðcommission€of€a€crime.€€Robbery€is€the€taking€and€carrying€away€the€property€of€anotherÏfrom€his€or€her€presence€and€control€by€force€or€the€threat€of€force€with€the€intent€to€steal€theÏproperty.€It€is€clear€from€the€facts€that€Frank,€by€going€into€the€convenience€store€with€Joe,Ïtook€a€substantial€step€toward€the€commission€of€the€crime€of€robbery.€€And€it€is€clear€that,Ïby€the€use€of€the€gun,€the€defendants€intended€to€take€the€property€from€the€presence€of€theÏclerk€by€force€or€the€threat€of€force.Ð (#(# ÐÌ(e)à0  àFelony€Murder:€In€order€to€convict€a€defendant€of€felony€murder,€the€state€must€prove€thatÐ à%0!$ Ðthe€defendant€or€another€participating€in€the€crime€with€the€defendant€attempted€to€commitÏa€felony€and€that,€during€the€commission€of€the€felony,€either€the€defendant€or€anotherÏparticipating€with€him€committed€an€act€which€resulted€in€the€death€of€the€victim.€€MarylandÏuses€the€agency€theory€of€liability€to€prove€felony€murder.€€Under€this€theory,€a€felon€cannotÏbe€guilty€of€murder€unless€the€homicidal€act€is€actually€or€constructively€the€act€of€the€felons.€ÏThis€requires€that€the€killing€be€committed€by€the€defendant€or€by€one€acting€in€concert€withÐ h+¸&* Ðthe€defendant€in€furtherance€of€the€common€design.€€Thus,€none€of€the€felons€is€guilty€ofÏmurder€when€a€police€officer,€victim€or€bystander€kills€a€police€officer,€victim,€bystander€orÏco„felon€because€the€homicidal€agents€are€direct€and€immediate€adversaries€of€the€felon(s)Ïand€are€engaged€in€resisting,€not€furthering€the€design€of€the€felons.€(9€U.€Balt.€L.€Rev.€508,Ï513„15)(1980).€€Therefore,€since€Joe€was€killed€by€the€store€clerk,€the€charge€of€felonyÏmurder€is€not€applicable.Ð (#(# ÐÌ(f)à0  àTheft:€€Theft€is€the€taking€and€carrying€away€the€property€of€another€with€the€intent€toÐ $ t Ðpermanently€deprive€the€owner€of€the€property.€€Frank€is€guilty€of€theft€because,€as€he€wasÏleaving€the€store,€he€took€a€carton€of€cigarettes.Ð (#(# ÐÌ(g)à0  àUse€of€a€Handgun€in€the€Commission€of€a€felony€or€crime€of€violence:€€In€order€to€convictÐ Ô$  Ðthe€defendant,€the€state€must€prove€that€the€defendant€committed€the€felony€and€that€theÏdefendant€used€a€handgun€in€the€commission€of€the€felony.€€Since€Joe€was€the€one€whoÏactually€held€the€handgun,€in€order€for€Frank€and/or€Barney€to€be€convicted,€it€must€be€as€anÏaccomplice.€€Ð (#(# ÐÌÝ‚)ÞÿÝÝ  ÝÝ‚)Þ‹ÝÚƒÚ2Ú  Ú.à0  àÝ  ÝDefenses:€€The€surviving€defendants€may€argue€as€follows:݃)Þ‹¦ÝÛ€ÛŒÐ\¬(#(# ÐŒÝ  ÝÌ(a)à0  àSolicitation:€€Both€Barney€and€Frank€will€argue€that€the€commission€of€the€crime€was€Joe'sÐ 4„ Ðidea€and€he€solicited€their€participation.€€Therefore,€they€cannot€be€guilty€of€solicitation.Ð (#(# ÐÌ(b)à0  àAiding€and€Abetting:€€Barney€will€argue€that€he€was€not€present€at€the€scene€of€the€crime;Ð øH Ðthat€he€was€across€the€street€in€front€of€the€bar,€and€that€he€did€not€aid€in€the€commission€ofÏthe€crime.€€However,€because€he€provided€the€gun€that€was€used,€he€may€be€found€guilty.