January 13, 2016

## VIA HAND DELIVERY

The Honorable Barry G. Williams
Associate Judge
Circuit Court for Baltimore City
534 Courthouse East
Baltimore, MD 21202
RE: State vs. Porter, No. 115141037
State vs. Goodson, No. 115141032
State vs. White, No. 115141036
State vs. Miller, No. 115141034
State vs. Nero, No. 115141033
State vs. Rice, No. 115141035

Dear Judge Williams,
I write on behalf of the State with regard to the trial scheduling of the abovereferenced cases. The State requests that none of the cases be tried until the Court of Special Appeals resolves the Porter immunity appeal. After that resolution, the State requests that Porter be retried first, followed by the trials of Goodson, White, Miller, Nero, and Rice, in that order. After recounting the current schedule, I will address the reasons for the State's request.

As of now, the Goodson trial has been stayed. The White trial, now set for February 8 , will likely soon be in the same or similar posture as the Goodson trial. Porter has filed a Notice of Appeal of your immunity order in the White case, and presumably that appeal will be consolidated with the previous Porter appeal, and the impact will be the same on the White case as the impact on the Goodson case. The Court of Special Appeals will hear argument on March 4, with its ruling presumably a reasonable time thereafter.

The Miller case is scheduled for March 7, and before the orders of the Court of Special Appeals, it was to be the next case tried after the White case. Although the Nero case is scheduled for February 22, and the Rice case for March 9, the plan was to reschedule Nero and Rice after the Miller case.

The State asks that Porter be retried before any of the other cases because that is the most practical thing to do. Retrying Porter first will (1) eliminate the need for a time consuming and potentially complex Kastigar hearing; (2) allow the State to avoid the costly redundancies of creating a "clean" team; and (3) moot virtually every objection made thus far by Porter in opposing the immunity conferred upon him. The savings in judicial and prosecutorial resources will be considerable and in the public interest.

The State has previously advised the Court of Porter's importance as a witness in the Goodson and White cases. Porter's testimony about the failure to seatbelt at the second stop is also critical to the trials of Miller, Nero and Rice. Each is charged with reckless endangerment and misconduct for failure to seatbelt Mr. Gray. The involuntary manslaughter and assault charges against Rice are also based, in part, upon the failure to seatbelt.

Also important is Porter's testimony concerning his interactions with Mr. Gray at the fourth stop. The State and its expert witnesses rely in part on Porter's evidence concerning that fourth stop to prove that Mr. Gray suffered his fatal injuries between the second and fourth stops. The defendants contend that these injuries occurred later, between the fifth and sixth stops. While not legally dispositive as to each and every charge against each defendant, where the injuries took place is important and will have impact upon the jury. It is directly implicated in the involuntary manslaughter and assault charges against Rice, and also relevant to the reckless endangerment charges against each of Miller, Nero, and Rice. If the injury happened where the State contends, it is directly traceable to the failure to seatbelt at stop two, and is therefore evidence that the conduct of Miller, Nero, and Rice "created a substantial risk of death or serious physical injury to another...." MPJI-Cr 4:26A. This is an objective test for which the actual injuries suffered are relevant: "Whether the conduct in issue has, indeed, created a substantial risk of death or serious physical injury is an issue that will be assessed objectively on the basis of the physical evidence in the case." Williams v. State, 100 Md . App. 468, 495 (1994).

Having closely observed the defense efforts in the Porter case to (1) assign the culpability for Mr. Gray's death to Goodson and to White, and (2) establish that Mr. Gray's injuries occurred between stops five and six, the State is persuaded of the importance of Porter's testimony in the trials of Miller, Nero, and Rice.

Finally, Goodson is charged with the most serious offenses of any of the defendants. Once Porter is first retried, for the reasons written above, it is fitting and in the public interest that Goodson be tried next. If the Goodson case is tried to a verdict, it may have an impact on both prosecutorial and defense decisions about the remaining cases.

Thank you for your consideration of these requests.
Very truly yours,


Michael Schatzow
Chief Deputy State's Attorney
Baltimore City State's Attorney's Office
MS/tsr

Cc: Matthew B. Fraling, III, Esquire, Via Email Marc L. Zayon, Esquire, Via Email Catherine Flynn, Esquire, Via Email Joseph Murtha, Esquire, Via Email Ivan Bates, Esquire, Via Email Michael Belsky, Esquire, Via Email Andrew Jay Graham, Esquire, Via Email Gary Proctor, Esquire, Via Emai Amy Askew, Esquire, Via Email


STATE'S MOTION TO COMPEL A WITNESS TO TESTIFY PURSUANT TO SECTION 9-123 OF THE COURTS AND JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS ARTICLE

Now comes the State of Maryland, by and through Marilyn J. Mosby, the State's Attorney for Baltimore City, and pursuant to Section 9-123 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article moves this Court to issue an order requiring Officer William Porter, D.O.B. 6/26/1989, in the above-captioned case to give testimony which he is likely to refuse to give on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination. In support of this Motion, the State avers the following:

1. The State may call Officer William Porter to testify as a witness in the above-captioned criminal proceeding being held before this Court.
2. The State's Attorney for Baltimore City has determined that the testimony of Officer William Porter in the above-captioned case may be necessary to the public interest.
3. Officer William Porter is likely to refuse to testify in the above-captioned case on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination because he has previously stated that he would refuse on those grounds to testify in cases involving the same underlying set of events as the present matter, namely the cases of State v. Caesar Goodson (\# 115141032) and State v. Alicia White (\# 115141036).
4. The State's Attorney for Baltimore City seeks to compel Officer William Porter to testify in the above-captioned case.

Wherefore, the State requests that this Court issue an order requiring Officer William Porter in the above-captioned case to give testimony which he is likely to refuse to give on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination.


## CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 14th day of January, 2016, a copy of the State's Motion to Compel a Witness to Testify Pursuant to Section 9-123 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings article was mailed and e-mailed to:

Joseph Murtha
Murtha, Psoras \& Lanasa, LLC
1301 York Road, Suite 200
Lutherville, Maryland 21093
(410) 583-6969
jmurtha@mpllawyers.com
Attorney for Officer William Porter

Michael Belsky
Chaz Ball
Schlachman, Belsky \& Weiner, P.A.
300 East Lombard Street, Suite 1100
Baltimore, MD 21202
(410) 497-8433
mbelsky@sbwlaw.com
Attorney for Lieutenant Brian Rice

Gary Proctor
Gary E. Proctor, LLC
8 E. Mulberry St.
Baltimore, MD 21202
410-444-1500
garyeproctor@gmail.com
Attorney for Officer William Porter


Marilyn J/Møsby (\#589290) State's Attorney for Baltimore City 120 East Baltimore Street The SunTrust Bank Building
Baltimore, Maryland 21202
(443) 984-6000 (telephone)
(443) 984-6256 (facsimile)
mail@stattorney.org


## ORDER

Having reviewed the State's Motion to Compel a Witness to Testify Pursuant to Section 9-123 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, in which the State's Attorney for Baltimore City seeks to compel Officer William Porter, D.O.B. 6/26/1989, to testify in the above-captioned criminal proceeding; finding that the State's Attorney for Baltimore City has determined that Officer William Porter may be called by the State as a witness to testify in the above-captioned criminal proceeding but that Officer William Porter is likely to refuse to testify on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination; further finding that the State's Attorney for Baltimore City has determined that the testimony of Officer William Porter may be necessary to the public interest; and further finding that the State's Motion to Compel Officer William Porter's testimony complies with the requirements of Section 9-123 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, it is this $\qquad$ day of $\qquad$ , 2016, by the Circuit Court for Baltimore City

ORDERED that the State's Motion to Compel a Witness to Testify Pursuant to Section 9-123 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article be and hereby is GRANTED; and it is further

ORDERED that Officer William Porter, D.O.B. 6/26/1989, shall testify as a witness for the State in the above-captioned criminal proceeding and may not refuse to comply with this Order on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination; and it is further

ORDERED that no testimony of Officer William Porter, D.O.B. 6/26/1989, compelled pursuant to this Order and no information directly or indirectly derived from the testimony of Officer William Porter compelled pursuant to this Order may be used against Officer William Porter in any criminal case, except in a prosecution for perjury, obstruction of justice, or otherwise failing to comply with this Order.

Judge
Circuit Court for Baltimore City

STATE OF MARYLAND
v.

LT. BRIAN RICE

## DEFENDANT LT, BRIAN RICE'S OPPOSITION TO THE STATE'S MOTION TO COMPEL A WITNESS TO TESTIFY PURSUANT TO SECTION 9-123 OF THE COURTS AND JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS ARTICLE

Defendant Lt. Brian Rice, by undersigned counsel, hereby files this Response in Opposition to the State's Motion to Compel a Witness to Testify Pursuant to Section 9-123 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. In support thereof, Defendant Lt. Rice states as follows:

1. On January 14,2015 , for the first time since the inception of the prosecution of these matters, the State asserted that it may call Officer William Porter to testify as a witness during the trial of Defendant Lt. Rice because Officer Porter's testimony "may be necessary to the public interest."
2. Beyond this bare assertion, the State provides absolutely no proffer in its two-page Motion as to why Officer Porter's testimony is either material or necessary to the trial of Defendant Lt. Rice, or how it is necessary to serve the public interest.
3. This request comes days after the Court of Special Appeals' injunction staying the trial of Officer Goodson, and a likely injunction staying the trial of Sergeant White. Both injunctions are the result of the State's characterization of Officer Porter as a material and necessary witness for the trials of Officer Goodson and Sergeant White, as well as the need to clarify the issues concerning Officer Porter's compelled testimony.
4. The State now attempts to place the Defendant's case in the same posture as those matters in an attempt to require a stay of this trial.
5. The State's past actions contradict the alleged need on which the present request rests. When the State was afforded the opportunity to select the order in which to call the cases in this matter, the State contended that "Defendant Porter is a necessary and material witness in the cases against Defendants Goodson and White, so it is imperative that Mr. Porter's trial takes place before their trials." Exhibit A, State's Letter dated September 15, 2015 (emphasis added). Consequently, the State suggested the following: "[w]ithout listing all the possible permutations, the State essentially seeks to have Mr . Porter tried before Mr . Goodson and Ms. White, to have Mr. Miller tried before Mr. Nero, and to have Mr. Miller and Mr. Nero tried before Mr. Rice." Id.
6. In the State's previous four trial witness lists to the Defendant, the State never once indicated that it intended to call Officer Porter as a witness. Moreover, the State has never suggested, until the filing of the present Motion, that Officer Porter's testimony was in any way necessary to the prosecution of Defendants Miller, Nero, or Lt. Rice.
7. In light of the State's past position, it is abundantly clear that the present Motion is nothing more than a pretext to regain control of the order of the Defendants' trials, and avoid trying the most factually and legally tenuous cases first.
8. However, in order to fulfill its procedural desires, the State is trampling upon the Fifth Amendment rights of Officer Porter, and placing the speedy trial rights of Defendants Miller, Nero, and Lt. Rice at peril. If the present Motion were granted, it would in essence reward the State for its tactical inadequacies and utter disrespect for the Defendants' constitutional rights.
9. For these reasons, compelling Officer William Porter's testimony at the trial of the Defendant Lt. Rice is not necessary to the public interest, and the present Motion must be denied.

Respectfully submitted,
Michry
Michael J. Bonsd, Esquire
Chaz Ball, Esqure
Schlachman, Belsky \& Weiner, P.A.
300 East Lombard Street, Suite 1100
Baltimore, Maryland 21202
(410) 685-2022
Counsel for Lieutenant Brian Rice
STATE OF MARYLAND
v.

LT. BRIAN RICE

* IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR


## BALTIMORE CITY

## REQUEST FOR A HEARING

Defendant Lt. Brian Rice, by undersigned counsel, hereby requests a hearing on the State's Motion to Compel a Witness to Testify Pursuant to Section 9-123 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.

Respectfully submitted,


Schlachman, Belsky \& Weiner, P.A. 300 East Lombard Street, Suite 1100
Baltimore, Maryland 21202
(410) 685-2022

Attorneys for Lieutenant Brian Rice


Having reviewed the State's Motion to Compel a Witness to Testify Pursuant to Section 9123 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article and Defendant Lt. Brian Rice's Opposition, it is this $\qquad$ day of $\qquad$ ,2016, by the Circuit Court for Baltimore City

ORDERED that the State's Motion to Compel a Witness to Testify Pursuant to Section 9123 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article be and hereby is DENIED.

## CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this $15^{\text {th }}$ day of January, 2016, a copy of the foregoing Defendant Lt. Brian Rice's Opposition to the State's Motion to Compel a Witness to Testify Pursuant to Section 9-123 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, Request for Hearing, Proposed Order, and referenced exhibits were sent via electronic mail and mailed, first-class postage prepaid, to Janice Bledsoe, Deputy State's Attorney, Office of the State's Attorney for Baltimore City, 120 East Baltimore Street, Baltimore, Maryland 21202.


September 15, 2015

## VIA HAND DELIVERY

The Honorable Barry G. Williams
Associate Judge
Circuit Court for Baltimore City
534 Courthouse East
Baltimore, MD 21202
Re: State v. Goodson, et al., Case Nos.: 115141032-37

## Dear Judge Williams,

I write as directed concerning the order and anticipated length of trials. The anticipated length of trial does not include the time for hearing and resolving pretrial motions, the time for jury selection, nor the length of the defense cases. Because the State has not yet received discovery from any of the Defendants, the anticipated length of trial also does not include possible additional time in the State's case from meeting anticipated defenses. The State would call the cases in the following order.

- First: William Porter, No. 115141037 Five days
- Second: Caesar Goodson, No. 115141032 Five days
- Third: Alicia White, No. 115141036 Four days
- Fourth: Garrett Miller, No. 115141034 Three days
- Fifth: Edward Nero, No. 115141033 Three days
- Sixth: Brian Rice, No. 115141035 Four days.

Defendant Porter is a necessary and material witness in the cases against Defendants Goodson and White, so it is imperative that Mr. Porter's trial takes place before their trials. Defendant Porter's counsel has known this since before the grand jury returned indictments in these cases. On July 24, 2015, counsel for Defendants Porter and Rice were advised by the State that Porter's case would be called first, either with Defendant Rice or without him, depending on the Court's ruling on the joinder sought by the State. Presumably, counsel for Defendants Porter and Rice so advised counsel for the other defendants. In any event, counsel for all Defendants were notified that the State intended to call the Porter case first during the chambers conference with the court on September 2, 2015.

The trial date of October 13, 2015 was ordered on June 19, 2015, based on the availability of the court and all counsel. As Judge Pierson requested, we had cleared that date with Dr. Carol Allan, the Assistant Medical Examiner who conducted the autopsy. We were advised by Dr. Allan this morning that she will be out of Maryland from November 16 through November 30. The State will be ready to begin the case against Mr. Porter on October 13. Counsel for Mr. Porter has expressed his intent to seek a continuance. The State informed counsel for Mr. Porter over the past weekend that it had no objection to a continuance of Mr. Porter's case of up to three weeks, provided that his remains the first case to be tried. However, given Dr. Allan's schedule,
the State now believes that it cannot consent to a continuance beyond October 26. Given that no other Defendant is required to be ready for trial on October 13 (and the State has not received any discovery from any Defendant 30 days before October 13), a two week continuance would not unduly delay the time by which all six cases could be resolved. However, if the consequence of a continuance for Mr . Porter would be forcing the State to try a different Defendant first, then the State would vigorously oppose a continuance for Mr. Porter. Mr. Porter's counsel has been aware of the October 13 trial date for almost three months, and has known with certainty that Mr. Porter's case would be tried first for at least six weeks. In light of the long scheduled and agreed upon trial date, and the other background referenced above, Mr. Porter has no legitimate basis for a continuance, particularly one that would impact the State's traditional right to call cases in the order it chooses.

Finally, the Court directed the State to provide an alternative order in the event that Mr. Porter's case is not tried first. Without prejudice to the State's position that, in light of the facts of this case and the information in this letter, it should be able to call the cases in the order expressed above, the State's alternative order would be to try Mr. Miller first, and then, in order, Mr. Porter, Mr. Goodson, Ms, White, Mr. Nero and Mr. Rice. Without listing all the possible permutations, the State essentially seeks to have Mr. Porter tried before Mr. Goodson and Ms. White, to have Mr. Miller tried before Mr. Nero, and to have Mr. Miller and Mr. Nero tried before Mr. Rice.

Thank you for your consideration of these requests. Pursuant to your instructions, I have enclosed the transcript of each defendant's statement. I trust that this letter is clear and responsive to your direction. If you have any questions or think that a chambers conference would be useful, the State is available at the convenience of the Court.


MS/tsr
Enclosures
Cc: Without Enclosures
Matthew B. Fraling, III, Esquire, Via Email
Marc L. Zayon, Esquire, Via Hand Delivery
Catherine Flynn, Esquire, Via Hand Delivery
Joseph Murtha, Esquire, Via Email
Ivan Bates, Esquire, Via Hand Delivery
Michael Belsky, Esquire, Via Hand Delivery
Andrew Jay Graham, Esquire, Via Hand Delivery
Gary Proctor, Esquire, Via Hand Delivery

| STATE OF MARYLAND | $*$ | IN THE |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| V. | $*$ | CIRCUIT COURT |
| LT. BRIAN RICE | $*$ | FOR BALTIMORE CITY |
|  |  | CASE NO. 115141035 |

DEFENDANT WILLIAM PORTER'S OPPOSITION TO THE STATE'S MOTION TO COMPEL A WITNESS TO TESTIFY PURSUANT TO SECTION 9-1.23 OF THE COURTS AND JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS ARTICLE

Now comes the defendant, William Porter, by and through undersigned counsel and hereby files this Opposition to the State's Motion to Compel a Witness to Testify Pursuant to Section 9-123 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. In support thereof, William Porter states the following:

1. The State has previously suggested, if not requested, that the Court consider postponing the trials of Officer Caesar Goodson, Sergeant Alicia White, Officer Garrett Miller, Officer Edward Nero, and Lieutenant Brian Rice until after the retrial of Officer William Porter. Such a suggestion was not adopted by the Court, and the trials of the remaining defendants were scheduled to proceed in the order identified. The order of the trials was disrupted after the Court of Special Appeals stayed the trial of Caesar Goodson after staying this Court's order compelling Officer P.orter to testify as a witness in the trial of Officer Goodson. An order compelling the testimony of Officer Porter in the trial of Sergeant Alicia White has been appealed, and it is anticipated that the trial of Sergeant White will
be stayed upon the Court of Special Appeals staying of this Court's order compelling Officer Porter to testify as a witness for the State.
2. On more than one occasion the State has communicated its interest in retrying the matter of Officer Porter before trying the remaining defendants. By virtue of the Court of Special Appeals' order staying Officer Goodson's trial, and the anticipated stay of Sergeant White's trial, it appears that the State's strategy of postponing the remaining cases now involves a not previously revealed desire to have Officer Porter testify in each and every co-defendant's trial. This theory, offered for the first time in communication with the Court on January 13, 2016, suggests that Officer Porter's "testimony about the failure to seatbelt at the second stop is also critical to the trials of Miller, Nero and Rice." The problem with this representation is that a review of the trial testimony of Officer Porter reveals absolutely no testimony "about the failure to seatbelt at the second stop." The State's attempt to use Section 9-123 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article as a vehicle to obtain postponements of the trials of Officer Miller, Officer Nero and Lieutenant Rice cannot be ignored by the Court.
3. On January 14,2016 , for the first time in a publicly filed pleading since the inception of the prosecution of these matters, the State asserted that it "may" call Officer William Porter to testify as a witness during the trial of Defendant Rice because Officer Porter's testimony "máy be necessary to the public interest."
4. Beyond this bare assertion, and its factually inaccurate
representation to the Court in a separate document, the State offers no proffer in its two page motion as to why Officer Porter's testimony is either material or necessary to the trial of Defendant Rice, or how it is necessary to serve the public interest.
5. As noted, the request comes days after the Court of Special Appeals' injunction staying the trial of Officer Goodson, and a likely injunction staying the trial of Sergeant White. Both injunctions are the result of the State's characterization of Officer Porter as a material and necessary witness for the trials of Officer Goodson and Sergeant White, as well as the need to clarify the issues concerning Officer Porter's compelled testimony.
6. The State now attempts to place Lt. Rice's case in the same posture as those of Officer Goodson and Sergeant White in an attempt to require a stay of his trial.
7. The State's past actions contradict the alleged need on which the present request rests. When the State was afforded the opportunity to select the order in which to call the cases in this matter, the State contended that "Defendant Porter is a necessary and material witness in the cases against Defendants Goodson and White, so it is imperative that Mr. Porter's trial takes place before their trials." Exhibit A. State's Letter dated September 15, 2015. Consequently, the State suggested the following:" $[$ w]ithout listing all the possible permutations, the State essentially seeks to have Mr. Porter tried before Mr.

Goodson and Ms. White, to have Mr. Miller tried before Mr. Nero, and to have Mr. Mr. Miller and Mr. Nero tried before Mr. Rice:" Id.
8. In the State's previous four trial witness lists to Brian Rice, the State never once indicated that it intended to call Officer Porter as a witness. Moreover, the State has never suggested, until the filing of the present Motion, that Officer Porter's testimony was in any way necessary to the prosecutions of Defendants Miller, Nero or Rice.
9. In light of the State's past position, it is abundantly clear that the present Motion is nothing more than a pretext to regain control of the order of the Defendants' trials, and avoid trying the most factually and legally tenuous cases first.
10. However, in order to fulfill its procedural desires, the State is trampling upon the Fifth Amendment rights, as well as the Article 22 rights, of Officer Porter. The State essentially seeks to take Officer Porter hostage as an unwilling witness in five trials, three of which are solely for the sake of postponing the trials until after the retrial of Officer Porter. If the present Motion is granted, it would be in essence reward the State for its tactical inadequacies and utter disrespect for the constitutional protections afforded Officer Porter.
11. The State's actions in the cases before the Court are without precedent. Officer Porter is being used as the designated whipping boy in the State's case against Officer Goodson and Sergeant White, and now the State seeks to torture him even more by moving to compel him to testify in the trials of

Officer Miller, Nero and Lieutenant Rice. The State does not shy away from saying that Officer Porter committed perjury in his own trial, yet they continue to think that they can sponsor his testimony in the other officers' cases, and then prosecute him for the crimes that they allege in the charging document filed in his case.. This cannot be tolerated, and particularly; should not be permitted as a means to obtain a postponement of the remaining three cases and dominate the order in which the trials proceed before the Court.
12. The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution declares in part that "No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. Const., 5th Amend. The Fifth Amendment creates a privilege against compelled disclosures that could implicate a witness in criminal activity and thus subject him or her to criminal prosecution. Hoffman y. United States, 341 US 479, 486-488, 71 S.Ct. 814, 818-819 (1951). The privilege against selfincrimination is a constitutionally-based privilege-not an evidentiary privilege.
13. To be clear: Porter is not saying that $\S 9-123$ is unconstitutional: he is saying that it is unconstitutional as applied to this defendant in this setting. To quote Chief Judge Murphy, in his capacity as chair of the General Assembly Criminal Law Article Review Committee:

The granting of some form of immunity against prosecution arising from compelled incriminating testimony does not, of itself, cure the constitutional defect. The General Assembly may wish to explore the scope of immunity that may be required to allow compelled testimony in harmony with federal and State constitutional precedent.

See notes to Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 9-204. The General Assembly has failed to do so, so it falls to this Court to provide Officer Porter shelter from the storm.
14. While Officer Porter has many valid reasons as to why he cannot be compelled to testify, the Fifth Amendment, the Sixth Amendment, Article 22, to name but three, the overarching principle is that the judicial system is built on trust and respect of the public and relies on that trust and respect for effectiveness. "It is of fundamental importance that justice should not only, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done." Rex v. Sussex Justices, 1 K.B. 256, 259 (1924). Similarly, the United States Supreme Court has said that trials themselves are "a reflection of the notion, deeply rooted in the common law, that 'justice must satisfy the appearances of justice,"' Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610,616 (1960) (quoted source omitted), and that the perception of fairness of trials and judicial acts is essential to the effectiveness of the system itself. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring). Frankly, calling Porter as a witness in two (2) trials [OR FIVE], about the same matters upon which he faces a pending manslaughter trial, wreaks of impropriety.
15. On a related point, and as previously mentioned, on September 15, 2015 the State told the Court that it was "imperative" that Porter be tried first. Implicitly, maybe even explicitly, the state acknowledged in this pleading that Porter had to go first in order that he not have a Fifth Amendment Privilege. If the

State truly believes that Officer Porter can be called as a witness, with a pending manslaughter charge, why was it "imperative" that Officer Porter proceed to trial first?
16. Co-defendants trials are severed every day in Maryland. And yet there is not a single reported case of one co-defendant being compelled to testify against the other in the way the circuit court envisages happening here. There is a reason for that: it effectively renders constitutional protections all but meaningless.
17. Even if there were nothing wrong, in theory, with proceeding as the State suggests, in this case it would nevertheless be impermissible with the factual scenario that is before this Court. While it might be a closer call if the State chose to insert a clean team, give transactional immunity, or if the State called Officer Porter after his case resulted in acquittal, ultimately he would still be an impermissible witness. The bottom line is that the State, who has sole charging authority, believes he will lie about matters that are material. And all the immunity in the world cannot cure that.
18. For the purpose of continuity, and to ensure that previously asserted issues are again considered by the Court, and preserved for any record that may be considered by an appellate court, Officer Porter incorporates, and adopts by reference, and attaches hereto as Exhibit B, Motion to Quash Trial Subpoena of Officer William Porter, filed in the matter of State of Maryland v. Officer Caesar Goodson, Case Number 115141032. Undersigned counsel understands that no
subpoena has yet to be served upon Officer Porter to testify in the trial of Officer Miller, but the arguments set forth in the referenced Motion to Quash were incorporated by reference in Officer Porter's opposition to the State's Motion to Compel his testimony in Officer Goodson's case. As such, he once again requests that this Court consider those related issues in determining the impropriety of granting the State's request.

WHEREFORE, for the reasons set forth in the body of this response, and the accompanying documents, William Porter requests that this Honorable Court find that compelling his testimony at the trial of Officer Garrett Miller is not necessary to the public interest, and offends the constitutional protections affored by the Fifth Amendment and Article 22, and deny the State's Motion to Compel his testimony in the trial of Officer Garrett Miller.

Respecifully submitted,


## CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this $19^{\text {th }}$ day of January, 2016, a copy of the foregoing Defendant William Porter's Opposition to the State's Motion to Compel a Witness to Testify Pursuant to Section 9-123 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, and referenced exhibits was sent via electronic mail to Janice Bledsoe, Deputy State's Attorney, Office of the State's Attorney for Baltimore City, 120 East Baltimore Street, Baltimore, Maryland 21202.


1

9
E. 25

Exhibit A
E. 26

Sepiember 15, 2015

## VIAHAND DELIVERY

The Honorable Earry C. Willams.
Assoditio Judge
Circuit Count for Baltmore City
534 Couthlouse East
Baltimore, MD 21202
Re: State v, Goodson, of al., Case Nos.: 115141032-a7

Dear Judge Williams,
I wite as directed concerning the order and anticlpated length of trials, The anticipated length of tiaf does not Include the , time formearing and resolving pretiral motlonse; the time for Juity selecton, nor the denghth of the defonse cases. Benausesthe State hás not yet reopival discovery fom any of the Dofendants, the antitipated length of trial aleo does not Inclide passible additional time in the Stato's case from meeting anticipated defenses. The state would call the cages in the following order.

- First Willam Porter No. 1161511037 Five days
- Secondt Caesar Goodison, No, 1;15144032. Fiverdays
- Third' Allola White, $\mathrm{No}, 115141036$ Four days
- Fourth: Garrett Miller, No. 115141034 Three days
- Fifth: Edward Nero, No. 115141033 Three days
- Sixth; Brlan Rice, No. 115141095 Four days.

Defendant Porter is a necessary and material witness in the cases against Defendants Goodson and White, so It is imperative that Mr. Porter's fral takes plaoe before ther trials. Deferidatit Porter's counisel Has known this since before the grand Jury teturned indictmente in these cases. "Oir Jtty 24,2015 , counsel for Defendants Porter and Rice were advised by the State that Porter's'case would be called first either with Defendant Rice or without Vitm, deperiding on theie Court's ruling on the joinder sought by the State. Presumably, counsel for Defendants Porter and Rice so advised counsel for the other defendants. In any ovent, counsel for all Defendents were notified that the state Intended to call the Porter case first during the chambers conference wifh the court on September 2, 2015.

The trial date of October 13, 2015 was ordered on June 19, 2016, based on'the avallabilly of the eourt and all counsel. As Judge Plorson requested, we had clegited that date with Dr. Carol Allan, the Assistant Mediod Examinar who condúatod the autopsy. We wore adveed by Dr. Allan thle moriting that shit will be out of Whatyand from November 16 through November 30. The State willibe redidy to begin the case agalnst Mr. Porter on Odtaber 13, Counsel for Mr. Porter has expressed "hils 'fitetit to seek a continuanoe. The State informed counsel for Mr. Porter over the past weekend that if had no objeation to a continuance of Mr. Porter's casce of up to threa wede provided that his remains the flrst case to be tried. However, given Dr, Allan's soligetuie,

the State now balleves that it cannot consenk to a continuance beyond Otober
 the State has not received any discovery from any Defondant 30 days before Ootober 13), a two week contiriuance would not unduly delay the time by whioh all six cases could be resolved. However, If the consequence of a continuance for Mr. Porter would be forcing the State to fry a different Dejendant first, then the State would vigorously oppose a continuanoe for Mr. Porter. Mr. Potter's counsid has been aware of the Ootober 13 tral date for almost three months, and has known wilh certainty that Mr, Porter's casa would be frled firat for at least six weeks. In light of the töng soheduited and agreed upan trial date, and the othor background referenced abovo," Mrt, Porter, has no legitmate basis for a continuance, partoularly one that would imfater the 'staters traditional right to call cases in the order't chooses.

Finally, the Court drented the Stuterty provide an altematlve order in the event that Mr. Porter's case is not tried first. Without prejudice to the Stato's position that, in light of the facts of this case and the information in this letter, it should be ablio to ofilithe oases in the order expressed above, the State's alternallye order would be to try Mr.





Thank you for your -consideration of theso trequests. Pursuant to your instructlons, ! have enolosed the transoript of each defendantis statemant, I frust that thls letter is ojear and responslye to your dilectibi, If you'fave any"duestons or think that a chambers conference would tie uséfut, the State 倍 avallable at the convenience of the Court.


## MS/tar

## Endototures

Co: Without Enclosures<br>Máthow B. Fraling, III, Esquire, Via Emall<br>Mar'c L, Zayon, Essquire, Via. Hand Dellvery<br>Gaitherme Filynm, Esquire, Via Hand Dellivery<br>Josoph Murtha, Esquite, Vla Emall<br>Ivan Bates, Esquire, Via Hand Dellvery<br>Michael Belaky, Eisquire, Vai Hand Dellvery<br>Andrèw Jay Graham, Esquire, Via Hand Delivery<br>Gary Proctor, Esquifo, Via Hatd Delivery

## Exhibit B

E. 29

STATE OF MARYLAND
v.

OFFICER CAESAR GOODSON Defendant.

$0.00000 \ldots$ MOTION TO QUASH TRIAL SUBPOENA

OF OFFIGER WILLIAM RORTER

Comes NOW Witness Officer-William G. Porter and hereby:moves this Honorable Court to quash his trial subpoena in the case at bar, and in support thereof states as follows:

## 1. RELEVANT FACTS

## PROCEDURAL POSTURE

Baltimore City Police Officer William Porter (hereafter "Officer.Porter") has been charged with Manslaughter, Second Degree Assault, Reckless

Endangerment and Misconduct in Office in Baltimore City Circuit Court Case Number 115:14.1037. The undersigned are counsel for Porter in that case. The charges involve the in-custody death of Freddie Gray on April 12, 2015. There are six officers charged in the death of Mr . Gray: Officer Porter, Officer Caesar Goodson, SergeantAlicia White, Officer Garrett Miller, Officer Edward Nero and Lieutenant Brian Rice. All were charged, and indicted on the same day. As one

Judge was assigned to all six (6) cases, initially there was discussion about which case would go first. ${ }^{1}$

On September 15, 2015 the State of Maryland, through Chief Deputy State's Attorney Michael Schatzow wrote to the specially assigned Judge, Judge Barry Williams, and told him that the state would be calling Officer Porter's case first, followed by Goodson, White, Miller, Nero and Rice. ExhibitA. The state's rationale for this was that:

Defendant Porter is a necessary and material witness in the cases against Defendants Goodson and White, so it is imperative that Porter's trial takes place before their trials. Defendant Porter's counsel has knowin this since before the grand jury returned indictments in these cases.

Id. The Court granted the state its wish, and Officer Porter proceeded to trial first.

## THE TRIAL

Jury selection began in Officer Porter's trial on November 30; 201.5.
Ultimately, the case mistried on December 16, 2015 as the jury were unable to reach a verdict as to any of the four (4) charges placed against Officer Porter. Following the mistrial, this:Court set the retrial for June 13, 2016.

- During his trial, Officer Porter testified in his defense. During the state's closing argument by Ms Janice Bledsoe, and the rebuttal by Mr. Schatzow, both commented on Officer Porter's credibility, candor and truthfulness. The following
$\overline{1} \quad$ Initially the state moved to consolidate some trials, but eventually the Court found that six (6) separate trials was appropriate.
are not all of the instances when the state, in effect, called Officer Porter a perjurer, but it sets out specific examples that are germane to the decision this Court must make in relation to this Motion:


## The State's Opening Closing Argument

[A] during his testimony at trial Officer Porter stated under oath that he heard Freddie Gray say during his initial arrest that he could not breathe. The state's theory at trial, was that Mr. Gray had said this much later. In her closing Ms. Bledsoe stated that not one of the other witness officers testified that they heard Mr. Gray say during his initial arrest that he could not breathe and went on to assert that "you know why? 'Cause it was never said [during the initial arrest]," TS 9:53:20. ${ }^{2}$ Ms. Bledsoe's assertion that it was never said leads to the inexorable conclusion that the state was accusing Officer Porter of perjury.
[B] The reason the state believed that Mr. Gray said he could not breathe much later was because of a report of a Detective Teel, who wrote memorialized a conversation she had with Officer Porter. In arguing that Officer Porter is not to be believed, Ms. Bledsoe stated that "who has the motive to be deceitful? It's not Detective Teel. It's Officer Porter." TS 9:54:07.
[C] Officer Porter testified that when he saw Mr. Gray in the back of the police wagon, at Druid Hill and Dolphin, he helped Mr. Gray (who was on the floor) onto

2 The "TS" stands for Time Stamp. The State's closing and rebuttal have yet to be transcribed, but the undersigned have watched the video, and transcribed herein, the arguments of counsel as faithfully as possible.
the bench, but that Mr. Gray had power in his legs and bore the weight of his body. In calling Porter a liar, Ms. Bledsoe stated that:
five times [Officer Porter]] was asked about it, not once did he say Freddie Gray assisted himself up on the bench. Five times he used words that indicate he put Freddie Gray on the bench. Not once in any of those five times did he say, "it would be physically impossible for me to do that, I did not just put him up on then bench I couldn't do that," not once, but he told you that from the stand.

TS 9:57:40.
[D] Officer Porter testified that he was aware that arrestees often feign injury in the hopes of avoiding a trip to jail. He testified that the term for it that many officers use is "jailitis." Ms. Bledsoe in her closing said that "this jailitis is a bunch of crap." TS 10:09:02.
[E] Officer Porter testified that, when he saw Freddie Gray at Druid Hill and Dolphin he believed that Mr. Gray was not injured. Officer Porter further stated under oath that if he knew Mr. Gray was injured he would have sought immediate medical attention. Ms. Bledsoe, in labeling Officer Porter a perjuror stated that Porter "knew Gray was hurt badly [at Druid Hill and Doiphin], he knew he wasn't. going to be accepted at Central Booking and he did nothing." TS 10:10:10. [F] Officer Porter testified that when Mr. Gray was loaded in the Wagon at Baker and Mount Streets, he did not know whether Mr. Gray was leg shackied or not. Ms. Bledsoe told the jury "he [Porter] knew Freddie Gray was placed into the wagon with handcuffs, leg shackles on..." TS 10:14:35.
[G] Because of the statements of Officer Porter referenced above, Ms. Bledsoe argued to the jury that "there's only one reasonable conclusion, Officer Porter was not telling the truth about his involvement in this incident," TS 10:15:15.
[H] After pointing out another statement that the state believed was inconsistent, regarding what Officer Porter told a civilian named Brandon Ross, Ms. Bledsoe again stated "the only reasonable conclusion you can come to is that Ofc. Porter is not telling the truth." TS 10:18:27.
[I] Additionally, Ms. Bledsoe argued to the jury that Officer Porter lied under oath when he stated that on April 12, 2015 he was unaware of a General Order numbered 1114. TS 10:27:08.
[J] Officer Porter testified at trial that he believed the wagon was headed to the hospital at one point, with Mr. Gray inside of it. Ms. Bledsoe, at TS 10:39:45, stated that this was false testimony, because Officer Porter was behind the wagon and new it was headed in a different direction.

## The State's Rebuttal

[K] Mr. Schatzow told the jury that "now that the defendant is on trial, he comes into court and he has lied to you about what happened." TS 1:01:15.
[L] Less than a minute later, Mr. Schatzow repeated his assertion that "The state proved through the evidence that he [Porter] lied when he spoke to the [investigative] officers and he lied on the witness stand." TS 1:02:09. ${ }^{3}$
[M] Mr. Schatzow stated that one of Porter's lies was "how he tried to pretend in his April $17^{\text {th }}$ statement that he was too far away at stop 2, to know what was going on." TS 1:02:43.
[N] Mr. Schatzow stated that Officer Porter misrepresented what he saw when at Baker and Mount Street, asking the jury "what was he trying to cover up, was he trying to cover up his own knowledge of what had happened there?" TS 1:03:50.
[O] While opining on Officer Porter's credibility generally, Chief Deputy Schatzow stated that "you prove that people aren't telling you the truth by showing inconsistencies in their statements. You prove that the statements are inconsistent with each other. You prove that they're telling something that just is, makes no sense at all." TS 1:04:41.
[P] The state's attribution of perjury to Officer Porter was far from subtle:
[the state] proved that what he said at stop two was a lie and that this "I can't breath" nonsense that he came up with. You see what he's fried to do in this testimony, every place fhät he is stuck, every place that he is stuck in his April 17, and every place in his April 15

3 Of course, Mr. Schatzow's assertion that Officer Porter lied to the initial police officers that interviewed him, could lead to additional charges of misconduct in office and obstruction and hindering. See, for example, Cover v. State, $297 \mathrm{Md} .398,400,466$ A.2d 1276, 1277 (1983) ("[b]oth this Court and the Court of Special Appeals have said that resisting, hindering, or obstructing an officer of the law in the performance of his duties is an offense at common law.")
statement he now comes up.with some new. explanation for. This business about that at stop 4 Mr . Gray used his own legs to get up. Nonsense. Five, síx times on April 17, you'll see "I picked him up and I put him on the bench, I put him on the bench, I put him on the bench". You wont see anything about Freddie Gray using his own muscles, using his own legs.

