mdcourts.gov HOME | OPINIONS | JOBS | FORMS | FAQs | SITE INDEX | CONTACT US | SEARCH

 

 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND

SCHEDULE

Thursday, January 5, 2012:

Bar Admissions

AG 8 Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Michelle Lynn Payer

Attorney for Petitioner: Marianne J. Lee

Attorney for Respondent: Harold S. Link


AG 6 Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Jude Ambe

Attorney for Petitioner: Dolores O. Ridgell

Attorney for Respondent: Herbert A. Dubin

No. 46 Muhammad H. Abdul-Maleek v. State of Maryland

ISSUES - CRIMINAL LAW - (1) WHETHER THE LOWER COURT VIOLATED SEC. 12-702(c) OF THE MD. COURTS & JUD. PROCEED. ART. WHEN IT INCREASED THE DEFENDANT’S SENTENCE BASED ON THE FACT THAT HE EXERCISED HIS RIGHT TO APPEAL & RECEIVE A DE NOVO JURY TRIAL? (2) WHETHER THE LOWER COURT VIOLATED THE DEFENDANT’S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS AS GUARANTEED BY THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT OF THE U. S. CONST. & ART. 24 OF THE MD. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS AS SET FORTH IN NORTH CAROLINA V. PEARCE, 395 U.S. 711 (1969) & COLTEN V. KENNEDY, 407 U.S. 104, 112 (1953)?

Attorney for appellant: Binny Miller

Attorney for appellee: Susannah E. Prucka

No. 57 Carlton M. Green, Personal Representative of the Estate of Walter L. Green, et al. v. Helen Nassif

ISSUES - ESTATES AND TRUSTS - (1) AS A MATTER OF FIRST IMPRESSION, WHAT ARE “ENFORCEABLE CLAIMS” IN ET SEC. 1-101(n) (renumbered 1-101(p)) AND WHAT ENFORCEABLE CLAIMS ARE TO BE PROPERLY DEDUCTED IN CALCULATING THE NET ESTATE FOR THE ELECTIVE SHARE IN THIS CASE? (2) DID THE LOWER COURT ERR IN HOLDING THAT THE ELECTIVE SHARE IS ENTITLED TO INCOME? (3) DOES THE PRINCIPAL & INCOME ACT APPLY TO THE ELECTIVE SHARE? (4) DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR BY ALLOWING MILLIONS OF DOLLARS IN CLAIMS TO BE DEDUCTED TWICE WHEN CALCULATING THE “NET ESTATE” FOR PURPOSES OF DETERMINING THE WIDOWED SPOUSE’S STATUTORY SHARE?

Attorneys for appellants: Walter W. Green and Carlton M. Green

Attorneys for appellee: Roy I. Niedermayer and Patricia W. Weaver

No. 58 Charles Robert Phillips v. State of Maryland

ISSUES - CRIMINAL LAW - (1) DID THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINE THAT LT. MCDERMOTT’S STATEMENTS TO PETITIONER WERE NOT THE FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENT OF INTERROGATION WHERE AFTER PETITIONER INVOKED HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL, MCDERMOTT IMMEDIATELY CEASED ANY QUESTIONING & INFORMED PETITIONER THAT THE POLICE COULD NOT TALK TO HIM FURTHER BUT THAT PETITIONER COULD CHANGE HIS MIND, THAT PETITIONER WOULD LIKE TO HEAR HIS SIDE OF THE STORY AND THAT IF PETITIONER DID CHANGE HIS MIND HE WOULD HAVE TO REAFFIRM THAT HE DID NOT WANT COUNSEL? (2) WAS ANY ERROR IN THE DENIAL OF PETITIONER’S SUPPRESSION MOTION HARMLESS BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT WHERE PETITIONER’S STATEMENT TO POLICE PROVIDED THE ONLY EVIDENTIARY BASIS FOR PETITIONER’S CLAIM OF SELF-DEFENSE/ACCIDENT & WHERE OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE APART FROM THE STATEMENT ESTABLISHED THAT PETITIONER BRUTALLY MURDERED THE ELDERLY VICTIM? (3) DID PETITIONER FAIL TO PRESERVE HIS CURRENT CLAIM THAT LT. MCDERMOTT’S STATEMENTS TELLING HIM THAT HE COULD REINITIATE CONVERSATION WITH THE POLICE WERE THE FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENT OF INTERROGATION WHERE THE TERMS “FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENT OF INTERROGATION” WERE NOT MENTIONED AT THE SUPPRESSION HEARING & WHERE DEFENSE COUNSEL DID NOT DISPUTE THE PROSECUTOR’S ASSERTION THAT PETITIONER REINITIATED THE CONVERSATION?