Ð (#(# ÐÌ(c)à0  àConspiracy:€€Barney€will€argue€that€he€did€not€agree€to€commit€the€crime€with€Frank€and€Joe,Ð ¨ø Ðand€therefore,€he€could€not€be€convicted€of€conspiracy.€€However,€he€knew€about€theÏproposed€crime,€provided€the€gun€and,€since€the€proceeds€were€to€be€divided€equally,€heÏstood€to€benefit.Ð (#(# ÐÌ(d)à0  àVoluntary€Intoxication:€€A€person€may€be€drinking€and€even€intoxicated€but€still€have€theÐ D!” Ðnecessary€mental€faculties€to€act€with€a€specific€intent.€€In€order€to€convict€a€defendant,€theÏstate€must€prove,€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt,€that€the€degree€of€intoxication€did€not€preventÏthe€defendant€from€acting€with€a€specific€intent.Ð (#(# ÐÌ(e)à0  àAttempted€Robbery:€€Barney€will€argue€that€he€took€no€steps€toward€the€completion€of€theÐ à%0!$ Ðrobbery.€€The€supplying€of€the€gun€constitutes€mere€preparation€at€best,€and€more€than€mereÏpreparation€is€required€for€a€conviction.Ð (#(# ÐÌ(f)à0  àFelony€Murder:€€Frank€and€Barney€will€both€argue€that,€since€Joe€was€killed€by€the€storeÐ )à$( Ðclerk,€neither€of€them€may€be€convicted€of€felony€murder.Ð (#(# ÐÐ h+¸&* Ð(g)à0  àTheft:€€Barney€will€argue€that€he€was€not€a€party€to€the€theft,€and€that,€since€the€theft€of€theÐ ° Ðcigarettes€was€not€a€part€of€the€original€crime€contemplated€he€could€not€even€be€convictedÏas€a€accomplice.Ð (#(# ÐÌ(h)à0  àUse€of€a€handgun€in€the€commission€of€a€crime€of€violence:€€Both€defendants€will€argue€thatÐ `° Ðaccomplice€liability€does€not€lie€for€this€crime.€€However,€their€presence€at€the€scene€andÏtheir€previous€knowledge€of€the€crime€may€be€sufficient€for€a€conviction.€€€Ô#†X_ÏXXX0âm#ÔÐ8 ˆ(#(# ÐÔ‡X0XXX_ÏÔà@ÝÝ!ìàò òà@@ÜÜ!ìàPART€E€„€QUESTION€Ió óˆÐ $ t Ðà@ìì*ìàˆÌØ€ØÝ‚)ÞÿÝÝ  ÝÝ‚)Þ¥˜ÝÚƒÚ1Ú  Ú.à0  àÝ  ÝPaul€can€assert€breach€of€implied€warranty€claims€and€express€warranty€claims€against€Sally.€Ð ü L  ÐAs€a€merchant€of€printing€equipment,€a€warranty€of€merchantability€is€implied€in€the€sale€byÏSally€under€Ô#†X_ÏXXX0˜#ÔððÔ‡X0XXX_ÏÔ2„314€of€the€Commercial€Law€Article,€unless€excluded€under€Section€Ô#†X_ÏXXX0š#ÔððÔ‡X0XXX_ÏÔ2„316.ñkñ.ñkñ€Ð Ô$  ÐBased€on€the€facts,€Paul€did€not€rely€on€Sallyððs€skill€or€judgement€to€select€the€press;Ïconsequently,€there€is€no€basis€for€a€claim€of€breach€of€implied€warranty€of€fitness€for€aÏparticular€use€under€Ô#†X_ÏXXX0š#ÔððÔ‡X0XXX_ÏÔ2„315.€€Paul€can€also€assert€a€claim€of€express€warranty€based€underÐ ¬ü  ÐÔ#†X_ÏXXX0È›#ÔððÔ‡X0XXX_ÏÔ2„313,€based€on€an€affirmation€of€fact€made€by€the€repair€records€furnished€by€Seller€that€Ð ¬ü  Ðthe€press€was€ð ðin€first€class€operating€condition.ðð€€Paul€can€argue€that€the€repair€record,Ïincluding€this€statement,€was€part€of€the€basis€of€the€bargain€and€created€an€express€warrantyÏthat€the€press€conformed€to€this€description.€Ô#†X_ÏXXX0gœ#ÔððÔ‡X0XXX_ÏÔ2„316.݃)Þ¥˜À˜ÝۀیЄÔ(#(# ÐŒÝ  ÝÌà0  àCredit€is€also€given€for€answers€which€construe€the€bill€of€sale€as€giving€Paul€the€right€toÏinspect€the€press€after€deliver,€and€to€revoke€acceptance€upon€discovery€of€latent€defects.