TS 1:05:54.
[Q] In response to the defense's assertion that Officer Porter's testimony was credible, Mr. Schatzow stated that "[Porter] sits here in the witness stand and he tries to come up with explanations for why he said what he said. But credibility is not an issue in this case, credibility is not an issue, not at all." TS 1:07:21.
[R] While discussing Mr. Porter's contention that Mr. Gray said "I can't breathe" during his initial arrest, Mr. Schatzow tells the jury that the other witnesses "don't say that because it didn't happen, because it didn't happen." TS 1:08:10. If it did not happen then Officer Porter is being directly accused of perjury.
[S] Mr. Schatzow told the jury "this is what you were told, 'you have no reason to not believe defendant Porter,' I have already given you a bunch of reasons, you've heard reason. But the biggest reason of all is he's got something at stake here ladies and gentlemen, he's got motive.to lie." TS 1:12:12.
[T] In accusing Officer Porter of lying when he said that he had very little conversation with Officer Goodson at Dolphin and Druid Hill, Mr. Schatzow stated that:

But that's like the [Baker and Mount] thing where, he can't identify his own shift commander that's sitting right in front of his face, that's
not a cover up, that's not frying to hide the truth, that's not trying to throw the investigators off. Naw, Naw that's not what that is.

TS 1:15:33.
While there are other examples of both prosecutors impugning William Porter's veracity, the above sets out a suifficient basis for this Motion.

The Subpoena •
During Officer Porter's trial, he was handed a subpoena to testify in the trials of both Goodson and White. Exhibit B.

## The Federal Investigation

Counsel have spoken with the members of the Civil Rights Division of the United States Attorney's Office that are investigating the in-custody death of Mr. Gray. As recently as October 22, 2015, the undersigned corresponded with the United States Attorneys involved in the investigation. It is standard practice for the Department of Justice not to be involved prior to the conclusion of the state prosecutions.

Counsel have had a similar experience with the witnesses. In meeting with one witness, that was called at Officer Porter's trial, the undersigned asked him a question and the response received was "the FBl also asked me that question." As such, there is an ongoing, verifiable, Federal investigation into the conduct of Officer Porter and others with regard to the death of Freddie Gray and, at this
time, it is impossible to predict whether this will result in charges in United States District Court.

Significantly: when Officer Porter testified at his trial the undersigned observed at least three (3) current members of the United States Attorney's Office for the District of Maryland in attendance, including the United States Attorney himself. It is therefore, surely, undeniable that Officer Porter remains in the sights of the United States.

## II. RELIEF SOUGHT

Officer Porter seeks that this Court find that, notwithstanding any grant of immunity by the state, that he cannot be compelled to testify in either the Goodson or White matters, because such testimony would result in the abridgment of his rights under both the state and federal constitutions.

## III. THE STATE'S PROPOSAL

On January 6, 2016 this Court proposes to hold a hearing. At said hearing, Officer Porter will assert his rights under state and federal constitutions to decline to testify at the trials of Goodson and White. Following that, the state proposes to give Porter immunity.

The immunity statute in question reads, in relevant part, as follows:
(b)(1) If a witness refuses, on the basis of the privilege against selfincrimination, to testify or provide other information in a criminal prosecution or a proceeding before a grand jury of the State, and the court issues an order to testify or provide other information under
subsection (c) of this section, the witness may not refuse to comply with the order on the basis of the privilege against self-incrimination.
(2) No testimony or other information compelled under the order, and no information directly or indirectly derived from the testimony or other information, may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except in a prosecution for perjury, obstruction of justice, or otherwise failing to comply with the order.
(c)(1) If an individual has been, or may be, called to testify or provide other information in a criminal prosecution or a proceeding before a grand jury of the State, the court in which the proceeding is or may be held shall issue, on the request of the prosecutor made in accordance with subsection (d) of this section, an order requiring the individual to give testimony or provide other information which the individual has refused to give or provide on the basis of the individual's privilege against self-incrimination.
(2) The order shall have the effect provided under subsection (b) of this section.
(d) If a prosecutor seeks to compel an individual to testify or provide other information, the prosecutor shall request, by wriften motion, the court to issue an order under subsection (c) of this section when the prosecutor determines that:
(1). The testimony or other information from the individual may be necessary to the public interest; and
(2) The individual has refused or is likely to refuse to testify or provide other information on the basis of the individual's privilege against self-incrimination.
Md. Code $\S 9-123$. The state believes that, under the grant of immunity conferred on by this section, Officer Porter will have no Fifth Amendment Privilege, and will have to answer the questions, under penalty of contempt.

While it is known to the Court and the parties - - but may not be by the reader of.this Motion = the state fully intends to go forward with Officer Porter's
retrial on June 13, 201.6-- but in the interim seeks to compel him as a witness in their cases against Officer Goodson and Sergeant White.

## IV. PORTER CANNOT BE COMPELLED TO TESTIFY

## (a) Summary of the argument

The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution declares in pait that "No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. Const., 5th Amend. The Fifth Amendment creates a privilege against compelled disclosures that could implicate a witness in criminal activity and thus subject him or her to criminal prosecution. Hoffman v. United States, 341 US 479, 486-488, 71 S.Ct, 8.14, 818-819 (1951). The privilege against selfincrimination is a constitutionally-based privilege--not an evidentiary privilege.

While Porter has many valid reasons as to why he cannot be compelled to testify, the overarching principle is that the judicial system is built on trust and respect of:the public and relies on that trust and respect for effectiveness. "It is of fundamental importance that justice should not only, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done." Rex v. Sussex Justices, 1 K.B. 256, 259 (1924). Similarly, the United States Supreme Court has said that trials themselves are "a reflection of the notion, deeply rooted in the common law, that 'justice must satisfy the appearances of justice," Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610,616 (1960) (quoted source omitted), and that the perception of fairness of trials and judicial acts is essential to the effectiveness of the system itself. See

Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring). Frankly, calling Porter as a witness in two (2) trials, about the same matters upon which he faces a pending manslaughter trial, wreaks of improriety.

On a related point: on September 15, 2015 the state told this Court that it was "imperative" that Porter be tried first. Implicitly, maybe even explicitly, the state acknowledged in this pleading that Porter had to go first in order that he not have a Fifth Amendment Privilege. If the state truly believes that Porter can be called as a witness, with a pending manslaughter charge, why was it "imperative" that Officer Porter go first?

Concomitantly, America has racked up masses of jurisprudence in its independence. Indeed, as argued herein, Maryland had a running start with English jurisprudence pre-1776 as precedent. So, for example, plug "bear wrestling" into Westlaw and you'll find statutes from Louisiana (La. Stat. Ann. § 14:102.10), Oklahoma (Okla. Stat. Ann. Tit. 21, § 1700), Missouri (Mo. Ann. Stat. $\S 578.176$ ) and Arkansas (Ark. Code Ann. § 5-62-124). You'll find cases from around the country discussing whether bear wresting (or the undersigned's favorite: boxing with a kangaroo) constitutes animal cruelty, or is unconstitutionally vague: In short: the courts of this land have tackied almost every conceivable issue. And yet, the silence is deafening when it comes to one defendant with a pending homicide trial being compelled to testify against another defendant about the same event, over his objection. There is a reason for that: it effectively renders the Fifth Amendment all but meaningless.

## (b) Agrant of immunity by this Court in this case will not put Officer Porter in the same position

A grant of immunity must provide a protection coextensive with the Fifth Amendment, as required by Kastigar. The State attempted to impeach Officer Porter during his mistrial, and to do so, the State presented a theory during Officer Porter's trial which alleged that Officer Porter lied and attempted to cover up facts when giving a statement to police officers, and when taking the stand in his own defense: Effectively, the State wishes to compel Porter; through the farce of a grant of imminity, to lay a foundation for evidence that the State has deemed as constituting an obstruction of justice and perjury:

Perjury, of course, has no statute of limitations. Md. Crim. Code $\S 9-$ 101 (d). So .Officer Porter can be charged with it as and when the state chooses to. It is also important to note that Md. Crim. Code § 9-101(c)(1) states that if a defendant gives two contradictory statements, the state does not have to prove which is false, it is enough that both statements under oath cannot be true. As such, if Officer Porter were to testify in. Officer Goodson or Sergeant White's trial (or both) something that the state believes is inconsistent with his trial testimony, the state would not have to prove which is false, and all the immunity the state could confer would be rendered meaningless.

Further: a defendant, of course, always has a right to testify in his defense. At the bench during Officer Porter's trial the Court went to great lengths to inform

Officer Porter of his absolute right to testify and the corresponding right to remain silent. That said "a person convicted of perjury may not testify." Md. Code 9-104. As such, calling Officer Porter as a witness in the Goodson/White trials may result in him being stripped of his ability to testify at his own trial. Again, all the immunity in the world can do nothing to alleviate this concern.

MD, CODE, CTS. \& Jud. PROC. § 9-123, "Privilege against self-incrimination provides:
(b)(1) If a witness refuses, on the basis of the privilege against selfincrimination; to testify or provide other information in a criminal prosecution or a proceeding before a grand jury of the State, ando the court issues an order to testify or provide other information under subsection (c) of this section, the witness may not refuse to comply with the order on the basis of the privilege against self-incrimination.
(2) No testimony or other information compelled under the order, and no information directly or indirectly derived from the testimony or other information, may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except in a prosecution for perjuríy, obstruction of justice; or otherwise failing to comply with the order.
(Emphasis supplied). In addition, the Supreme Court ruled in Kastigar that a witness may be compelled to testify when given use and derivative use immunity, if after the immunity is granted, the immunity leaves the witness in the same position, as if the witness had simply claimed the privilege. Kastigar $v$. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972); see also Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 79 (1964) abrogated by United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666 (1998). Thus, the,Maryland statute and Kastigar are directly inapposite to the State's theory that Officer Porter committed an obstruction of justice during his
taped statement and Officer Porter committed perjury when he took the stand in his defense at trial.

Courts have agreed, that "Ithe exception in the immunity statute allows the use of immunized testimony only in prosecutions for future perjury, future false statements, and future failure to comply with the immunity order, not for past acts." Matter of Grand Jury Proceedings of Aug., 1984, 757 F.2d 108 (7 $7^{\text {th }}$ Cir. 1984). Truthful testimony under a grant of immunity may not be used to prosecute the witness for false statements made earlier. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 819 F. $2 d 981$ (11 ${ }^{\text {th }}$ Cir. 1987). Thus, based on the State's blatant impeachment of Officer Porter during his trial, the State is effectively presented with a Hobson's choice. The State either has to retract their previous theory, and admit that Officer Poiter was truthful, or the State has to recognize that the grant of immunity would be a farce - that is, the State's grant of immunity would be coaxing Officer Porter into committing what the State believes is perjury and an obstruction of justice, both of which are crimes that falls outside the scope of immunity granted in the immunity statute. MD, CODE, CTS. \& JuD. PROC. § 9-123. Such a farcical grant of immunity would fly in the face of Kastigar's holding that a witness may be compelled to testify when given use and derivative use immunity, if after the immunity is granted, the immunity leaves the witness in the same position, as if the witness had simply claimed the privilege. 406 U.S. 441.

An analogous scenario is found in United States v. Kim, 471 F. Supp. 467 (D.D.C. 1979). Kim held that when a defendant was found to have given a
perjurious response to a congressional committee's question, and then that same defendant is granted use and derivative use immunity to answer the same question, such a grant was not coextensive with scope of privilege that must be provided under Kastigar, as it could have resulted in the infliction of criminal penalties. U.S. v. Kim is similar to Officel Porter's scenario in that the prosecution cannot.first allege that Porter has provided perjured testimony/committed obstructions of justice, and then thereafter grant immunity to suborn the very same testimony that was allegedly perjured. To summarize: "ijit is wellestablished in federal. courts that the privilege against self-incrimination can properly be invoked based on fear of a perjury prosecution arising out of conflict between statements sought to be compelled and prior sworn testimony." Johnson v. Fabian, 735 N.W.2d 295, 310-11 (Minn. 2007), (citing other cases).

Further: each additional statement by Officer Porter would be live tweeted and reported upon, resulting in an inability to receive a fair trial. Notably; this is a matter in which $100 \%$ of the jury panel was aware of the case. Likely the same percentage of a new panel would have at least some knowledge of preceding case(s). If Officer Goodson or Sergeant White were to be acquitted it is all but inevitable that jurors: would conclude that Porter $-\ldots$ the star witness $-\cdots$ was not credible. If convicted, the jurors will assume that Officer Porter has knowledge of inculpatory acts that he has now revealed when granted immunity. Commentators will likely opine as to this regardless of the outcome of each trial.

Officer Porter's statement at his trial was unquestionably voluntary, and his statements to F.I.T. and Detective Teel were found by the Court to be voluntary. Contrarily, Officer P.orter's potential statements in Officer Goodson's trial and Sgt. White's trial would not be. Officer Porter would thereby be subjected to jurors with some knowledge of the substance of his compelled statements. Parsing out whether a juror's knowledge of Officer Porter's previous testimony was from the initial voluntary statements, or the later compelled statements would not be possible in voir dire. A mini-Kastigar hearing. would be required for each juror. ${ }^{4}$

Moreover, in Officer Porter's trial; and any retrial, the witness were and can be sequestered. The reason for this is obvious, that each witness should testify about his or her recollection, untainted by what every other witness said. And while the Court can compel witnesses at Officer Porter's trial from learning what the other witnesses have testified to, it can scarcely prohibit people from . following accounts of Officer Porter's testimony.in the Goodson and White trials.

If this. Court buys what the state is selling, why:wouldn't a prosecutor do it in every case? It is all too common that more than one person is charged with any given homicide. Because of a host of reasons, the cases are often severed or not joined. Why would an enterprising prosecutor not say "you know what, Defendant B may testify in his trial. So l'll give him immunity and call him as a witness in Defendant A's trial. I'll see how he responds to questions, get an advance preview of what he's going to say, get a feel for how to cross him,

4 See the related Poindexter argument below.
whether to offer him a plea, sure I can't use what he says; but they can'tmake me forget it, there's no prohibition against me getting a transcript, no brainer, right?" 'This is exactly the kind of harm the Eighth Circuit' saw, when holding that "[s]uch use could conceivably include assistance in focusing the investigation, deciding to initiate prosecution, refusing to plea-bargain, interpreting evidence, planning cross-examination, and otherwise generally planing trial strategy." United States v: McDaniel, 482 F.2d:305, 311 ( $8^{\text {th }}$ Cir. 1973).

A later Kastigar will be insufficient to remedy Officer Porter's testimony at two trials. As Officer Porter has "not yet delivered the...material, and he consistenitly and vigorously.asserted his privilege. Here the 'cat' was' not yet 'out of the bag' and reliance upon a later objection or motion to suppress would 'let the cat out' with no assurance whatever of putting it back." Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. $449,463,95$ S. Ct. 584, 593, 42 L. Ed. 2D 574 (1975).

Should this Court give the state its imprimatur to make an end run around self-incrimination, the preceding sentence is a preview of coming attractions. "[Elven if the sole purpose in calling a witness is other than subterfuge, the questioning by a party of its own witness concerning an "independent:area of inquiry" intended to open the door for impeachment and introduction of a prior inconsistent statement could be found improper.". Walker v. State, 373 Md. 360, 386, 818 A.2d 1078, 1093 (2003)

Mr. Schatzow will surely not ask Officer Porter the same questions six months later as he did the first go around. Even if he did, it is inconceivable that

Officer Porter will answer them the same way. All good cross examination is palimpsest, it builds on what you already know. To allow the state to have two (2) more runs at Officer Porter, prior to his retrial, is anathema to our notions of the right to remain silent.

The Maryland statute on immunity states that "if a witness refuses...the witness may not refuse to comply...may be used against the witness...if a witness refuses to comply..." Id. (emphasis supplied). The statute is designed for people without skin in the game: witnesses. Not Officer Porter.

- To be sure: there are ways of compelling someone that the state believes to be less culpable in a criminal act to testify at the other's trial. People $v$.

Brunner, 32 Cal. App. 3d 908, 911, 108 Cal. Rptr. 501 (CA Ct, App. 1973).
California sensibly holds that:
where, as here, the defendant properly invokes the privilege against self-incrimination in a felony proceeding and is compelled by invocation of [the California Immunity Statute] to testify to matters which tend to incriminate him as to presently charged offenses, he may not be prosecuted for them, notwithstanding that his testimony is not used against him.

People v. Campbell, 137 Cal. App. 3d 867, 187 Cal. Rptr. 340 (CA Ct. App.
1982). ${ }^{5}$ Accord People v. Matz, 68 Cal. App. 4th 1216, 80 Cal. Rptr. 2D 872, 875
(1998).

5 Again, California holds that, under its statute "The measure of what incriminates defines the offenses immunized. Thus, the inference ("link") from compelled testimony to implicated offense serves to identify and hence define the offense immunized from prosecution." Reople v. Campbell, 137 Cal. App. 3d 867, 874, 187 Cal. Rptr. 340 (CA Ct. App. 1982) (emphasis in the original).

## (c) Porter has not been immunized federally

As this Court is aware:
The assistant United States attorney testified that she too was authorized to grant [a witness] immunity from any federal prosecution within the...District [that that Federal prosecutor practices in] based upon his testimony or the fruits thereof. She also indicated that the immunity she was offering was not immunity under the federal immunity statute, 18 U.S.C. $\S \S 6001-03$ (1982), which requires federal judicial approval, but rather immunity granted solely under the authority of her office and without the approval of a federal judge.

State ex rel. Munn V. MicKelvey, 733 S.W.2d 765, 767 (Mo. 1987). Of couise, Federal prosecutors and Judges also have the abiltiy pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-03 to grant a more formal immunity.

Neither such Orders have been provided in this case. And that notwithstanding, as stated earlier, that the United States Department of Justice is very much aware and monitoring all that is going on in the case at bar.

As the Court is aware, and as will be discussed further later, when the United States Government becomes aware of immunized testimony it typically develops a "taint" team. ${ }^{6}$ The undersigned provides two (2) examples for the purposes of making a record in this case.

1) the undersigned both represented correctional officers that were accused of beating an inmate. The officers, and others that worked on their shift, were compelled to testify in administrative hearings. As a result of this compelled

6 Sometimes the respective teams are called "clean" and "dirty."
testimony the Federal Government put a "taint" team in place. The FBI Agents and the United States Department of Justice had two prosecution teams. The first got to read everything. The compelled testimony, the information developed through other sources, all of it. The second got to read only what the first team decided was untainted. So the prosecutors did not know what was said by people compelled to answer questions. Nor were the agents actually proactively investigating the case aware what was said during the compelled statements, 2) Under Federal law a defendant in a capital case has a right to raise mental diseases and defects, not amounting to insanity, to argue that he should not receive a sentence in cleath. Fed. R. Crim. P. § 12.2. The wrinkle is that the Government has a right to advance notice of $\mathrm{it}_{1}$ and the opportunity to get their own assessment. What if a capital defendant, not raising insanity, decides to testify at his guilt phase? Well, any prosecutor worth his salt would surely work that information into his cross. Even if a defendant doesn't testify, it could, almost inadvertently, be brought out through other witnesses. IQ scores, personality disorders, defects that go to an ability to accurately recall events, all would be fair game. So the United:States Attorney's Office provides two (2) sets of attorneys. Team 1 tries the case. Team 2 receives the mental health disclosure from the defense, hires their own experts, files whatever challenges they believe may lie. And, here's the important part, Team 2 does not share anything that they are doing with Team 1 unless and until said mental health evidence becomes a factor at the penalty phase of the trial.
$\therefore$ These two examples are provided solely to point out that there are no such dichotomous participants in this case. The same prosecutors that presented the case to the grand jury, participated in pretrial hearings, and tried Officer Porter's case are now seeking to compel his testimony in the trials of two others, and will be counsel of record when Porter round 2 commences. No walls will be erected around this testimony, the spill over effect will be instantaneous and indellible. For that reason alone this Court must disallow the calling of Officer Porter as a witness.

## (d) The state would be suborning perjury

Firstly, it will surely have escaped no-one's notice that Maryland does not allow for a prosecutor or a Court to immunize perjury. Which makes sense from a societal standpoint: 'here's your immunity, now go say whatever you want' is scarcely in the public interest. So, whatever grant this Court makes will have no effect on the ability of the State of Maryland to charge Officer Porter with perjury later.

If Officer Porter is compelled to testify at Goodson trial, and were to testify differently from his own trial: it is surely axiomatic that he would have committed perjury during at least one of the trials. However, even if he testifies consistently with his previous trial: as narrated above the prosecution already believes he has committed multiple instances of perjury. And, as detailed below, what is of crucial importance is what they, the state, believe.

The state's commenting on Officer Porter's testimony would be admissible in Goodson and White's trial as an admission of a party oponent. See, for example, Wisconsin v. Cardenas-Hernandez, 219 Wis. 2d 516, 529, 579 N.W.2d 678, 684 (1998) (collecting cases).

## Similar situations

The Tennessee Bureau of Investigation investigated a Tri-Cities attorney for perjury, after he was accused of advising one of his clients to "lie under oath" in a DUI case. The lawyer sent the following email to the client, "they won't have anyone there to testify how much you had to drink. You won't be charged with perjury. I've never seen them charge anyone with perjury, and everybody lies in criminal cases, including the cops. If you want to tell the truth, then we'll just plead guilty and you can get your jail time over with. ${ }^{17}$

In State Bar of Cal. v. Jones, 208 Cal. 240, 280 P. 964 (1929), the Supreme Court of California held that a one-year suspension from practice for attorney's attempt to cause miscarriage of justice through inducing clients to give perjured testimony was not an excessive penality.

In Premium Pet Health, LLC v. All American Proteins, $\operatorname{LLC}$, et al. the Court reprimanded counsel for suborning perjury by submitting an affidavit stating that counsel did not have relevant materials, after counsel deleted all of the relevant

7 Available at http://crimlaw.blogspot.com/2005/12/from-dont-leave-written-evidence-of.htmil
materials the day before. The judge took particular issue with this turn of events, since Bryan Cave partner Randall Miller was aware of this before he filed an affidavit that denied this, "[Miller] reviewed the Landers Affidavit and filed it ... thereby suborning perjured testimony ... Miller also failed to alert the Court or opposing counsel to the spoliation that Bryan Cave had ordered the day before, another clear violation of professional and ethical obligations." ${ }^{\text {B }}$

In Tedesco v. Mishkin, an attorney, against whom sanctions were sought both as an attorney and as a litigant in a securities action, suborned perjury of witness in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. $\S 1622$ and aided and abetted witness to commit perjury in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. $\S \S 2,1621$ by not advising witness, after hearing his proposed testimony and knowing it to be false, against testifying in that manner. Tedesco v. Mishkin, 629 F. Supp. 1474 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). The attorney's later telling witness to do what he had to do was insufficient to stop witness from carrying out agreement given attorney's knowledge that witness would go to drastic lengths to protect attorney. Id.

## The harm to due process

The relevant law governing a prosecutor's use of perjured testimony is set forth in Napue v. Illinois (1959):
$[l] t$ is established that a conviction obtained through use of false evidence, known to be such by representatives of the State, must fall

8 Available at http://abovethelaw.com/2015/06/biglaw-partner-and-associate-destroyed-evidence-suborned-perjury/2/.
under the Fourteenth Amendment. The same result obtains when the State, although not soliciting false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when it appears.

The principle that a State may not knowingly use false evidence, including false testimony, to obtain. a tainted conviction, implicit in any concept of ordered liberty, does not cease to apply merely because the false testimony goes only to the credibility of the witness. The jury's estimate of the truthfulness and reliability of a given withess may well be determinative of guilt or innocence, and it is upon such subtle factors as the possible interest of the witness in testifying falsely that a defendant's life or liberty may depend.

360 U.S. 264, 269 (citations omitted.) Accordingly, Staté v. Yates, decided by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, presents a legal scenario thiat is analogous to that of the instant matter. $629 \mathrm{~A} .2 \mathrm{~d} 807,809$ (1993). In Yates, the prosecutor reasonably believed that a witness presented false testimony when the witness denied any involvement in illicit drugs, and that witness' false testimony was integral to the conviction of the defendant. Id. The defendant's "entire defense depended on the premise that [the witness] owed [the defendant] money from a cocaine sale." Id. The prosecutor knew before trial that the witness had recently been indicted for drug possession, yet, the prosecutor failed to correct the witness' statement when the witness denied any involvement in illicit drugs.

Importantly, the Yates court stated that one does not need to prove that the prosecutor had actual knowledge of the uncorrected false testimony; one "need only show that the prosecutor believed [the witness'] testimony was probably false." See May v. Collins, 955 F.2d 299, 315 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 504 U.S.

901 (1992); United States v. Mills, 704 F.2d 1553, 1565.(11th Cir. 1983), cert. Denied, 467 U.S. 1243 (1984); cf. Giglio v. United States, 405.U.S. 150, 154 (1972) (knowledge of one attorney in prosecutor's office attributed to other attorneys in offiçe). The Supreme Court of New Hampshire ultimately held that a lawyer's duty of candor to the tribunal "is neglected when the prosecutor's office relies on a witness's denial of certain conduct in one case after obtaining an indictment charging the witness with the same conduct in another case." Yates, 629.A.2d at $809 .{ }^{\circ}$ For the prosecution to offer testimony into evidence, knowing it or believing it to be false is a violation of the defendant's due process rights. Mills, 704 F. 2 d at 1565 citing United States v. Sutherland, 656 F.2d 1181, 1203 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 949 (1981); United States v. Brown, 634 F.2d 8.19, 827 (5th Cir. 1981). As noted by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, "the nondisclosure of false testimony need not be williful on the part of the prosecutor to result in sanctions." Hawthorne v. United States, 504 A. 2 d 580, 591 n. 26 (D.C. 1986) citing Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. at 154.

9 The parallel rule in Maryland is Maryland Rule 16-812, Maryland Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3 "Candor Toward the Tribunal," which provides:
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer;
(2) fail to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act-by the client;
(4) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer has offered material evidence and comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures.

So while Officer Porter one "need only show that the prosecutor believed [the witness'] testimony was probably false," he need go no further than the factual summary above to evince that both Ms. Bledsoe and Mr. Schatzow stated unambiguously that what Officer Porter said was demonstrably false.

## There is no way around this

It is of no moment if the state makes claims that Officer Porter is very unlikely to be prosecuted for any statement he might make at the White /

Goodson trials. That is because:

We find no justification for limiting the historic protections of the Fifth Amendment by creating an exception to the general rule which would nullify the privilege whenever it appears that the government would not-undertake to prosecute. Such a rule would require the trial court, in each case, to assess the practical possibility that prosecution would result from incriminatory answers. Such assessment is impossible to make because it depends on the discretion

United States v. Miranti, 253 F.2d 135, 139 ( $2^{\text {nd }}$ Cir. 1958) .(cited with approval in Choi v. State, 316 Md. 529, 539 (1989).

Even if (which they cannot) the state could somehow confine their direct questioning to areas in which they have never levied a perjury accusation against Officer Porter, this would still not solve the issue.

This is because "a judge must allow a defendant wide latitude to crossexamine a witness as to bias or prejudices." Smallwood v. State, 320 Md .300 ,

307-08, 577 A.2d 356, 359 (1990). Accordingly, whatever narrow focus the state may decide to employ in an attempt to cure the unconstitutional ill set out herein, nothing would bind counsel for Goodson and White from a much wider foray on cross-examination. And, in the event that Officer Porter withstands their cross with his reputation intact, the prosecutors could then become character withesses to impugn his veracity (see further below).

To allow. Porter to testify, is likely to result in him being unavailable for cross-examination. While the state may give him immunity, the defense cannot. And any new areas that they enquire into are likely to result in Porter declining to answer. No part of any statement Porter has ever given can be used if he is unavailable for cross-examination. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004); State v. Snowden, 385 Md. 64, 867 A.2d 314 (2005).

## (e) The cases cited by the State

They do not stand for the proposition that Officer Porter can be compelled to testify

The state principally relies on United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 680682 (1998). There are several points to make about this case. Firstly, even the portions that the state relies on cannot be said to be anything more than dicta. The holding of Balsys was that "[w]e hold that concern with foreign prosecution is beyond the scope of the Self-Incrimination Clause." Id. at 669.

Balsys was an immigration case. Balsys was not given any immunity, and so is dissimilar to the case at bar. And Balsys' purported fear was that he might be prosecuted in "Lithuania, Israel and Germany." Id. at 670. Of course, no prosecution at that time was pending, indeed there was nothing in the record that Lithuania had had any contact with the defendant since his immigration from that country 3.7 years earlier. The Supreme Court distilled the issue into one sentence: could Balysis "demonstrate that any testimony he might give in the deportation investigation could be used in a criminal proceeding against him brought by the Government of either the United States or one of the States, [then] he would be entitled to invoke the privilege." Here: Officer Porter has demonstrated, conclusively, that there is an ongoing investigation by the United States:

Moreover, Balsys reiterates that "the requirement to provide an immunity as broad as the privilege itself." As stated herein, given that the same prosecutors will take Mr. Porter's testimony not once: but twice - - in the trials of Goodson and White, will then cross-examine Officer Porter again at his retrial, he will not, and cannot be, placed in the same position as if he had never testified. The state gets an advantage, and what Mr. Schatzow learns of Officer Porter's knowledge during the compelled testimony during the trials of Goodson and White cannot be unknown to him on June 13, 2016.

Further, what the state is in effect asking this Court to find is that as a matter of Federal law, Officer Porter's testimony at the Goodson and White trials cannot be used against him later. Respectfully, this matter is proceeding in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, and this Court cannot make such an inferential leap as to what a separate sovereign may decide in the future.

Following Balsys, the state next cites United States v. Cimino, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155236 (10/29/14). Firstly, an unreported United States District Court decision from another circuit is scarcely a reason for this Court to make law that flies in the face of 12 score years of Anglo-Maryland jurisprudence.

Secondly, the reluctant witness in Cimino was an "agent of the FBl...carrying out the controlled buys orchestrated by the Bureau." Id. at 5 . This is a world away from the case at bar. While the Cimino witness may have had a snowball's chance in hell of being prosecuted, no matter what she said, Officer Porter has already been tried once for homicide, with another to follow anon. Lastly, in

## Cimino:

However, the immunity arguments pressed on this Court by defendant are of no relevance to the case at bar. The informant has not been immunized by anyone, for anything. She has no agreement that requires any sovereign to forbear from prosecuting her for any crimes she may commit, including crimes committed during the course of her work as an informant

Id. at 11-12. Thus, the portion cited by the state cannot be said to be anything other than unreported, non-binding, dicta.

The third case in the state's trifecta of cases it cited is United States $v$. Poindexter, 698 F. Supp. 300 (D.D.C. 1988). The primary thrust of the case concerns the steps taken by grand jury members to avoid learning of immunized testimony given at Congress, prior to their returning of an indictment. That is night-and-day from what we have here. The reason Poindexter supports Officer

Porter's position, however, is that:
there must be noted several administrative steps which were taken by Independent Counsel from an early date to prevent exposure of himself and his associate counsel to any immunized testimony. Prosecuting' personnel were sealed off from exposure to the immunized testimony itself and publicity concerning it. Daily newspaper clippings and transcripts of testimony before the Select Committees were redacted by nonprosecuting "tainted" personnel to avoid direct and explicit references to immunized testimony. Prosecutors, and those immediately associated with them, were confined to reading these redacted materials. In addition, they were instructed to shut off television or radio broadcasts that even approached discussion of the immunized testimony. A conscientious effort to comply with these instructions was made and they were apparently quite successful. In order to monitor the matter, all inadvertent exposures were to be reported for review of their possible significance by an attorney, Douglass, who played no other role in the prosecution after the immunized testimony started...Overall, the file reflects a scrupulous:awareness of the strictures against exposure and a conscientious attempt to avoid even the most remote possibility of any impermissible taint. .

Id. at $312-313$. It is therefore, readily apparent that the prosecution team in Poindexter went out of their way to avoid learning anything $-\cdots$ let alone anything of consequence - - from the immunized testimony. In the case at bar, however, there is but one prosecution team. The same people that crossed Officer Porter last time will be in the room when he is called as a witness next time, and the
time after that and, potentially, a fourth time at his retrial. The state's failing to Chinese wall the different prosecutions means that they cannot now remove the indellible taint.

Even if the cases said what the state believes they say, Officer Porter has a separate right not to testify under the Maryland Declaration of Rights

Assuming, arguendo, that Murphy signaled a sea change in federal constitutional jurisprudence in its ruling that the federal constitutional privilege against self-incrimination protects a state witness against incrimination under federal and state law, and a federal witness against incrimination under state and federal law. Murphy, 378 U.S. 52, 78. Very importantly, in making its decision, the Murphy Court discussed, in detail, two English common law cases decided before 1776:

In 1749 the Court of Exchequer decided East India Co. v. Campbell, 1 Ves.Sen, 246, 27 Eng.Rep. 1010. The defendant in that case refused to 'discover' certain information in a proceeding in an English court on the ground that it might subject him to punishment in the courts of India. The court unanimously held that the privilege against self-incrimination protected a witness in an English court from being compelled to give testimony which could be used to convict him in the courts of another jurisdiction.
ld. at 58. The Supreme Court also cited Brownsword v. Edwards, 2 Ves.sen. 243, 28 Eng.Rep. 157, decided in 1750, one year after East India Co. v. Campbell, in which the defendant refused to divulge whether she was lawfully married to a certain individual, on the ground that if she admitted to the marriage she would be confessing to an act which, although legal under the common law, would
render her 'liable to prosecution in ecclesiastical court.' Murphy, 378 U.S. 52, 5859. Thus, as the Supreme Court stated, Brownsword applied the ruling from East India Co. in a case involving separate systems of courts and law located within the same geographic area.

Why this matters is that the Maryland Declaration of Rights Article 5(a)(1) provides, "That the Inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to the Common Law of England, . . . as existed on the Fourth day of July, seventeen hundred and seventy-six." (Emphasis supplied). Thus, pursuant to Article 5 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, Maryland common law retains the dual sovereignty doctrine in its entirety, as Maryland retains the rulings set forth in England pre1776, providing a different protection for its citizens than its federal counterpart.

As stated supra, Article 22 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights ${ }^{10}$ is the state parallel to the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment. Counsel has located no case which holds that Murphy or Balsys' rulings are applicable in Maryland under Article 22 grounds.

Further support is found in Choi v. State, 316 Md. $529,545,560$ A.2d 1108, 1115-16 (1989). Because while a witness may have:
waived her Fifth Amendment privilege, she certainly did not waive her privilege against compelled self-incrimination under Art. 22 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Long ago, in the leading case of Chesapeake Club v. State, $63 \mathrm{Md} .446,457$ (1885), this Court expressly rejected the waiver rule now prevailing under the Fifth Amendment and adopted the English rule that a witness's testifying 10 Article 22 states, "Itithat no man ought to be compelled to give evidence against himself in a criminal case."
about a matter does not preclude invocation of the privilege for other questions relating to the same matter.
Id. This is authority for Officer Porter's contention herein that, while immunity cannot cure his Fifth Amendment concerns, it most certainly cannot assauge his Maryland rights.

Maryland retains the dual sovereignty doctrine in its entirety. Evans v. State, 301 Md. 45 (1984) (adopting the dual sovereignty principle as a matter of Maryland common law); see also Gillis v. State, 333 Md. 69; 73, 633 A.2d 888, 890 (1993) (holding that "Lu]nder the "dual sovereignty" doctrine, separate sovereigns deriving their power from different sources are each entitled to punish an individual for the same conduct if that conduct violates each sovereignty's . laws). Bailey v. State, 303 Md. 650, 660, 496 A.2d 665, 670 (1985) (stating that "[t]his Court has adopted, as a matter of common law, the dual sovereignty doctrine.").

Article 22 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights reads that "That no man ought to be compelled to give evidence against himself in a criminal case." Id. Under Article 22, "[tt] he privilege must be accorded a liberal construction in favor of the right that it was intended to secure." Adkins v. State, $316 \mathrm{Md} .1,8,557$ A.2d 203, 206 (1989).

Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, Article XII states, similarly, that no one can be "compelled to accuse, or furnish evidence against himself." And in Massachusetts "[o]nly a grant of transactional immunity" will suffice. Attorney

Gen. V. Colleton, 387 Mass. 790, 801, 444 N.E.2d 915, 921 (1982). Thus, Officer Porter could not be called, were we in Massachusetts, "so long as the witness remains liable to prosecution criminally for any matters or causes in respect of which he shall be examined, or to which his testimony shall relate." Id. at 797.

## (e) The state would be making themselves witnesses

There have been only two people that called Officer Porter untruthful. It was not Officer Porter. It was not the Detective Teel, the lead investigator, to the contrary she said he was trying to be candid in her discussions with him. It was not the coroner, nor was it Dr. Lyman, who did not opine as to the reasonableness of Porter's actions. It was not any members of the jury, who presumably at least partiy credited his testimony in failing to return a guilty verdict.

The only two (2) persons that have called. Officer Porter a liar - - to date -are Janice Bledsoe and Michael Schatzow. As stated, supra, Mr. Schatzow's greatest hits include that Porter "lied to you [the jury] about what happened... lied when he spoke to the [investigative] officers and he lied when he spoke on the witness stand;" while Ms. Bledsoe penned the one hit wonder "Officer Porter was not telling the truth about his involvement in this incident.,.,the only reasonable conclusion you can come to is that Ofc. Porter is not telling the truth." Id. Coming from two deputies in the States Attorney's Office these comments are that much more significant because:

Attorneys'. representations are trustworthy, the [The Supreme] Court [has] reasoned, because attorneys are officers of the court, and when they address the judge solemnly upon a matter before the court, their declarations are virtually under oath.

Lettley v. State, 358 Md. 26, 47, 746 A.2d 392; 404 (2000) (internal citations omitted).