Attorney for appellant: Mark Colvin

Attorney for appellee: Daniel J. Jawor

Friday, January 6, 2012:

No. 70 Environmental Integrity Project, et al. v. Mirant Ash Management, LLC, et al.

ISSUES - (1) DID THE LOWER COURT ERR WHEN IT REVERSED MORE THAN TWO DECADES OF THIS COURT’S PRECEDENT & ADDED A NEW STANDING REQUIREMENT FOR INTERVENTION AS OF RIGHT? (2) DID THE LOWER COURT ERR WHEN IT HELD THAT THE MD DEPARTMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENT ADEQUATELY REPRESENTS THE CITIZEN-PETITIONERS’ INTERESTS IN AN ENFORCEMENT ACTION DESPITE THE DEPARTMENT’S REPEATED ADMISSIONS TO THE CONTRARY?

Attorneys for appellants: Christine M. Meyers and Andrew W. Keir

Attorney for appellees: Deborah E. Jennings

No. 73 Ocie L. Black, Jr. v. State of Maryland

ISSUE - CRIMINAL LAW - DOES A JURY NOTE WITH NO DATE OR TIME STAMP FOUND IN THE APPELLATE RECORD ESTABLISH THAT THE TRIAL COURT RECEIVED THE JURY COMMUNICATION AT ISSUE IN ORDER TO TRIGGER THE REQUIREMENTS OF MD. RULE 4-326(d)?

Attorneys for appellant: Deborah S. Richardson and David Kennedy

Attorney for appellee: Ryan R. Dietrich

No. 81 120 West Fayette Street, LLLP v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, et al.

ISSUES - (1) WHETHER AN INCIDENTAL THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY’S CHALLENGE TO ENFORCE A CONTRACT PRESENTS A JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY? (2) WHETHER PLAINTIFF BELOW HAS ANY BASIS TO ASSERT A PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION CHALLENGING THE TRUST’S REVIEW & APPROVAL OF THE PROPOSED SUPERBLOCK DEVELOPMENT UNDER THE MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT (MOA) BETWEEN THE TRUST & THE CITY?

Attorney for appellant: M. Albert Figinski

Attorneys for appellees: George A. Nilson and Kathleen Wherthey


No. 72 Alicia Gomez v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc.

ISSUES - COMMERCIAL LAW - (1) WAS THE LOWER COURT WRONG TO CONCLUDE THAT THE MD CREDIT SERVICES BUSINESS ACT (ACT) REQUIRES A DIRECT PAYMENT FROM THE CONSUMER TO THE LOAN ARRANGER AND THEREFORE PETITIONER DID NOT STATE A CLAIM? (2) WAS THE LOWER COURT IN ERROR IN FINDING THAT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY DID NOT INTEND THE USURY AMENDMENT OR THE ACT IN GENERAL TO APPLY TO A REFUND ANTICIPATION LOAN ARRANGER LIKE RESPONDENT BECAUSE IT DOES NOT PERFORM CREDIT REPAIR? (3) DID LOWER COURT ERR WHEN IT STATED OR IMPLIED THAT THE ACT APPLIES ONLY TO CREDIT REPAIR COMPANIES & TO BUSINESSES THAT ARRANGE LOANS FOR CONSUMERS USING THIRD-PARTY LENDERS WITH HIGHER INTEREST RATES THAN PERMITTED UNDER MD LAW? (4) DID THE LOWER COURT ERR IN SUGGESTING THAT THE ACT ONLY APPLIES TO CREDIT SERVICES BUSINESS ARRANGEMENTS IN WHICH BUSINESSES RECEIVE MONEY OR OTHER VALUABLE CONSIDERATION DIRECTLY FROM THE CONSUMER?