Ð (#(# ÐÌÝ‚)ÞÿÝÝ  ÝÝ‚)ÞjŸÝÚƒÚ2Ú  Ú.à0  àÝ  ÝPaul€is€unlikely€to€prevail€in€his€claim€based€on€implied€warranty.€€The€term€ð ðas€is,ðð€in€theÐ 4„ Ðbill€of€sale€which€he€signed,€is€deemed€to€call€ð ðthe€buyerððs€attention€to€the€exclusion€ofÏwarranties€and€makes€plain€that€there€is€no€implied€warranty.ðð݃)ÞjŸ…ŸÝۀیР(#(# ÐŒÝ  ÝÌà0  àHowever,€Paul€is€likely€to€prevail€in€his€claim€based€on€a€breach€of€express€warranty.€€TheÏð ðas€isðð€term€does€not€limit€or€negate€an€express€warranty€Ô#†X_ÏXXX0 ž#ÔððÔ‡X0XXX_ÏÔ2„316(1).€€The€printing€press€wasÐ Ð  Ðsold€with€the€express€warranty€that€it€was€in€first„class€operating€condition.€€This€expressÏwarranty€was€breached.€€òòLimited€Flying€Club,€Inc.€v.€Woodóó.€632€F.2d€51€(8òòthóó€Cir.€1980),€29Ð ¼  ÐUCC€Rep.€1497.Ð (#(# ÐÌÝ‚)ÞÿÝÝ  ÝÝ‚)ÞZ£ÝÚƒÚ3Ú  Ú.à0  àÝ  ÝSally,€a€used€printing€equipment€dealer,€is€a€ð ðperson€in€the€business€of€selling€goods€of€thatÐ €#Ð! Ðkindðð€Ô#†X_ÏXXX0¢#ÔððÔ‡X0XXX_ÏÔ1„201(9).€€Consequently,€Paul€will€be€deemed€a€buyer€in€the€ordinary€course€ofÐ l$¼" Ðbusiness€and€will€take€free€of€any€security€interest€created€by€the€seller,€Sally.€Ô#†X_ÏXXX0_¤#ÔððÔ‡X0XXX_ÏÔ9„307.݃)ÞZ£u£ÝÛ€ÛŒÐl%¼ #(#(# ÐŒÝ  ÝÌ4.à0  àIf€Sally€were€a€shop€owner,€instead€of€a€dealer,€she€would€make€no€implied€warranty€ofÐ X'¨"% Ðmerchantability,€as€she€is€arguably€not€a€merchant€with€respect€to€the€equipment.€ÏAlternatively,€it€is€arguable€that€Sally€still€gives€the€implied€warranty€of€merchantabilityÏbecause€she€holds€herself€out€as€having€knowledge€peculiar€to€the€press.€€Ô#†X_ÏXXX0[¥#ÔððÔ‡X0XXX_ÏÔ2„104.€€Credit€isÐ *l%( Ðgiven€for€a€discussion€of€either€alternative.Ð (#(# ÐÐ ,X'* Ðà0  àLikewise,€if€Sally€is€not€a€dealer,€the€protection€of€9„307€is€not€available€to€Paul.€€By€filingÏa€financing€statement€in€the€office€of€the€Maryland€State€Department€of€Assessments€andÏTaxation,€the€Bankððs€security€interest€was€perfected.€€Ô#†X_ÏXXX0w§#ÔððÔ‡X0XXX_ÏÔ9„410(c).ЈØ(#(# ÐÌà0  àPaul€took€title€subject€to€the€Bankððs€perfected€security€interest€in€the€press.€€Paul,€the€ownerÏof€the€press,€is€a€ð ðdebtorðð€for€provisions€of€the€UCC€dealing€with€the€collateral.€€Ô#†X_ÏXXX0;©#ÔððÔ‡X0XXX_ÏÔ9„105(d).Ð` °(#(# ÐÌà0  àUpon€a€default€by€Sally€in€payment€of€the€$5,000,€the€Bank€may€exercise€its€rights€to€takeÏpossession€and€dispose€of€the€collateral.€Ô#†X_ÏXXX0tª#ÔððÔ‡X0XXX_ÏÔ9„503,€Ô#†X_ÏXXX0t«#ÔððÔ‡X0XXX_ÏÔ9„504.Ð8 ˆ(#(# ÐÌÌà@¶¶ ìàò òà@@ÜÜ!ìàPART€E€„€QUESTION€IIó óˆÐ `  ÐÌà0  àThe€Suns€breached€the€employment€contract€by€terminating€Scott.€€Based€on€the€facts,€ScottÏwas€guaranteed€a€place€on€the€team,€regardless€of€performance€standards.€€Scott€is€entitledÏto€recover€damages€of€$400,000€per€month,€or€$3,600,000€for€the€nine€months€remaining€ofÏthe€contract.Ð (#(# ÐÌà0  àThe€general€rule€is€that€the€measure€of€recovery€by€a€wrongfully€discharged€employee€is€theÏamount€of€salary€agreed€upon€for€the€period€of€service,€less€the€amount€the€employee€hasÏearned€or€reasonable€effort€might€have€earned€from€other€employment€opportunities€notÏsought€or€accepted€by€the€discharged€employee€which€can€be€applied€in€mitigation.