If Officer Porter is called to testify in the Goodson and White trial there are two (2) people, and only two (2) people, that can be called to impugn his credibility, Ms. Bledsoe and Mr. Schatzow. Thus, "Fiiln order to attack the credibility of a witness, a character witness may testify...that, in the character witness's opinion, the witness is an untruthful person." Md. Rule 5-608.

This presents all sorts of problems because:
MLRPC Rule 3.7(a). The policy behind this rule is succinctly stated in the Comment; "Combining the roles of advocate and witness can prejudice the opposing party and can involve a conflict of interest between the lawyer and client." MLRPC Rule 3.7 cmt . With regard to the mixing of roles, the Comment continues:
The opposing party has proper objection where the combination of roles may prejudice that party's rights in the litigation. A witness is required to testify on the basis of personal knowledge, while an advocate is expected to explain and comment on evidence given by others. It may not be clear whether a statement by an advocatewitness should be taken as proof or as an analysis of the proof.

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Klupt v. Krongard, 126 Md. App. 179, 205-06, 728 A.2d 727, 740 (1999). The advocate-witness rule "assumes heightened importance in a criminal case." Walker v. State, 373 Md. 360, 397 (2003). In short: calling Officer Porter at the

Goodson and White trials will not only result in his rights being violated, but will necessitate a quagmire in which rights are trampled on all sides in the ensuing free-for-all.

WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons and any others that appear to this Court, Officer Porter prays that the Court grant his Motion to Quash the Subpoena he received for the case at bar.

Respectfully Submitted,


## CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this $4^{\text {th }}$ day of January, 2016, a copy of witness William Porter's Motion to Quash the subpoena was hand delivered to Ms. Bledsioe at 1:20 E. Baltimore Street, $9^{\text {min }}$. Floor, Baltimore MD 21202.

> GARYE. PROCTOR


Now comes the State of Maryland, by and through Marilyn J. Mosby, the State's Attorney for Baltimore City; Michael Schatzow, Chief Deputy State's Attorney for Baltimore City; Janice L. Bledsoe, Deputy State's Attorney for Baltimore City; and Matthew Pillion, Assistant State's Attorney for Baltimore City; and responds herein to Defendant Brian Rice's Opposition to the State's Motion to Compel a Witness to Testify Pursuant to Section 9-123 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.

## 1. Background

On January 14, 2016, the State filed in the above-captioned case a Motion to Compel a Witness to Testify Pursuant to Section 9-123 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. The witness in question was Officer William Porter. The State's Motion, submitted and signed by the State's Attorney herself, averred that the State may call Officer Porter to testify against the Defendant and set forth her determinations that Officer Porter's testimony may be necessary to the public interest but that he is likely to refuse to testify on the basis of his privilege against selfincrimination given his similar refusal to testify in the related cases of State $v$. Caesar Goodson and State v. Alicia White.

On January 15, 2016, the Defendant filed his Opposition to the State's Motion to Compel. The Defendant attacks the State's Motion as lacking an explanation of "why Officer

Porter is either necessary or material to the trial of Defendant Miller or how it is necessary to serve the public interest." Def. Opp. at 1. The Defendant argues that Officer Porter's testimony is, in fact, not necessary to the public interest based on his assessment of the State's reasons for filing the Motion and his view of the Motion's effect on both his and Officer Porter's constitutional rights. Def. Opp. at 2-3. As such, he urges the Court to deny the Motion.

## 2. The Defendant Lacks Standing to Object that it is not Necessary to the Public Interest to

## Compel Officer Porter to Testify as a Witness

The Defendant's Opposition should pose no barrier to this Court's granting the State's Motion to Compel because, in short, the Defendant lacks standing to object that it is not necessary to the public interest to compel Officer Porter to testify as a witness. Indeed, nowhere in CJP § 9-123's provisions does there even exist any right for the subject of the criminal prosecution-or the witness to be compelled-to file a responsive pleading or otherwise be heard to object to the merits of the State's Motion to Compel. Instead, the statute sets forth the following as the only prerequisites to a court order compelling testimony:
(c) Order requiring testimony
(1) If an individual has been, or may be, called to testify or provide other information in a criminal prosecution or a proceeding before a grand jury of the State, the court in which the proceeding is or may be held shall issue, on the request of the prosecutor made in accordance with subsection (d) of this section, an order requiring the individual to give testimony or provide other information which the individual has refused to give or provide on the basis of the individual's privilege against self-incrimination.
(2) The order shall have the effect provided under subsection (b) of this section.

CJP § 9-123(c) (emphasis added). Subsection (d) outlines what such a prosecutorial request should entail:
(d) Prerequisites for order. -- If a prosecutor seeks to compel an individual to testify or provide other information, the prosecutor shall request, by written motion, the court to issue an order under subsection (c) of this section when the prosecutor determines that:
(1) The testimony or other information from the individual may be necessary to the public interest; and
(2) The individual has refused or is likely to refuse to testify or provide other information on the basis of the individual's privilege against self-incrimination.
C.JP $\S 9-123(\mathrm{~d})$. Absent from this subsection is any requirement that the State even file the Motion with the Clerk, much less does the statute require that the State explain in any additional detail its determination to seek immunity and then permit the defendant or the witness to argue against the grant of immunity. So long as the State's immunity request complies with the pleading requirements under subsection (d), the Court "shall issue" an immunity order. The immunity statute does not grant a defendant or a witness standing to object, nor does the statute permit the Court to consider such objections, even if made.

While Maryland's appellate courts have yet to construe CJP § 9-123 on the question of standing to object, the federal courts have had occasion to consider standing under the federal immunity statutes-which are virtually identical to Maryland's $\S 9-123$-and have viewed them as deliberately denying standing to a defendant or witness to object to a prosecutor's immunity decision and as limiting judicial review to verifying prosecutorial compliance with the statute's formal prerequisites. In United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191, 1200-01 (3d Cir. 1978), the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit rejected the notion that a defendant had standing to seek judicial review of the government's decision about whether it is in the "public interest" to seek compelled testimony under a grant of immunity authorized in 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002-6004. The Court considered that such review would not only involve an impermissible
intrusion into prosecutorial discretion in violation of separation of powers principles but that allowing review of such objections would be contrary to the purpose of immunity statutes:

The legislative history of the immunity statutes also shows no sign of a purpose to benefit defendants. The narrow purpose of the use immunity provisions was twofold: to eliminate those federal immunity statutes that required conferral of transactional rather than use immunity and to reduce the number and complexity of immunity statutes. The shift to use immunity was intended to take advantage of the more favorable view of use immunity expressed by the Supreme Court in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52, 84 S. Ct. 1594, 12 L. Ed. 2d 678 (1964). See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 455-59, 92 S. Ct. 1653, 32 L. Ed. 2d 212 (1972). The clear intent of the shift to use immunity was to make it less costly for the United States Attorney to grant immunity, by allowing for fuller prosecution of both the defendant and the immunized witness. In broader perspective, it is apparent that the immunity statute was part of a massive program of legislation whose central purpose, as its opponents recognized, was to strengthen the hand of the prosecution and to weaken that of the criminal defendant, in many cases to the full extent permitted by the protections of the Bill of Rights.

Id. at 1202.

The Third Circuit also drew upon the reasoning of the Supreme Court's construction of a predecessor immunity statute in Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956). There the Supreme Court considered the question of whether a witness could properly request a judge to deny an immunity application that otherwise comported with the statutory pleading prerequisites, which at the time required an averment that "in the judgment of a United States Attorney, the testimony of [the] witness . . . is necessary to the public interest" and also required that the United States Attorney obtain "the approval of the Attorney General" before making an application to the court. Id. at 423-424. The Government argued "that the court has no discretion to determine whether the public interest would best be served by exchanging immunity from prosecution for testimony [and] that its only function is to order a witness to testify if it determines that the case is within the framework of the statute." Id. at 431. The

Supreme Court agreed that "[a] fair reading of [the immunity statute] does not indicate that the district judge has any discretion to deny the order on the ground that the public interest does not warrant it"; rather, the court's "duty under [the statute] is only to ascertain whether the statutory requirements are complied with by . . . the United States Attorney and the Attorney General . . . " Id. at 432-34.

The reasoning of the Supreme Court and the Third Circuit holds true for CJP § 9-123. Certainly nothing within CJP $\S 9-123$ 's provisions indicates that it was intended in any way to confer any rights on a defendant. The statute is a prosecutorial tool granted by the legislature requiring only a few prerequisites to its use. Here, the State's Motion to Compel unquestionably complied with § 9-123(d). The Motion was submitted in writing to the Court and signed by the State's Attorney herself, setting forth her averred determinations that Officer Porter's testimony may be necessary to the public interest but that he is likely to testify based on his prior refusal to do so in related cases. The Court needs no more before issuing its Order and, indeed, is statutorily required to issue the Order upon finding those facts properly presented. As such, the Defendant's Opposition-which does not dispute that the State has met the statutory pleading requirements-raises no cognizable objection and should not be considered by this Court.

Wherefore, the State requests that this Court grant the State's Motion to Compel a Witness to Testify Pursuant to Section 9-123 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article notwithstanding the Defendant's Opposition thereto.

Respectfully submitted,

Marilyn J. Mosby


C
Jance L. Bledsoe (\#68776) Deputy State's Attorney 120 East Baltimore Street The SunTrust Bank Building Baltimore, Maryland 21202
(443) 984-6012 (telephone)
(443) 984-6256 (facsimile)
ibledsoe@stattorney.org


Matthew Pillion (\#653491)
Assistant State's Attorney
120 East Baltimore Street
The SunTrust Bank Building
Baltimore, Maryland 21202
(443) 984-6045 (telephone)
(443) 984-6252 (facsimile)
mpillion@stattornev.org

## CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 20th day of January, 2016, a copy of the State's Response to Defendant Brian Rice's Opposition to the State's Motion to Compel a Witness to Testify Pursuant to Section 9-123 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article was mailed and emailed to:

Michael Belsky
Chaz Ball
Schlachman, Belsky \& Weiner, P.A.
300 East Lombard Street, Suite 1100
Baltimore, MD 21202
(410) 497-8433
mbelsky@sbwlaw.com
Attorney for Lieutenant Brian Rice
Respectfully submitted,
Marilyn J. Mosby


## COPY

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State v. Nero, Miller, Rice, White January 20, 2016 BEFORE JUDGE BARRY G. WILLIAMS

TRANSCRIPT OF OFFICIAL PROCEEDINGS (Motions Hearing)
-- -- -- -- --
BEFORE: THE HONORABLE BARRY G. WILLIAMS, JUDGE -- -- -- -- --
HEARING DATE: January 20, 2016
APPEARANCES:
For the State:
MICHAEL SCHATZOW, Esquire JANICE L. BLEDSOE, Esquire MATTHEW PILLION, Esquire JOHN BUTLER, Esquire

For Defendant Nero:
MARC L. ZAYON, Esquire ALLISON R. LEVINE, Esquire
For Defendant Miller: CATHERINE FLYNN, Esquire BRANDON MEAD, Esquire

For Defendant Rice:
MICHAEL J. BELSKY, Esquire CHAZ R. BALL, Esquire
For Defendant White: IVAN I. BATES, Esquire For Defendant Porter: JOSEPH MURTHA, Esquire

Transcriptionist: Karen Ehatt, CET D-574

Transcription
Service: ACCUSCRIBES TRANSCRIPTION SERVICE Heaver Plaza
1301 York Road, Suite 601
Lutherville, Maryland 21093
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## PROCEEDINGS

(On the record - 02:06:52 p.m.)
THE CLERK: All rise. The Circuit Court For Baltimore City, Part 31, will start the morning session.

The Honorable Barry G. Williams presiding.
THE COURT: The afternoon session, too.
THE CLERK: Say it again?
THE COURT: Maybe the afternoon session, toc.
Everyone can be seated.
You said morning.
THE CLERK: Oh, I did? Okay.
THE COURT: Call the case, please.
MR. SCHATZOW: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Call
the case of State versus Alıcia White, Number 115141036.
Present on behalf of the State is myself, Mıchatl Schatzow, Deputy State's Attorney Janice Bledsoe and Assistant State's Attorney Matthew Pillion and John Butler.

THE COURT: Good afternoon.
MR. SCHATZOW: Good afternoon, Your Honor.
MR. PILLION: Good afternoon.
MR. BATES: (Good afternoon, Your Honor. My name $1 s$ Ivan Bates. I represent Sergeant Alıcia White standing to the left of me at the trial table.

THE COURT: Good afternoon. And you're here,

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too, so say --
MR. MURTHA: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Joseph Murtha on behalf of Officer Porter.

THE COURT: All right. Good afternoon to all. Mr. Bates filed a motion to strike the Curt's order compelling Officer Porter's testimony during Alicia White's trial. Court has had an opportunity to review it. I've seen the response from the Defense.

Mr. Bates, do you want to be heard at all, sir?
MR. BATES: Yes, I do, Your Honor. First of all, Your Honor, I would like to state that I do feel that we do have standing. Do feel at this moment in time this case is a little different in the sense that the State wishes to introduce evidence that we feel is not admissible in the trial.

One of the $1 s s u e s$ we look at, Your Honor, with this order, it states that under subsection $[$, Your Honor, D-1, the testimony or other information from an individual may be necessary to the public interest. Well, Your Honor, one of the things we have to do -hefore we were judges, prosecutor or defense attorneys we were lawyers, brand new lawyers. In looking at the preamble, what it states is that a lawyer stalll and the legal profession in pursuing these objectives and should Help the bar regulate itself in the public interest.

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What is important, Your Honor, is to sit down and look at the rules of professional candor, 3.3.

THE COURT: Well, actually, Mr. Bates, what I'm more concerned about 15 whether or not when the Goodson matter was called, and Mr. Murtha made it clear to thıs Court that has client wasn't going to testify and that he made it clear, because there was a subpoena in your case also, that he wasn't going to testify in your case also, whether it was appropriate for me to allow basically the State and Mr. Murtha to make the same arguments that he made in Goodson which were appropriate to make, to make them in your case. I belreve that it was appropriate, but what I will ackrowledge that it was inappropriate for me not to allow you to be there. So for that, I will apnlogize.

MR. BATES: Yes, sır.
THE COURT: So --
MR. BATES: But Your Honor, we do feel that it's inappropriate -- we do feel that we have standing to make the arguments, some of whach that Mr. Murtha may have made to the Court, Your Hener.

THE COJJPT: Well, what do you mean you have standing to make the -- what do you -- I don't uriderstand what you're sayıng.

MR. BATES: Well, we feel that because the State

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wishes to call Officer Porter, that as an officer of the court, when we sit down and we see something that we view as unethical in terms of the rules of professional candor, that we must bring those issues to the Court. However, these issues directly affect my client. When you sit down and look, the rules are clear. You cannot -- in reference to false evidence, when evidence that a lawyer knows to be false is provided by a person who is not the client, the lawyer must refuse to offer it regardless of the client's wishes. Here --

THE COUPT: So basically, Mr. Bates, what I understand $1 s$ you're saying --
(Loud noise)
THE COURT: That's my cane falling. Don't worry about 1t. I'll probably blame that on you, too, though.

MR. BATES: That's fine. I'm used to $1 t$.
THE COURT: I know you are. What you're sayırig is that the State is offering anformation and would be offering information $2 n$ your case that they can't offer. Is that effectively what you're saying?

MR. BATES: That is effectively, Your Honor. Urider the proiessional rules --

THE COURT: But isn't that a trial $1 s s u e ?$ And that would be for the Court to make a determination whether $2 t ' s$ approprıate to allow the evidence $1 n$ or not,

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not for you, as a lawyer -- you're talking about when we started out -- as a lawyer looking at the canons of ethics? Isn't that more appropriate?

MR. BATES: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. BATES: Well, because what it states under the 9-123 that it must be for the public interest. And one of the problems we have with the public interest, the State has already called Officer Porter a liar. Based on that, it's important that the judrcial system is not seen as caving in to the State's wishes in which they try to manıpulate the system. What we have --

THE COURT: I'll take that as a jab at me but go ahead. Here's what I'm going to say. The Court granted the motion from the State in the Goudscn matter based on the arguments that were presented, and I granted the motion in the White matter based on the arguments that were presented on that day. Goodson was here because it was pretrial motions. You were not here, as I noted, because didn't expect, candidly speaking, the Court of Sperial Appeals to take this case in the manner in which they did. They did. Otherwise, you would have had an cppertunity at your trial to make the arguments that you warited to make wherever I believed it would be apprepriate to do so.

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Under the circumstances as presented here, again, I've already apologized to you for not allowing you to be at the hearıng, but $I$ do not believe that necessarily you had a right to make any arguments at all. But also, I do not believe that it would be appropriate to grant your motion given the earcumstances that we find ourselves in where the Court of Special Appeals has accepted the Goodson matter, and they're going to have hearings in March and that I do believe that the factual scenario and the legal issues presented in the White case are extremely similar. So for those reasons, I'm going to deny your motion.

And if at the appropriate time, when you are before me for a trial, I'm going to kind of guess that you're going to have a number of arguments that you want to make. Am I right in that?

MR. EATES: Yes, Ycur Honor.
THE COURT: I kind of figured that. Okay. So for this moment --

MR. BATES: I do have one --
THE COJRT: Every time you talk --
MR. BATES: That was my fault.
THE COIJRT: -- every time you talk that thirig falls.

MR. BATES: Well, that's because --

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THE COURT: Every single time.
MR. BATES: -- the cane is telling you that you're wrong on the ruling, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Is that what the cane is telling me?
MR. BATES: So it falls because you're wrong.
THE COURT: Okay. I'll accept that.
MR. BATES: Respectfully. Respectfully.
THE COURT: And you know I hate when lawyer say "respectfully" because it means the exact opposite.

MR. BATES: I know. I know.
THE COURT: The exact opposite. So your motion is denıed.

MR. BATES: Yes, sir. I do have one question. I guess we'll deal with scheduling at a later time period, correct?

THE COURT: Absolutely.
MR. BATES: Thank you, Your Honor. May I be e:cused?

THE COURT: You don't want to stick arcund?
MR. BATES: I'm going to stıck around but just excused from the trial table.

ThE COURT: You can move on. Thank you.
MR. BATES: Thank you.
THE COIJRT: All right. And as long as we're still on this partıcular $1 s s u e, ~ I ~ d o ~ n o t e ~ t h a t, ~$

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Mr. Murtha, you filed a request for injunction pending appeal in the White case. Clearly, the matter is already before the Court of Special Appeals in the Goodson matter. Based on the Court's rulings, I do believe that under the circumstances it would be appropriate for me to grant your request. I note there's no objection from the State. So the injunction in the Alicia White matter, that will be granted.

MR. MURTHA: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. You can call the other three now.

MR. SCHATZOW: Your Honor, just with regard to that, just so I -- you're staying not just your order in the case, but you're staying the trial as well?

THE COURT: Well, given the fact that the Court of Special Appeals --

MR. SCHATZOW: Yes.
THE COURT: -- kind of told me that they wanted that in the Goodson matter -- oh, sit down.

MR. BATES: Your Honor, just for the record, I want it to be clear that we object on behalf of Allcia White. We invoke our speedy trial rights.

THE COURT: How about I assume that you object to everythıng I to?

MR. BATES: That would be perfect, Your Honor.

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THE COURT: There we go. Appreciate that. All right.

MR. SCHATZOW: Your Honor, do you want me to call all three of the other cases now at once?

THE COURT: I do. Um-hum.
MR. SCHATZOW: Very well. Your Honcr, then State would call the following three cases: State versus Miller, Number 115141034, State versus Nero, Number 115141033 , and State versus Rice, Number 115141035. Again, Your Honor, on behalf of the State, Michael Schatzow, Deputy State's Attorney Janice Bledsoe and Assistant State's Attorneys Matthew Pillion and John Butler.

THE COURT: You may as well speak first.
MR. MURTHA: Thant. you, Your Honor. Good afternoon again, Your Honor. Joseph Murtha on behalf of Walliam Purter. I will note that Officer Porter is nut here with the Court's permission. He has walved his appearance consistent with what he has done in the past when permitted to do so, Your Honor.

MS. FLYNN: Good afternoon, Your Honor.
Cacherine Flynn and Brandon Mead here on behalf of Offacer Miller who's standing to my right.

MR. ZAYON: Your Honor, good afternoon. For the record, Marc Zayon and Allison Levine present on behalf

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of Officer Edward Nero.
MR. BELSKY: Good afternoon, Your Honor.
Michael Belsky and Chaz Ball on behalf of Lieutenant Rice who's present and standing behind me.

THE COURT: All right. We are here because -If you want to just sit down, however you want to set up doesn't really matter to me. We are here because the State has filed a request to compel Officer Porter's testimony in the trials of Officer Miller, Nero and Rice.

Mr. Murtha, I'll hear from you.
MR. MURTHA: Thank you, Your Honor. Your Honor, this is unlike the two other cases which the Court has actually heard. In the Goodson matter, the White matter, those two individuals that were golng to trial,
previcusly the State had clearly idertified that they anticipated that Officer Porter would be a material witness in both of those cases and had put us on advance notice.

And for the purpose of the record, there has been an opposition to the motion to compel that has been filed with the Court. I would adopt and incorporate by reference that document. There is an attachment. That attachment is the motion to quash the subpoena that has -- that was served in both the White and Goodson cases. I would rote that no subpoena has been served in

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regard to Officer Miller, Officer Nero and Lieutenant Rice's cases, but the arguments were incorporated by reference for the purpose of the record and once --

THE COURT: Mr. Murtha, I'm going to make your Job a little bıt easier at the moment. Can you proffer to the Court what your client's testimony would be or position would be as far as testifying in the cases of Miller, Nero and Rice?

MR. MURTHA: If he would be called to the watness stand right now, he would indicate to the Court that he would anvoke his Fifth Amendment privilege.

THE COURT: Thank you. You may be seated.
MR. MURTHA: May I be heard at all, Your Honor?
THE COURT: You will at some point, but not right now.

MR. MURTHA: Okay.
THE COLIRT: State?
MR. SCHATZOW: Your Honor, in light of that, we renew our motion to compel. The motion sets forth in the words of the statute what the two prerequisites, that is, that the State's Attorney for Baltimore City has determıned that the testimony of Officer Forter may be necessary to the public interest. And we also assert that the State's Attorney determined that Officer Porter ıs likely to refuse to testify, which his counsel has

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Just represented.
The statutory prerequisites having been met, Your Honor, we believe that the Court should grant the immunity orders. The issues ralsed by Mr. Porter are 1ssues that $A$, the Court of Special Appeals is looking at, and $B$, are issues that are for the Kastigar hearin'g, not for this stage of the proceedings.

And with regard to the -- I don't know if you want to hear me yet on this, and if you don't, I'm sure you'll tell me. But with regard to the Defendants' motions, cur -- the State's position is they have no standing to make these arguments. Their concerns, as you mentioned, are trial concerns which are to be raised at trial. They have no standing --

THE COURT: Well, as I mentioned for Mr. Bates' argument --

MR. SCHATZOW: Yes.
THE COURT: -- I didn't say anythıng about the others.

MR. SCHATZOW: Yes. But I thank logically the same thing is true, Your Honor, when the State -- when the State wishes to have a witness immunized, obvicusly the Court -- only the Court has the authority to do it; the State makes the motion to the Court but we -- but in analogous situations, there's no room for the Defense.

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If we're conducting a grand jury investigation, and we want to immunize a grand jury witness, we don't have to consult with a putative defendant about it.

THE COURT: We have actual Defendants here, right?

MR. SCHATZOW: We do have actual Defendants. You're right, Your Honor. But if you look at the Herman case, which we cited in the oppositions that we filed this morning to the Defendants', the three Defendants' motions, Third Circuit relying on an old Supreme Court case which was decided before there was use and derıvative use immunity but based on transactional mmunity, both the Supreme Court and the Third Circuit came to the same position, that the immunity statute was not designed to confer rights upon defendants. Their rights are trial raghts. Thelr rights are not to interfere with the State's ability to make reasoned judgments about what may or may not be necessary and what may or may not be in the public interest in terms of making those, you know --

THE COURT: Well, can you proffer to the Court what's the reasoned judument lor Porter's testamony in Officer Miller's casc and Officer Nero's case and Officer Rice's case?

MR. SCHATZOW: Yes, Ycur Henor, I can, although

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just -- if I might for the record say, Your Honor, I'm going to do that. I'm going to do it willingly but as -just for the record, as a matter of law, we don't think. 1t's necessary once the State's Attorney has made that determination. But I'm going to proffer it.

THE COURT: Well, let me ask you something. If the State's Attorney makes the determination, but the Court finds that it's a ruse and subterfuge, what would the Court have to do at that point in time?

MR. SCHATZOW: Well, Your Honor, that's arı interesting question. And I certainly don't want to suggest that the Court is without power to deal with ruses arid subterfuges. That's not what we have here. But it is true that both the Supreme Court of the United States and the Third Circuit have said that as long -that that is a decision that's entrusted to the State's Attorney and that the -- that it would be a violation of the separation of powers to interfere with that determınation.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. SCHATZOW: SO I'm not sayıng that., Your Honor, to insult you or because I'm not going to answer your question --

THE COURT: And you're saying it respectfully, I'm sure Just --

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MR. SCHATZOW: I'm not going to use that word. I was going to use that but --

THE COURT: Everyone uses it.
MR. SCHATZOW: I'll just say it with a great deal of respect. And --

THE COURT: Thanks.
MR. SCHATZOW: -- so that's our legal position, Your Honor.

But to answer your question, to answer your question, there are two areas --

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. SCHATZOW: -- in which this testimony becomes significant and in the public interest. The first is the failure to seatbelt at the second stop. And what Mr. Porter has to say about that in his papers because he was aware, Your Honor, just, you know, that we --

THE COURT: Are you talking about his statement or his trial testimony?

MR. SCHATZOW: Yes. His statement because his trial testimony --

THE COURT: Or.ay.
MR. SCHATZOW: -- no. There was no testimony abcut it. But it is in the transcrift that we used as a demonstrative aid dırıng the trial of Mr. Porter. At

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both pages 39 and page 71, he indicates that the --
Mr. Gray, the decedent --
THE COURT: And 71?
MR. SCHATZOW: And 71, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. SCHATZOW: It's very clear on 39. Seventyone is a little broader, but it's clear on context.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. SCHATZOW: Pages 39 and 71 says he was not seathelted.

THE COURT: Um-hum.
MR. SCHATZOW: The --
THE COURT: Well, doesn't page 40 say, "But agaın, I dıdn't watch the entire ordeal."?

MR. SCHATZOW: That's what he says then and we also -- of course, we also have the video where he's standing there as he's put in the wagon, and Lieutenant Rice is coming out of the wagon so --

THE COURT: So basically what you're sayıng is you're proffering to the Court that in the case of Oificer Miller, Nero and Rice, you need Purter to testify that he was never seatbelted in?

MR. SCHATZOW: That's right, Your Honor, because they're all -- each of them -- each of them are charged with assault and -- just give me one second. Reckless --

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excuse me, not assault. Take that back. Each of the three are charged with recklessness -- with reckless endangerment and masconduct for the fallure to seatbelt at that stop. And ir addition, Lieutenant Rice is charged with manslaughter and assault which we contend stem from the failure to seatbelt at the second stop. So that's one of the two bases, Your Honor, is the failure to seatbelt at the second stop.

THE COURT: So what's the second one?
MR. SCHATZOW: The second one is the place where the injury occurred.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. SCHATZOW: As I'm sure you recall, there was -- the State's position, which has been relied on by both its experts and the State in proving its case, is that the injury to Mr. Gray that proved fatal took place between the second stop and the fourth stop. And the Defense has contended that the injury toot place between the fifth stop and the sixth stop and that is -- the State does not contend that that's --

THE COURT: Well, I'm sorry. Excuse me orie second. You said that you need Officer Porter's testimony based on his statement on pages 39 and 71?

MR. SCHATŻOW: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead.

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MR. SCHATZOW: Excuse me. So in terms of the -and that was related to the second stop, failure to seatbelt, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Um-hum.
MR. SCHATZOW: In terms of the place of injury, Officer --

THE COURT: Well, I'm -- I got to back up. I'm sorry. You're talking about page 71, but if you look at page 70 , the question has to do with what Goodson did. So how does that have any relevance to Nero, Miller and Rice for page 70 and 71?

MR. SCHATZOW: My recollection, Your Honor, and I don't have it in front of me, my recollection was that --

THE COURT: I do.
MR. SCHATZOW: I know you do. My recollection was that ir the context of 70 and 71 , they're talkıng about the totality, not just at the fourth stop, but the totality --

THE COURT: Page 70, lane 20, Detective Andersun, "So what -- what was Goodsun dolng? I mean, did he sea!belt him $1 \mathrm{ri}^{\prime \prime}$

Officer Forter, "Well, he -- I -- I -- I guess he didn't seatbelt hım after I left. No."

Again, Anderson, "So he -- so he wasn't

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seatbelted in？Okay．＂
Detective Teal，＂Do you own a taser？＂
Officer Porter，＂No．I don＇t have one．＂
And so Detective Anderson again，down at
line 11，＂All raght．So at no time did you see him seatbelted in？＂
＂No．Right．＂Any further question，Detective Anderson．That＇s what＇s there．

MR．SCHAT2OW：Yes，Your Honor．＂So at no time did you see him seatbelted 1 n？＂Your Honor．When I was referring to，it was broader in conte\％t than just the second stop．He＇s saying at no time on that day－－ this－－page 71 is near the very end of the interview，as I recall．And so he＇s summing－－Detective Anderson in his question is summing up on an overall basis what is set forth in terms of－－

THE COURT：Well，is Detective Anderson going to testify to that，that he was summing up？

MR．SCHATZOW：I can＇t tell you，Your Honor， that I＇ve asked him that specific question．All I can tell you is we－－that＇s how we read the transcript－－

THE COURT：ciray．
MR．SCHATZOW：－－in addition t．）what＇s on page 39 which is specific to the second stop．

THE COURT：And page 40.

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MR. SCHATZOW: Yeah. This continues on.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. SCHATZOW: Yes.
THE COURT: Go ahead.
MR. SCHATZOW: Okay. So that's one discrete area. And the second area, Your Honor, the second discrete area involves the place of injury.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. SCHATZOW: And there is a dispute, as you're well aware, that -- between the State, which contends that the fatal injuries took place between the second stop and the fourth stop, and the Defense, which contends that the injuries took place between the fifth stop and the sizth stop. And part of what the State relies on and part of what the State's experts rely on are Officer Porter's description of what occurred at the fourth stop --

THE COURT: And you're talk.ng about in his statement or $1 r_{1}$ the trial testimony?

MR. SCHATZOW: In both.
THE COURT: Ol:ay.
MP. SCHATZOW: In buth. In both. And so we don't contend, Your Honor, that it is legally dispesitive of every single charge against each of Mr. -- Messrs. Mıller, Nero and Rıce. But we do think it's important,

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when there＇s a dispute like that，it＇s important to the jury when they start weighing how they＇re going to decide the case．And－－

THE COURT：Well，didn＇t the dispute start when he gave his statement？What I＇m obviously concerned with is you made it very clear to this Court when this case started back when I got involved，sometime in June，what your order was going to be and why．You made it clear that you needed Officer Porter＇s testimony for Gcodson and for White．Whether the Court agreed with that or not was irrelevant．Doesn＇t matter but you made that clear． At no point at all did you ever make it clear to me－－ you may have talked to the Defense attorneys，I don＇t know－－but you never made it clear to the Court that there would be a reason for Officer Porter to effectively testıfy $n$ every single case．

So it＇s either the issue of you didn＇t know， and you didn＇t figure it out until after the trial， although you had his statement，or for some other reason． So I don＇t understand so explain．

MR．SCHATZOW：Your Honer，what you just sald is arcurate．We didn＇t take that position．But we tried ti learn somethıng̣ from our experıence in trying Mr．Porter， and we tried to learn somethirig about what was effective in what we did，what was effective in what the Defense

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did, what we tried to read into what the jury did. And we think we have the right to change our mind, Your Honor. And we acknowledge we're --

THE COURT: Sure.
MR. SCHATZOW: -- changing our mind.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. SCHATZOW: Nobody's trying to mislead you, and we haven't tried to mislead you, and we're not misleading you now. You are absolutely right in what you described as the order that we presented. It's still the order that we want -- would like to try the cases in ultimately. That would be a question for you and -- but the --

THE COURT: More so the Court of Special
Appeals, but we'll see about that, too.
MR. SCHATZOW: And the Court of Special Appeals. But we do think, having watched the case play out, that it's goirig to become important particularly because in the case of the -- of Miller, Nero and Rice, if the jury believes and concludes that the injury happened betweer. stops two and four, I think they look at their culpability in a much different way than if they believe the injury happened between five and siy. It may not be legally dispositave, but $I$ thank at's very important for the jury. And I think that's something that got hammered

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home to us as we looked back on our experience in the Porter case and watched the trial unfold and that's the -- those are the twe reasons, Your Honor. It's as simple as that is, or whether it's complicated or simple, that's what the reasons are.

THE COURT: All right. So as far as the seatbelting, you say that you need Officer Porter's testimony. At what stop you're talking about?

MR. SCHATZOW: Two.
THE COURT: Stop two. That's where the videc is, correct?

MR. SCHATZOW: Correct, Your Honor. That was the -- yeah, the viden with him being -- you know, where they show Mr. Gray on his knees and the leg chalns on him and putting him in the van.

THE COURT: So $1 f$ I understand what you're talking about there, the video showed Officer Porter closer to the van. Officer Porter indicated that he wasn't close to the van and couldn't see anything. So what is it that you need him to say?

MR. SCHATZOW: That he did not -- exactly what he says in his statement. He did not see him seatbelted in that van, and we can show where he was at the time and what his opportunity to observe was and he can -- and he'll say, we assume, if he testifies consistently with

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his statement, that he was not -- he did not see him seatbelted.

THE COURT: So what you're saying is you believe that the testimony that you're -- you're offering immunity in the case of Nero, Miller and Rice for the purpose of Mr. Porter to come in and state that I never saw them seatbelt him in; is that correct?

MR. SCHATZOW: At stop two.
THE COURT: At stop two.
MR. SCHATZOW: Yes.
THE COURT: But then we know that if we go to the next page of his statement, "But again, I didn't watch the entire ordeal." So my question to you is how is that statement going to be admıssible and relevant?

MR. SCHATZOW: Well, $I$ think it will be admıssible and relevant because he says he didn't see him and the -- didn't see him seatbelted, and the video will show what his opportunity to abserve was, when the opportunaty began, when the opportunity ended. And that will allow us to prove that he was net seatbelted in the --

THE CollRT: Well, let me stop ycu there. How does that prove that given that the video doesn't shcw anside the van, correct?

MR. SCHATZOW: No. It doesn't show inside the

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van. You're right, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. SCHATZOW: But what it shows is Lreutenant
Rice stepping out of the van and Mr. Porter stepping back to allow Lieutenant Rice out of the van, and there's no evidence that anybody else ever went into the van. So if he wasn't seatbelted then at stop two, he was not seatbelted at stop two.

THE COURT: Well, does the vadeo show the entire time from Mr. Gray belng placed into the van and Mr. Gray -- the van door closing?

MR. SCHATZOW: I can't say that, Your Honor. If you'll recall, I thank there's some times when the video is pointing down at the street. So I'm not going to say that it proves it to a mathematical certalnty but --

THE COURT: Well, of course. And I don't need you to do that. What I'm trying to figure out, before I make my ruling, is what it is that you want to get because --

MR. SCHATZOW: Right. But -agree, the statute is relatively clear stating when the prosecutor determines that the testimony may be necessary to the public anterest, the Court shall issue arı order requiring the individual give testimony. But I also note that common sense also dictates looking at the Maryland

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Rules, Rule 401 which defines relevant evidence, Rule 5-402 which talks about all relevant evidence is admissible, and things that are not relevant are not admissible, and then the more important one, 5-403 makes it clear that although relevant evidence may be -although relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfalr prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the jury or by considerations of undue delay. And I'm sure that if I let the Defendants stand up, they're going to talk about their speedy trial issues and other things.

So answer that for me now.
MR. SCHATZOW: Well, I -- in terms of speedy
trial, Your Honor, I --
THE COURT: Well, when I say answer that for me now, it really wasn't --

MR. SCHATZOW: Oh.
THE COURT: -- that part of it. Just saying why should I allow it?

MR. SCHATZOW: Because we are making the request. We are making it in good faith. I've explained to yous the two bases -- the two separate bases on which $w=$ have concluded that this testimony is in the public interest. Arid I thank that these -- these are not sort of frivolous or made up arguments. They're real

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arguments, and the statute entrusts the State's Attorney's Office to make the decision of whether it's in the public interest. And I understand Your Honor's desire to make sure that there's not a ruse or some subterfuge going on here. And I assure you there $1 s n^{\prime} t$, and I've explained to you why there isn't.

But once you're past that, Your Honor, then I think it's separation of powers. It's the intent of the legislature. It's the constitutional law. This is the State's Attorney's decision to make, and once they make it, and they make $1 t$ in good faith, then we're done.

Now you have other issues. We're only talking right now, Your Honor, about the question of granting the motion to compel. I'm not saying that because you immunize him that means you're nc longer the judge at trial; you can't make rulings on what's admissible and what's not --

THE COURT: If only.
MR. SCHATZOW: -- Insofar as hıs testimony is -goes. But what I am saying very strongly, Your Honor, that's premature. Those are issues that you'll decide when he's on the witness stand, and we ask a question, and somebody objects, and then you'll make a ruling. And you will not hear me say that because you immunize him then that means he -- you can't control the evidence

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presented to the jury. I'm just saying that it's premature on this particular issue that's before you today right now.

THE COURT: And of course, if I grant him -- if I grant immunity in each of those cases, the next stef that you've asked this Court to do is to postpone the cases.

MR. SCHATZOW: That's correct, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And tell me why I would do that.
MR. SCHATZOW: Well, for -- I think for a -- two different reasons although they're all -- they're kind of related. First off, I think and would submit to the Court that it's the most practical thing to do for these three reasons. One is if you put off these cases, we ultimately get a decision from the Court of Special Appeals, and they tell us what we're -- what to do, and we're all going to do what they tell us what to do.