Attorney for appellant: Jonathan R. Krasnoff

Attorney for appellee: Paul A. Solomon

 

Monday, January 9, 2012:

No. 53 Dorothy M. Tracey v. Anthony K. Solesky and Irene Solesky, as the Parents, Guardians and Next Friends
of Dominic Solesky, a Minor

ISSUES - (1) IS THE HARBORING OF AMERICAN STAFFORDSHIRE TERRIERS (PIT BULLS) BY TENANTS AN INHERENTLY DANGEROUS ACTIVITY FOR WHICH LANDLORDS MAY BE HELD STRICTLY LIABLE? (2) DOES MD JURISPRUDENCE PERMIT AN INFERENCE OF KNOWLEDGE OF PRIOR VICIOUS PROPENSITIES OF A DOMESTIC ANIMAL BY A LANDLORD (A) WHOSE TENANT HARBORS THE ANIMAL IN LEASED PREMISES BASED UPON SUBJECTIVE CONCLUSIONS AS TO THE ANIMAL’S TEMPERAMENT OF NEIGHBORS WHO HAVE MADE LIMITED OBSERVATIONS OF THE ANIMAL’S BEHAVIOR WHICH WERE NEVER CONVEYED TO THE LANDLORD? AND (B) BASED UPON THE EXISTENCE OF AN EXCULPATORY CLAUSE IN A RESIDENTIAL LEASE CONCERNING BODILY INJURY CAUSED BY THE TENANT’S PETS? (3) MAY A LANDLORD BE HELD LIABLE FOR INJURIES CAUSED BY A TENANT’S DOMESTIC ANIMAL DUE TO THE FAILURE TO REQUIRE REASONABLE CONFINEMENT OF A DOMESTIC ANIMAL IN THE LEASED PREMISES WHEN THE ANIMAL ESCAPES THE PREMISES BY A MEANS WHICH THE LANDLORD HAD NO REASONABLE BASIS TO FORESEE? (4) AFTER SHIELDS AND MATTHEWS WAS THE INHERENTLY DANGEROUS/VICIOUS NATURE OF PIT BULLS KNOWN TO MARYLAND LANDLORDS? (5) DID MATTHEWS IMPOSE A DUTY UPON LANDLORDS WHO RENT TO TENANTS WITH PIT BULLS IN A RESIDENTIAL NEIGHBORHOOD TO ACT WITH REASONABLE CARE IN REQUIRING APPROPRIATE HOUSING OR STORAGE OF THE TWO PIT BULLS WHEN OUTSIDE THE HOUSE?

Attorneys for appellant: Richard E. Schimel and Clifford A. Robinson

Attorney for appellees: Kevin A. Dunne

No. 68 Alonzo Jay King, Jr. v. State of Maryland

ISSUES - CRIMINAL LAW - (1) DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR BY DENYING APPELLANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS DNA EVIDENCE OBTAINED THROUGH A WARRANTLESS SEARCH CONDUCTED WITHOUT ANY INDIVIDUALIZED SUSPICION OF WRONGDOING? (2) DID THE COURT BELOW IMPROPERLY SHIFT THE BURDEN OF PROOF TO THE DEFENSE TO DEMONSTRATE THAT A SEARCH OR SEIZURE MADE WITHOUT INDIVIDUALIZED SUSPICION IS UNREASONABLE?