€€TheÏemployer€must€show€that€other€employment€was€comparable€or€substantially€similar€to€thatñlñÏof€ñlññmñ€ñmñwhich€the€employee€has€been€deprived;€the€employeeððs€rejection€of€or€failure€to€seek€otherÏavailable€employment€of€a€different€or€inferior€kind€may€not€be€resorted€to€in€order€toÏmitigate€damages.€€òòParker€v.€20òòthóó€Century€Foxóó,€3€Cal.€3d€176,474€P.2d€689€(1970).ÐøH(#(# ÐÌà0  àThe€Suns€substitute€offer€of€employment€as€a€pitching€instructor€and€goodwill€ambassadorÏconstituted€an€offer€both€different€and€inferior€to€that€of€a€major€league€baseball€player.Ð (#(# ÐÌà0  àConversely,€there€should€be€no€issue€that€the€offer€from€the€Cubs€was€for€similarÏemployment€and€that€Scott€should€reasonably€have€accepted€this€offer.€€Therefore,€the€SunsÏshould€be€credited€with€$900,000,€the€amount€guaranteed€by€the€Cubs.Ð (#(# ÐÌà0  àScott€likely€will€recover€$3,600,000€from€the€Suns.Ð (#(# ÐÐ  0%€ # ÐÔ#†X_ÏXXX0Á«#ÔÔ‡X0XXX_ÏÔà@ýý!ìàò òPART€Fó ó„€ò òQUESTION€IˆÐ ° Ðà@ìì*ìàˆÌó óà0  àSmithððs€case€raises€a€number€of€constitutional€issues.€€First,€although€the€Full€Faith€andÐ ŒÜ ÐCredit€Clause€of€the€Constitution€requires€states€to€honor€judgments€issued€by€the€courts€ofÏanother€state,€this€principle€does€not€prevent€Maryland€courts€from€examining€the€validityÏof€the€underlying€judgment€and,€if€it€is€not€valid,€refusing€to€enforce€the€foreign€judgment.€ÏòòSee,€e.g.,€Miserando€v.€Resort€Propertiesóó,€345€Md.€43,€691€A.2d€208,€1997.Ð< Œ(#(# ÐÌà0  àAs€to€the€merits€of€Smithððs€case,€he€should€first€argue€that€he€had€insufficient€contacts€withÏWestover€to€warrant€that€stateððs€exercising€jurisdiction€over€him€at€all.€€He€resides€inÏMaryland,€is€retired€and€thus€has€no€occupation€and€claims€never€to€have€been€in€WestoverÏin€his€life.€€More€importantly,€the€contact€wñnñhñnñich€is€the€basis€of€the€action€was€not€made€inÏWestover€but€Maryland;€Westoverððs€role€in€this€action€appears€to€be€quite€fortuitous€and€isÏbased€solely€upon€the€fact€that€Appliance€Shack€has€moved€its€corporate€headquarters€to€thatÏstate.€€In€a€long€series€of€cases,€the€Supreme€Court€has€made€it€clear€that€there€must€be€atÏleast€ð ðminimum€contactsðð€between€the€forum€state€and€the€defendant.€€"Due€process€requiresÏonly€that€.€.€.€[the€defendant]€have€certain€minimum€contacts€with€[the€forum€state]€such€thatÏthe€maintenance€of€the€suit€does€not€offend€'traditional€notions€of€fair€play€and€substantialÏjustice.'"€€òòInternational€Shoe€Co.€v.€Washingtonóó,€326€U.S.€310,€316,€66€S.€Ct.€154,€90€L.€Ed.Ð Lœ Ð95€(1945).€€"The€quality€and€quantity€of€contacts€required€to€support€the€exercise€of€personalÏjurisdiction"€depend€upon€the€facts€of€each€particular€case.€òòCamelback€Ski€Corp.€v.€Behningóó,Ð $t Ð312€Md.€330,€338,€539€A.2d€1107€(1988),€òòcert.€deniedóó,€488€U.S.€849,€102€L.