Then we would have the opportunity, Your
Honor -- you would have the opportunity to schedule the retrial of Mr. Porter first. And if you were to do that, Your Honcr, that would have at least three impacts. It would eliminate the need for a fiastıgar hearing, which could be complex, cuuld be simple, but it could be complex, and it's going to definitely take time no matter what. It will allow the State to avoid the expense and

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problems associated with putting together a clean team sometime before Mr. Porter testifies under immunity and those -- that's -- that is clearly in the public interest to save --

THE COURT: Well, couldn't you have figured that out when you charged these six officers that you would need that, if you wanted their testimony?

MR. SCHATZOW: Well, I don't thınk we assumed, Your Honor, that the first case would end in a mıstrıal and --

THE COURT: Why wouldn't you assume that that's a possibilıty?

MR. SCHATZOW: We did assume it was a --
THE COURT: Mistrial, not guilty, guilty --
MR. SCHATZOW: We did assume --
THE COURT: -- those are the three options.
MR. SCHATZOW: -- we did assume it was a possibility, Your Honor. We did assume that. And Your Honor, I know you don't thank so, but we really do pay attention to what you say and you made -- when you were talking before, you made it fairly clear -- I know you weren't prejudg̣ırig anything. I'm not accusing that. But that it would be necessary for us to have a taint team. And the fact -- a clean -- call it a clean team. You know what I'm talling -- a team that's not exposed to the

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immunized testamony.
And okay, we heard you, Your Honor. The fact 1s in federal --

THE COURT: Well, it's not me. It's the
Court -- the Supreme Court made it clear that if you want to use 1 mmunized testımony how it's done. I had nothing to do with that. That goes way back.

MR. SCHATZOW: Well, no. But it is true, Your Honor, there's a split in circuits about whether -- in the federal circuits there's a split about whether the mere fact that the prosecutor has access to the immunized testimony is actual derivative use if the prosecutor divesn't go out and get evidence based on that.

THE COURT: But of course, you have to prove that.

MR. SCHATZOW: Yes. And we'd have to prove that at a Kastıgar hearing.

THE COURT: Right.
MR. SCHATZOW: And you're absolutely right. It's much easier to prove that if you have a clean team, and you don't have tainted prosecutors. So we antleipated -- we didn't antıcıpate, Your Honor, that we would have such a strong impression that we needed to have a clean team because we san account, in a retrial for Mr. Porter, of all -- fior all the evidence because we

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already have put the evidence in．And so that＇s exactly what our thinking was in response to that．So it would avoid that．

And then secondly，Your Honor，in terms of virtually every objection Mr．Porter has made，both before you and the Court of Special Appeals，if his case were tried before the others，before he was compelled to testify，virtually every one of those objections goes away．

THE COURT：There．I want to do that，dori＇t I？ That＇s my concern to help the state out．

MR．SCHATZOW：No．Well，it＇s not to help the State out，Your Honor．It＇s to help－－

THE COURT：I mean，yes，of course it is．It absolutely，positively－－Mr．Schatzow，it absolutely， positively is．There＇s no other reason for you to say that．I don＇t care whether you have to have a clean team or a dirty team．I don＇t care if you get a guilty，a not guilty，a hung jury．I don＇t care $1 f$ the Defendants are found guilty or not guilty．That＇s for the process．

But for you to sit here and knowing full well that I said no，I＇m not geing to try Mr．forter＇s case next because these other Defendants have a right to go to trial，and then for you at this later poınt in time to say oh，by the way，you know what，we never thought about

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using Porter; we investigated this case for the time that we did; we looked at these cases; we charged the six Defendants; we never, ever thought that we'd possibly have to use Porter's testimony in every case, sounds strange to the Court.

So with all that said, yes, you should have figured this out. Yes, $1 t$ 's your job to do these things. You didn't do it and that's fine. This is where we are.

So sort of apologize for the outburst, but by you saying that you didn't know and that it would help you not to have a talnted team because you think that's what I'm requiring, the law requires it. It would help you so that all the concerns that Mr. Porter has would go by the wayside, not my concern. So please continue.

MR. SCHATZOW: Yes, Your Honor. I'm not trying to suggest it wasn't in the State's interest. I'm not tryang to suggest that at all, Your Honor. I guess what I am trying to suggest is that it's also in the public interest if the Defendants' rights are protected to all -- to have the case go wath a minimum expenditure of public resources. That's all I'm trying to suggest, Your Honor. It's Eertainly 1 r the State's interest, and I don't want you to iriterpret what I'm saying as not being in the state's interest. Of course, it is in the State's 1nterest, but the State is not just some ordinary party

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to the proceedings. We're no more important, we're no more special the Defendants are, but we're not just a private citizen making an argument. And so that's one set of reasons.

And the other set of reasons relates to the things that $I$ said before, these two substantive areas where we think it's in the public interest to have the benefit of his testımony. And Your Honcr, I hear you loud and clear and --

THE COURT: Well, I know you always do, Mr. Schatzow. You're firie.

MR. SCHATZOW: What?
THE COURT: I said I know you always do.
MR. SCHATZOW: So we do think, for the reasons I said before, those two discrete areas, that it makes sense. And you know, all I can do is say this, Judge. I think. I've tried to demonstrate it. We're acting in good falth here. Whether someone, including you, thinks that we should have figured all this out earlier, I don't know what we would have -- well, I do know what we would have done differently. We would have told you in the beginning that we wanted porter in each and every trial. That's whal we would have done differently.

But we are where we are, and $1 f$ somebody is going to be blamed for not having the sufficlent

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foresight, that should be me. But that's where we are, and I urge you to grant these motions. They're being made in good faith. They comply with the statute. They comply with the constitution. And if you have no other questions, Your Honor, I would submıt on what I've said in our papers.

And I would also like Your Honor to incorporate, as Mr. Murtha did, the arguments we made in the Goodson case as well as our written cpposition to the motion to quash filed in the Goodson and White cases.

THE COURT: Very well. Well, in these sases, you did not file a -- there's no subpoena in these cases.

MR. SCHATZOW: We haven't fıled a subpoena, Your Honor, because --

THE COURT: Okay. Just wanted to make sure.
MR. SCHATZOW: -- quite frankly, because where we are in the scheduling.

THE COURT: I uriderstand. All rıght. I Just wanted to make sure that I didn't mıss something.

MR. SCHATZOW: That's accurate. We have not issued the subpoenas. We assume that that part we will Le akle to work sut with Mr. Murtha.

THE COURT: All right. And I do have one more question.

MR. SCHATZOW: Sure.

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THE COURT: The issue concerning the seatbelt again for Officer Porter, if he testifies the way you want him to, are you not setting him up for perjury?

MR. SCHATZOW: I don't see how, Your Honor, because again, this whole -- the perjury --

THE COURT: Well, you --
MR. SCHATZOW: -- Your Honor, I would just --
THE COURT: -- you need him to say --
MR. SCHATZOW: -- I'd just like to get him convicted for what I've charged him with --

THE COURT: I understand.
MR. SCHATZOW: -- before I worry about something else. You know, in terms of the way my understanding, which I think is correct, about the way this works, we cannot use his immunized testimony to prosecute him for perpury that he committed before his immunized testimony if he committed such perjury. So I don't see how we're
 privilege to perjure himself. He's got to tell the truth.

THE COURT: Well, but here's the problem that I see. Under this factual scenarie that you've presented the Court, not the factual scenario for Goodson and White, but under the scenario that you have here, effectively each Defendant has a right to cross-examine

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Mr. Porter, and if he wants to say something different, it kind of impacts their ability to cross. You have the ability to ask questions the way you want, but also there's a right to cross-examine. And you're saying you're granting immunity, but it seems problematic that you get to say all right, we want him to say $X$, and as long as he says $X$, everything is fine. But then when he's gcing to be crossed, he's going to take the Fifth. You're saying well, you know, he's sayıng something different now. So where are we with that?

MR. SCHATZOW: Your Honor, maybe I have a fundamental mısunderstanding. I think when -- his compelled testimony is all of his testimony. In other words, if he says a stoplight was red on direct, and he says ıt's -- and on cross he says it was rainıng, I think the raining is also the subject of the compelled testimony. In other words, you're not going to let him get on the stand and say just answer the prosecutor's questions, and now you can take the Fifth for the --

THE COURT: No. I wouldn't do that.
MR. SCHATZOW: No. So my understanding is we -his immunity applies to his compelled testimoriy. His compelled testimony begins when we start askirig him, and it ends when you excuse him from the witness stand. So I don't see -- you know, so in other words, I want to be

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clear here, Judge. Yeah. Nobody is asking you and we are not giving and we are not seeking a license for him to get on the stand and commit perjury. We're asking to compel his truthful testimony, and we assume that the testimony will be the same regardless of whether we ask the questions or the Defense asks the questions.

THE COURT: The same consistent with this statement, correct?

MR. SCHATZOW: Well, yes. That's our basis for believing what he's going to say because he's already said it. Yes.

THE COURT: Mr. Murtha?
MR. MURTHA: May we fust approach very briefly? And it's just a Porter issue so --

THE COURT: That's fine.
BENCH CONFERENCE
(Bench Conference begins - 02:46:16 p.m.)
(The parties approach the bench where the following ensues:)

THE COURT: Um-hum.
MR. MURTHA: Your Honor, because I know the Court instructed us not to apperid the January 13th, 2015 letter to ary pleading, but in the January 13th, 2015 letter to the Court, the representation that the State made was that they were relying upon the testimony and I

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will -- if the Court has a copy of the letter --
THE COURT: I do.
MR. MURTHA: And it's on the second page. And so I read and reread. It's on the second page, first paragraph. And the State makes the representation not that they're relying upon the statement, but they're relying upon his testimony. Which now there's a shifting sand that, you know, adjusts the foundation upon which I stand upon.

But I would mark as an exhibıt hıs trial testimony for the purpose of the hearing, in light of the representation that had been made, and just admit it to show that there is literally an absence of any testimoriy relating to whether or not Officer Porter made an observation about whether Mr. Gray was seatbelted or not seatbelted.

THE COURT: Here's the situation that I find us in. You're right. We do have the letter here. Which number $1 s$ the September letter? I know I have it --

MR. MURTHA: September the 15th I --
THE COURT: Yeah. No. I'm Just saying whether it was in ur nijt before. It's one of the few times I did allow you to write me as opposed to a motion.

MR. SCHATZOW: Your Honor, I believe the September l5th letter was attached as an exhibıt to --

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THE COURT: I think so.
MR. SCHATZOW: -- somebody's papers. I can't tell you --

THE COURT: That's fine. Ieah, yeah.
MR. MURTHA: It was --
THE COURT: Okay. That's fine.
MR. MURTHA: -- for scheduling. It was actually to all of -- all of the oppesitions included the September the 15 th letter.

THE COURT: Well, here's the thing. All this
may be in another court anyway. You effectively read this into the record just -- I'm not bothered by it. I'm just saying you referred to everything in here. That's fine. I'll let it be an exhibit --

MR. MURTHA: Okay.
THE COURT: -- that you car reference. And then I have no problem with it. That's all. So that's fine.

MR. MURTHA: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay.
(Bench Conference concluded - 02:48:12 p.m.)
(The parties return to the trial tables where the following ensues:)

THE COUFT: So Mr. Murtha, you'se making reference to what now?

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MR. MURTHA: Your Honor, I would ask -- and I actually have a copy; it's highlighted. It the State does not oppose the highlighted version, I could substitute it. That there be marked as Officer Porter's Exhibit A which is a January the l3th, 2016 letter.

THE COURT: It will be Exhibit 1.
MR. MURTHA: Exhibit l, $1 f$ I may approach. I have stickers.

THE COURT: Any objection to the highlighted one, or do you have a clean one over there, Mr. Schatzow?

MR. MURTHA: I have --
MR. SCHATZOW: Oh. Do they have -- I have a --
MR. MURTHA: I have a clean one.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. MURTHA: If I may approach, Your Honor.
Exhibit l. I'm sorry. I didn't fill out these stickers. That would be the January the 13th, 2016 letter to the Court from Mr. Schatzow advising the Court of essentially what has just been argued.

And I wouid note that on page 2 of that letter, in the first paragraph in the representation to the Court, the State siys that they would be relying upon the testimony of Officer Forter. So in anticlpation of today's hearing and searching for why it would be that they would rely upen testimony that literally never

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addressed the issue of seatbelting I would -- I have marked and asked that it be admitted as Defendant's Exhıbit 2, and that is the trial testimony of Officer Porter. And I would proffer that --

THE COURT: Any objection, just for the record?
MR. SCHATZOW: For the letter going in? No,
Your Honor.
THE COURT: And the transcript.
MR. SCHATZOW: Oh, and the transcript? No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. So entered.
(Defendant Porter's Exhibits 1 and 2 are marked for identification and admıtted into evidence.)

MR. MURTHA: And that reason that becomes important is because seven days later, we're in a position where the State has said -- after having the benefit of actually reading the responsive pleadings including the responsive pleading of Officer Porter opposing the motion to compel, saying that nowhere within that trial transcript is there actually any testimony that relates to seatbelt or not seatbelting. And I thint: that's significant because -- and it's not always easy to make accusations of things such as pretext, subterfuge and ruses, but that's what thas is.

And the reason being is slearly the court

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had -- or excuse me, the State had communicated to the Court previously an interest in trying the cases of Officer Miller, Officer Nero and Lieutenant Rice after the retrial of Officer Porter. The Court was not inclined to do that, and I don't think there was ever a formal postponement. And then after a trial on Officer Porter, and after, not at a time of Officer Goodson's trial or Officer Whate's tral but only after injunctive relief had been granted by the Court of Special Appeals, does it become important for the State to actually call Officer Porter as a witness about stop two.

Now I think in the -- it will be reflected in the cross-examination by Mr. Schatzow and also in the closing arguments -- the State ridiculed Officer Porter because Officer Porter indicated when he got out of his car he couldn't see what was going on, and he was vigorously cross-examined about how close he was and then also asked why he couldn't identify who the people were. So here the State's making a representation to the Court that he's a vital material witness of a fact, one, that is never testrfied to, and two, where it being subject to cross-examination, the state held him $1 h_{1}$ contempt for not being able to see what was artually going on. In fact, in the videotape that's being referenced by the State, he turns his back, and he actually approaches the crowd

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because he engages in crowd control.
Now adopting the State's theory of the use of a Defendant as a witness, it would be much easier for the State to look down this trial table and to say you know what, stop two, who could we use? Well, let's see. We have Dfficer Garrett Miller's first, and what we're going to do is we're going to immunize Officer Nero, and we're going to call him because that's our theory. We want the most important witness that can testify to that. Or maybe we even ımmunize Lreutenant Rice because he's third.

How does Officer Porter, whose back is turned to the van before the doors close, who doesn't know whether or not he was seatbelted, become a material witness abrout stcre two? That -- it's a disingenucus pretext for the purpose of getting a postponement. And it's actually -- it's offensive in the sense that the State stands up here and makes the representations that they do, suggesting that it really $1 \mathrm{sn}^{\prime} \mathrm{t}$ for the purpose of getting a postponement.

In regard to the fourth stop, there are three officers that have actually been glven immunity. officer Novak -- and Oificer Novak has been identified as a State witness. Officer Novak did not testify for the State. He's testifled for the Defense. But Officer Novak

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testifies very clearly of his involvement in stop two. He's already been granted immunity. He was a participant in the arrest of Mr. Gray at stop two. He had a bird'seye view of what transpired. They had a sufficient witness who could actually testify.

In regard to the fourth stop, there's Officer Gladhill and there's Officer Wood. Those are other officers actually or Officer Gladhıll, another officer --

THE COURT: And you think you have the authority to tell the State which witnesses to call?

MR. MURTHA: I can't but all these arguments are being made for the purpose of arguing that this is a pretextual effort by the State to postpone the cases and subject Officer Porter -- actually, and I've said it in the pleadings, what they want to do is they want to take him hostage for five cases, and then torture him in his own trial, having laıd a mınefield of suggestıons that he's actually perjured himself. And as the State has acknowledged, and as the Court actually inquired in regard to the extent of cross-examınation, there are limits. We have no -- we are literally powerless in regard to coritrolling the nature of the testimony or objecting to the alr of questioning when he's called as a witness for the State and subject to cross-eyanination by the Defense.

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So it really -- as a zealous advocate for Officer Porter, it's offensive that now he's going to be drawn ints becoming a material witness when never before has he ever been recognized as a material witness.

Your Honor, I've put in our papers. In fact, paragraph 13, page 5 of the papers is a comment by Chief Judge Murphy about has observations, how the nature of the immurity that is extended by Courts and Judicial Proceedings 9-123 really isn't sufficient and suggests that the legislature expand it for the purpose of protecting people who are called as witnesses. And that's why, for all the reasons that have previously been stated, that it -- the protections are not adequate urider the circumstances of this case.

The Court is now powerless. I understand the State says separation of powers. The Court actually -once we check $A, B$ and $C$, the Court has to grant it. But the Cuurt asked very insıghtful questions --

THE COURT: Thanks.
MR. MURTHA: -- specifically -- and I'm always respectful, folks, so I'm not going to use --

THE COURT: There we go. There it $1 s$.
MR. MURTHA: But, well, you asked questions that I would have asked if I had the opportunity. They're questions that -- answersd but aren't complete. There's

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a case from 2002 that Judge Moylan actually wrote the opinion in. And it's actually Charity v. State, and it's 132 Md. App. Reports 598.

Now Charity v. State $1 s$ a case where there was a Maryland State trooper who under the Whren doctrine that was announced by the Supreme Court in regard to a police officer's opportunity to actually make a traffic stop and even if there was a legitımate basis for the traffic stop that allowed them to get to the car. Previcusly, arguments had been made that the ofiicer's actions were pretextual.

Well, Judge Moylan, in this case, chastises the law enforcement efforts to abuse the privilege that had been extended by the Supreme Court in Whren. And Judge Moylan says if there's a lesson to te learned from this case, it is that when the police, and in this case we can substitute prosecutors, are permitted a very broad, persistently controversial investigative prerogative, they would well be off used (sic) when not literally required to do so to exercise their prerogative with restraint and moderation, lest they lose it. Jn fact, he later on goes to say that should the State or law enforcement sontinue to push the envelope out, it may lose the goose that has laid the golden egg.

And the reason $I$ cite the Charity case, because

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it's the only case I could find where the judiciary says to the State you're right. You do have a legitimate basis for coming before the Court and saying that it was valid. But you have pushed the envelope so far out that you're at the point of exploiting the privilege that has been eztended to you. And that's what we have here.

And I don't think the Court is powerless to actually just buy wholesale -- the State makes the representations, but the State also knows the history of these cases. It knows that in September of 2015, the State identıfied the lıneup of the cases and how important it was for Officer Porter to go first because his perceaved Fifth Amendment privilege. But now his Fifth Amendment privilege is disregarded, whether or not he can protect himself and his Si\%th Amendment right to a fair trial later on because --

THE COURT: Well, the Court of Special Appeals will determine that. I made the ruling as I did in the Goodson and White matters. I'll make a ruling in this case based on what is presented. But as far as his protections, the Court of Special Appeals has made it clear they're 1 ritcrested in $1 t$, and they're goirig to make a decision so --

MR. MURTHA: Thy are. But the Court, understanding all the information, can make a finding,

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and that＇s how new case law is made all the time．The Court can make a finding that based on the history of this case and on the facts presented that it really isn＇t in the public interest．

Looking down the lineup here，there could be several other witnesses who provide much more material testimony，and they could receive the benefit of use and derivative use testımony to give a much clearer observation in－－

THE COURT：Well，but once again，that＇s not your job．That＇s solely within the area of the State＇s Attorney＇s Office to make a decision which witnesses they wall call in their case．You have nothing to do with that．Please move on．

MR．MURTHA：That＇s true．But in protecting my clıent－－

THE COURT：Which you have a right to do， obviously．

MR．MURTHA：I assert that because there＇s no doubt in my mınd，and the Court may rule favorably for the State and say Mr．Murtha，nice try，but it Just isn＇t encugh to carry the day．But $I$ do belleve that it is a preteytual effort by the State to seek a postponement．

Now the State is actually assuming a fact that will not have been determıned as of today because they

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asked for a postponement. There is a presumption that the State is making that Officer Porter, after contemplating the Court's decision, will seek injunctive relief and appeal each of the Court's orders if the Court orders him to compel. He didn't see anything at stop two. He wasn't a partıcipant with Officer Nero and Officer Miller. So we have to assess what we're going to do next.

So the state should presume that automatically the Court's order to compel the testimony in each one of these cases automatically should result in postponement. I'm only saying that because, well, one is Mr. Proctor is out of the country raght now, and we haven't assessed what Officer Porter would like to do. It very well -the logic would be that there would be injunctive relief sought and an appeal filed with the Court of Special Appeals. That would be the conventıonal wisdom. And I'm not sayıng that that's not gioing to happen, but I think the state has actually put the cart before the horse, so to speak, in asking for a postponement today when a critical decısıon has not been made that would cause the Court to believe that the cases should be postponed. That is not my argument. That's the argument for the counsel for each of the Defendants.

But I would ask the Court to find that the

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State's efforts to call Officer Porter are pretextual in nature, they are for the purpose of obtaining a postponement, and thrusting Officer Porter into being not just the first case tried but the second case tried and in the process, trampling upon his ability to ultimately have a fair trial in the future, having been subjected to the torture of being a witness in other cases. So for those reasons, Your Honor, I respectfully request the Court not grant the State's request in the three cases where they've sought an order compelling his testimony as a witness. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Counsel for Miller, Nero and Rice, from my perspective, the -- I have read what you filed. The only issue I think would be appropriate -- I mean, the State disagrees you don't have any standing. I disagree with that to some degree. But I will hear you solely on the issue -- want to be heard on the issue of speedy trial, if you want to be heard on that ir not.

MS. ELYNN: Thank you, Your Honor. Catherine Flynn on behalf of Officer Miller.

THE COJRT: What's your name again, ma'am?
MS. FLiNN: That would be Catherine Flynn, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you, ma'am. Go ahead.

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MS. FLYNN: Thank you. I understand the State has not actually formally requested a postponement, but essentially I guess that's why I'm here on behalf of Officer Miller.

THE COURT: Sort of.
MS. FLYNN: All right. So I want to clarify. It's my understanding that the State's position with Officer Porter is that he's a material witness in the prosecution of Officer Goodson and Sergeant White and that the failure to be able to call Officer Porter essentially guts the prosecution of Officer Goodson and Sergeant White. That's my understanding of the State's position as opposed to their position in calling Offacer Porter in Officer Miller's case, that they would like to sall Officer Porter. They may call Officer Porter. But they have not identified him --

THE COURT: It may be necessary to the public interest which is stralght from the statute.

MS. FLYNN: Yes. But they haven't identıfied him in the same way that they did in the Goodson and White case as a material witness and without him they -the prosecution would be gutted of Gfficer Miller.

I do want to clarify that at stop two, my client made a statement, and he was asked what he was doing at stop two, and he indicated that he was filling

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out the tow tag which is the documentation regarding the arrest of Mr. Gray. He indicated he never went into the wagon and that he was outside of the wagon the entire time.

For the sake of argument, I would proffer that we could enter a stipulation about Officer Miller and the seatbelt at stop two. From what I gather, Officer Porter's testımony was that he didn't really see exactly what was going on. And it sounds to me like the State may want to call him to impeach him. But if the only issue is whether or not Officer Miller was involved in seatbelting Mr. Gray at stop two, if asked, I could enter a stipulation to that fact because Officer Miller gave a statement indicating exactly what he was doing at stop two.

The issue about stop --
THE COURT: Well, the issue that I want to hear from you has to do with postponement.

MS. FLYNN: Okay. So the State $1 s$ saying that they need a postponement because they want to call -they want to try Officer Porter's case --

THE COUPT: WEll, I know why they're askıng.
MS. FLYNN: -- first.
THE COURT: My question for you is are you objectıng to a postponement? You're scheduled for --

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MS. FLYNN: March 7th.
THE COURT: March 7th.
MS. FLYNN: I was contacted by the Court last week and given that date, and we are prepared to go forward on March 7th. We are prepared to file all of our pretrial motions as required. What the State $I$ think is failing to --

THE COURT: And you're objecting to -- if the Court were to grant the motion to compel, and if the Court were to stay the case and postpone all the cases, you're objecting to that; is that correct?

MS. FLYNN: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Thank you. Next?
MS. FLYNN: If I could, Your Honor --
THE COURT: Could what?
MS. FLYNN: The State is basıcally saying that without --

THE COURT: I don't want -- again, your issue -your purpose here is whether you agree or not agree with the postponement request.

MS. FLYNN: I understand that, Your Honor. But the Stats is sayirig that they need a successful prosecution one way or another for Oificer Porter --

THE COUPT: I don't really care what they have to say abwout that. And I'm not being funny at all.

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MS. FLYNN: Okay.
THE COURT: I don't care about that because the issue has to do with whether they had the right to do this and the basis for it. So I've got that.

MS. FLYNN: And certainly --
THE COURT: Thank you very much, ma'am. Ma'am, thank you so much.

Next.
MR. ZAYON: Your Honor, thank you. Yes. So Obviously on behalf of Officer Nero, we would object to any postponements. I'm reaffirming his right to a speedy trial at this moment, and I would adopt all of the arguments that Mr. Murtha has made as they apply to my client with regard to why we are objecting to Officer Porter even being compelled as a witness in this case.

I thank I'm set for February 22nd, and there are some scheduling issues with regard to that separate from these issues. Eut I guess we can discuss that at a later time or at this time, whatever Your Honor --

THE COURT: You may want to be ready to talk.
MR. ZAYON: I'm ready when the Court's ready.
THE COURT: llezt.
MR. BELEKi: Good afternoon, Your Honor. On behalf of Lreutenant Rice, we are prepared for trial. We would assert our speedy trial raghts and will tell this

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Court under the guise of speedy trial, my client is actually suspended without pay at this point. He has four children. He has no income coming in relative to his police capacity. He's in hard times right now. He has every interest in getting this case heard at a speedy -- as speedy as possible, and we would assert our speedy trial rights. We're ready to go to trial.

THE COURT: Thank you. You can respond.
MR. SCHATZOW: Your Honor, just very briefly to clear up the record. When Mr. Murtha was referring to Mr. Novak having a bird's-eye view of the arrest at stop two, I think he meant stop one. Stop two is Baker and Mount. Presbury and Mount is where the arrest took place and where Mr. Novak was involved.

When Mr. Murtha said that Officer Gladhill and others were at stop four, stop four was Uruid Hill and Dolphin. Officer Gladhill was not present. Officer Porter was the only one present other than Cfficer Goodson and I --

THE COURT: Well, stop fuur has nothing to do with this, correct, because Miller, Nero and Rice weren't Lhere. That's Just involving Goodson.

MF. SCHATZOW: Well, except it $1 n v o l v e s ~ M i l l e r ~$ in terms of our second point. We've heard about -people have addressed the seatbelt. Nobody really has

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addressed the point about where the injury took place, and that's why stop four is relevant for Miller, Nero and Rice because, as I point out in my letter and according -- the Williams case and the standard jury instruction, it's relevant to the issue of reckless endangerment and lt's also -- it's direiztly relevant, important to the jury because if they didn't seatbelt at stop two, that was the last chance to seatbelt before the injury occurred. That's where --

THE COURT: And you're saying the injury occurred when?

MR. SCHATZOW: Between 2:00 and 4:00, between Baker and Mount and Dolphin Hill (sic) and Druid Avenue.

THE COURT: But you don't know where. It could have been after stop two. It could have been after stop three.

MR. SCHATZOW: Possibly.
THE COURT: It could have been after -- or by stop four, correct?

MR. SCHATZOW: Could have been but yeah, by -we contend it happened by stop four and after stop two. Yes.

THE COIJRT: Ol:ay.
MR. SCHATZOW: And the only other thing I wanted to respond to -- well, two other thangs very briefly,

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Your Honor. When Mr. Murtha talks about paragraph 13 of his papers and what Chref Judge Murphy said when he was part of the -- speaking on behalf of the Criminal Law Article Review Commıttee, it's ironic because he was talking about a transactional immunity statute which he said did not go far enough to provide immunity. It wasn't constitutional because it needed to provide, in the context of the cases he's clting to, Evans and in re Criminal Investigations, because it didn't provide use and derivative use. What Chief Judge Murphy is saying there, and this goes to the substance, Your Honor, and so it completely undermınes Mr. Murtha's substantive arguments because he was speaking in favor of use and derivative use immunity, and he was equating Article 22 to Section 5. And it's right there $1 n$ the notes that Mr. Murtha references which are part of the comments to Section $9-204$.

And, you know, the point I make about stop four, the reckless endangerment actually requires proof that the risky conduct could lead to a significant anjury. And we thank the proof that it did lead to $a$ significalit irijury is such proof.

With regard to the speedy trial arguments, iour Honor, I would simply point out that these cases are -- I think tomorrow -- I mıght be off by a day or twci, but I

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think tomorrow is the eight month anniversary of when the grand jury indictment was returned. And while the State would love to get the cases tried quickly, and we're not asking for some inordinate delay, and I'm sure the Court of Special Appeals will move with what they consider to be promptness and speed, we are not talking, you know, we're not talking about a two-year delay. We're not talking about putting things off for --

THE COURT: Well, what happens if after the case comes back and you -- if I were to grant what you asked, you try Porter, and it's the same result?

MR. SCHATZOW: Well, you know, Your Honor, I would say that we would have to re-esamine it. We recognize that your patience is not unlimited and we recognize that --

THE COURT: Certainly it is.
MR. SCHATZOW: Well, you've demonstrated it to be unlimited. I'll say that. But I'm now trying to look far into the future. And look, Judge, if the case were te mis-try two cases in a row because of hung juries on all counts, obviousiy we'd have to take a look -- a very serious look at it. And our ability to go back to the well repeatedly to ask for the same thang, Your Honor, is limited by the practicalities and the fact that we all lave $1 \mathrm{r}_{1}$ the real world. But where we are right now, in

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terms of right now, we're a day short by my calculations, although I could be off, we're a day short of being eight months out from the indictment. That is not an extraordınary long tıme. To the contrary, it's a pretty short time in this court for cases of this magnitude.

And so I understand the Defendants are making an objection, and I understand that that's their right to make an objection. But I don't think that they meet the four-part test for a speedy trial violation at this point, and I doubt very seriously that they will be able to when the Court promptly schedules the cases in for trial, if the Court were to grant the relief we request, and the Court of Special Appeals speaks to the issue.

THE COURT: Thank you.
MR. SCHATZOW: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. This Court is very clear that the State has broad power to seek 1 mmunity, and when the request is pursuant to Maryland Courts and Judicial Proceedings 9-123, again, as I read a number of times, and the prosecutor determines that the testimony may be necessary to the public interest, the Court shall issue an order reqialing the individual to give testimony. Certanly this Court found in the white case and the Goodson case that it was appropriate based on the proffer of the Stat:.

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The State effectively argues that they don't believe they're required to proffer anything. Of course, that's for another day for someone to determine whether it's a requirement or not. The Court of Special Appeals will make 1t clear. The Court of Appeals or Supreme Court will make it clear whether there's a requirement for the State to proffer to the Court what the information is that they're using. Or is it simply a matter of the Court being a rubber stamp once the Ěecutive Branch says we find that it is necessary to the public interest that the Court is required to grant immunity?

I don't believe that it's that simple. I think under the circumstances presented in the White and Goodson matter, although obviously people disagree with the Court, based on the way it was presented I to believe It was appropriate. This case is a little different and may get to the same result, may not. But this is different because at rio point until January 13 th did the State make $1 t$ clear that Miller, Nero and Rice would be cases where Mr. Porter's testimony would be needed.

Mr. Schatzow indicates that they reassessed things, and I belleve that actually happeried, that things were reassessed, and they made a determınation. But I also do note that the request for immunity for officer

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Porter is directly tied to the State's request to postpone the matters until they can get a more favorable outcome which is what both sides want. Both sides want a favorable outcome to each of the scenarios that are presented for Porter, Goodson, White, Miller, Nero and Rice. So all sides are doing what they believe is appropriate.

This Court, looking at the evidence that the State has proffered, noting that it's for two issues, for the seatbelt issue for Nero, Miller and Rice and for the place of injury. I do note that in the January 13th letter, the State referenced that is important -- also important is Porter's testimony.

Now one could say we're splitting hairs. Is testimony trial testimony, or is testimeny, a statement? Either way, I have taken the time to go through Mr. Porter's statement and to go through Mr. Porter's trial testimony. And as the State pointed out on page 39 of his statement, Mr. Porter indicates, "I never saw them seatbelt him agaın. But again" -- to page 40, says, "But agaın, I didn't watch the entire ordeal." To allow the State to put that testimoriy in during a trial against Nero, Miller or Rice certainly would be possibly problematic with 5-403, unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, mısleading the jury or consideration of undue

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delay.
Undue delay in relationship to the time when these cases are tried, I don't know. We have some trial schedıled for February, that's for Nero. For Miller and Rice, we are scheduled for March, and I do acknowledge that the Court of Special Appeals will not come back with its decision until obviously sometime after the arguments which are March 4th. So I don't know when those cases will come back.

But the State, in the manner in which it's seeking to immunize Mr. Porter for Miller, Nero and Rıce, it does seem to this Court, candidly speakıng, that it's for a dual purpose: to get the postponement that they want, to get around this Court's ruling that these cases need to continue and possibly for the reason stated, that Mr. Porter's testimony is relevant to the seatbelt issue and relevant to the place of injury.

Based on the proffer that's presented by the State and having gone through Mr. Porter's statement and Mr. Porter's trial testimony, I don't necessarily see the seatbelt issue playing out the way the State envisions 1t. Now does that mean that I can't granit them the request? No. It doesn't mean that. But of course, I have to assess it because again, I say $5-403$ is relevant and 5-402 is relevant.

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If Mr. Porter gets on the stand and testifies consistent to his statement, there may be issues, there may not be. I don't know. But the issue with white and Goodson was a simple one, from this Court's perspective. The issue here for Miller, Nero and Rice is not simple. I do not believe that based on the proffer presented by the State for the seatbelt issue and the place of injury, the concerns that this Court has with the speedy trial rights of the Defendants, the concern that this Court has with the position that Mr. Porter will be placed $1 n$ by the request of the State and again, I quess most importantly, finding that the request for immunity has more to do with getting around the Court's postponement request than anything else, I do not find it is appropriate, and the request for immunity for Mr. Porter for Miller, Nero and Rice is denied.

Thank you.
MR. SCHATZOW: Thank you, Your Honor.
MP. MURTHA: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Counsel, approach. All ccunsel
approach. Well, all --
MR. MURTHA: T'1l --
THE COURT: One representative for each cine. I just want to quickly --

MR. MURTHA: Well, actually, I should --

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THE COURT: Even you. Even you. Even you. It's a quick question.

BENCH CONFERENCE
(Bench Conference begins - 03:18:19 p.m.)
(The parties approach the bench where the following ensues:)

MR. ZAYON: Should be siy.
THE COURT: Yeah. I was just checking. Is anyone planning to respond to the motion to intervene?

MS. BLEDSOE: I can't hear him.
MR. ZAYON: I didn't hear -- the motion?
MS. BLEDSOE: I can hear --
THE COURT: Is anyone planning to respond to the motion to intervene? I'm just curious.

FEMALE SPEAKER: Motion to what?
MS. ELEDSOE: For the media.
MR. SCHATZOW: Oh, for the media.
MALE SPEAKER: Intervening.
MS. BLEDSOE: Oh.
MALE EPEAKER: No.
THE COURT: Ol:ay. I know someone --
MATIF SPEAKER: Is --
THE CCIURT: -- had sald they were so I -before --

MR. SCHATZOW: Not at this point.

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THE COURT: Okay. That's all I cared about. You may as well stay here. No, we can do it on the record. I just want to -- as far as postpone, I'm not postponing anything unless -- well, I'm not so --

MR. ZAYON: Okay.
THE COURT: -- step back.
MR. ZAYON: Okay.
THE COURT: Okay.
THE COURT: Okay.
(Bench Conference concluded - 03:18:51 p.m.)
(The parties return to the trial tables where the following ensues:)

THE COURT: Let's see. Excuse me one second. BENCH CONFERENCE
(Bench Conference begins - 03:19:05 p.m.)
(A woman approaches the bench where the following ensues:)

THE COURT: Do I have to do anything?
FEMALE VOICE: (Inaudible).
THE COURT: I did. That's what I just did. I just don't know -- I was wondering if -- okay.
(Bench Conference concluded - 03:19:14 p.m.)
(A woman leaves the bench where the following ensues:)

THE COURT: All right. Anything else from any

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of the parties?
MR. SCHATZOW: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Thank you.
MS. FLYNN: Yes, Your Honor.
MR. MURTHA: Excuse me.
THE COURT: What?
MS. FLYNN: Well, I have a trial date, and are we going to schedule a motions --

THE COURT: Yeah. We certainly are. Your trial is scheduled, as far as I know, and certainly the neyt one up is Nero. You're after Nero, and you're after Miller. So as far as this Court is concerned, we're continuing.

MR. BELSKY: I hate to do this but can we -THE COURT: I can't hear you.

MR. BELSKY: Can we approach for one second? I'm sorry.

THE COURT: Ok:ay. Fine.
BENCH CONFERENCE
(Rench Conference begins - 03:19:52 p.m.)
(The parties approach the bench where the following ensues:)

MR. EELSKY: I apoloyize. Right now my trial is scheduled for March 9th. I'm tryang to schedule a surgery at this point. Ms. Flynri's client is scheduled

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to go March 7th. Am I to assume in scheduling that I'm not going March 9th or --

THE COURT: I have no clue at this point.
MR. BELSKY: Okay.
THE COURT: Rıght now, I'm -- all I'm more concerned with -- all I'm more concerned with; that's not even grammatically correct. I'm more concerned with Nero's case because that's the next one up.

MR. BELSKY: Sure.
THE COURT: Now certainly we'll find, after we deal with Nero, where are we with Mıller. Is it likely that it will be postponed? I don't know. But I don't know the circumstances that we find ourselves in so --

MR. BELSKY: Okay. Well, I can reach out.
MR. ZAYON: So let me, if I may with regard to Nero, and I mean, you guys can chıme in or not chime in. I have no idea. But my understanding -- and it's fine. I Just have to get with my experts and get everything done.

THE COURT: Um-hum.
MR. ZAYON: But my uriderstanding was always that Nero was golry after Miller. And the last time everything was postponed, I wasn't invited to that postponement party.

THE COUKT: You sure weren't.

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MR. ZAYON: But my understanding was that's just because you didn't get to me yet, and that case was going to be postponed.