Attorney for appellant: Celia Anderson Davis

Attorney for appellee: Robert Taylor, Jr.

No. 74 Johnette Cosby v. Department of Human Resources, Allegany County Department of Social Services

ISSUE - FAMILY LAW - DID THE MARYLAND LEGISLATURE WHEN REMOVING FROM FAM. LAW. ART., SEC. 5-706.1 THE REQUIREMENT THAT A FINDING OF NEGLECT IN A CINA CASE PRECLUDE A PETITIONER FROM CHALLENGING A REGISTRY ENTRY, INTEND TO STILL ALLOW A PETITIONER TO BE BLOCKED BY COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL?

Attorney for appellant: Ramon Rozas, III

Attorney for appellee: Sandra Barnes


No. 78 In Re: Adoption/Guardianship of Cross H.

ISSUE - FAMILY LAW - MAY THE CIRCUIT COURT PROCEED WITH A TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS HEARING WHEN THE PARENTS’ APPEAL OF THE CINA ORDER CHANGING THE PERMANENCY PLAN FROM REUNIFICATION TO NON-RELATIVE ADOPTION IS STILL PENDING IN THE CSA?

Attorney for appellant: Nenutzka C. Villamar

Attorneys for appellees: Ann Sheridan and Constance J. Ridgway



Tuesday, January 10, 2012:

In the Matter of the Application of R. for Admission to the Bar of Maryland

Attorney for Applicant: Andrew Graham

 

No. 75 Bagada Dionas v. State of Maryland

ISSUE - CRIMINAL LAW - DID THE LOWER COURT ERR IN FINDING THAT THE IMPROPER LIMITATION OF CROSS-EXAMINATION OF A WITNESS’ EXPECTATION OF LENIENCY WAS HARMLESS ERROR WHERE THE JURY DELIBERATED FOR FIVE DAYS AFTER THREE AND A HALF DAYS OF TESTIMONY AND SENT OUT FOUR NOTES INDICATING THAT THEY WERE UNABLE TO REACH A UNANIMOUS VERDICT OR WERE OTHERWISE HAVING DIFFICULTY WITH DELIBERATIONS?

Attorney for appellant: Deborah S. Richardson

Attorney for appellee: Jessica V. Carter


No. 77 District of Columbia v. Wayne Singleton, et al.

ISSUE - WHEN A MOTOR VEHICLE LEAVES THE ROAD & PASSENGERS SUE FOR DAMAGES & THE ONLY EVIDENCE AT TRIAL IS BY A PASSENGER WHO WAS ASLEEP AT THE TIME THE VEHICLE LEFT THE ROAD & AWOKE ONLY AS THE VEHICLE WAS AIRBORNE & WHO DID NOT KNOW HOW OR WHY THE VEHICLE LEFT THE ROAD, DID THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISS THE CASE AT THE CLOSE OF PLAINTIFFS’ CASE AND DID THE LOWER COURT ERR BY REVERSING THAT DECISION?

Attorney for appellant: Todd S. Kim

Attorney for appellees: Gerald I. Holtz

No. 76 Tyrone L. Smith v. State of Maryland

ISSUE - CRIMINAL LAW - DID THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDE THAT THE EXCEPTIONS TO THE LICENSING REQUIREMENT SET FORTH IN SUBSECTIONS (2) & (3) OF TRANSPORTATION ARTICLE, SEC. 16-101(a) ARE NOT ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE OF DRIVING WITHOUT A LICENSE, BUT ARE INSTEAD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES THAT MUST BE RAISED BY THE DEFENDANT?

Attorney for appellant: Brian M. Saccenti

Attorney for appellee: Todd W. Hesel

 

 

On the day of argument, counsel are instructed to register in the Clerk’s Office no later than 9:30 a.m. unless otherwise notified.

After January 10, 2012 the Court will recess until February 2, 2012.

 

BESSIE M. DECKER
CLERK