€Ed.€2d€103,€109Ð ` ÐS.€Ct.€130€(1988).€€Ð (#(# ÐÌà0  àOrdinarily,€cases€involve€either€"general€jurisdiction"€where€the€cause€of€action€is€unrelatedÏto€the€defendant's€contact€with€the€forum€state,€or€"specific€jurisdiction"€where€the€cause€ofÏaction€arises€out€of€the€defendant's€contacts€with€the€forum€state.€òòIdóó.€Generally€speaking,Ð ¬ü Ðwhen€the€cause€of€action€does€not€arise€out€of,€or€is€not€directly€related€to,€the€conduct€of€theÏdefendant€within€the€forum,€contacts€reflecting€continuous€or€systematic€.€.€.€conduct€will€beÏrequired€to€sustain€jurisdiction.€On€the€other€hand,€when€the€cause€of€action€arises€out€of€theÏcontacts€that€the€defendant€had€with€the€forum,€it€may€be€entirely€fair€to€permit€the€exerciseÏof€jurisdiction€as€to€that€claim.€€òòCamelback€Ski€Corp.€v.€Behningóó,€312€Md.€at€338-39.€€ÐH!˜(#(# ÐÌà0  àThis€is€a€case€of€general€jurisdiction€and€Smith€does€not€have€the€regular€contacts€withÏWestover€necessary€to€establish€jurisdiction.Ð (#(# ÐÌà0  àA€second€argument€is€that€the€notice€afforded€of€the€Westover€litigation€was€inadequate.€ÏWhat€steps€are€adequate€to€provide€notice€depends€upon€a€consideration€of€several€factors:Ð (#(# ÐÌà0  àTo€determine€whether€notice€in€a€particular€case€is€constitutionally€sufficient,€the€court€"mustÏbalance€the€interests€of€the€state€or€the€giver€of€notice€against€the€individual€interest€soughtÏto€be€protected€by€the€fourteenth€amendment."€€At€a€minimum,€the€notice€must€beÏ"reasonably€calculated,€under€all€the€circumstances,€to€apprize€interested€parties€of€theÐ l+¼&* Ðpendency€of€the€action€and€afford€them€an€opportunity€to€present€their€objections."€Ð (#(# ÐÌà0  àAmong€the€multiple€factors€to€be€considered€in€determining€what€process€is€due€in€a€givenÏsituation€is€the€nature€of€the€action€being€brought.€Ð (#(# ÐÌà0  àWhat€is€a€sufficient€method€of€notification€depends€upon€the€nature€of€the€action€and€theÏcircumstances.€The€interests€to€be€considered€are,€on€the€one€hand,€those€of€the€state€and€ofÏthe€plaintiff€in€bringing€the€issues€involved€to€a€final€settlement€and,€on€the€other€hand,€thoseÏof€the€defendant€in€being€afforded€an€opportunity€to€defend.€The€practicalities€of€the€situationÏmust€be€considered.€A€state€is€not€precluded€from€exercising€such€judicial€jurisdiction€as€itÏmay€possess€by€the€fact€that€under€the€circumstances€it€is€impossible€to€make€certain€thatÏnotice€will€reach€the€defendant€or€because€the€only€sure€way€of€giving€notice€would€be€soÏburdensome€and€expensive€as€to€be€impracticable.€€òòMiserando€v.€Resort€Propertiesóó,€òòsupra,óóÐ À  Ð345€Md.€53,€54.€€[Citations€omitted.]Ð (#(# ÐÌà0  àHere,€the€action€is€for€a€small€amount€of€money€but,€on€the€other€hand,€it€is€clearlyÏestablished€in€most€states€and€under€most€circumstances€that€actual€service€is€the€preferredÏmethod€of€effecting€service.€€While€service€first€class€mail€may€be€adequate€under€certainÏcircumstances,€it€does€not€generally€offer€a€sufficiently€ð ðhigh€degree€of€actual€notice.