THE COURT: And here's the issue. As I stated from the beginning, I did not expect my ruling to go to the Court of Special Appeals. I can only speak --

MR. ZAYON: Well, none of us expected that, I guess. So right but --

THE COURT: So we are where we are. We're trying these cases. We're moving forward so --

MR. ZAYON: Okay. Because we've been -- are you fine with that? I mean, I guess it doesn't matter if they're fine because we --

MS. BLEDSOE: It doesn't matter what we're fine with, clearly.

MR. ZAYON: Okay. All right.
MR. BELSKY: Why don't we all talk?
MS. RLEDSOE: We're not calling the shots on this one.

THE COIJRT: Yeah. So we'll see where we are. So you'll be getting a scheduling -- got to send this out later today.

MR. BELSKY: Ferhaps --
MR. 2AiON: We could save you a stamp, and you can just hand it to us.

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THE COURT: No. We'll send it out. We'll get it to you. Okay.

MR. BELSKY: Perhaps we all could talk and --
THE COURT: You all can do what you want. And I don't mean that in a flippant way. I mean --

MS. BLEDSOE: We know what we need to do.
THE COLIRT: Right.
MS. BLEDSOE: And we'll do what we need to do.
THE COURT: And I'm sure that will happen. I'm sure this is not the last I've heard of this. What a shock.

MS. BLEDSOE: [ know, Judge.
THE COURT: Yeah.
MS. BLEDSOE: Is what it is.
THE COURT: Absolutely. But this will go out later today sayıng that the trial in this matter scheduled to begirı February 22nd, 2016, barring me hearing anything from anyone who has more power than me -- and candidly speakirig, it's only a small group of people whe have more power than me on this issue -- if I hear from them, I do what they tell me to do. If I don't hear from them, ws move forward.

MS. BLEDSOE: Oray.
MK. BELSKY: Thank you, Youi Horior.
MR. ZAYON: Underscood. Okay.

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MS. BLEDSOE: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All righty.
(Bench Conference concluded - 03:22:06 p.m.)
(The parties return to the trial tables where the following ensues:)

THE COURT: Thank you everyone. Court's in recess. You all can go. I got to clean up and also got to stand up slowly.
(Off the record - 03:22:19 p.m.)

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This is to certify that the proceedings in the matter of State of Maryland versus Edward Michael Nero, Case Number 115141033; State of Maryland versus Garrett Edward Miller, Case Number 115141034; State of Maryland versus Brian Rice, Case Number 115141035; and State of Maryland versus Alicia White, Case Number 115141036, heard in Circult Court for Baltimore City on January 20, 2016, was recorded on digıtal media with video.

I hereby certify that the proceedings herein contained were transcribed by me or under my direction. That said transcript is a true and accurate record to the best of my ability and constıtutes the official transcript thereof.

In witness thereof, I have hereunto subscribed my name on February 8th, 2015.


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NOW COMES the State of Maryland, by and through Marilyn J. Mosby, the State's Attorney for Baltimore City; Michael Schatzow, Chief Deputy State's Attorney for Baltimore City; Janice L. Bledsoe, Deputy State's Attorney for Baltimore City; and Matthew Pillion, Assistant State's Attorney for Baltimore City; and pursuant to Section 12-301 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland hereby notes an appeal on behalf of the State from a final judgment of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City entered on January 20, 2016, in the above-captioned case denying the State's Motion to Compel a Witness to Testify Pursuant to Section 9-123 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.

Respectfully submitted, Marilyn J. Mosby



Janice L. Bledsoe (\#68776) Deputy State's Attorney 120 East Baltimore Street The SunTrust Bank Building Baltimore, Maryland 21202 (443) 984-6012 (telephone) (443) 984-6256 (facsimile) ibledsoe@stattorney.org


Matthew Pillion (\#653491)
Assistant State's Attorney
120 East Baltimore Street The SunTrust Bank Building Baltimore, Maryland 21202 (443) 984-6045 (telephone) (443) 984-6252 (facsimile) mpillion@stattornev.org

## CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 4th day of February, 2016, a copy of the State's Notice of Appeal was mailed and e-mailed to:

Joseph Murtha
Murtha, Psoras \& Lanasa, LLC
1301 York Road, Suite 200
Lutherville, Maryland 21093
(410) 583-6969
jmurtha@mpllawyers.com
Attorney for Officer William Porter

Gary Proctor
Gary E. Proctor, LLC
8 E. Mulberry St.
Baltimore, MD 21202
410-444-1500
garyeproctor@gmail.com
Attorney for Officer William Porter

Respectfully submitted,
Marilyn J. Mosby


Now comes the State of Maryland, by and through Marilyn J. Mosby, the State's Attomey for Baltimore City: Michael Schatzow, Chief Deputy State's Attomey for Baltimore City; Janice L. Bledsoe, Deputy State's Attomey for Baltimore City; and Matthew Pillion, Assistant State's Attomey for Baltimore City; and pursuant to the Court's inherent power requests that this Court issue a stay of the above-captioned proceedings pending resolution of the appeal filed by the State on February 4, 2016, from the final judgment of this Court entered on January 20, 2016, denying the State's Motion to Compel a Witness to Testify Pursuant to Section $9-123$ of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article ("CJP" herennafter).

## I. Summary of Arqument

Despite the Court's good intentions in seeking to avoid delay of the Defendant's trial, the Court's denial of the State's Motion to Compel Officer William Porter's testimony ran contrary to the plain language of CJP § 9-123 and to the Legislature's intent in enacting the immunity statute. It also violated separation of powers principles by appropriating to the Judiciary a discretionary power granted to the Executive Branch. The State is now appealing these errors given their ramifications on the State's ability to prosecute this and other cases here and throughout the State. As outlined below and previously argued, this Court had no authority to engage in judicial review of the State's Attomey's vested exercise of lawful discretion in determining that Officer Porter's testimony may be necessary to the public interest in the State's prosecution of the Defendant for his role in the fatal arrest and custodial transportation of Mr.

Freddie Gray. Instead, this Court had only the power to verify that the State's Motion to Compel complied with the procedural and pleading requirements of Section 9-123. Upon finding such compliance, the Court was required to follow the mandate of the Legislature and issue the immunity order.

Though the Court has disagreed with the State's assessment of the statute's mechanics, the State's arguments about Section 9-123's power distribution are strong. Moreover. the Court acted without any express authority or guidance on this issue from either of Maryland's appellate courts-and in the face of overwhelming precedent from other jurisdictions. If, as the State firmly maintains, this Court was, in fact. wrong in its denial of the State's Motion to Compel, to deny the State any meaningful opportunity for appellate review of that decision would potentially result in a miscarriage of justice in the Defendant's trial. The People of this State deserve that opportunity, and this Court has always demonstrated a commitment to giving both the Defendant and the People a fair trial. That commitment now requires allowing a higher court to review this Court's decision before moving forward in this case. As such, this Court should exercise a discretionary power it unquestionably possesses-the power to stay the proceedings pending the State's appeal.

## II. Background

On January 14, 2016, the State filed in the above-captioned case a Motion to Compel a Witness to Testify Pursuant to Section 9-123 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. The witness in question was Officer William Porter. The State's Motion, submitted and signed by the State's Attorney herself, averred that the State may call Officer Porter to testify against the Defendant and set forth her determınations that Officer Porter's testimony may be necessary to the public interest and that he is likely to refuse to testify on the basis of his privilege against
self-incrimination given his similar refusal to testify in the related cases of State v. Caesar Goodson (No. 115141032 ) and State v. Alicia White (No. 115141036 ).

On January 15, 2016, the Defendant filed an Opposition to the State's Motion to Compel. The Defendant attacked the State's Motion as lacking an explanation of "why Officer Porter is either necessary or material to the trial of Defendant Rice or how it is necessary to serve the public interest." Def. Opp. at 1. The Defendant argued that Officer Porter's testimony is, in fact, not necessary to the public interest based on his assessment of the State's reasons for filing the motion and his view of the motion's effect on both his and Officer Porter's constitutional rights. Def. Opp. at 2-3. As such, he urged the Court to deny the motion. Likewise, on January 19. 2016, Officer Porter filed an Opposition to the State's Motion in which he too requested that the Court deny the State's Motion on grounds that the Court should find that compelling his testımony would not be necessary to the public interest and would violate his pnvilege against self-incrimination. Def. William Porter's Opp. at 8.

On the moming of January 20, 2016, the State filed a Response to the Defendant's Opposition, arguing that Section 9-123 granted neither the underlying defendant nor the witness standing to make such objections to the State's request for a grant of immunity and that under the plain terms of that statute, this Court lacked the discretion to deny a motion to compel ummunized testimony when presented with a motion that complied with the statute's procedural requirements. Because the State's Motion to Compel unquestionably did comply with Section 9123, the State urged this Court to follow the statute's mandates and issue the order to compel Officer Porter's testimony under a grant of use and derivative use immunity.

On the afternoon of January 20, 2016, this Court conducted a hearing on the State's Motion to Compel. At that hearing, the State repeated the arguments presented in its Response.

Nevertheless, the Court considered objections from both Officer Porter and the Defendant and then required the Chief Deputy State's Attomey to explain in open court the reasons that prosecutors believed that Officer Porter's testimony may be necessary to the public interest. Though the State maintained that such a judicial inquiry was improper under Section 9-123 and separation of powers principles, the Chief Deputy explained that the State sought to elicit from Officer Porter testimony regarding two important aspects of the charges against the Defendant. Consequently, the State's Attorney had determined that such testimony may be necessary to the public interest. The Court then made its own determination that granting him immunity would not be in the public interest, irrespective of the State's Attomey's contrary determination as properly pled in her Motion to Compel, and the Court denied the Motion. From this denial, the State filed a Notice of Appeal on February 4, 2016.

## III. This Court should stay the proceedinas pending appellate review of the Court's

 erroneous denial of the State's Motion to Compel to avoid a miscarriape of iusticeA. Denying the State's request for a stay would impermissibly frustrate an appellate court's ability to act

Pending appellate review of this Court's denial of the State's Motion to Compel Officer Porter, the State requests that the Court issue a stay of the proceedings. This Court has the full power to issue such a stay and has granted one in the related case of State v. Alucia White (No. 115141036). As the Court of Appeals has described, when such an appeal is taken, "the trial court retains its 'fundamental jurisdiction' over the cause, but its right to exercise such power may be interrupted by . . . a stay granted by an appellate court, or the trial court itself, in those cases where a permitted appeal is taken from an interlocutory or final judgment." Pulley v. State, 287 Md. 406, 417 (1980). Though this Court retains "fundamental jurisdiction" over this
proceeding, the Court of Appeals has also held that "the propriety of the exercise of that jurisdiction" is a separate matter. In re Emileigh F., 355 Md. 198, 202 (1999). In that regard, "[a]fter an appeal is filed, a trial court may not act to frustrate the actions of an appellate court," and "[p]ost-appeal orders which affect the subject matter of the appeal are prohibited." Id. at 202-03; see also State v. Peterson. 315 Md. 73, 82, n. 3 (1989) ("We think that a trial court ordinarily should not proceed with a hearing [when a writ of certiorari has been issued], thereby mooting an issue before an appellate court."); accord Jackson v. State, 358 Md. 612, 620 (2000) (While "a circuit court is not divested of fundamental jurisdiction to take post-judgment action in a case merely because an appeal is pending from the judgment," "[w]hat the court may not do is to exercise that jurisdiction in a manner that affects either the subject matter of the appeal or the appellate proceeding itself-that, in effect, precludes or hampers the appellate court from acting on the matter before it.") (emphasis in original). Were this Court to order that the Defendant's trial will not be stayed and that the State must proceed to trial without the testimony of Officer Porter, such an order would unquestionably frustrate the actions of an appellate court, effectively mooting the State's appeal and preventing any further review of this Court's denial of the Motion to Compel.

## B. Denving the State's request for a stay would needlessly cause irreparable harm

Moreover, a decision by this Court not to stay the proceedings would cause irreparable harm to the State's ability to prosecute this case at no commensurate gain to Officer Porter or the Defendant. Indeed, Officer Porter, the appellee in the appeal, will not be affected by a stay. Despite the State's request to schedule his retrial soon after the December mistrial and before trial of the related cases, Officer Porter's retrial was set for June 13, 2016, due to the asserted unavailability of his counsel prior to that date. Consequently, the State's appeal should be
resolved by then. Regarding the Defendant, he will not be a party to this appeal. As such, granting the stay would cause the Defendant to lose only a legally insignificant short amount of time awaiting resolution of the appeal before starting his trial.' On the other hand, denying the stay would cost the State a valuable witness in its case. Officer Porter would provide key evidence regarding the Defendant's alleged misconduct and his alleged recklessness. Once the jury has been sworn in the Defendant's trial. however, the State will be foreclosed from seeking any meaningful remedy to this Court's dental of the Motion to Compel. If the Defendant were acquitted after a trial without Officer Porter's testimony, the damage would be done and could not be undone.

A stay would obviate the risk of such a potentially unfaur result, a risk made all the more compelling given the public interest that abounds in this matter. At stake here is not only the outcome of one of the most hugh-profile criminal trials in Maryland history but also the very fiber of our State's constitutional separation of powers. This Court's denial of the Motion to Compel has deprived prosecutors of both a valuable witness in this case and also an indispensable prosecutorial tool that the Legislature provided to them over twenty-five years ago. Whether this Court's ruling is correct or whether the State's view is proper is a question which an appellate court should be permitted to timely answer. The public interest deserves no less, particularly in light of the strong merits of the State's case on appeal.

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## C. The State will likely prevail on appeal

The merits of the State's appeal will tum on the question of whether CJP § 9-123 requires a court to order compelled, immunized witness testimony after verifying that the statutory pleading requirements of the prosecutor's motion to compel have been met, or whether the statute instead permits a court to substitute its own discretion and judgment as to whether compelling the witness's testimony may be necessary to the public interest such that the court may deny a prosecutor's motion to compel even if the motion otherwise complies with the pleading requirements of the immunity statute. By its terms, CJP § $9-123$ squarely answers this question, vesting the decision about whether to seek immunity for a witness squarely within a prosecutor's discretion and granting a court only the role of confirming that the prosecutor's pleadings are procedurally compliant and then issuing the immunity order as statutorily prescnbed. In relevant part. § 9-123 states:
(c) Order requiring testimony. --
(1) If an individual has been, or may be, called to testify or provide other information in a criminal prosecution or a proceeding before a grand jury of the State, the court in which the proceeding is or may be held shall issue, on the request of the prosecutor made in accordance with subsection (d) of this section, an order requiring the individual to give testimony or provide other information which the individual has refused to give or provide on the basis of the individual's privilege against selfincrimination.
(2) The order shall have the effect provided under subsection (b) of this section.
(d) Prerequisites for order. -- If a prosecutor seeks to compel an individual to testify or provide other information, the prosecutor shall request, by written motion, the court to issue an order under subsection (c) of this section when the prosecutor determines that:
(1) The testimony or other information from the individual may be necessary to the public interest; and
(2) The individual has refused or is likely to refuse to testify or provide other information on the basis of the individual's privilege against selfincrimination.

Cts. \& Jud. Proc. Art. § 9-123(c)-(d) (2015) (emphasis added). This language leaves no ambiguity about the prosecutor's and the judge's respective roles-the prosecutor makes the discretionary determination of the public's interest and then requests immunized testimony, while the judge determines only the request's accordance with the statute and then orders immunized testimony. Nowhere does this language permit the court to inquire into the prosecutor's decision-making, nor does the statute allow the subject of the immunity request or the underlying defendant to object to the manner in which the prosecution has exercised its discretion. The court has no discretion to deny a prosecutor's immunity request properly pled under subsection (d).

The history of § 9-123 confirms that this plain language achieves precisely the result that the legislature intended. As described by the House of Delegates, the immunty statute was intended

FOR the purpose of authorizing certain prosecutors in certain circumstances to file a written motion for a court order compelling a witness to testify, produce evidence, or provide other information; specifying the effect of the order; prohibiting testimony or other evidence compelled under the order or certain information derived from the compelled testimony or evidence from being used against the witness except under certain circumstances; requiring a court under certain circumstances to wsuc an order requiring a witness to testify or provide other information upon request by a prosecutor; establishing procedures for enforcement of an order to testify or provide other information; defining certain terms; and generally relating to immunity for witnesses in proceedings before a court or grand jury.

1989 Md. Laws, Ch. 289 (H.B. 1311) (emphasis added). The phrase "requiring a court" does not equate with "allowing a court"; rather, the Legislature's purpose was to create a mandatory judicial action.

Moreover, a formal Position Paper contaned within the legislative history bill file for HB 1311 similarly describes the procedural mechanism of the proposed new immunity statute:

By far the most significant changes provided by the proposed statute are procedural. Immunity would no longer be conferred automatically or accidentally, but rather only through court order. To ensure coordinated, responsible requests for immunity, the decision to seek a court order requires approval by the State's Attomey, Attomey General, or State Prosecutor. The State's Attomey, Attomey General, or State Prosecutor will thereby have central control and ultimate responsibility for the issuance of grants of immunity.

The judicial role under this statute is ministerial. The judge verifies that:
I. The State's Attorney, Attorney General, or State Prosecutor has approved the request for an immunity order:
2. The witness has refused or is likely to refuse to testify;
3. The prosecutor has determined that the witness's testimony may be necessary to be the public interest [sic].

Once the judge concludes these three requirements are met. he issues a court order compelling testimony and immunizing the witness.

The Judge will not himself determine whether the witness's testimony may be necessajy to the public interest. To do so would transform the Judge into a prosecutor and require him to make delicate prosecutorial judgments which are inappropriate. Furthermore, a particular immunity grant may be a very small aspect to a large scale investigation, making it impossible for the judge to make any meaningful evaluation of the public interest.

Position Paper on HB 1311, Witness Immunity, 8-9, 1989 Reg. Sess. (1989) (emphasis added)
(attached as State's Exhibit 1). ${ }^{2}$
Additionally, the legislature's Division of Fiscal Research submitted a Fiscal Note for
House Bill 1311, summarizing the proposed immunity statute as follows:
SUMMARY OF LEGISLATION: This amended bill provides for the granting of 'use' immunity to witnesses compelled to testify regarding a criminal matter. Specifically, if a witness refuses to testify on a criminal matter, on the grounds of privilege against self-incrimination, the Court may compel the witness to testify or provide information by issuing a court order to that effect. The court order would only be granted upon the written request of the prosecutor, who has found that the testimony or information of a witmess may be necessary to the public interest, and that the testimony or information would not be forthcoming absent the order.

[^1]Criminal prosecution would be allowed against the witness for the crimes that were tesufied about; such testimony, however, would not be 'used' against the witness in any criminal case except those involving the failure to comply with the Court's order.
Md. Gen. Assembly Div. of Fiscal Research. Fiscal Note Revised for H.B. 1311, 1989 Reg. Sess. (Apr. 4, 1989) (emphasis supplied) (attached as State's Exhibit 2).

These materials make clear that the General Assembly intended CJP § 9-123 to grant to the Executive Branch the sole power to determine whether giving a witness immunity would in fact be in the public interest and to authorize the Judiciary to serve only the ministerial role of supervising the procedure of granting immunity. Consequently, this Court's attempt-however well intentioned-to limit and appropriate to itself the prosecutor's statutorily vested immunity authority volated Maryland's separation of powers principles. See Md. Decl of Rights, Art. 8 ("the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial powers of Govemment ought to be forever separate and distinct from each other . . ."). This plain language and legislative history analysis of CJP § 9-123 by itself makes clear that the State will prevail on the merits of its appeal from this Court's denial of the Motion to Compel.

While Maryland's appellate courts have yet to construe CJP § 9-123's division of power. the statute's legislative history suggests that another ready source of guidance lies in federal law. As the Position Paper on HB 1311 correctly noted at the time § $9-123$ was being considered, "[t]he proposed statute is based substantially on the federal immunity statutes: 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-04 (1985)." Position Paper, supra at 2. That federal statutory scheme provides in relevant part:
§ 6003. Court and grand jury proceedings
(a) In the case of any individual who has been or may be called to testify or provide other information at any proceeding before or ancillary to a court of the United States or a grand jury of the United States, the United States district court for the judicial district in which the proceeding is or may be held shall issue, in
accordance with subsection (b) of this section. upon the request of the United States attorney for such district, an order requiring such individual to give testimony or provide other information which he refuses to give or provide on the basis of his pnvilege against self-incrimination, such order to become effective as provided in section 6002 of this title [ 18 USCS § 6002].
(b) A United States attomey may, with the approval of the Attomey General, the Deputy Attomey General, the Associate Attomey General or any designated Assistant Attomey General or Deputy Assistant Attomey General. request an order under subsection (a) of thus section when in his judgment--
(l) the testimony or other information from such individual may be necessary to the public interest; and
(2) such individual has refused or is likely to refuse to testify or provide other information on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination.

18 U.S.C. § 6003 (emphasis added). This provision uses a materially identical procedure as that outlined in CJP § 9-123, and federal courts have amassed a substantial body of law construing this provision's distribution of power between the court and the prosecutor in a manner that strongly indicates that the State will prevail on appeal.

At the foundation of these federal precedents lies the Supreme Court's construction of a predecessor immunity statute in Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956). There the Supreme Court considered the question of whether a witness could properly request a judge to deny an immunity application that otherwise comported with the statutory pleading prerequisites, which at the time required an averment that "in the judgment of a United States Attorney, the testimony of [the] witness . . . is necessary to the public interest" and also required that the United States Attorney obtain "the approval of the Attomey General" before making an application to the court. Id. at 423-424. The Government argued "that the court has no discretion to determine whether the public interest would best be served by exchanging immunity from prosecution for testimony [and] that its only function is to order a witness to testify if it determines that the case is within the framework of the statute." Id. at 431. The Supreme Court agreed that "[a] fair reading of [the immunity statute] does not indicate that the
district judge has any discretion to deny the order on the ground that the public interest does not warrant $i t$ "; rather, the court's "duty under [the statute] is only to ascertain whether the statutory requirements are complied with by [prosecutors]." Id. at $432-34$ (emphasis supplied).

After Congress enacted the procedurally similar present-day immunity scheme, the federal Circuit Courts of Appeal have uniformly construed those provisions in accordance with Ullmann. For example, In re Kilgo, 484 F.2d 1215 (4 ${ }^{\text {th }} \mathrm{Cir} 1973$ ), involved an appellant who had been held in contempt after refusing to testify despite being immunized and compelled under the federal immunity statute. He claimed, in part, "that the immunity order, on which the contempt citation rest[ed], [was] invalid [because] neither he nor the court was apprised of the basis of the United States Attorney's conclusion that his testimony was necessary to the public interest Id. at 1217. The Fourth Circuit found no merit in this contention, explaining

No case interpreting the public interest provision of the 1970 Act [enactung the immunity scheme] has been called to our attention. However, cases construing analogous requirements in earlier immunity statutes establish that the district court is not empowered to review the United States Attorney's judgment that the testimony of the witness is necessary to the public interest. The leading case is Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 100 L. Ed. 511, 76 S. Ct. 497 (1956), which construed the Immunity Act of 1954 [18 U.S.C. § 3486] dealing with grand jury inquiries involving national security. That Act also limited grants of immunity to witnesses whose testimony, in the judgment of the United States attomey, was necessary to the public interest. The Court, recognizing the potential constitutional question that would arise if the judiciary reviewed the merits of immunity, construed the statute to withhold from the district court 'any discretion to deny the order on the ground that the public interest does not warrant it.' 350 U.S. at 432. It held that the function of the district court was limited to ascertanning whether the application complied with the statutory requirement -that is, had the United States attorney certified that in his judgment the testimony of the witness was in the public interest. [...] The drafters of the 1970 Act left no doubt that the construction given to the public interest provision in previous immunity acts was to be applied to § 6003, and the legislative history confirms the limited role of the court. Because the Act does not authorize the district court to review the United States attomey's judgment that the testimony of the witness may be necessary to the public interest, no evidence pertaining to this judgment need be offered.

Id. at 1218-19.
Similarly, the Thrd Circuit described the procedural operation of the federal immunity statutes in In re Grand Jury Investigation, 486 F.2d 1013, 1016 ( $3^{\text {rd }}$ Cir. 1973), saying, "[u]nder the language of [ 18 U.S.C. § 6003] the judge is required to issue the order when it is properly requested by the United States Attorney," and "[h]e is given no discretion to deny it." Likewise, the First Circuit in In re Lochiatto, 497 F.2d 803, 805 ( $1^{\text {s }}$ Cir. 1974), construed § 6003 in accordance with Ullmann as using language that "does not indicate that the district judge has any discretion to deny the order on the ground that the public interest does not warrant it." Accord In re Maury Santiago. 533 F.2d 727, 728-29 (1 ${ }^{\text {st }}$ Cir. 1976) ("The U.S. Attorney filed a letter from a proper official of the Justice Department authorizing him to request immunity for Maury. He stated in open court that Maury's testimony was, in his opinion, necessary to the public interest. The judgment of the U.S. Attomey is unreviewable in this matter . . . and we see no reason to require that this representation be put in affidavit form."); United States v. Levya, 513 F.2d 774, 776 ( $5^{\text {th }}$ Cir. 1975) (holding that the witness was not entitled to notice and a hearing before an immunity order is granted and construing that "since the court's duties in granting the requested order are largely ministerial, when the order is properly requested the judge has no discretion to deny it."); Urasaki v. United States District Court, 504 F.2d 513, 514 ( $9^{\text {th }}$ Cir. 1974) ("In passing upon an immunty application, the district court is confined to an examination of the application and the documents accompanying it for the purpose only of deciding whether or not the application meets the procedural and substantive requirements of the authorizing statute. [...] Adversary procedure is not a part of the legislative scheme in connection with the district court's performance of its limited duties in granting or denying the application for immunity."). Lastly, in Ryain v. Commissioner, 568 F.2d 531, 541 ( $7^{\text {th }}$ Cir. 1977), the Court rejected an appellant's
claim that an immunity order was invalid because the record "did not contain facts showing that the prosecutor had any basis for making the judgment that the grant of immunity would be in the public interest." As the Court explained, "[s]ince that judgment is entirely a matter for the executive branch, unreviewable by a court, there is no need for the record to contain any facts supporting the decision of the United States Attomey." Id.

In addition to this guidance from the federal courts, the New Jersey Supreme Court has squarely considered the propriety of the judiciary questioning a prosecutor's decision that there exists a public need to grant immunity to a witness. In In re Tuso, 376 A.2d 895 (N.J. 1977), the appellant was a lawyer who had been subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury considering an indictment. When the lawyer asserted his privilege against self-incrimination, the New Jersey Attomey General petitioned the court to compel his testimony under New Jersey's similar use and derivative use immunity statute, which provides that upon such a petition "the court shall so order and that person shall comply with the order." Id. at 896 . Before the court could rule on that petition, a different state grand jury indicted the lawyer on charges involving the same subject matter as the testimony that the Attomey General sought to compel. Id. When the court nevertheless granted the petition and ordered the lawyer to testify, the lawyer appealed to New Jersey's intermediate Appellate Division, which reversed the trial court's order as improper. Id. "The principal basis for the conclusion of the Appellate Division was that the State did not need the information it was seeking from Tuso" because the "Attorney General conceded at oral argument he had sufficient information for an indictment against D'Anastasio but wanted Tuso's testimony to assure a conviction." Id. at 896-97. Moreover, though the "Appellate Division conceded that the federal cases uniformly construe the parallel federal immunity statute to withhold any discretionary right in the court to deny an order to testify when the prosecuting
officer has met the prerequisites of the statute . . . the Appellate Division felt the federal cases were not authoritative where the order sought was 'basically unfair, inequitable or totally unnecessary." Id. at 896.

On subsequent appeal to New Jersey's highest court. the Attomey General challenged the Appellate Division's intrusion into his authority, and the Supreme Court agreed with his position. In reversing the Appellate Division, the Supreme Court explained regarding the state's immunity scheme:
[I]t is clear that the statute cited above delegates the function of determining need in such a situation to the Attorney General (or prosecutor, with the approval of the Attomey General), not the court. conformably with the duty of that officer to attend to the enforcement of the criminal laws. Upon request by the Attomey General, the statute directs that the court 'shall' order the witness to testify. [. . .]

Id. at 896 (emphasis supplied).
In summation, on the question of the State's likelhood to prevail here on appeal as it bears on the issue of whether to grant a stay of the proceedings, every source of authority-from CJP § 9-123's plain text and legislative history to its federal corollary's extensive appellate construction-demonstrates that this Court erred in replacing the State's Attorney's determination of the public interest with its own and that the State will prevall on appeal accordingly. The clear intent of the Legislature was that the Executive Branch, not the Judiciary, should have the discretion to determine whether a particular witness's testimony may be necessary to the public interest under Maryland's general immunity statute.

Wherefore, the State requests that this Court grant the State's Motion to Stay Proceedings Pending Appeal.

Respectfully submitted, Marilyn J. Mosby

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Jani申e L. Bledsoe (\#68776) Deptry State's Attorney 120 East Baltimore Street The SunTrust Bank Building Baltimore, Maryland 21202
(443) 984-6012 (telephone)
(443) 984-6256 (facsimile) bledsoc'(abstattorncy:org


Matthew Pillion (\#653491)
Assistant State's Attorney
120 East Baltimore Street The SunTrust Bank Building Baltimore, Maryland 21202 (443) 984-6045 (telephone) (443) 984-6252 (facsimile) mpillion(östatturney:ory

## CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 5th day of February, 2016, a copy of the State's Motion to
Stay Proceedings Pending Appeal was mailed and e-mailed to:

Joseph Murtha
Murtha. Psoras \& Lanasa, LLC
1301 York Road, Suite 200
Lutherville, Maryland 21093
(410) 583-6969
imurtha@mpllawyers.com
Attomey for Officer William Porter

Michael Belsky
Chaz Ball
Schlachman, Belsky \& Weiner, P.A.
300 East Lombard Street, Sunte 1100
Baltimore, MD 21202
(410) 497-8433
mbelsky@ulsbwlaw.com
Attorneys for Lieutenant Brian Rıce

Gary Proctor
Gary E. Proctor, LLC
8 E. Mulberry St.
Baltimore, MD 21202
410-444-1500
garyeproctor(àgemail.com
Attorney for Officer William Porter

Respectfully submitted, Marilyn J. Mosby


HEIARAN liAM K
II liN: bs MaE NI ry

1. INTMEMARTIIN
A. the Problem


There arc basically iwo types of Immunity andy: transact: final and Transactional laming monunity (hereinafter use imomaliy"). compelled 10 testify about an lacldeat a witness has been prosecuted for offenses aristas out of the may never be Independent evidence of the off out of that transaction even if than the witness .. comes to light is) .. from a source other term for use and derivative light. Use immunity, m shorthand witness has been corivative use Jampalty, means that once a that testimony nor any evidence terivabut an offense, neither be used against the witness. If independent that testimony may discovered, or has been preserved independent evidence is still be prosecuted for the of fence the witness theoretically may

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Obviously crimiasi activity situations in which insider Inforatition about activity. the prosecuccessary In order to prosecute criminal when only transactional is faced with untenable alternatives
is available
For example.
ff function las effective o scenario in which a narcotics network echelon leader is a direly with alefarchy in which the first has never been conviciedperous. "white collar" professional who refer to as "Kingpin". peoviderime. That individual. who me can the narcotics which is distribute the capital necessary to purchase hand on the narcotics and enters to users. lie never has his Kingpin. however, relies upon only into cash transactions. and an individual tho monitions certified public account ("A") network ("Bn).

Kingpin may never be successfully prosecuted without Information from " $A$ " or " $B$ ". There may not be enough evidence against " $A$ " or " $B$ " to prosecute them for their role in the




 imeimination. Linder the present law. the prosecutor wnifit ithen lare the dilcman of hasins to stve "A" or " $\boldsymbol{B}^{*}$ trinsactional insuntiy of totai exemption from liability for their mistrads. "A" of " $B^{\prime \prime}$. inen, could cuncelvably not be prosccuicd for thetr role ta the consplafy on eliner the state or federat level. If eranted transactional imominity. they also concelvably miny not incur civil liability for their involvencot. "A"op"H" roncrivably may not incur civil tan liability in the foftio of prnalties and " $A$ " conceivably may not face professional Aiscigline in the form of liccnse suspension of revoration by his professional ifcensing authority. To permit "A" of "H" tomalk auas from their misdecds mould iruly be a miscarriage of jusilre.

## B. The Resolut ton

The resoluition of the dilems is to provide the proserutor with use immuity to permit the prosecutor to bulid a ind proxprution case against Kingpin by lmanizing "A" from the use of "A's" testimony ngalnst hom, or arcolics case by mmanizing
 stilit be prosecuted tor thelp lavolvement in the consplracy. rould still be forced to pay civil tax pearatife and "A" could sitil be subject to discipline on a professional basls. rertainly. consideration of appropriate sanctions arainst " $\boldsymbol{N}^{\prime \prime}$ amal "日* should and must include all possibilitics fiven the mignituile of theif involvement in the crime.

## If. [PMOIVXBD (;FFF:KAL IANENITY STAITTE

The proposed statute is bascd substantialiy on the federal impounit; statutcs: 18 (1.S.C. 556001-04 (1985). Changes made in thi lidRU.ike afe primirlis those required hy the differences
 in the foiteinl and atate systame

Ihe proposed gencial inamafiy statutediffers subatantivils frimn pxisting Maryland statutes in infeemays:

1. It prosides for use and derlvative use insirad of Iransactioner Inmuntiy:
2. It is ceneraliy available rather inan jimited to specific erlmes:
3. It has buili-in procedmral safeguards mhich must be complicd wish pidor to lis utilifetlow. Generaliy. ine prescat statutcs operate automilcaliy.

The proposed Immuntiy statute would feplace the Immuntiy provistons for spectflc crimes. Presently, Maryland bas srparate Immalty provistions for the followine cilmes: Articie 27. 523. Aribery of Public Officials: t/ Articie 27. 624. Aitbery of Athletfc Partlcipants; Article 27. 639. Consplracy to Commit Bribery. 2/ Cambiling of Lotiery violations: Article 27. 5298. Controlied Dangerous Substances; Arilcie 27. 5262. rambling: Apilcle 27. 5371. Lotiery viotations: Articie 27. 5400. Selling I.Iquor to minors: Article 27. 5340. Sabotage Prevention: Aplicle 33. 526-16. Election Irregulatities: Pinancial institutions 69.
$\sigma$

1/Article 111.550 of the Constitution of marytand requires the General Assembly to adopt abribery statute contering transcallonal lmmulty. Article 27,5523 and 39 dre the response to the mandate. Consequently, absent a constliutional smendiment. Inmunlity for bribery must continue to be "iransactional" as opposed to the more limited "use and derivative use" immunity.
$2 /$ transactional umpunity for conspleacy to cmomit briliery also mould not be affected since ithas constifutional ourtumes

111. H.ASIS IGM I'? INAMNII
A. Iegni liasis for itac Imenuity

In 1892. the Supreme Court held uaronstitutinnal of fitivit dmemintiy statute which barted the Introduction of ranyoniled testimony but permiticd li to be used to jarate ather puldence. ${ }^{4 /}$ The Court reasoned . confectily . . ihat surn derivative use of the tainted evidence rendered the imanitiy munalagless. nut rather than simply siatiag that the Consiliviton required derivative use immunity: i.e.. litomunity from both the introduction of cumpelied testimnny and exploitation of the testimony to find leads, the opinion spone in broad ianguage which secmed to require iransactionat fimmunity. Consequentiy. Congress enacted a ifinsactinnal limmaliy statute which was upheid by the Supreme Court. ${ }^{\prime \prime}$. and which berime the model for state legisiation. In 1970. Congress repealed the. iransactional jmmanily statutes and enacted new use jumunity statule. 18 U.S.C. S6600i-04 (1970). then the Supreme Court revicued the new statute, ft held that the transactionat jumunits langunge in counselman which had been relied on for dimnst one hundred years ues dicta. Thus. the Court heid that the nev. statute which bars the use and derivative use of infurmatian oblatined under a grant of trmuntiy provides the protecilon qequired by the Fifit Amendment.iy

Alarytand's transactionat immolty statuies. If the frafini
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3/ Immoliy in the savings and loan situation mould rianin tho srame slace the dupation of the Inmunity accotied to the Investlgation of the pending matiers would be limited to unce mure extension of the sunsed provisions.

4/Counsejman v. Itichcork. 142 U.S. 547 (IBg21.
S/Brown v. Wather. 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
E/Kastigar v. United States. 106 U.S. 141 (1972).


 wre. therefore. uutilated.

## B. Practiral Rases for Ifectinmaliy

In adation to providing the possibility ihnt $n$ wifines Itven usc lumunity may be subject to subsequent pposccution fof his crimingl activity. i.e.. the Oilver Norin prosecution. nad would be subject io collateral conscqucnces. use fimmuliy jrovides for more canplete disclosure of culdence than iransactional tmmuntiy. As Professor G. Robert Blakely stated at the 1974 Seminar of the National Associations of Attorneys Ccneral:

With transactionat immunity all the witness
has to do is mention the iransaction; he does not have to fili in the details. So his atorney can tell him to just mention fi. and then say. "I don't remember. But with a - usé statuie, smart atiorney advises his client to tell all he knows. because the mine he ielis. the less can be later used arainst him. So "use" statules encourage fuller disclosure by witncsses. And that ls what they are realiy ail mbout.

As fesult. individuals testifying under a erant of use mamits; frac efeater reason to disclose ineir involvenent. 7/

Further, seneral tmminty statute. Jnstead of the present patchuofk quilt of immults statuies for particular crimes. wnulat Ithen lse be more conductve to full disclosure of cuidence bs an Immunized witness. Often testimony about a drus transaction mill encompass other crimes. such as violations of criminal iax statutes. Undef the present systen, altaess subpenared to testify pursuent to the dminntiy provistons of Arifcie 27.5298


7/whether transactional or use witness immulity dours nut
 odth.



 prisents the pussibility of a trap for inc nnuafy fripseriutur Inguifing into dive violstions and inadverientiy franting fransactinal tmanity for sume previously unknome criminal Activity.

Furthef. there are no procedurat safcguafds in the prisent lammitity siatutes and consequeatiy theif operation is irimkerrd hapharardiy. without identification of when a witmess besins in recelve immuntiy. The statules also provide an autamotic impuntiy bathn. Across the nation. $9 /$ witnesses subpownacd luritre the grand Jury unst either assert the pilvilege against seif. Incrimination or else notify the prosccutor that it is their Intention to do so. The prosecutor then asks the caurt to arifer cestimony and certiftes that the fmanity conferred therrby is in the pubilc interest. This is the procedure set out in inis proposed statute and is the procedure incorporated in the recentiy adopted savings and loan immontiy legisiation. In shart contrast. most present Miryland statutes fmmulze cuefyone who pasects guestions in the grand Jury. lof No nssertion of the privitcge is requifed. nor is there any pequircinent of a ceftification inat the immulty is in the pubilc interest. rhe uncertainty of when the statute is appilcable, coupled with ithe blanket automatic transactional lmmaity bath. molkes ilafyland ommoliy statutes both haphafard and dangerous. l'uless a
s/in re: Criminat Investigation No. 1.162, 307 1in. 623 (1987).