ðð€ÏòòMiserando€v.€Resort€Propertiesóó,€345€Md.€at€65.€€Ð4„(#(# ÐÌà0  à(Note:€the€Court€of€Appeals€split€4€„€3€on€this€issue€in€the€òòMiserandioóó€case€so€I€really€donððtÐ  \ Ðcare€how€the€examinees€come€out€on€this€issue.)Ð (#(# ÐÌà@½½ ìàò òPART€F€ó ó„€ò òQUESTION€IIó óˆà0 È àÐÐ È(#È(# ÐÌà0  àThe€right€against€self„incrimination€applies€in€civil€as€well€as€criminal€proceedings.€€òòMeyersÐ ¬ü Ðv.€Manessóó,€419€U.S.€449,€464€(1975).€€Adam€has€two€choices;€both€are€detrimental€to€him.€Ð ˜è ÐFirst,€he€could€waive€the€privilege.€€If€it€is€waived€in€the€civil€proceeding,€it€cannot€beÏinvoked€to€prevent€any€of€his€testimonial€admissions€from€being€used€in€the€criminal€trial.€Ïñeñ€€ñeñAlternately,€Adams€could€asseñfñrñfñt€the€privilege€in€the€civil€proceeding.€€The€trier€of€fact,€in€theÏcivil€proceeding,€would€then€be€permitted€to€draw€an€adverse€conclusion€from€his€silence.Ð (#(# ÐÌà0  àIn€the€civil€proceeding,€the€plaintiff€is€permitted€to€call€Adams€as€a€witness.€€A€witnessÏcannot€claim€privilege€as€a€reason€for€not€taking€the€stand.€€òòAdams€v.€Stateóó,€200€Md.€133,€145Ð  $\" Ð(1952).€€He€would€be€required€to€take€the€stand.€€He€also€could€take€the€stand€in€his€ownÏdefense.€€However,€he€cannot€be€compelled€to€answer€any€questions,€in€the€civil€proceeding,Ïthat€would€tend€to€incriminate€him.€€In€order€to€preserve€this€right€against€self„incrimination,Ïhe€would€have€to€asseñgñrñgñt€the€ð ðFifth€Amendmentðð€upon€being€asked€an€incriminating€question.€ÏThe€court€would€then€determine€whether€the€testimony€sought€would€be€ð ðinformation€whichÏwould€furnish€a€link€in€the€chain€of€evidence€that€could€lead€to€prosecution,€as€well€asÏevidence€which€an€individual€reasonably€believed€could€be€used€against€him€in€a€criminalÏprosecution.ðð€€òòHoffman€v.€U.S.óó,€341€U.S.€479,€486€(1951).€€If€the€testimony€meets€this€two„Ð l+¼&* Ðpronged€test,€Adams€cannot€be€compelled€to€answer.€€If€he,€however,€elects€to€waive€hisÏprivilege€and€disclosed€criminal€behavior,€he€is€subject€to€cross„examination€and€mustÏdisclose€all€of€the€details.€€òòRogers€v.€U.S.óó,€340€U.S.€367,€373„374€(1951);€òòBrown€v.€U.S.óó,€356Ð ˆØ ÐU.S.€148,€154„156€(1958).Ð (#(# ÐÌà0  àThe€detriment€to€Adams€in€preserving€this€right€is€that€the€civil€trier€of€fact€will€be€permittedÏto€weigh€Adamððs€invoking€of€the€privilege€against€him.€€The€plaintiff€will€be€permitted€toÏcomment€on€this€silence.€€òòRobinson€v.€Robinsonóó,€328€Md.€507,€514„516€(1922);€òòWhitaker€v.Ð $ t ÐPrince€Georgeððs€Countyóó,€307€Md.€368,€384„387€(1986).Ð `(#(# ÐÌà0  àAlternatively,€should€Adams€answer€an€incriminating€question,€he€will€be€deemed€to€haveÏwaived€the€privilege€and€will€no€longer€be€able€to€assert€it€in€either€proceeding.€€AlthoughÏhe€cannot€be€forced€to€testify€in€the€criminal€proceeding,€his€statements€from€the€civilÏproceeding€can€be€admitted€in€the€criminal€trial€as€statements€by€a€party„opponent.€€Md.€RuleÏ5„803.Ð (#(# ÐÔ#†X_ÏXXX0*³#Ô