9/witness lamunfty. National Associdtion of Atiorniss Feneral. August. 1978.

10/Statev. [anagoulis. 253 nit. 699 (1969) (litincss who appesed voluntarify before grand jury io make statemout and mals then asked questions was complifed" io testify within timerinilik uif lifibury umomitity siatutrs).




 jury ircnuentiy becomes unusible as an dnvestifative imot in hrse nreas. The fesult is that the finnactal nupeitis of lafks diuk uperations rannot be investigated by anfyiand grand jurire
. Finaliy. despite the brond brush imsuntiation the present statutes provide. they may ironicaliy depilve potential defendants of the opportuntiy to provide enculpatory cyiticnce it a grand jury. A prosecutor whombent otherwise consent to the appearance of a defendant who want to lestify befnef an investigative srand jury or $\cdot$ the more common ocrurance . . A prosecutor who is wiliting to call a winess supportive of the defense. may decifine to do so because he fears automatlc immunifation. There are mo lmandity wiver statutes and ine question of whether the automatic Immantiy can be walved has yet to be resolved by the appellate courts.

## Iv. FMXMOSED STATUTE

The proposed siatute substitutes use for trinsirifinat - immentyl/ berause of the additional fact-ining utility that use famulity provides. It would automaticaliy briag the Maryinind Inw into sccord with the Supreme Coupt's cufrent vicw of the breadih of the Fifit Amendment.

The proposed statute is made sracialiy applicatic primitils for two reasons. It assures the rompciliobility of the icatimans regarding transaction which may involve a variciy of intefrelated cflmes and thus clrcuavents any constitut imand
ilftransactional immunity for the crime of bribefy is retaned because of its constitutional wnderpinntan ind fur tho satimes and lonn limistikation brrause of its limitiat tilfatian.



 existence of a generality aiatiable but limited insmints at.itife mould remedy the dual problems of no lamualiy for most erlines ond ton musth Inomantiy for diugs. gambiling and elactions offenses.

By far the most signiflcant changes provided by the pruposid stalute are procedural. Imanality would no longer be coaferied autimatically or accidentally, but rather only through coilt order. To ensure coordinated, responsible reguests for immintis. the decision to seek $n$ court order requires approval by the State's Attorney. Attorncy frneral or State Prosceutor. rhe State's Attorney, the Attorney General or State Proserutor nili thereby have central cuntrol and ultimate responsibility fior the issuance of erants of immunily.

The judicial role under this statute is ministerial. the judge verifles that:

1. The State's Attorney, the Atturncy General. or State Proseculor has approved the request for an immini:y order:

- 2. The witaess has retused or is likely to feluse to testify:

3. The prosecutor has determined that the witness's testimony may be neressary to be the public interest.

Once the judge concludes these three reguirements are met. he Issues $n$ court order cumpeliligg testimony and inmunifing the witness.

The Judge mill not himseif determine whether the witness.

12tif. In reciriminal luvastigation No. 1-162. supra. n 6 . (xithera lintse reasunobls feir prosticution for onc of commeratril of (rinars).




 the jurke to make any meaningivi evaluation of the pulitic ontcrest.
mouse 8111311 (The Specker. et al) (Oelegate memes, chairaen. Special
comittee on Drwi and alconol Abuse)

Judictary
Referted co ludtctal Procedinge
semmen of IEsisuation: This anoned 0111 provides for the grenting of uge* inmuity to vitnesses comelled to testify ragarding ecriainal cetter. Specifically. if aitness refuses to testify on a criaiml motter. on the grownds of privilege cgatnst self-incrioination, the court ayy compel the vitness to testify or provide information by issuing a court order to that effact. The court order mould only be grented woon the witten request of the prosecutor. dion has found that the test trony or inforation of withess ay oe necessery to the alblic interest. and that the testicony or inforitition rould not be forthcoming cosent the order.

Criainal prosecution would be alland cgatast the vitmess for the criaes that merp testified sbout: such testimony, havever, would not te "used" egeinst the ritmess in any criaimal case. except those invoiving the fatlure to comply with the Court's order.

LOCAL fiscal limet staitilit: mo effect.

STATE REVIMES: mo effect.
STAIE EMELDITMES: The Abinistrative Office of the Courts edvises that the cost of ary edsitional Court orders nocessary under this legislation could te cosorbed vithin exist ing resources. Scate empenditures ore not affected by this cheape in proceduril requirements for compelling testiangy free uitmesses claiaing self-incriaination privileges.

LOCM Racines: mo effect.
LOCM erndotinass: mo effect.
ImFumilom sumet: adninistrative Opifice of the Cowrts. Departant of Public Safety and Correctiomi Services (Division of Correction). Department of fiscel services



## DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO STATE'S MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS PENDING APPEAL

NOW COMES Defendant Brian Rice, by undersigned counsel and files this Response to the State's Motion to Stay Proceedings Pending Appeal and for reasons states:

1. Lieutenant Brian Rice is pending Involuntary Manslaughter and related charges. The trial is currently scheduled to begin on April 13, 2016.
2. On January 13,2016 the State filed a Motion to Compel Testimony of Officer William Porter.
3. On January 15,2016 , the State sent a letter to the Court expressing its intent to request a postponement of the trial date.
4. On January 20,2016 this Court conducted a hearing on the State's dual requests. The Court denied both requests.
5. On February 4, 2016 the State filed a Notice of Appeal.
6. On February 5, 2016 the State filed a Motion to Stay Proceedings Pending Appeal. This Motion to Stay is yet another transparent subterfuge on the part of the State to obtain a postponement, in order to avoid trying the most legally and factually tenuous cases next.
7. The State does not cite to any Rule that enables the State to seek a stay of the proceeding, NOISIAO TYNHANO
an extraordinary request at this stage of the proceedings. The Maryland Rules include
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provisions to seek a stay pending an appeal in a civil matter. It is instructive, however, that the Rules governing criminal proceedings are silent on this process. The State is relying on CJP §12-301 which allows an appeal only from a final judgment. The statute does not include any direction regarding a stay as this would be unnecessary after a final judgment has been rendered.
8. In addition, the filing of a Notice of Appeal does not divest this Court of jurisdiction to continue the proceedings. See e.g. Pulley v. State, 287 Md. 406 (1980). In that this Court does retain jurisdiction, " $[w]$ hether to grant or deny a stay of proceedings in a matter is within the discretion of the trial court, and only will be disturbed if the discretion is abused." Vaughn v. Vaughn, 146 Md. App. 264, 279 (2002).
9. The trial court is best equipped to decide if the trial should be stayed pending the State's efforts to appeal. The trial court is quite familiar with the facts of this case and all of the issues arising from the litigation. The trial court is uniquely situated to assess the legitimacy of the State's bald allegation that the ruling at issue is a final judgment.
10. This Court "shall consider the same factors that are relevant to the granting of injunctive relief by a circuit court." Md. Rule 8-425. The four factors relevant to the issuance of an injunction are "(1) the likelihood that the plaintiff will succeed on the merits; (2) the 'balance of convenience' determined by whether greater injury would be done to the defendant by granting the injunction than would result by its refusal; (3) whether the plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury unless the injunction is granted; and (4) the public interest." Schade v. Maryland State Board of Elections, 401 Md. 1, 36 (2007). It is the moving party's burden to establish these four factors and "failure to prove the existence
of even one of the four factors will preclude the grant of preliminary injunction relief." Id.
11. With regard to the first factor, the State cannot win on the merits because the issue they seek to be reviewed is not a final judgment. This Court's ruling is just one of many pre-trial rulings that have occurred in this case. In its Motion to Stay, the State outlines its underlying complaints about this court's ruling but utterly fails to articulate the basis for its entitlement to file for an appeal at this stage of the proceedings. Simultaneously with the filing of this pleading, the defense has filed a Motion to Dismiss the Notice of the Appeal with the Court of Special Appeals. See Exhibit 1. In addition to the fact that this appeal has been filed without any legal authority, the trial court has already made a factual determination that the State's Motion to Compel was without merit and should be denied. For all of the reasons already litigated, the trial court's determination was correct and there is little to no likelihood that the appellate court would disturb this ruling.
12. It is the Defendant's position that this court's denial of the State's Motion to Compel is not a final judgment and therefore the State has no chance to succeed on the merits of its appeal. The inquiry need go no further than here. However, with regard to the second and third factor, the State cannot show that it will suffer greater and irreparable injury if the stay is denied than the defendant will suffer if it is granted. The State claims that Officer Porter is a "valuable witness" in its case and that without him it "would cause irreparable harm to the State's ability to prosecute this case." The State has identified no less than 75 witnesses that it intends on calling in its prosecution of Lt. Rice. The first time that the State indicated that it intended on calling Officer Porter was on January 13, 2016.

Certainly, the State's late recognition of Officer Porter's "value" undercuts its contention that the State would be irreparably harmed in its ability to prosecute Lt. Rice for the pending charges. Additionally, this Honorable Court found the value of Officer Porter's testimony questionable at best after hearing the State's proffer of his "needed" testimony at the hearing on the Motion to Compel.
13. On the other hand, granting a stay in this case would delay Lieutenant Rice's trial well beyond acceptable speedy trial dimensions. The State has consistently argued that any speedy trial violations are insignificant, that any delay in Lieutenant Rice's trial would be a "legally insignificant short amount of time awaiting resolution of the appeal." This assertion ignores the real possibility that any ruling by the Court of Special Appeals would then be reviewed by the Court of Appeals. The State is asking that Lieutenant Rice's trial be put back in the original line-up of cases which would arguably result in the case being scheduled in September, 2016, at the earliest.
14. The State suggests that the fact that this is "one of the most high-profile criminal trials in Maryland history" should figure into the public interest factor. The public interest is best served by the process continuing in the ordinary course of criminal litigation. The State has taken an extraordinary step in seeking to appeal in the midst of litigation, a decision that is not supported by the law. The public should be able to trust that each case prosecuted by this State's Attorney will be tried in a speedy and predictable manner, in accordance with the rules and the law.

WHEREFORE, the Defendant respectfully requests that this Honorable Court deny the State's Motion for Stay Pending the Appeal.

Respectfully submitted,

# Cnichsil Beloky Chaz Ball <br> Schlachman, Belsky and Weiner, P.A. <br> 300 East Lombard Street, Suite 1100 <br> Baltimore, Maryland 21202 <br> 410-685-2022 

## CERTIFICATION OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 8th day of February 2016, a copy of the foregoing
Motion was hand-delivered to Janice Bledsoe, Deputy State's Attorney for Baltimore City, 120
E. Baltimore Street, $9^{\text {th }}$ Floor, Baltimore, Maryland 21202.



## ORDER

HAVING READ AND CONSIDERED the Defendant's Response to the State's Motion to Stay the Proceedings Pending Appeal, it is hereby ORDERED, that the State's Request for a Stay is DENIED.

[^2]STATE OF MARYLAND
v.

BRIAN RICE
Appellee

APPELLEE'S MOTION TO DISMISS THE STATE'S NOTICE OF APPEAL

The Appellee, Brian Rice, through his counsel, Michael Belsky and Chaz Ball and Schlachman, Belsky and Weiner, P.A., hereby files this Motion to Dismiss the Notice of Appeal filed by the State, and in support thereof states:

1. On May 1, 2015 Lt. Brian Rice was charged in a Four Count Indictment alleging charges of involuntary manslaughter, second degree assault, misconduct in office and reckless endangerment.
2. The trial was originally scheduled for October 13,2015 . That trial date was postponed at the State's request to March 9, 2016.
3. On January 13, 2016 the State filed in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, a Motion to Compel Testimony of Officer William Porter and by letter dated January 15, 2016 the State indicated an intent to request a postponement from the trial judge, the Honorable Barry G. Williams.
4. On January 20, 2016, the Court conducted a hearing to consider the State's motion. After hearing a proffer of the anticipated testimony and

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argument from the State, the trial court denied the State's request for the Motion to Compel and denied the State's request for postponement.
5. In denying both of the State's requests, the Court found the State's sudden need for Officer Porter's testimony and the timing of the request, "questionable" and believed at minimum, a partial purpose of the request was to create grounds for a postponement of Lt. Rice's trial. In addition, the Court found that the testimony would most likely not be admissible pursuant to Maryland Rule 5-403.
6. The appellee is preparing pre-trial motions, pursuant to the court's scheduling order. These motions included evidentiary motions and proposed voir dire.
7. On February 4, 2016, fifteen days after the hearing, the State filed a Notice of Appeal in the above captioned matter. Exhibit 1. The State tethered its alleged right to appeal this evidentiary ruling on Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article §12-301 which provides:

Except as provided in §12-302 of this subtitle, a party may appeal from a final judgment entered in a civil or criminal case by a circuit court. The right of appeal exists from a final judgment entered by a court in the exercise of original, special, limited, statutory jurisdiction, unless in a particular case the right of appeal is expressly denied by law. In a criminal case, the defendant may appeal even though imposition or execution of sentence has been suspended. In a civil case, a plaintiff who has accepted remittitur may cross-appeal from the final judgment.
8. The Appellate Courts of Maryland have unequivocally and consistently found that a ruling on a pre-trial evidentiary motion is clearly not a final judgment under CJP §12-301.
9. On January 27, 2016, in Seward v. State, No. 12, 2016 Md. LEXIS 11, (Jan. 27, 2016). the Court of Appeals reiterated the definition of a final judgement as follows:
one that "either determine[s] and conclude[s] the rights of the parties involved or den[ies] a party the means to 'prosecut[e] or defend[ ] his or her rights and interests in the subject matter of the proceeding." " Important is whether "any further order is to be issued or whether any further action is to be taken in the case."

Id. at 171, 31 A.3d at 259 (citations omitted). An interlocutory order, on the other hand, exists when " there are pending proceedings in which issues on the merits of the case remain to be decided.' "Id. at 172,31 A.3d at 260 (citation omitted). Moreover, the purpose of CJP § 12-301 is to permit appeals only from final judgments "to 'prevent piecemeal appeals and ... the interruption of ongoing judicial proceedings.' "Id., $423 \mathrm{Md} .156,31 \mathrm{~A} .3 \mathrm{~d}$ at 259 (citations omitted)(emphasis added).
10. The trial court's order was simply one of a multitude of pre-trial evidentiary rulings in this case which is not immediately subject to appeal and is interlocutory in nature, "a final judgment exists when the rights of litigants have been established conclusively at the trial level.

The general rule in criminal cases is that no final judgment exists until after conviction and sentence has been determined, or, in other words, when only the execution of the judgment remains." Sigma Reproduction Health Center v. State, 297 Md. 660, 665 (1983).
11. The Sigma Court further stated, "[o]rdinarily, therefore, an appeal from a pretrial or trial order will not be heard where there are pending proceedings in which issues on the merits of the case remain to be decided. Such orders are interlocutory, not final, and nonappealable until after entry of a final judgment." Id. At 666 .
12. Generally the State's right to appeal is very limited and is governed by Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article §12-302 which specifies the parameters of the State's right to appeal a trial court's evidentiary ruling. This ruling does not fall under any of the parameters that would allow an interlocutory appeal under that section.
13. On February 5, 2016 the State filed a Motion to Stay Proceedings Pending Appeal in the Circuit Court, in an attempt to divest the Circuit Court of its fundamental jurisdiction of this case.
14. As the Court emphasized in Pulley v. State, 287 Md. 406 at 418 (1980),
"If fundamental jurisdiction was lost, it would be unnecessary to require stays since the court could not act in any event. Moreover, particularly with regard to what may be termed as appealable interlocutory orders, a policy contrary to that which we announce today could play havoc with the trial of cases in this State. What we said nearly fifty years ago in support of the then policy against allowing piecemeal appeals applies with equal force in preventing abuse with regard to those that are presently permitted:

If, on a question left to the court's discretion, upon a suggestion for removal, a prisoner (or other party) is permitted to take an immediate appeal, then proceedings in every criminal (or civil) case, great or small, may be stopped and delayed while the (party) prosecutes an appeal on this preliminary matter . . . . And this would add just so much to
the resources of those who might find vexatious delays advantageous, and would multiply appeals in criminal (and civil) cases, often when (a judgment in the appealing party's favor), in the end, would render them profitless. (Lee v. State, supra, 161 Md . at $434,157 \mathrm{~A}$. at 724 .)
15. The State's right to appeal is a statutory right, and as previously stated is
detailed in Courts and Judicial Proceedings §12-302:

## Appeals by State in criminal cases

(c)(1) In a criminal case, the State may appeal as provided in this subsection.
(2) The State may appeal from a final judgment granting a motion to dismiss or quashing or dismissing any indictment, information, presentment, or inquisition.
(3) The State may appeal from a final judgment if the State alleges that the trial judge:
(i) Failed to impose the sentence specifically mandated by the Code; or
(ii) Imposed or modified a sentence in violation of the Maryland Rules.
(4)(i) In a case involving a crime of violence as defined in § 14-101 of the Criminal Law Article, and in cases under §§ 5-602 through 5-609 and §§ 5-612 through 5-614 of the Criminal Law Article, the State may appeal from a decision of a trial court that excludes evidence offered by the State or requires the return of property alleged to have been seized in violation of the Constitution of the United States, the Maryland Constitution, or the Maryland Declaration of Rights.
(ii) The appeal shall be made before jeopardy attaches to the defendant. However, in all cases the appeal shall be taken no more than 15 days after the decision has been rendered and shall be diligently prosecuted. (iii) Before taking the appeal, the State shall certify to the court that the appeal is not taken for purposes of delay and that the evidence excluded or the property required to be returned is substantial proof of a material fact in the proceeding. The appeal shall be heard and the decision rendered within 120 days of the time that the record on appeal is filed in the appellate court. Otherwise, the decision of the trial court shall be final.
(iv) Except in a homicide case, if the State appeals on the basis of this paragraph, and if on final appeal the decision of the trial court is affirmed, the charges against the defendant shall be dismissed in the case from which the appeal was taken. In that case, the State may not prosecute the defendant on those specific charges or on any other related charges arising out of the same incident.
(v) 1. Except as provided in subsubparagraph 2 of this subparagraph, pending the prosecution and determination of an appeal taken under this paragraph or paragraph (2) of this subsection, the defendant shall be released on personal recognizance bail. If the defendant fails to appear as required by the terms of the recognizance bail, the trial court shall subject the defendant to the penalties provided in § 5-211 of the Criminal Procedure Article.
2. A. Pending the prosecution and determination of an appeal taken under this paragraph or paragraph (2) of this subsection, in a case in which the defendant is charged with a crime of violence, as defined in § 14-101 of the Criminal Law Article, the court may release the defendant on any terms and conditions that the court considers appropriate or may order the defendant remanded to custody pending the outcome of the appeal.
B. The determination and enforcement of any terms and conditions of release shall be in accordance with the provisions of Title 5 of the Criminal Procedure Article.
(vi) If the State loses the appeal, the jurisdiction shall pay all the costs related to the appeal, including reasonable attorney's fees incurred by the defendant as a result of the appeal.
16. It is clear that the statutory scheme strictly limits the circumstances under which the State may appeal and affirmatively requires a certification that "the appeal is not taken for purposes of delay." Courts and Judicial Proceedings §12-302(c)(3)(iii).
17. In this case, the provisions of §12-302(c)(3)(i) do not apply as the crimes charged are neither crimes of violence nor narcotics crimes.
18. The State has no legal recourse available to appeal this non-final judgment, and therefore, the purpose of this appeal is a veiled attempt to obtain a postponement which the State has been unable to obtain despite their continuous efforts.
19. For the aforegoing reasons, the Appellee respectfully requests that this Honorable Court Dismiss the State's Notice of Appeal.

WHEREFORE, Appellee Lt. Brian Rice requests that this Honorable Court Dismiss the State's Notice of Appeal.


## CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 8th day of February 2016, a copy of the foregoing Motion was hand-delivered to Janice Bledsoe, Deputy State's Attorney for Baltimore City, 120 E. Baltimore Street, 9th Floor, Baltimore, Maryland 21202 and mailed to Joseph Murtha, Murtha, Psoras, \& Lanasa, LLC, 1301 York Road, Suite 200, Lutherville, Maryland 21093



## STATE'S NOTICE OF APPEAL

NOW COMES the State of Maryland, by and through Marilyn J. Mosby, the State's Attorney for Baltimore City; Michael Schatzow, Chief Deputy State's Attomey for Baltimore City; Janice L. Bledsoe, Deputy State's Attorney for Baltimore City; and Matthew Pillion, Assistant State's Attorney for Baltimore City; and pursuant to Section 12-301 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland hereby notes an appeal on behalf of the State from a final judgment of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City entered on January 20, 2016, in the above-captioned case denying the State's Motion to Compel a Witness to Testify Pursuant to Section 9-123 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.

Respectfully submitted, Marilyn J. Mosby



Janice L. Bledsoe (\#68776) Deputy State's Attorney 120 East Baltimore Street The SunTrust Bank Building Baltimore, Maryland 21202 (443) 984-6012 (telephone) (443) 984-6256 (facsimile) jbledsoe@stattornev.org


Matthew Pillion (\#653491)
Assistant State's Attorney
120 East Baltimore Street The SunTrust Bank Building
Baltimore, Maryland 2.1202
(443) 984-6045 (telephone)
(443) 984-6252 (facsimile)
mpillion@stattornev.org

## CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 4 th day of February, 2016, a copy of the State's Notice of Appeal was mailed and e-mailed to:

Joseph Murtha
Murtha, Psoras \& Lanasa, LLC
1301 York Road, Suite 200
Lutherville, Maryland 21093
(410) 583-6969
jmurtha@mpllawyers.com
Attorney for Officer William Porter

Michael Belsky
Chaz Ball
Schlachman, Belsky \& Weiner, P.A.
300 East Lombard Street, Suite 1100
Baltimore, MD 21202
(410) 497-8433
mbelsky@sbwlaw.com
Attorney for Lieutenant Brian Rice

Gary Proctor
Gary E. Proctor, LLC
8 E. Mulberry St.
Baltimore, MD 21202
410-444-1500
gatyeproctor@gmail.com
Attorney for Officer William Poiter

Respectfully submitted,
Marilyn J. Mosby
Ianice, L. Bledsoe (\#68776)
Deputy State's Attorney
120 East Baltimore Street
The SunTrust Bank Building
Baltimore, Maryland 21202
(443) 984-6012 (telephone)
(443) 984-6256 (facsimile)
jbledsoe@stattorney.org


Upon consideration of the Appellee's Motion to Dismiss Appeal, it is this day of $\qquad$ 2016 hereby ORDERED that the Appellee's Motion to Dismiss Appeal is GRANTED.


On September 15, 2015, the State notified this Court that it intended to try the above-captioned case and related cases in a certain order. The State indicated that the order was preferable because Officer William Porter was a material witness in the cases against Sergeant Alicia White and Officer Caesar Goodson. On December 16, 2015, Officer Porter's trial ended in a mistrial. His retrial is currently scheduled for June 13, 2016.

On January 7, 2016, this Court granted the State's Motion to Compel Officer Porter to testify in the Goodson and White trials. Officer Porter appealed this Court's decision and the Goodson and White trials are stayed pending a decision by the Court of Special Appeals.

Shortly after the Goodson and White trials were stayed, this Court notified all parties that it planned to proceed with the Nero, Miller, and Rice trials, with Nero's scheduled to begin on February 22, 2016. It was only then, four months after the State identified Officer Porter as a material witness in two other trials, and one month after Officer Porter's mistrial, that the State notified this Court, in a January 16, 2016 letter, that Officer Porter may be a material witness in the Nero, Miller, and Rice cases and that it wished to postpone all five cases until after Officer Porter's retrial. One of the reasons
the State requested the Court grant the postponement was so that the State could avoid a Kastigar hearing and the need to put together a "clean team."

On January 20, 2016, this Court heard arguments on the State's Motion to Compel the testimony of Officer Porter in the Nero, Miller, and Rice trials and denied the State's motion. This Court found that the State was using Md. Code, Cts. \& Jud. Proc. § 9-123 in an attempt to control the schedule and order of the trials and to circumvent this Court's ruling that postponement in these cases was not appropriate.

This Court agrees that its role is not to impose its opinion upon the State's determination that a witness' testimony is in the public interest. This Court believes, however, that rather than become a rubber-stamp for the State's Attorney, there should be a two-step process in granting immunity under § 9-123 when, and only when, the motives of the requesting party are called into question. The denial of the State's motion to compel was not based upon an imposition of the Court's opinion on the State's determination that a witness' testimony was in the public interest under § 9-123, but rather based upon the Court finding that the State's motion was simply an attempt at subterfuge because they did not agree with the Court's order to continue with the other trials. It is this action of the State that this Court found was not in the public interest.

For these reasons, this Court finds that its denial of the State's motion to compel was appropriate. Therefore, it is this


ORDERED that the State's Motion to Stay Proceedings Pending trial in the above-captioned case is DENIED.

Judge Barry G. Williams
Judge's Signature appears on the original document
BARRY G. WILLIAMS JUDGE, CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY

Clerk, please mail copies to the following:
Michael Belsky, Attorney for Brian Rice
Janice Bledsoe, Deputy State's Attorney, Office of the State's Attorney for Baltimore City

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COMM 062215 EMS WITH THE PARTIES TO THE ABOVE-CAPTIONED CASES THROUGH
CUMM 062215 GMS COINNSEL, IT IS THIS 19TH DAY OF JUNE, ¿O15, ORDERED THAT
COMM 062215 CMS A MOTIONS HEARING IS SCHEDULED FOR SEPTEMBER 2, 201S, AT
COMM 062&15 LMS 9:3C A.M. AND FURTHER ORDERED THAT THE TRIALS IN EACH OF
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    COMM U6301E C2C DEF'S JOIIIT MOTION IN OPPOSITION TO STATE'S MOTION FOR
    COMM 063015 C2E PROTECTIVE ORDER PURSUANT TO PULE 4-263 (M), MEMORANDUM
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    COMM 07U゙6l5 lgJ DEFSNDANT'S REPLY TO STATE'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDAIJTS'
    GOMM 070615 lg] NIOTION EOR FEMOVAL AND REQUEST FOR HEARING Cこ: JUDGE
    CCMM 0700:5 lg] WILLIAMS
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    COMM C70815 CLC FOK PROTECT=VE OREER PURSUANT TC RULE 4-263(M)
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    COMM 070815 こ2C CHAMBERS.
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    COMM 071715 SCE ORDER DATEC AHD DATE STAMPED تlLl 17, 2015; THAT THE STATE'S
    ECMM 071715 SCE MGTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER PURSUAIIT TO FULE 4-263(M) IS
    COMM 071715 SCB DENIED; B. WILLIAMS, J
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    COMM 072:15 lgJ THE SEARCH AID SEIZURE OF DEFENDANT'S CEPARTMENTAL CELL
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    COMM 072315 EKW WTJLIAMS PER LAW CLERK
    COMM 072410 1T¿己 WAITING ON PHONE CALL FR. JUDGE, WILLIAMS SEC. BEFÜRE
    COMM r7241j 1T2 SCHEDULING THIS MATTER/NO TRIAL SUMMARY/7-22-:5...TJ
    COMM 072415 lou STATE'S SUPPLEMENTAL DISCLOSURE
    COMM 072415 lgJ FITED ASA - BEEDSOE, JANICE L , ESQ 68770
    COMM 0I:T15 CPR STATE'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' JOINTLI FILEC MOTION TC
    COMM 07̌715 CPR SIJPPRESS STATEMENTS PURSUANT TO THE L.E.O.ב.R. AND
    NEXT PAGE P/N PAGE 011
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9:27:43 Monizay, Febrisery 08, ¿Ol6
    02/03/1% CRIMINAL COURT OF BALTIMORE CASE JIUQUIRY 09:`3
        CAS[ 1151410j5 ST A RICE, BRIAN LT A32449 COD Y DCM C 09021S
    EVENI DATE OPER PART TIME ROCM REAS / EVENT COMMENT
    COMM O8l4l5 CIN STATE'S MOTICN TO QUASH HEARING SUBPOENA REIUESTEL BY
    COMM 08141E CNN CATHEPINE ELYNN AND SERVED ON DR. CAROL ALLEN
    MPRO 081415 ly) MOTION FUR PROTECTIVE ORDER ;TICKLE DATE= 20150901
    COMM 081415 lg] STATE'S MOTION TC QUASH HEARING SUBPOENA REQUESTE[ BY
    COMM 08i4l5 lgj CATHERINE FLINN AND SERVED ON ASSISTANT STATE'S ATTORNEY
    CONM 08:415 lyl LISA GOLDBEFG
    COMH 08:415 SCB STATE'S MOTIOIJ TO QUASH HEARING SUBPOENA FEQUESTED BY
    COMM OBl4l5 SCB BY CATHERINE SLYNN AND SERVEL ON DEPUTY STATE'S ATTORNEY
    COMM 081415 SCB JANICE BLEDSGE ELD
    MPRO 081415 SCB NOTIUN FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER ;TICKLE DATE= 20150901
    CCIMM 0814\vdotsל SCB STATE'S MOTION TO QUASH HEARING SUBPOENA REQ!IESTED BY
    CCMM 0814:5 SCB CATHERINE SLYNN AND SERVED ON CHIEE UEPUTY STATE'S
    COMM 0814ミ5 SCB ATTORNEY MICHAEL SCHATZOW FLD
    MFPU C&1.115 SCR MÜTTÖN FOR FROTECTIVE ORDER ;TISKLE DATE= 201S0901
    CGMM CR1815 SCY DATE STAMPES & ORDERED 8/17/15, STATE'S MCTIOH TO QJASH
    COMM C&1815 SCi HEARING SUBFOENA REQUESTED BY CATHERINE FLYUN AND SERVEU
    COMM OE1815 SC` ON UR. CAROL ALLEN. ORDERED THAT THE HEARING SIJBPOF.HA
    COMM O&1815 SCY SERVE\Omega ON LR. CAROL ALLEN FOR THE SEPTEMBEP 2, ¿Ol5.
    COMM 081815 SCY HEARING 1S QUASHED. (SEE ORDER) WILLIAMS, J (CC: ALL
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@::2:\13 Monday, Eebruary 08, 2016
02/(18/10́ GRIMINAL COURT UF BALTIMORE CASE INQOIRY 0Y:23
CASE 115141035 ST A RICE, BRIA!] LT A32449 COD Y GCM C 090215
EVE!:T UATE SPER PART TIME ROOM PEAS / EVENT CCMMMENT
CUMM 08:FlS SCY ATTORNEY OF RECORC)
COMM 08i91s Eごi DATE STAMFED \& ORDERED 8/17/1E, STATE'S MOTICN TO GUASH
CJMM 081915 SEY HEARTNF SUBPOENA REQUESTEU BY CATHERINE FLINN AND SERVED
CCMM 08lyis SCY ON ASSISTAIIT STATE'S ATTORNEY, ALBEPT PEISINGER. ORDERED,
COMM 0819:5 SCY SHAT THE HEARING SUBFOENA SERVED ON ALBERT PEISINGER FOR
CCMM 0819:5 SCY THE SEPTEMBER 2, 2015 HEARING IS QUASHEL. WILLIAMS, J
COMM 081915 SCY (CC: ALL ATYORNEY'S OF RECORD)
COMM 081915 SCİ DATE STAMPED \& GRDERED 8/17/15, STATE'S MOTION TO QUASH
COMM 081915 SCY HEARING SJBFOENA REQUES?ED BY CATHERINE FLYNN AND SERVED
COMM C81915 SCY ON ASSISTANE STATE'S ATTURNEY LISA GOLDBERG. ORDEREL,
COMM 0H1915 SC% THAT THE HEARING SUBPOENA SERVED ON LISA GOLDBERGG FOR THE
GOMM CEl'gls SC: SEPTERMBPR 2, 2015 HEARING IS QUASHED. WILLIAMS, J {CC: ALL
COMM O\&191E SCY COUNSEL OF RECORD)
COMM Uठ̈lyl5 SCY DA'E STAMPED \& ORUERED B/l7/15, STAIE'S MOTION TO QUASH
CCMN. 0B1G15 SCi HEARING SUBPOENA REQUESTED BY CATHERINE FLYNI! AND SERVED
COMN: O\&1915 SC: ON WAYNE WILLIAMS. ORDERED, THAT THE IIEARING SUBPOENA
COMM O\&l\xi!s SCV SERVED ON WAINE WILLIAMS FOR THE SEPTEMBER 2, 2015 HEARING
COMM Uठ̈lכ1E SCY IS QUASHEC. WILLIAMS, J (CC: ALI COUNSEL UF RECORD)
COMM OBl91؟ jC: DATE STAMPED i ORDERED 8/l7/l5, STATE'S MOTION TO QUASH
NEXT PAGE

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9:?3.4.3 Monday, February 09, 2016
    C12/03/16 GRIMINAL COURT CF BALTIMORE CASE INQ:JRY 0G:こ?
        CASE 115141035 ST A RTCE, BRIAN LT A32449 COD \cong DCM S 020215
    EVENT DATE OPER PART TIME ROGM REAS / EVENT COMMENT
    COMM 08191E SCl HEARING SIJBPOEIIA REGUESTED BY CATHERINE FLYNN AND SERVEU
    COMM 081915 SCY Üll AVG!! MACKFL. ORDERED, THAT IHE HEARING S!MBPOENA SERVER
    COMM 08:915 SC` ON AVON MACKEL FOR THE SEPTEMBER 2, iO15 HEARING IS QUASHED.
    COMM 081915 SCY (CE: ALL COUNSEL CF RECCRD)
    COMM 0819!5 SCY DATE STAMEED & ORDERED 8/l7/15, S'A'IE'S MOTION TO QUASH
    CCMM 0819:5 SCY HEARING SUBPOENA REQUESTED BY CATHERINE ELYNN AND SERVED
    COMM CEIGl5 SCY ON CHIEF DEPUTY STATE'S ATTORNE: MICHAEL SCHATZOW. ORDEREU,
    COMM 081915 SCY THAT THE HEARING SUBFOENA SERVED ON MICHAEL SCHATZOW FOR THE
    COMM 081915 SC% SEPTEMBER 2, 2015 HEARING IS ZJASHED. WILLIAMS, J (CC: ALL
    COMM C&1915 SCY CÜJNSETL OF RECORD)
    COMM U&lyls SCY DATE STAMPED & OKDEREC 8/17/15, STATE'S MOTION %O QUASH
    COMM 081G15 SCY HEARING SUBFGEIIA REQUE.STED BY GATHERINE FLYNIJ AN[' SERVED
    \becauseOMM 0&1915 SCY ON STATE'S ATTORNEY MARILyN MOSBY. OFDERED, THAT THE
    COMM URIGIS SCY HEARING SUBPOENA SERVED ON MARTLYN MOSBY FOR THE SEPTEMBER
    COMM O&1915 SCY 2, 2015 HEARING IS QUASHED. WILLIAMS, J (CC: ALL COUNSEL
    COMM 081g15 SICY OF RECÜRD)
    CGMM OP1915 SCY DATE STAMFED & ORDERED 8/17/15, STATE'S MOTION TO QUASH
    SOMM 081G15 SCi HEARING SUBPOEIIA REQUESTED BY CATHERINE FLYNN ANU SERVED
    COMM OR1g15 SCY IN UEPUTY STATE'S ATTORNEY JANICE BLEDSOE. ORDERED, THAT
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y:27:44 Mondiy, February 0j, 2C:6
* 4
0こ/03/16 ERIMINAJ, EOURT OF BALTIMORE CASE TNQUIRY 09:23
    CASE ll5l41G35 ST A RICE, URIAN LT A32449 COD Y DCM C 0:0215
    EVEITT UATE OPER PART TIME ROOM REAS / EVENT COMMENT
    COMM 081915 SC` THE HEARJNG SUBPOEIJA SERVED ON JANICE BLEDSÜE FCR THE
    COMM 0&l915 SCY SEPTEMBER 2, 2015 HEARIUT, IS QIJASHED. WILLIAMS, J (EC: ALL
    COMM 081915 SCY COUNSEL OF RECOPCI
    CCMM 0819:5 SI:Y DATE STAMPED & OFEERED E/17/15, STATE'S MOTIOII TO QJASH
    COMM C819i5 SCY HEARING SUBPOENA REQUESTED BY CATHERINE FLYNN AND SERVED
    COMM OHlSlg SCY Oll DEPUTI STATE'S ATTORNEY ANTONIO GIOIA. ORDEREL, THAT
    COMM OEIG1S SCY THE HEARING SUBPOEIIA SERVED OIN ANTONIO GIOIA EOR THE
    COMM 0&1915 SGi SEFTEMBER 2, 2015 HEARING IS QUASHED. WILLIAMS, J (CC: ALL
    COMM 0&1915 SCY COUNSEL OF RECORD)
    COMM 081`15 こER STATE'\subseteq SUPPPLEMENTAL DISCLOSURE
    COMM GEこ415 SCE STATE'S MÜTION TO QUASH HEARING SUBEOENA SERVEC IN
    COMM 0&2415 SCB DETECTIVE DAWNYELL TAILOR FLD
    MPRO 0צ2415 SCB MOTION EOR PROTECTIVE OPDER ;TICKLE DATE= 20150511
    CCMM GGこ&lE SCB STATE'S MOTION TO gIJASH HEARING SUBEOENA SERVED ON
    COMM OB2415 SCB MATUR SAM SCGAN FLD
    MPFO 0R2415 SCB MOTION FOP PROTECTIVE URDER ;TICKLE LATE= 20150G11
    COMM UN2&1S SCB STATE'S MOTION TO QUASH HEARING SUBPOENA SERVED ON THE
    COMM 082y15 SCB CUSTODIAN OF RECOPDS FOR THE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF MEDICAL
    COMM OR2&IS SCB EXAMTNER FLD
NEXT PAGE P/N PAGE 017
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#.こ.:44 Monday, February 08, 2910
    02/ÜB/16 CRIMIHAL EOURT OF BALTIMORE CASE INUUUIRY 09.23
        CASE 115]4i035 ST A RICE, BRIAN LT A3こ449 COD Y DCM C U90215
    EVENT DATE OPER PAPT TIME RUNM REAS / EVENT COMMENT
    MPRO 082415 SCB MOTICN FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER ;TICKLE DATE= 20150911
    MPRO O-2415 SCB MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER ;TICKLE CATE= 20150911
    CGMM U'स2415 SCB STATE'S RESPONSE TO DEF'S SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN
    COMM OB241E SCB SUPPORT OF JOINT MOTION FOR RECUSAL OF BALTIMORE CITY
    EOMM QB2d15 SCB STATE'S ATTORNE: CFFICE FLD
    NPRO OB251S CKW MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER
    COMM 032015
    COMM
    OMM 082615
    СомM 082615
    COMM 082615
    CCIMM 082615
    COMM 082615
    COMM 08<\epsilon15
    GDMM O82cls
    CCMMM 08=615
    COMM 082615
    COMM 082615
    COMM 082E15
    gCIMM 08ZEl5 SCB FOR THE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF MEDICAL EXAMINER FOR THE
    NEXT PAGE
        P/N
    PAGE 018
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9:23.45 Mon'Jay, Febrisary 0&, 2016
    02/08/16 CRIMINAL COURT OF BALTIMORE CASE INCUIRY 09:23
    CASE 1lSl+1CjS ST A RICE, BRIAN LT A32449 COD Y DCM C 09021S
    EVENT DASE OPER PART TIME ROCMM REAS / EVENT COMMENT
    CUMMM U8Jllo S8T STATE'S SUPPLEMENTAL DISCLOSIJRE FILED EY JAIJICE BLEDSOE
    CONM OSOE15 1DM SSEI ARRG; P08; 07/02/15; 1DM
    CSNM OS(1215 1DM ESET .JT ; P3l; 10/13/15; 1DM
    TFAK (19rر>1S IDM ASSIGHED TO TRACK C - 120 DAYS ON 09/02/2015
    COMM 0GO215 11'2 CONSENT WAIVER GF PRESEINCE OF DEFF'S "GRANTED" (JUDGE
    CrJMH 090215 1T2 WILLIAMS)
    COMM O90215 1T< JUDICIAL STATEMENTS HEARD AND "DENIED" (.JUDGE WILIIAMS)
    COMM 0g0215 lTZ̈ JOINT MOTION FOR SANCTIONS HEARD AND "DENIED" (JUDGE
    COMM 090215 1T2 WILLIANS)
    COMM 090215 1T2 DEFT'S REQUEST FOR EVIDENTIARY HEAPING HEARD AISC
    COMM 090215 1T: "DENIED" (JUNGE WILLIAMS)
    COMM 090215 122 JOINT MOTION TC FECUSE BALTIMORE CITY ASA AND OFFICE
    COMM 090215 1T2 HEARD AND "CENIED" (JUDGE WILLIAMS)
    COMM OSU̇215 1T2 STATE WITHDRAWS MCTION FOR JÜINT TRIAL OS DEFT., RICE
    CCMM 050215 1T2 (JIJDGE WILLIAMS)
    HCAL 0902:5 SC:Y F3:;0э3R;r28 ;PMOT; ;O=HR; ;WILLIAMS, EARRY;8C9
    COMM 09(18:5 lgj UEFEIIDANT'S SUFPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM TG DEFENDANT'S MOTION
    COMM 0908:5 lgJ FOR REMOVAL
    COMM C.30915 S8T STATE'S SUPFJEMEITTAL UISCLOSURE FILED BY JANICE BLE'DSOE
NEXT PAGE P/N PAGE Ú2C
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9:22:45 Monday, Fetrruary De, -016
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|  <br> CASE INQUIRY 09：23 |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| CASE | 115141035 ST | A RICE，BRIAN L＇！Aご449 CCU Y DCM C 090215 |
| EVENT | DATF．DFER | PART TIME ROOM REAS／EVENT COMMENT |
| COMM | 09161s उСb | SIATE＇S NOTICE OF INTEIT TO USE dNA FIO |
| ссмм | 091615 SC3 | ¢TATE＇S SUFPLEMENTAL DISCLISIJRE FLD |
| сомm | 09141！1こ！ | CEFEIUDANTS＇JOINT MOTION FOR RECORLATIUN ©F |
| CUMM | 091015 19\％ | SEPTEMPER 24,2015 SCHEDULING CONTERENCE |
| COMM | 051315 19j | MOTIUN TO PPODUCE RECORDS REGARDING DNA ANALYSIS |
| COMM | 091815 lgj | STATE＇S SUPPLEMENTAL DISCLOSURE OF EXPERT WITNESS |
| ：CIMm | 092215 CKW | STATE＇S SJPPPLEMENTAL DISCLOSURE FLO |
| Сомм | 0.2315 SCY | DATE STAMPED 8 ORDERED 9／2こ／15，THAT THE DEET＇S REQUEST FOR |
| Сомм | 092315 SCY | SEPTEMBER 24， 2015 SCHEDULJNG CONFEREIICE TO TAKE ？LACE ON |
| çmm | 0923：5 SCY | THE PECORD，is lenied．WILLIAMS，J（CC：MICHAEL BELSKY， |
| СОMM | 092315 SCl | ATTURENY FOR CEFT，JANICE BLEDSÜE，DEPUTY STATE＇S ATTORIJEY， |
| Comm | C92315 SCy | OEFICE OF THE STATE＇S ATTORNEY FOR BALTIMORE CITY） |
| CCMM | 092315 CPP | STATE＇S MITIUN TO COMPEL DISCOVERY |
| COMM | 092315 SPR | STATE．＇S SUPFLEMENTAL UISCLOSURE |
| SOMM | 092315 大．ill | STATE＇E RES［UUSE TU̇ UEFEIJDANT＇S MOTIUN TO PRODUCE RECORDS |
| COMM | 09231S CNN | REGARDING DNA ANALYSIS |
| MCOM | 092315 C2C | MCTICN TO COMFEL DISCUVERY $\quad$ TICKLE DATE $=20151 \mathrm{CO}$ |
| сомм | $0928151 T 2$ | CSET HEAR；［31；09／29／15；1T2（ADD－ON／LAW CLK／JUDGE |
| EOMM | 092915 1T2 | WIELIAMS CALLING PT． $40^{\circ} \mathrm{DKT} . / \mathrm{RM}$ ： 34 EAST） |
| NEXT | PAGE | O／N PAIJE 0：2 |




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乡:2ji47 Monday, Feoruary 08, 2016
    02/C8/16 GRIMINAL COURT OF BALTIMORE CASE IN:2UIRY 09:23
        CASE liSl4lO3S ST A RICE, QRIAN LT A32449 COD Y DCM C 090215
    EVENT DATE OPER PART TIME RUOM REAS / EVEIJT COMMENT
    COMM lOOS15 SCY THE STATE'S RESPONSE IN PARAGRAPHS C, D, E, I, AND P IS
    GCIMM 1COSIS STY INSUFEISIENT, IT IS ORDERED THAT THE STATE DISCLOSE THE
    COMM 1DOS1S SC:i DOCUMENTS REQUESTED BY THE DEFENDANT IN PARAGRAPHS C, D, E,
    COMM 100515 SCY I, AND P. (SEE ORDER FOR DETAILS) WILLIAMS, J
    COMM 100515 SCY (ICC: MICHAEL EELSKY, ATTORNEY FOR BRIAN RICE, JANJCE BLEDSOE
    COMM lOUSIS SCY DEPUTY STATE'S ATTORNEY, OFEICE OF STATE'S ATTORNEY FOR
    COMM 100515 SCl FOR BALTO. (I'TY)
    COMM lUO515 SCB STATE'S SUPPLEMFNTAL UISCIOSUFE FLD
    COMM l00815 VGI CSET PMOT; P31; 10/14/15; VGI (ER ADE ON PEP LW CK GI)
    CUMM 100815 VGL CSET PMOT; P31; 10/13/15; VGI (EF ADD ON PER LW CK GI)
    COMM 100815 SCY DATE STAMFED & ORDERED 10/8/15, HEAKENG UPON PRE-TFIIAL
    COMM 100815 SCY MOTIGNS IN THESE CASES IS SCHEDULED TO OCCUR ON OCTOBER 13,
    COMM 100815 SCY ASIC OOTOBER 14, 2015 AT 9:30 A.M. I\because IS ORDERED, THAT ALL
    COMM 100815 SCY PROVISIONS OF THE SECURITY/MEDIA FROTOCOL ORDER DATED AUGUST
    CCMM 1008:5 SC.Y <̨̨, 201¢ SHALL APELY TO THIS HEAFING. PIERSCN, J
    COMM 10)(18:5 SÖT STATE'S SJPFLEMENTAL DISCLOSURE FILED BY JANICE BLEDSOE
    COMM LUU915 CNN STATE'S RESPONSE TU DEFENDANT'S SIJPPLEMEIJT TC DEFENLANTS'
    COMM 100915 CNN JOINT MOTION TO COMPEL AND FOR SANCTIONS
    HCAL 101315 CYH F31;0G(10;r28 ;JT ; ;POST;PAV;WILLIAMS, BARRY;8CG
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9:23:48 Monday, February 08, 2C10
    0こノJ8/10' SPIMIHAL COURT OF BALTIMOFE CASE JNQUIRIM 09:23
        CASE l!5l4l1)3& ST A RTCE, OPIAN LT A3<449 COD : DCM C 0.j0215
    EVENT DATE O?EP PART TIME ROGM REAS / EVENT COMMENT
    COMH 10:315 SCY REPLY =O STATE'S RESPONSE TO LEFT'S MIDTION TO DISMISS FÜR
    COMM lC1315 SEY FAILORE TO CHARGE A CRIME FLD
    HCNL 10:315 CKW P31;0G30;528 ;PMCT; ;CONT; ;WILLIAMS, BARRY;8C9
    CIJMM lCI315 GKW DEFEUSE MOTION FOR POSTPONEMENT AT MOTIONS HEARING IS
    COMM lCl315 EKW HEREBY HEARD AND DENIED; DEFENSE MOTION TO DISMISS
    COMM lG:3ls CKW STATEMENT IS NITHDRAWN; DEFENSE MOTION FOR SEQUESTRATION
    COMH 10:315 EKW IS HEREBY HEAPD AND GRANTED; CONTIN(1E CIN 3/9/15 PT31
    COMM 101415 CKW DATE STAMPFE ANL ORDERED UN 1)/14/1S THAT IN CONSIDERATION
    COMM ICIAl5 CKW GF LEF'S JOINT MOTION TO CONPEL AND FOR SANCTIONS, THE COURT
    COMM lCI4lE CKW HAVING FÜIND THAT THE STATE HAS FAILED TO ERODUCE
    COMM 1Cl4lr, EKW INFOPMATION THIS COUFT CEEMS EXCULPATORY, IT IS THIS 14TH
    COMM IClH15 GKW DA/ OF OCTOBEP 2Cl5 HEREB! ORDERED THAT UEF'S MOTIOII IS
    CCMM 1C1415 CKW GRANTED IN PART AND HEREBY ORDERD THAT THE STATE ON OR
    COMM 1C14]s こKW BEFORE 10/28/15, PROVIDE COUNSEL FOR DEFS WITH COPIES OF ANY
    COMM 1C1419. CKW AND ALL COCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE IHVESTIGATION AND
    COMM 101415 CKW PROSECUTION OF DEFS. ALL OTHER REQUESTS EY THE STATE ANU
    COMM 101415 CKW THE [IEFS FOK SANCTIONS ARE HEREBY DENIED PER
    CCIMM J01415 E:\% ت̈OCCE BARRí C. WILLIAMS (SEE ORDER); CE COPIES TO
    CJMM 1014:5 EKW MIFHAEL BELSKY, ATTY FOR BRIAN PICE AND JANICE BLEDSCE
    NEXT PAGE
    P/N
    PAGE 026
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0こ;べ/10 CRIMINAL COORT OF EALTIMORE SASE INQUIRI 09:23
CASE llflilú35 ST A RlCE, BRIAIJ LT A32449 COL Y DSM -090215
EVENT LATE OPER PART TIME RUOM REAS / EVENT CUMMENT
COMM 101415 CKW EEPUTY STATE'S ATTY, OFFICE OF THE STATE'S ATTY FOR
COMM liliis SKW BA.LTIMORE CIT:
COMM 1015:5 SīY LATE STAMPED \& UFDERED 10/14/is, ON MAY 14, 2015, THIS COURT
COMM lolsis SEY RECEIVED THE STATE'S MOTION FOR ISSIJANCE OF ORDER BARRING
COMM lÜl. 15 SCY EXTRAJUULCIAL STATEMENTS. ON SEPTEM3ER 29, 2015, THIS COURT
COMM 101515 SCY RECEIVED THE DEET'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATIOII OF THE DENIAL
CCMM 101515 SCY OF MOTION FOR REMOVAL \& REQUEST FOR HEARING. THE DEFT'S
COMM lÜlés SCY MOTIOH NOTED HIS CUNCERN FOR THE ACCUMULATIOU OF PRETRIAL
COMM 101sis SEY PUELICITY, INCLUCING THE DISCLOSURE OF EVICENCE NOT IN THE
COMM lolsis SCY PUBLIC RECORD, \& THE EFFECT OF SUCH ON THE VICR DIRE PROCESS
COMM lÜlels SCY a HIS RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL. ACCGRDINGLY, IT IS HEREBY
COMM 101515 SCY OFDEFEC THAT: l.) THIS ORDER IS BINDING ON THE UEFT, ALL
COMM lojsls sCy ATPGRNEYS FOR THE DEFT \& THE STATE, \& ON ALL EMPLOYEES,
COMM lolsls Sicy keppesentatives, or AGents GF SUCH ATTORNEIS. IT SHALL
CUMM 101515 SCY REMAIH IN FORCE UNTIL THE CONCLUSISN OF THIS CASE OR UNTIL
COMN lolsjs SCi fIJRTHER ORLEP OF THIS COURT. 2.) HO PERSON COVERED BY THIS
CGMN 101515 SCY GRDER SHALL MAKE UR ISSUE AIJY EXTRA.TUDICIAL STATEMENT,
COMM LO151E SCY WRITTEN UR OFA亡., CONCERNING THIS CASE FOR DISSEMINATIUN BY
CIMMM : 01515 SCY MEANS OF PUBL:C COMMIJNICATION. 3.) COUNSEL ARE REMINDED ÚF
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9:23:48 Mondav, Fehruary 09, 2016
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next page

9:27: 49 Monday, February 08, 2016
02/C13/1E CRIMINAL COURT OF BALTIMCRC CASE INQULRY 09:23 CASE llci4io3s ST A RICE, BRIAN LT A32449 GCD Y DCM C 99G215 EVENT LATE OPER PART TIME ROXM REAS / EVENT COMMENT
COMM 1021]s SCB STATE'S SUPPLEMENTAL DESCLOSURE FLD COMM 110415 CPR STATE'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS FUR COMM llo\&ls čor tallure To Charge a crime
CCMN 010:16 l.נ STATE'S SUPPLEMENTAL CISCLOSIJRE OF EXPERT NITNESS
 CGMM 01CEl6 SCY PROCEECINGS AND REQUEST FOR HEARING FL[
CUMM 011416 SCI DATE STAMPED \& ORUERED 1/13/16, UPON CONSJLATION WITH THE COMM 011416 SCY PARTIES TO THE ABOVE-CAPTIONED CASE THROUGH COUNSEL, IT IS COMM 011416 SCY ORDERED THAT A HEARIIIG IS SCHECULED FOR JANUARY 20, 2016 CUMM 011416 SC: AT 2:00 P.M. WILLIAMS, J (CC. MICHAEL BEJSKY, ATTY FOR COMN GJl4jo sč: GRTAN R:CE, JANICE DLEDSOE, DEPUTI STATE'S ATTY, OEFICE OF COMM 011416 SEE THE STATE'S ATTY FOR BALTO. ©ITY) CGMM 011416 SBT STATE'S MOTION TO COMPEL A WITUESS TO TESTIFY FURSUAIUT TO COMM 0llal6 38T SECTEON y-123 GF THE COURTS 8 JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS ARTICLE COMM 011416 S8T EILEC BY MARILYN MOSH:
CGMM Oll51G SCy DEFT LT. ERIAN RICE'S OPPOSITION TO THE STATE'S MOTION CIMM 011516 SCY TO COMPEL A WITNESS TO TESTIFY PUPSUANT TO SECTION 9-123 COMM OIIS10 SCY OF THE COURTS AND JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS ARTICLE FLD CCMM 011516 CPR EECURITY/MEUIA PROTOCOL ORDER

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PAGE 029

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9:22:4今 Monday, Fek.ruary 0&, ¿0:6
    0こ/08/16 CRIMINAL CCURT OF BALTIMORE CASE INQUIRI 03:23
        CASE 115141035 ST A RICE, BRIAN LT A32419 COD ! DCM C G90215
    EVENT CATE GPER EART TIME POOM REAS / EVENT COMMENT
    COMM 011916 CNII DEFENDANT WILLIAM PORTER'S OPPOSITION TO THE STATE'S
    GOMM 011910 ENIJ MOTION TO COMPEL A WITNESS TO TESTIFY FURSUANT TO SECTION
    COMM O11916 CUN 9-123 OF THE COUFTS ANC JUDICIAL PPOCEEDINGS ARTICLE
    COMM OILC:G CHN STATE'S FESPONSE TO DEFENDANT BPIAN RICE'S OPPOSITION
    COMM G1201E CNHITU THE STATE'S MOTION TC COMPEL A WJTNESS TO TESTIFI
    COMM ClZOlG CNN PURSUANT TO SECTION 9-123 OE THE COIJRTS AND JUDICIAL
    COMM 012016 CNN PROCEEDINGS ARTICLE
    HCAL 012016 l SCB P31;0930;528 ;HEAR; ;CONT; ;WILLIAMS, BARRY;8C`
    COMM 012016 SCB CSET HEAR; P31; 01/20/16; SCB
    COMM Dl201G SCB STATE'S MOTION TC COMPEL PORTER'S TESTIMCHY DURING TRIAL
    COMM 012U16 SCB IS HEREBY HEARD AND EENIED
    COMM 012016 SCB EEF'S MOTION FOP SPEEDY TRIAL RIGHT IS DENIED; CONTINUE ON
    COMM 112016 SCB ORIGINAL SCHED:JLE
    COMM 01281E :-PR ETATE'S SUPPLEMEIJTAL DESCLOSURE
    CGMM 020S16 I.SU STATE'S NOTICE OE AFEEAL FLD. O|l CENIAL OF MOTION TO COMPEL
    CTJMM 020;i6 CSU FLD. PER MICHAEL SCHAT2OW, ASA EHECK #147S IN THE AMOUNT OF
    CGMM 0こCil6 CEU $61.00. DUE TO TRANSMIT \N 04-04-16.
    COMM 02C416 CSIJ*******************ASSIGNED TO LMH***********************
    GIJMM 02C516 SCR STATE'S MOTION TO STAI EROCEEDINGS PENDING APPEAL ELD
    NEXT PAGE
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9:2?:50 Monday, Feturuary 03, 2016

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9:2र:50 Monday, Ëebruary 0r, <016
U<LO8,16 URINIHAL COUJRT C:F BALTIMORE CASE IIMUIRY 00:23
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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY, MARYLAND

STATE OF MARYLAND
vs. Case Number: 115141037
WILLIAM PORTER,

DEFENDANT.

REPORTER'S OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS (Excerpt - Testimony of William Porter)

Baltimore, Maryland
Wednesday, December 9, 2015
BEFORE :

HONORABLE BARRY G. WILLIAM, Associate Judge (and a jury)

APPEARANCES:

For the State:

JANICE L. BLEDSOE, ESQUIRE
MICHAEL SCHATZOW, ESQUIRE
MATTHEW PILLION, ESQUIRE
JOHN BUTLER, ESQUIRE

For the Defendant:

JOSEPH MURTHA, ESQUIRE
GARY E. PROCTOR, ESQUIRE

* Proceedings Digitally Recorded *

Transcribed by:
Patricia Trikeriotis
Chief Court Reporter
111 N. Calvert Street
Suite 515, Courthouse East
Baltimore, Maryland 21202
E. 248
T A B L E O F
C O N T E N T S

VOIR
STATE'S WITNESSES: $\underline{\text { DIRECT }} \underline{\text { CROSS }}$ REDIRECT RECROSS DIRE
William Porter $4 \quad 91$ 154

DEFENDANT'S EXHIBITS:
IDENTIFICATION EVIDENCE

9 (Photograph of Bruce and Presbury Street) -- 23

10 (CCT Image of Mount Street) 37
11 (Photograph of Western District) 77

STATE'S EXHIBITS:

34-A (Transcript of William Porter's Police Interview on April 17th, 2015)

104

77 (Disc of CCTV footage from North and Pennsylvania)
$\underline{P} \underline{R} \underline{O} \underline{E} \underline{E} \underline{D} \underline{I} \underline{N} G S$
(Excerpt - Testimony of Officer William Porter
began at 10:48 a.m. )
MR. PROCTOR: At this time, the Defense will
call Officer Porter.
THE COURT: All right. Very well.
MR. MURTHA: Your Honor, just -- is there any
way that get turned off?
(Brief pause.)
MR. MURTHA: Thank you.
THE COURT: Swear the witness in.
THE CLERK: Sir, raise your right hand, sir.
Whereupon,
WILLIAM PORTER,
the Defendant, having first been duly sworn, was examined
and testified on his own behalf as follows:
THE CLERK: Thank you, sir.
Have a seat, and state your name.
THE WITNESS: William Porter.
THE COURT: You may proceed.
Ladies and gentlemen, you'll note in a few
seconds that Mr. Proctor seems to have a cold that has
been going around this courthouse for the last couple of
months, just bear that in mind.
MR. PROCTOR: Thank you, sir.
If anyone can't hear, put a hand up.
DIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. PROCTOR:
Q. Officer Porter, did you know Freddie Gray?
A. Yes, I did know Freddie Gray.

I saw Freddie Gray on a daily routine. Every
day, I saw Freddie Gray out. I worked foot -- on our foot patrol in the Gilmor Homes up at North and Carey and Pennsy and North. He was a regular fixture up there. And if he wasn't dirty, he'd come over and talk to me.
Q. What do you mean?
A. Dirty means, you know, that you have drugs, you have, like, a pack of drugs on you. If he wasn't, he'd come over and talk to me. And I'd talk with Brandon Ross and to Davonte Roary. I talked to all the guys up there.
Q. Did you have a problem with him?
A. Not at all, no.
Q. So then when he said he needed a medic, why didn't you call for one?
A. Well, I didn't call for a medic because after talking to Freddie Gray, Mr. Gray, he was unable to give me any reason for -- for any kind of medical emergency. Just talking with him, I didn't see anything externally,
any cuts or wounds or anything.

And the medic usually takes a while to come -come to a scene. Where we were Mr. -- the transport would have transported Mr. Gray to the hospital in 10 minutes. It usually takes a little bit longer for them to get to us, and for them to assess the scene, and take him to a hospital.
Q. And why didn't you seatbelt him at Druid Hill and Dolphin?
A. Just prior training and experience, as everyone has said, that wagon back there is pretty tight. You know, it becomes a -- when I'm walking in, my gun side -I'm right handed, so my gun side is on the right. So going into the wagon, my gun is always presented to the prisoners who are sitting along the wall. So it always presents a problem getting into the wagon.
It's just -- throughout all of my training, I've seatbelted people inside my vehicle, but I -- my personal cruiser, but never the wagon.
Q. At Druid Hill and Dolphin, did Mr. Gray tell you he couldn't breathe?
A. Absolutely not.
Q. So why does Detective Teel's report say differently?
A. Detective Teel's report. She called me on my
way down to Virginia. I was on my way -- I answered the phone just because $I$ knew it was a Baltimore City number. She asked me, you know, could I explain to her what happened.

And assuming that she had known -- that she had investigated the case, that she had known that $I$ had been all of the stops from one to -- well, with the exception of one, but one to six $I$ had been at all the stops from the beginning. So I started from the beginning, which was Presbury and Mount, in which Mr. Gray had been hurt, saying he couldn't breathe, and that he needed an asthma inhaler.
Q. Okay. Now let's start at the beginning. Where did you grow up, sir?
A. I grew up in Baltimore City, West Baltimore
more specifically. Within the -- in the Western
District, various areas. Carey and Edmondson Avenue is where I lived. I lived on Braddish, 1800 block of Braddish. The 1700 block of Ashburton. I lived on -then on Riggs. So a lot of areas in the Western.
Q. And other than being a police officer, have you had any other jobs?
A. Yes, I have.
Q. And what are those?
A. Other than being a police officer, I worked at

Towson Commons Movie Theater when it was still there. I also worked at a computer company with one of my mentors.
Q. What high school did you graduate from?
A. I graduated from National Academy Foundation.
Q. And what did you do after that?
A. After that I -- I went to Villa Julie

University -- started Villa Julie College, which is now known as Stevenson University. I attended there for two to three years.
Q. And when did you start coming into regular contact with police officers?
A. Very young. Being young, my mom didn't have a -- or my family didn't have much money. So she couldn't pay for summer camp; she needed to work during the day. So I joined the Police Athletic League. At the Police Athletic League, $I$ came into regular contact with -contacts -- I'm sorry -- with officers every day.
Q. Okay. And how would you describe that contact?
A. It was always positive. You know, it was like a camp setting, so $I$-- you know, we came in. They gave us a little breakfast. We'd do activities throughout the day. They'd give us lunch.

If you had gone to the PAL Center during school
time, they'd -- they'd help you with school -- I mean with your homework.

Every Friday, they would take us out to various
places in Baltimore City, like the Baltimore Aquarium, the zoo, things like that.
Q. Did you ever think about joining the military?
A. I did think about joining the military, specifically the Air Force. My dad and my grandfather were both in the Air Force. Unfortunately, I'm color blind, so $I$ was unable to do the Air Force.
Q. What does your mom do for a living?
A. My mom is a nurse.
Q. So when did you decide to join the police force?
A. I decided to join the police force just from the experiences I had with the Police Athletic League. And about 2010 is when I decided. And even then, we were -- the society was having a negative image of police. There were certain police cases that were coming up, and people were having just a negative interpretation of police.

And so I decided that $I$ would become a police officer, and give someone -- give -- give the people a different view to police.
Q. And what kind of a cop would you describe yourself as?
A. I was always fair. I -- I had little things
that would annoy me, such as, like, littering. Littering would annoy me because you should be proud of where you come from, so you shouldn't litter.

I mean, like, Gilmor Homes in the Western
District is filthy. It's filled with, like, trash all over the place. There's some people that walk out just, you know, whatever they eat and whatever they' re drinking, they'll just drop on the ground. So, you know, I would get on them, and say, you know, you should be proud of where you come from.

I always tell the guys up at Pennsy and North that -- you know, Pennsy and North was like a pivotal place where black people, in like the 1950 s, Cab Calloway would go there, and Lena Horn would go there. And -- and it's become the heroin capital of the East Coast up at Pennsy and North.
Q. Did you write tickets for minor infractions?
A. I wrote tickets for, like I said, littering. And sometimes $I$ would have write tickets for
loitering. It's just a problem, loitering. A lot of -you know, we have 300 plus murders here in the City. A lot of those guys are just sitting outside loitering, whether it be a corner store or a liquor store.
Q. So what do you remember about your training at the academy, sir?
A. Training at the academy, my academy was extended. It was for 11 months. Typically, it's six months -- during my training at the academy, unfortunately I had a -- a trainee that was shot by an instructor. But other than that, I learned.
Q. When the trainee was shot, did the people teaching you change?
A. Oh yeah. They -- they basically moved everybody out, and just did a reform of the -- of the police -- of the training academy.
Q. What kind of things did you learn at the academy?
A. At the academy, we learned law, ACT, which is arrest control tactics; defensive tactics; you know, just the basics on how to become a police officer.
Q. What kind of medical training did you receive?
A. I'm sorry. Just what, I think her name is, Officer Carson-Johnson. Just that EMAT (phonetic) class, just a three-day period, eight hours. That's basically was my medical class, what we sat through there.
Q. What about seatbelting?
A. We were always told to seatbelt, but it -- I had never been given any demonstration or anything about seatbelting.
Q. Okay. So did you receive a copy of the General

Orders at the police academy?
A. I wasn't -- I have never ever had a physical copy of the entire General Order. I know that I signed for a piece of paper. But coming from the civilian side, when -- when someone says we're going to hand you something called the General Orders, I had no idea what that was. So, yes, I did sign for it.

But during the academy, $I$ was given a flash drive, and I was -- I'm sorry -- the General Orders were put on that flash drive.
Q. After the police academy, what's the next thing that happens?
A. After the police academy, you do field training. It's supposed to be 10 weeks. Unfortunately, our class had done six weeks of field training. You just go under a field training officer, who's trained to train officers.
Q. And during your field training, was anyone arrested?
A. Yes. Yes. Lots of arrests.
Q. And with your -- what do you call the person responsible for supervising you?
A. He's called an FTO or Field Training Officer.
Q. Okay. So people were arrested during your six weeks of field training; is that correct?

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A. Yes, sir.
Q. Were they put in a wagon?
A. They were put in a wagon, yes.
Q. Were they seat belted?
A. They were not seat belted.
Q. How many arrests have you been present at?
A. I have an approximate number, probably 110 arrests for two years, but I've probably been a part of 200 arrests.
Q. And of those 200 arrests, how many left in a wagon?
A. Probably around 150.
Q. And of those 150, how many were seat belted?
A. None.
Q. What is your understanding of, when a detainee gets in the wagon, whose responsibility are they?
A. I think any officer would tell you it's the responsibility of the -- the wagon driver to get the prisoner from Point A to Point B, whatever that Point B may be.
Q. So you've heard testimony about a PocketCop. What is a Pocketcop?
A. A PocketCop is actually an application that, you know, the police department and various police departments have. It's placed on the departmental phone
so that civilians can't access that PocketCop app, and it's distributed throughout the police department.
Q. Did you have one?
A. I did not have PocketCop
Q. So if you wanted to check your email, how would you do it, sir?
A. I would need to go in early or stay late, and get on one of those antiquated computers that we talked about earlier.
Q. Your shifts, how many hours are they?
A. Well, it just recently turned into -- well, when I was there, it had recently turned into 10-hour shifts.
Q. And of those 10 hours, what are you expected to be doing?
A. I need to be patrolling, actively engaging the public.
Q. So of your 10 hours, how much time did you physically spend at the District?
A. Just roll call, which $I$ think it's 27 minutes or something like that. And then we would go on the street. We're expected not to come into District unless you need to come into the District. And you're out to stay our and patrol.

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            The Western District is a pretty -- pretty
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violent place. You know, I had plenty to do.
Q. So tell me what the average day in the life of a Western District patrol officer, like yourself.
A. I can tell you about my first day of field training. First day of field training, we get a call to Club International. At Club International, we were just doing some crowd control. I'm with my field training officer, the crowd was moving. And I hear about seven gun shots rang out.

I then pull my service weapon, and I go into the direction of the gun -- the gun fire. There, I meet up with my field training officer. We located a number one -- I'm sorry, a black male who had been shot. I'm not -- an unknown amount of times.

I could actually see the -- a suspect running down the street. And my field training officer advised me not to run after him, but to give his -- his -- what he looked like, his appearance, and call it out on the radio.

Then we called for an ambulance to -- the
gentleman on the ground. He was taken away. And we then did the area canvass. From there, we cleared out from the scene, you know, did regular patrol.

But at the end of that night, about six o'clock in the morning, $I$ received a call of alarm of fire. From
there, I witnessed a fire at a church that had been started by -- it was an electrical fire. But, you know, that's a pretty exciting first day at work.
Q. And what's a typical day look like?
A. A typical day looks like that. It depends on what shift you're on. Baker -- I'm sorry, baker shift, which is their earliest shift, tends to be a little bit slower.

But Charlie shift is you're going from
beginning. You can go to domestic calls, to a missing person's report, to shoplifting, you know.
Q. Okay. Now, talk a little bit about a PocketCop. If you wanted to check your email, sir, how would you do that?
A. Like I said before, $I^{\prime} d$-- I'd either go in early or stay late and get on one of the antiquated computers. And there were only two available. So there would be other people on the computers, and I'd just have to wait and check those emails.
Q. And if, for your shift, something was
important, how would you learn about it?
A. It's typically read out at roll call. There would be -- during roll call, they tell us about the areas that we need more police presence in. They tell us about BOLOs, be on the look out for persons and wanted
persons. And it's typically read out during roll call. And whenever they have policy changes, they're read out during roll call.
Q. Did you ever receive anything critically important by email?
A. We did, yes.
Q. What kind of things?
A. Like I said, the wanted persons, the BOLOs. They sent out emails every day for -- for anything. I mean, but your email could also contain something about, you know, a retirement dinner from someone at the Southern District.
Q. So in the month of April, do you know how many emails you received?
A. It's approximately 1300 emails, over 1300.
Q. And did you ever send emails from Baltimore City Police Department?
A. No. I didn't really send emails, no.
Q. So -- and April $9^{\text {th }}$. April $9^{\text {th }}$, the day that Lieutenant Quick sent out that email; are you familiar with that?
A. I am familiar with that, yes.
Q. How many emails did you get that day?
A. 44 emails that day.
Q. If you were present at an arrest, and drugs
were recovered, what would you do with them?
A. If I were the arresting officer, I would have to, you know, place them in my pocket until I get to the District where I could package them.
Q. You were provided with evidence bags?
A. They're located at the District. But, no, on the street, $I^{\prime} m$ not provided with evidence bags, no.
Q. So in your day-to-day responsibilities, right, how much of that, what you do every day, did you learn at the academy?
A. Probably about 20 percent.
Q. So where did the other 80 percent come from?
A. On the street training and experiences.
Q. By whom?
A. Senior officers and field training officers.
Q. Now, what's use of force?
A. Use of force is -- is -- you know, if I were to use my baton to hit -- strike someone, that's a use of force. If $I$ were to use a taser, that's a use of force. If $I$ were to deploy mace, that's a use of force.
Q. Did you ever have any findings that you used force?
A. No. No findings that I used force.
Q. So --
A. I was -- I was always able to --

THE COURT: You need a question.
THE WITNESS: I'm sorry.
BY MR. PROCTOR:
Q. So how could you de-escalate the situation without using force?
A. I was always able to use my rapport to kind of talk the guy into cuffs, and not have to strike him or anything.
Q. Other than at the range, did you ever fire your gun?
A. No, sir.
Q. What's officer safety?
A. Officer safety is just, you know, as I said, officer safety, you -- you want to make sure your officers are safety and yourself is safety -- I mean, your safety. That's basically it.
Q. And how important was that to you as a police officer?
A. It was paramount. You know, as a police officer -- I became a police officer to protect life and property. And before property, comes life. So it was pivotal. It was paramount.
Q. You weren't trained on officer safety at the academy?
A. I can't say that there's specific training, but
it's just ingrained to protect life. Your life, the public's life, and also your fellow officer's life.
Q. How did every roll call end?
A. They would typically say make sure you, you know, back each other up.
Q. Okay. Now, let's talk about April $12^{\text {th }}$. April 12th's a Sunday; right?
A. It is, yes.
Q. So what's the first thing you do every Sunday morning?
A. On Sunday, we have inspections. So that's a gun inspections. You get inspected as far as your uniform and your appearance. You also have vehicle inspections every Sunday.
Q. Okay. So did you do a vehicle inspection that morning?
A. I did do a vehicle inspection that morning.
Q. What, if anything, significant happened during your vehicle inspection?
A. While -- while waiting to wash my car, Lieutenant Rice comes over the air and says that he's in a foot pursuit.
Q. Okay. Now, let's step back a little. You're title as a police officer is what?
A. Police officer.
Q. Who's your direct supervisor?
A. My direct supervisor would be a sergeant.
Q. And on that morning who's the sergeant?
A. Sergeant Alicia White.
Q. And who's her supervisor?
A. Her supervisor is Lieutenant Rice.
Q. And so when you say Lieutenant Rice called a foot pursuit, that's your boss' boss?
A. In a way, yes.
Q. And the -- explain, in case it's not clear, is

Baltimore broken into separate divisions?
A. Yes. We have nine different districts.
Q. Southeast, Northwest, that sort of thing?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you're in the Western; right?
A. I'm in the Western.
Q. On that Sunday morning who's in charge of Western District?
A. Lieutenant Rice is the shift leader. He's the shift commander. He's the commander for the District that morning.
Q. Okay. So Lieutenant Rice calls out a foot pursuit; right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Does he use any codes?
A. I can't say for certain. But, you know, the typical code would be, you know, 10-16.
Q. Let's talk about that a little, sir.
Q. What's a 10-16?
A. A 10-16 is urgent backup.
Q. Are you free to disregard that?
A. There are very rare occasions. You know, if I'm protecting life, then yes, I'm free to. But if I'm just washing my car, then no I'm not free to disobey a 10-16.
Q. So he says 10-16, what do you do?
A. I immediately run out to my vehicle and respond to the areas in which he called out.
Q. And where is that area?
A. He may have said Gilmor Homes or -- or, you know, Mount Street and Westwood because I responded over to Westwood and Bruce Street.
Q. Okay. And when you get there, what do you do?
A. When I get there, I exit my vehicle. I walk southbound on Bruce Street where I can -- where I locate Lieutenant Rice. MR. PROCTOR: May I just retrieve one of these? Thank you.

Judge, I'm not sure if the jury can see. Could Officer Porter get off the stand, and just have him point
to the map?

BY MR. PROCTOR:
Q. Officer Porter.

Now, I'm the wrong person to be saying this
sir, but you have to keep your voice up.

Okay. Can you see on this map where you parked your vehicle?
A. My vehicle was in Bruce and --

THE COURT: The witness needs to move to the right of it so all the jurors can see.

THE WITNESS: I'm sorry.

My vehicle --

THE COURT: No, no. Let --

MR. PROCTOR: How's that?

THE WITNESS: My vehicle would have been here.

BY MR. PROCTOR:
Q. Okay. And what direction did you walk in?
A. Southbound. In this direction, down.
Q. And who did you see as you walked that way?
A. Lieutenant Rice was (indiscernible at

11:11:30 a.m.)
Q. And as best as you can point out on Defendant's Exhibit 1, where was Lieutenant Rice?
A. Let's see.

THE COURT: You need to move out the way of the

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THE WITNESS: I'm sorry.

It may be covered up. Somewhere in here.

BY MR. PROCTOR:
Q. Okay. You can take the witness stand again. So when you see Lieutenant Rice, do you have a discussion with him?
A. Yes.
Q. And based on that, what do you do?
A. From there, I began searching for a second suspect that he said was in this area, general area.
Q. Okay. I'm showing you what's about to be marked --

MR. MURTHA: 9. 9; is that correct?

MR. PROCTOR: As a defendant's exhibit.

THE CLERK: Number 9.

MR. PROCTOR: 9 .
(Defendant's Exhibit Number 9
was received in evidence.)

THE COURT: Is it for ID or for entry?

MR. PROCTOR: It's for entry.
THE COURT: Any objection?

MR. SCHATZOW: No objection.

BY MR. PROCTOR:
Q. I'm showing you what's been marked as

Defendant's Exhibit 9, and ask you if you recognize that?
A. Yes. That looks familiar.
Q. What is it?
A. That's going to be Bruce Street, and that is Presbury.
Q. Okay. And does that fairly and accurately depict the area where you were looking for the second suspect, part of it?
A. I -- yes. I would have been behind these houses here.
Q. Okay. And you're pointing to the top right corner of the screen, to the right of where the person on the bicycle is?
A. Yes.

MR. PROCTOR: I'd ask that be published to the jury.

THE COURT: Very well. It's entered and published.
(Brief pause.)
THE COURT: Excuse me one moment.
(Brief pause.)
THE COURT: You can retrieve it.
MR. PROCTOR: Thank you, sir.
BY MR. PROCTOR:
Q. So, Officer Porter, as you're searching for the
second suspect, do you hear anything?
A. Yes, sir. While searching for the second suspect, I can hear a gentleman, I didn't know at the time, but I know now, to be Mr. Gray. He was just yelling inaudible stuff. At some point in time, he said I can't breathe, I need an asthma inhaler. He also said something about his legs. I could hear -- I was just a block over, and I could hear what he was yelling.
Q. So you can hear it, but can you see it?
A. I cannot see it, no. I'm behind houses.
Q. So approximately how long do you spend searching for a second suspect?
A. I don't have a good -- it was -- it wasn't -it was a short time. It wasn't very long. Lieutenant Rice walks back over -- walks back to me and, you know, tells me to 10-6, don't continue that search any longer.
Q. Okay. So again -THE COURT: Excuse me one second. I need Defense 9. I need it over here with the exhibits until --

MR. PROCTOR: Absolutely, sir. THE CLERK: Thank you. THE COURT: Thank you. BY MR. PROCTOR:
Q. What's a 10-6, sir?
A. A 10-6 just means to stand by.
Q. It means -- okay.

So after Lieutenant Rice says 10-6, where do
you go?
A. From there I just do some -- some crowd control over -- I'm on Mount Street and Presbury. Just standing at that corner, there was some -- some citizens there just expressing that they didn't like the way Mr. Gray was arrested.
Q. At stop one, the -- with all -- you've been present for testimony; right?
A. Yes.
Q. And you've heard people describe the six stops; right?
A. Yes.
Q. And what we're talking about at the moment is Stop 1; is that true?
A. Yes. That is the moment -- that's what we're talking about at the moment, yes.
Q. Do you ever see the wagon at Stop 1?
A. The wagon just may be pulling away, but no I don't see the wagon.
Q. Do you ever see it with the doors open?
A. No. No.
Q. Did you ever see anyone inside it?
A. No. I never saw anyone get inside it.
Q. Did you ever see anyone getting lifted up into it?
A. No.
Q. So you're talking about crowd control in Gilmor Homes?
A. Yes.
Q. In your experience, how many of the arrests you've been present at happened at Gilmor Homes?
A. A large number happened in Gilmor Homes.

Gilmor Homes -- yes, a lot.
Q. So in your experience, when someone gets arrested at Gilmor Homes, what happens?
A. When someone gets arrested in Gilmor Homes -it's a housing project. Typically, people tend to come out and start -- a crowd starts to gather, and they -they just start to yell things at us.
Q. So why did you feel it necessary to do crowd control?
A. Just because I -- I -- during my shifts, I frequently walk foot in Gilmor Homes, and I'm a familiar face, and I know people by first names, and I talk to them a lot. So, you know, I can typically get people to calm down in -- in the Gilmor Homes.
Q. Did you see the -- the video that was shown, I think it was Mr. Moore recorded. Did you see that video?
A. I saw that video in court, yes.
Q. And there were people screaming and hollering?
A. There are, yes.
Q. Is that a frequent occurrence?
A. Absolutely, in Gilmor Homes, yes.
Q. So after the -- how long do you spend, roughly, doing crowd control?
A. Not long at all. Lieutenant Rice instructed everybody to clear out and get out of Gilmor Homes pretty -- pretty quickly.
Q. So what did you do?
A. I then walked back to my vehicle and controlled -- I mean, continued my regular patrol duties.
Q. Okay. Roughly, do you recall what direction you drove in?
A. From Westwood, I probably went northbound on Fulton and then went eastbound on North Avenue.
Q. And what's the next thing of any significance that happens?
A. I -- I hear someone call for the wagon to go to Mount and Baker so that it could place shackles on, I know now to be Mr. Gray, and fill out the Central Booking Bin Number thing.
Q. Is that commonly called the toe tag?
A. It is commonly called the toe tag, yes.
Q. Tell the jury what a toe tag is.
A. A toe tag is just, you know, we place -there's identification numbers when you take people into Central Booking. We call it the Bin Number. You just write down the Bin Number from the bracelet that we place on the prisoner.

And you just write on a piece of paper and the wagon driver or the transport driver hands it over to the people over at Central Booking. And that's how you -that's the receipt for the prisoner.
Q. Okay. So you hear someone say they're going to toe tag him.
A. Yes.
Q. Does anyone request for assistance?
A. After -- after they -- after the wagon -- I guess after the wagon heads back there, there's another call on the radio, just for one more unit I think they said, and I respond. I had just been up the street. I was going to Mount and Baker.
Q. Was there a code given?
A. I'm -- I'm not certain. I don't recall.
Q. So why'd you go?
A. Just that's what I do. That's my sector. I
work in Sector 4. And that's my responsibility.
Q. And, by the way, we talked about the hierarchy, okay. And your shift is Baker shift?
A. At that time it would have been Baker shift, yes.
Q. How many people are supposed to be working on a Baker shift?
A. 17 officers.
Q. How many were there that day?
A. It may have been 10 to 11 officers there.
Q. How many sergeants are you supposed to have in a shift?
A. Three sergeants, or it should be four sergeants for every sector, but three to four sergeants.
Q. How many on a shift?
A. On a shift? Like I said, three to four sergeants, depending on how many sectors there are in the District.
Q. How many were there that day?
A. Just one.
Q. How many wagons are you supposed to have on a shift?
A. There's supposed to be two wagons for my District.
Q. And how many were working that day?
A. Just one.
Q. So now let's talk about Stop 2; okay? Because I think everybody in here knows what Stop 2 is.

You said you headed over there. When you go there, what's going on?
A. I stopped my car about 20 feet back. I could hear the crowd. I could hear people yelling at the officers at the wagon. They were saying, you know, don't -- you beat him, why'd you beat him, why'd you tase him. And there some expletive language.

I then walked up to the back of the wagon. They were pulling -- at that time, I didn't know who it was, you know, because it was officers standing in front of whoever the suspect was.

And they were -- as they pull him into the wagon, I turned around and I go to the crowd because there's three officers and one suspect. So there's no need for me to be over there. And I go to the crowd.
Q. So who pulled him into the wagon?
A. Well, $I$ know now to be Lieutenant Rice.
Q. Did you know at the time?
A. Not at the time, I didn't know. I speculated between either Lieutenant Rice or Officer Nero.
Q. Okay. And did you see Mr. Gray get lifted up into the wagon?
A. I think he began to go before I turned around.
Q. I'm sorry. Can you repeat that?
A. I'm not certain. He may have been -- well, he may have been just getting into the wagon. I think I said something about his feet were kicking, and the other two officers grabbed his feet, and placed him in the wagon.
Q. So then within a few seconds, I think I heard you say that you turned away from the wagon; right?
A. Yes. I turned around to the wagon to -- just to do more crowd control. We want to make sure someone doesn't come up to the back of the wagon and, you know, do something, honestly.
Q. Why didn't you assist them in lifting Mr. Gray into the wagon?
A. Why did I or why didn't I?
Q. Why did you not?
A. I did not because there were enough officers there. There was three officers and one detainee. There's only --
Q. Who was handcuffed?
A. Who was handcuffed. There was no need for me to go over there.
Q. Okay. So I think I heard you say you did crowd control?
A. Yeah. I began walking over to the crowd.
Q. What does that entail?
A. Just trying to get them to calm down. And -and if I can, get them to leave the scene. Just --
Q. And is that the conversation you had with Brandon Ross (phonetic)?
A. That's -- that's when Brandon Ross asked me to come over to him.
Q. Now, Brandon Ross has testified; right?
A. Yes.
Q. Tell the jury what you know about Brandon Ross.
A. I've -- I've -- Brandon Ross and Freddie Gray hung out a lot. I've seen -- like I said, Sector 4, which is the area we're talking about generally, is the sector $I^{\prime} m$ in. And $I^{\prime} m$ usually walking foot there. I'm usually talking with Brandon Ross or Freddie Gray or various people in Gilmor Homes.

So I've seen him a bunch. I've never actually arrested him, but I've been there while he's been arrested also.
Q. Okay. Have you ever arrested Freddie Gray?
A. I never arrested Freddie Gray, no.
Q. So you have this -- tell the jury about your conversation, as you recall it, with Brandon Ross.
Q. Well, being the type -- being the officer that

I am, I built a rapport with Brandon Ross and the other guys in the neighborhood. So Brandon asked me to come over. And he was just explaining to me that he -- he's upset with the officers tasing Mr. Gray and beating Mr. Gray. And I'm just explaining to him I had never -- I didn't see anybody tase him or beat him or anything.

And he asked for a supervisor. I -- I point out my supervisor on the scene, and let him know that Lieutenant Rice is the highest guy in the District, and he would need to talk to Lieutenant Rice. He said that wasn't good enough.

I then instructed him to call 911. He didn't think that was a good enough fix. So he said, you know, we got it on video. And I told him, you know, if you've got it all on video then, you know, go to the media with it and get it broadcasted.
Q. And he did; right?
A. I guess so.
Q. You mentioned the taser.
A. Yes.
Q. Did you have one?
A. I was not issued a taser. No, I didn't have a taser.
Q. Did you see the wagon doors close?
A. No. I didn't see the wagon doors close. I was
talking to Brandon Ross.
Q. Do you know what position Mr . Gray was put in inside the wagon?
A. I saw him being pushed -- put into the wagon. But no, I didn't -- I don't know what position he ended up in.
Q. And do you know if he was seat belted when he put in the wagon?
A. I -- no. I'd be making assumptions about it if I were to say that.
Q. And by the way, you've both put people in a wagon yourself, and assisted other officers doing it; right?
A. Typically, when you arrest people, they don't -- they don't want to be arrested. And they tend to fight back sometimes -- or just sort of actively resist. Not fighting, not throwing strikes at the officers, but actively resisting and refusing to get into the wagon.

So yes, I've had instances where I've -- you
know, I was hit with a wagon door. Or they kick the door, and the door hit me.
Q. So --
A. And I've seen that happen to officers, too.
Q. Have you seen other officers get injured

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loading people into a wagon?
A. Not injured to the point where they needed to get medical attention, but, you know -- you know, maybe a jammed finger or, you know, little cuts, little bruises.
Q. So after talking to Brandon Ross, what did you do?
A. Oh. After talking to Brandon Ross and -- he then walks off. Then I walk back over to the wagon because I can hear the -- I can hear kicking -- or what I think to be kicking. I can hear there's bumps, and I can see the wagon shaking side to side, not back and forth but side to side.
Q. Put your hand up as if it's the wagon. Show me how it was shaking.
A. It was going side to side.
Q. You're familiar with Freddie Gray; you've arrested Freddie Gray. Ballpark, what was he like?
A. I haven't -- I haven't arrested him.
Q. I'm sorry. You're right. Being in contact with him on a daily basis, what does he weigh, roughly?
A. Probably 130, 150 pounds, something around there.
Q. And the wagon is shaking; is that correct?
A. Yes. The wagon was shaking.

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Q. And can -- is there any loud voices happening?
A. There's yelling. It's inaudible. He's not saying any specific or distinct.
Q. Now, let me show you what's been marked -MR. PROCTOR: Let me show Mr. Schatzow first. (Brief pause.) BY MR. PROCTOR:
Q. What's been marked as Defendant's Exhibit 10 and ask if you recognize that?
(Defendant's Exhibit Number 10 was marked for identification.) THE WITNESS: Yes. It's CCT footage from -that appears to be Mount Street.
Q. And what does it depict?
A. In the -- in the picture, I can see Brandon Ross. I also see myself. And there's another officer there. And it looks like there's somebody behind us. MR. PROCTOR: Judge, I'd move Defendant's

Exhibit 10 into evidence.
MR. SCHATZOW: No objection, Your Honor. THE COURT: So entered. (Defendant's Exhibit Number 10 was received in evidence.) MR. PROCTOR: May I just publish it again? THE COURT: You may.

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MR. PROCTOR: While the jury is looking at that, if $I$ can just reload?

THE COURT: Absolutely.
(Brief pause.)

THE COURT: Actually, Counsel, approach while they' re looking at that. MR. PROCTOR: Yes, sir.
(Counsel approached the bench, and the
following ensued:)

THE COURT: (Inaudible at 11:30:00 a.m.)

MR. PROCTOR: I'm doing all right. I'd rather
keep going, but it's up to you. If you want to take a break, I'll take one.

THE COURT: (Inaudible at 11:30:06 a.m.)

MS. BLEDSOE: A break?

MR. PROCTOR: Well, if it will make your life easier, $I$ won't stand in the way of that.

THE COURT: Literally, five minutes. As soon as they finish, we'll break.
(Counsel returned to the trial table, and the following ensued:)
(Brief pause.)

THE COURT: All right. Ladies and gentlemen, we're going to take about -- not about, we're going to take a five-minute break.

Please do not discuss this testimony, even among yourselves.

Leave your notepads on the chair.
All rise for the jury.
(Brief pause.)
(Whereupon, the jury was excused from the courtroom at 11:31 a.m.)

THE COURT: Thank you. Everyone may be seated.
Counsel, approach.
(Counsel approached the bench, and the
following ensued:)
THE COURT: I only need one. I don't need both. I just need one. That's all I need.

It's usually a five-minute break (inaudible at 11:32:04 a.m.) And then we'll just go until lunch. And lunch (Inaudible at 11:32:08 a.m.) break then.

I assume you have a bit more of the officer?
MR. PROCTOR: 25-30 minutes probably.
THE COURT: So we may be able to begin with cross, but maybe not. We'll see.
(Counsel returned to the trial table, and the following ensued:)

THE CLERK: All rise.
(Whereupon, a recess was taken at 11:32 a.m., and the matter resumed at 11:42 a.m.)

THE COURT: Thank you. Everyone may be seated.

You may remind the witness.

THE CLERK: You may be seated. Just reminding
you you're still under oath. State your name for the record.

THE WITNESS: William Porter.

THE COURT: You may proceed.

MR. PROCTOR: Thank you.

BY MR. PROCTOR:
Q. Officer Porter, when we left off, we just admitted Defendant's Exhibit 10 into evidence.

Is that a captured image of the discussion with

Brandon Ross that you've already testified about?
A. Yes, sir. It is.
Q. And what's Brandon Ross doing? Do you remember that moment in time?
A. Vaguely.
Q. What's Brandon Ross doing?
A. He -- he was -- he was very upset. He was yelling. He was very emotional.
Q. And where are your hands, sir?
A. Just down by my side, and in -- in -- we call it the interview stance, just down by your side.
Q. Now, what dose the interview stance -- what does that mean?
A. You know, just when you're -- I'm trying to show Brandon Ross that $I^{\prime} m$ not being aggressive with him. I'm just keeping my hands by my side, and just having a conversation with him with hopes that he'll then calm down and have a conversation with me.
Q. And he did; right?
A. Well, not really. He kind of just walked away.
Q. Okay. So you testified right before the break about the wagon shaking; is that correct?
A. Yes. Yes.
Q. While the wagon was shaking, what were you doing?
A. I was then talking to Officer Miller. Officer Miller was filling out the toe tag. But he was having difficulty because the wagon -- he was filling it out on the side of the wagon. He was having difficulty because the wagon was shaking back -- side to side.
Q. So I understand and the jury understands, you're saying he was writing on the side of the wagon like this?
A. That's correct.
Q. But because the wagon was shaking, his hand wasn't steady?
A. That is correct.
Q. And during that conversation -- who is Officer

Miller?
A. Officer Miller is just a guy that $I$ work with. We were in the academy together. And, unfortunately, he's also a part of the Freddie Gray case.
Q. Okay. So at that point, did you learn anything?
A. At that point in time, I asked who -- who this prisoner was because it was causing such a -- you know, a ruckus in the Gilmor Homes and in the (indiscernible at 11:44:31 a.m.)
Q. And who was the prisoner?
A. The prisoner was Mr. Freddie Gray.
Q. And -THE COURT: Counsel, approach.
(Counsel approached the bench, and the
following ensued:) THE COURT: I just got a note from Juror Number 8 saying I'm having a difficult time consistently hearing defense counsel. MR. PROCTOR: I'm doing what I can, Judge. THE COURT: I'm sure you are. Your voice does come in and out. MR. MURTHA: Should you stand closer? MR. PROCTOR: I'll stand closer to the jury. As long as Officer -- if Officer Porter can't

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hear me, he won't be able to answer the question.
MR. SCHATZOW: Can you order him not to breathe
in my direction, Your Honor?
THE COURT: I understand that. That's fine.
(Counsel returned to the trial table, and the
following ensued:)
BY MR. PROCTOR:
Q. Officer Porter, if you can't hear me, let me know; okay?
A. I will.

MR. PROCTOR: And, Judge, if the jury can't
see, can you let me know?
THE COURT: Well, maybe -- it's a difficult
position. This is the way the courtroom is set up. If you can't see something, just signal, raise
your hand, and I'll be looking for any of you.
Backup some anyway. That's forward. Backup
and stop.
MR. PROCTOR: I'll try over here. THE COURT: That's fine.

BY MR. PROCTOR:
Q. Officer Porter, you said that you learned from Officer Miller that it was Freddie Gray; right?
A. Yes. Yes.
Q. What did the name Freddie Gray mean to you?
A. Well, I've known Freddie Gray from the neighborhood. I've seen him a bunch of times. But what I said to Officer Miller was that he had done the same thing or similar to the same thing about two weeks earlier where he was arrested in Gilmor Homes, at Mount and Baker again. But this time he was attempting to kick out the windows of an SUV.

After being arrested, Sergeant Stevens asked for backup because Gilmor Homes began to empty out again. And I responded there.
Q. And what did you see Mr. Gray do?
A. I saw him attempt to kick out the windows. And that's when we opened up the door -- or I didn't open the door, but one of the officers opened the door, and you know, tried to calm him down.
Q. Had you -- I think you already testified that you, yourself, had never arrested Freddie Gray.
A. I have never arrested Freddie Gray, no.
Q. Had you seen him be taken in police custody on prior occasions?
A. Yes.
Q. And typically, what would happen?
A. He would --

MR. SCHATZOW: Objection, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Sustained.

BY MR. PROCTOR:
Q. On these prior occasions you've seen him taken into custody, what, if anything, did you see?
A. He would use --

MR. SCHATZOW: Objection, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled. As to what he saw, he can testify.

THE WITNESS: He would usually act out and yell
and feign some type of injury.
BY MR. PROCTOR:
Q. Okay. Let's take this one on one.

He would usually act out how?
A. Just yelling and -- and sometimes he -- he would, you know, actively resist not -- not attempt to hurt any officers, but actively, you know, pull away whenever you had him in custody.
Q. Okay. Yell?
A. Yes, he would yell.
Q. And let's go back to Stop 1 for just a second. When you were searching in the back of this -in the back of those yards; you remember that?
A. Yes.
Q. You now know from the video where the wagon is; right?
A. Yes.
Q. So from where you were searching to where the wagon was, how far is that?
A. It's not far at all. I would have been essentially in the backyard of the houses where the video was filmed.
Q. Okay. So ballpark?
A. I don't know. I don't know.
Q. Okay. But you could hear him yelling from however far away it was?
A. Yes. I could hear him. MR. SCHATZOW: Objection, Your Honor. This is

THE COURT: Sustained. Sustained. Again, do not lead. BY MR. PROCTOR:
Q. Could you hear -- you could hear someone yelling?
A. I could hear someone yelling, yes.
Q. Now, back to Stop 2, over how long that you saw it was the wagon shaking?
A. Probably around five to eight minutes.
Q. Okay. And then what happens?
A. Well, then the wagon pulls away, and I continue to have conversation with Officer Miller and Officer Nero.
Q. Okay. And ballpark, how long was that conversation?
A. It's not long at all. Probably another four minutes or so. And then I get back in my car and continue patrol duties.
Q. Okay. So where do you go?
A. I -- I'm just driving around Sector 4.
Q. Okay. And what's the next thing that happens, if anything?
A. The next thing that happens is Officer Goodson asks for a 10-11, for someone to meet him over on Druid Hill and Dolphin.
Q. What's a 10-11?
A. A 10-11 just to meet -- just means to meet someone.
Q. Okay. And who responded?
A. I answered up. And I didn't know where Dolphin was. But from working in the Western District, $I$ knew where Druid Hill was. So I just took Druid Hill down to Dolphin.
Q. Okay. Stop -- we're calling it Stop 5; right?
A. Yes.
Q. Which is where? MR. MURTHA: Four. MR. PROCTOR: Four?

BY MR. PROCTOR:
Q. I'm sorry, Stop 4. We're calling it Stop 4, which is where?
A. Stop 4 is --
Q. Druid Hill and Dolphin?
A. I thought that was -- the other stop at -Goodson stopped at by himself.
Q. That's three.
A. That's three?

MR. PROCTOR: Pretty sure. Let me step over here.

It's over here. Thank you.

If I may show it to the witness?

THE COURT: You may.

BY MR. PROCTOR:
Q. So let me just hold that right here.

Keep your voice in the microphone.

THE COURT: Well, why don't you do the same?

There's a microphone there.

MR. PROCTOR: Yes.

BY MR. PROCTOR:
Q. So you just testified you left Stop 2; is that correct?
A. That was correct.
Q. And you go back to your patrol duties?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you hear a call over the radio for a wagon check?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And where was that?
A. That was a Druid Hill and Dolphin.
Q. Do you see that on this map?
A. There.
Q. And that's Stop 4; isn't it, sir?
A. That is labeled as Stop 4, yes.
Q. Okay. Is Stop 4 in the Western District?
A. It is not in the Western District, no.
Q. So in your entire police career what District was that spent in?
A. From the academy, I went over to the Western District where I walked foot. I'm sorry. Field training. From field training, I went to the Western District where I walked foot. And from foot, I became a patrol officer in the Western District, all in the Western District.
Q. So when you hear Druid Hill and Dolphin, do you know exactly where that is?
A. No. But I know where Druid Hill is.
Q. So then what do you do?
A. At that point in time $I$ was on North Avenue. I
just take North Avenue over to Druid Hill Avenue. And from Druid Hill Avenue, there's a one-way street, so I go southbound on Druid Hill until I reach Dolphin.
Q. Okay. And when you get to Dolphin, what, if anything, do you see?
A. When I get to Dolphin, I stop just before the intersection. And across the intersection, I could see the transport wagon pulled over into a parking spot.
Q. Okay. So said you stopped. What did you do next?
A. From there, I exited my vehicle. Officer Goodson also exited his vehicle and began to walk to the back. By the time $I$ crossed the intersection, he was -just said to me, you know, help me check this prisoner -check the prisoner.
Q. Okay. And what happens next?
A. The doors are opened, and I see Mr. Freddie Gray laying chest down or stomach down. His head is to the -- towards the cabin of the vehicle, and his feet are to the rear of the door. I then say to him, what's up, and he says, help.
From saying help, I say how can I help you; what's wrong with you. And then he says, can you help me up. I think I help him up. Or -- or we're just kneeling, and I'm talking to him.
Q. Hang on one second.

So I just want to make sure I understand. He's lying on his chest?
A. On his chest, yes.
Q. And what's his head facing?
A. I can't remember what side his head may have been facing to, but --
Q. It was on one side?
A. It was on one side or the other, yes.
Q. So his chin was not touching the floor of the wagon?
A. No.
Q. One cheek or the other was?
A. One cheek or the other was.
Q. Okay. And when you have this conversation with Mr. Gray, where is Officer Goodson?
A. He was just to the rear of the wagon, just standing outside the doors.
Q. Could you estimate how far?
A. I don't have a specific length. But, you know, if I were to reach back, I couldn't touch Officer Goodson.
Q. You could not?
A. Could not touch Officer Goodson, no.
Q. So he was a few feet away?

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A. Yes.

MR. PROCTOR: Judge, can Officer Porter come off the stand? And can I use Mr. Murtha?

THE COURT: If you want to sit this way?

BY MR. PROCTOR:
Q. Officer Porter, could you come off the stand? MR. PROCTOR: Mr. Murtha?

And one more thing, Judge.

BY MR. PROCTOR:
Q. Officer Porter, could you put Mr. Murtha in the position Mr. Gray was when you opened the wagon?

MR. PROCTOR: And, Judge, is it -- could you tell the second row of the jury that they can stand up? THE COURT: Very well.

THE WITNESS: All right. This would have the position --

BY MR. PROCTOR:
Q. Keep your voice up, sorry. I know --
A. This would have been the position that Mr. Gray was sitting in -- or laying in.

THE COURT: When I said everybody, I meant everyone in the jury. Everyone else, sit down, please.

BY MR. PROCTOR:
Q. Okay. And pretend this chair's the bench. Put the bench in relation to where Mr. Gray was.
A. Obviously --
Q. You can hold this.
A. It was expanded -- it was expanded, but it was
Q. How far?
A. It would have been, you know, just that far.
Q. Okay. And so -- so the record is clear, the rear of the wagon is where, sir?
A. Where you're standing.
Q. Okay. So where were you standing?
A. I would have been standing where you're -where you're standing.
Q. Okay. Let's trade places then. So the wagon, you had gotten into it?
A. Yes.
Q. So then just show the jury, and if you could because we're trying to make record here, kind of talk us through it as you do it, what you did?
A. All right. Well, at this point in time, he would -- he asked for help. So the wagon is kind of tight. So --
Q. Is Mr. Murtha's head where Mr. Gray's head was, or should he turn?
A. I don't remember which side his head was turned to, but he wasn't face down.
Q. Okay.
A. All right. And I would have gone on the side, and reached under his arms and tried to brace myself. You know, try to get him this way. That's the way we were. I was just standing behind him this way, and I was talking to him. He was looking at me this way.
Q. Okay. And then did there come a time you helped him on the bench?
A. Yeah, eventually. Then we, you know, we kind of slid back and he assisted me in sliding back, and he would have been on bench side.
Q. Okay. Thank you. If you can you go back to the stand. I just wanted to walk through that. MR. PROCTOR: Judge, would you like to mark Mr. Murtha and take him into evidence, there'd be no objection.

THE COURT: That'd be fine.
(Laughter.)

BY MR. PROCTOR:
Q. So let's walk through it one at a time. THE COURT: Hold on a sec. Hold on, hold on. Okay. BY MR. PROCTOR:
Q. So you put your arm under his left armpit?
A. Yes. My -- my right arm to -- under his left
armpit.
Q. And I should have asked this a moment ago. Did you have a gun on that day?
A. Yes. Absolutely.
Q. And if you could stand up and just show the jury where on your body your gun is placed.
A. It was just on the side here.
Q. Okay. So on your right hip?
A. On my right hip, yes.
Q. Okay. Thank you. Have a seat, please. So Mr. Gray's hands, were they cuffed?
A. They were cuffed. They were in a -- flex cuffs, but yes, they were cuffed.
Q. In the rear?
A. In the rear.
Q. So as you're helping Mr. Gray up, how close were his hands to your gun?
A. They're very close.
Q. So let me ask you this. I just said as you're helping him up. Did you lift him and pick him up and put him on the bench? How did that work?
A. That would be -- that would be physically impossible to pick up a 150 pound man. I weight 220 pounds. To physically pick him up and put him someplace. There's no way I would able to do that.

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Q. Okay. So --
A. He obviously -- he assisted me in helping himself kneel. And he obviously assisted me in sitting on the bench.
Q. You've heard testimony at this trial of what -whether he was stuck; do you remember that?
A. I do.
Q. Based on your observations, was he?
A. I -- I -- I'd be assuming if I were to say that. I have no idea if he were stuck. He just asked me to help him up on the bench, and I helped him on the bench.
Q. Okay. So you put him on the bench, what position is he in?
A. I assisted him to the bench, and he's just -with his hands behind his back, and he's just leaning against the -- I'm sorry. Just sitting regularly, that you would sit on a bench with handcuffs on.
Q. And it's hard to see you on that witness stand. Could you just come down for one more minute? Could you sit in this chair the way Mr. Gray was sitting on the bench?
A. Just sitting like this. And he's leaning against the back of the wall, the east wall.
Q. Okay. So -- go back to the witness stand,
please, sir.

Is he supporting his own head?
A. Yes, he is supporting his own head.
Q. So do you have any further conversation with him?
A. There -- we talked about the -- you know, I asked him just how we're going to get to jail today because we've already had to stop multiple times. He was acting out. And I'm just like how are we going to get you to jail today, man, you know, it's taking way too long. And I was like what do you need, like, go to the hospital, you need a medic or something. Because typically people feign injury or, you know, they just don't want to go to jail. They --
Q. Let's talk about that a little. Are you familiar with the term jailitis?
A. I'm familiar with jailitis, yes.
Q. What is it?
A. Just feigning injury with hopes that, you know -- we're understaffed, so if -- if it's just a petty crime, we call -- like loitering or something like that, the officer will write you a citation or find other means in -- to not taking you to jail.
Q. Tell the jury about the first arrest you ever made.
A. The first arrest $I$ ever made was a gentlemen by the name Tyrone Johnson (phonetic). It was in Gilmor Homes, 1400 Mount More Court (phonetic), one of the courts in there. I'm sorry, one of the homes there.

And we had someone watching the CCTV, which we had footage from. Someone was watching the camera, and they see -- see Mr. Johnson smoking marijuana.

Me and Officer Miller attempt to stop Mr. Johnson. Mr. Johnson then attempts to flee into a house. Fresh pursuit, we go after him.

After he's in the house, he begins to resist. He puts his hand down by his dip, and he won't move his hands.

And then we're all -- we're just sliding across the floor. By the time we get to a television stand, he then throws his hands up like this, and we were able to cuff him up. And I bring him outside, and I'm talking with him. We're trying to find the marijuana he was smoking.

Officer Miller went into -- or stayed in the house and searched under the TV stand. There, we located CDS. Once Officer Miller came outside and said we have your CDS, then Tyrone Johnson said, oh, I'm having a seizure, and he kind of just shakes and falls to the ground.
Q. Okay. And what did you do?
A. We called for a medic. We transported him to the hospital. The doctor said he can't be for certain, but they definitely don't think that he had a seizure, especially if he was able to tell me that he was having a seizure.
Q. And you said you called for a medic.
A. Yes.
Q. Why did you call for a medic?
A. Well, there was a -- he was shaking on the ground. There was an exigent circumstance.
Q. And you and I know what exigent means, but --
A. This is an emergency -- just it is apparent it is emergent. That's what exigency means.
Q. So when Mr. Gray called for a medic, what would it have taken for you to get on the radio right there?
A. I think what you -- what you mean is for me to call for a medic for Mr. Gray.

Just talking to him, he never made, like, a complaint of injury or pain or anything. And I'm asking him questions, and he's not unresponsive. He's just not responding to the -- to certain questions I'm asking. And when I asked him if he wanted to go to the hospital, he said, yes, I want to go to the hospital. So having just given me -- in order for me to
call a medic or call an ambo, I need age, sex, I need to tell them my location, and I need a complaint of injury. If there's no complaint of injury, I have nothing to tell the medics when they respond to the scene. So --
Q. So when you helped Mr. Gray up to the bench --
A. Yes.
Q. Did he appear to be in any pain?
A. No, he did not appear to be in any pain. No. He just, to me, he looked tired. "Lethargic" is the word I used. He just looks tired.
Q. What's an adrenaline dump?
A. An adrenaline dump is, you know -- I've had an adrenaline dump chasing a guy for like eight blocks. And once I get to him, it's just he and I, and he wanted to fight with me, so I ended up taking him to the ground. And I'm just holding him on the ground until more officers show up. And then they cuff him up, and then I'm just tired.

And, you know, I had run for eight -- eight -eight blocks. And then I had to wrestle with this guy for, $I$ don't know, 45 seconds until the other officers showed up. I was just tired, and I just, you know, felt like I was going to throw up or something like that.
Q. So when you said in your statement that Mr. Gray was having an adrenaline dump, what did you mean by
that, sir?
A. It appeared to me that he was, you know -- just based on my training and experience, it seemed to me that he was having an adrenaline dump because he was -- it takes some kind of force to make that wagon go side to side, as opposed to back and back, where you're using the shocks. Side to side is a little different. He had been doing it for a while.
Q. Okay. Was he making eye contact?
A. He was making eye contact, yes.
Q. When he was answering your questions, was he answering them in a normal tone of voice?
A. Just a normal tone of voice, yes.
Q. Have you ever had a detainee refuse to talk to you?
A. Absolutely. People -- you know, people exercise their Miranda Rights all the time.
Q. And you and I know what that is, but let's talk about a few terms that have just come up.

You said he had something in his dip. What's a dip?
A. A dip is just, you know, a front area of your pants.
Q. Okay. What's CDS?
A. CDS is controlled dangerous substance. It can
be drugs. It can be other things.
Q. What are Miranda Rights?
A. Miranda Rights are just your right to remain silent. You know, just ask for a lawyer to be present.
Q. Okay. And have you had detainees exercise those rights?
A. Absolutely. I have detainees not talk to me all the time. They -- I mean, there's a culture here in Baltimore called no snitching. You know, people don't say anything to police all the time.
Q. So when Mr. Gray ceases to answer -- he didn't say much; is that fair -- did you testify to that already?
A. Yes. He didn't say much.
Q. So he's not saying much. What are you thinking?
A. I didn't think anything about it. I mean, it happens quite often. Whenever someone's arrested, they don't want to talk to police.
Q. Did you have any belief that he was under any -- that he was injured beyond tired?
A. No, sir.
Q. Now, you were here when Detective Teel testified; is that correct?
A. Yes, I was present.

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Q. And she said, did she not, that at Stop 4, you reported Mr. Gray said he couldn't breathe.
A. She wrote at Druid Hill and Baker that that's what I said.
Q. Do Druid Hill and Baker ever intersect?
A. They do not.
Q. So at Stop 4, did Mr. Gray discuss anything about his ability to breathe?
A. No, he did not.
Q. Did you hear him express that he couldn't breathe?
A. No. He was able to have -- to speak words. He had a regular tone of voice when he was talking to me.
Q. At any point on April $12^{\text {th, }}$ did you hear him say he couldn't breathe?
A. Yes.
Q. Where was that?
A. At the first stop he said he needed an asthma inhaler.
Q. And what did you tell Detective Teel?
A. That's what I told her from the first stop. Like I said earlier, when she called, I assumed that she already the information that I had been at the majority of the stops. So once she had told me to tell me -- when she said tell me what happened, I started from
the beginning.
Q. And describe that conversation.
A. I -- I can't really remember what that
conversation was.
Q. So you know it started at Stop 1.
A. She just called and said in reference to April $12^{\text {th }}$, you know, what was my involvement. I explained to her I was -- I was there. And she said tell me what happened.
Q. Okay. And let's talk a little bit about Mr. Gray said he needed a medic; right?
A. I offered it to him, and he said, yes. He accepted.
Q. So after he said that, what did you do?
A. After then, then I -- I get out of the wagon. And I'm talking with Officer Goodson, and I said that guy's asking to go to the hospital.

So there's no way he's going to pass medical down at Central Booking because the more he says he wants to go to the hospital, they're going to reject him.
Q. Well, let's talk about that for a minute. Have you transported prisoners to Central Booking?
A. I have, yes.
Q. And what's the process?
A. Like you hand them the toe tag, the prisoner
goes in, then there's a -- there's a nurse on the inside. She asks them various questions, and maybe take his blood pressure. If their answers to the questions are correct, then he's able to serve or be accepted into Central Booking. If not, then he is medically rejected.
Q. Okay. And if someone is medically rejected, what do you have to do?
A. We have to take them to the hospital, and they have to get a medical clearance from a doctor.
Q. Can a medic provide a medical clearance?
A. They cannot, no. It needs to be a doctor.
Q. So let's say you arrest me, and I say my elbow hurts, but $I$ look fine, maybe $I^{\prime} m$ even waving my hands. In your experience, is Central Booking going to take you?
A. If you say those same things that you just said to me right now, and you say that to the nurse, no, they will not accept you.
Q. So if I say my elbow hurts, but I look fine, what would you do?
A. Just transport you to the hospital.
Q. And why would you do that, sir?
A. Just -- we don't have enough officers out on the street as it is, just efficiency. We need to be efficient. So it would be a waste of time to have you go down to Central Booking and get rejected. And have
another wagon have to go down and pick you up, and then take you to a hospital.
Q. Have there been occasions when you've called for a medic to the scene?
A. Yes.
Q. Why would you do that?
A. Just -- they -- they gave me a complaint of an injury.
Q. So in your mind, what's the difference between calling a medic and taking someone straight to the hospital?
A. A medic is like when you call for an ambulance or if you have a medical emergency, and it needs to be taken care of right then and -- like someone has been shot, someone has been stabbed, there's -- things of that sort.
Q. Okay. And a sore elbow, what do you do in that situation?
A. A sore elbow, I could transport you to the -- I could just transport you to the hospital via wagon.
Q. Okay. When Mr. Gray is in the back of the wagon -- you with me?
A. I'm with you, yes.
Q. -- who is primarily responsible for him?
A. It is -- primary -- it is the wagon driver's

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job to get the prisoner or detainee from Point A to Point B, or whomever is transporting that -- that detainee.
Q. So at Druid Hill and Dolphin, who's primarily responsible for Mr. Gray's safety?
A. Officer Goodson never transferred custody to me. He is still under the custody of Officer Goodson.
Q. So Mr. Gray says he needs a medic; right?
A. He -- he says yes to my question, which is do you need a medic, do you need to go to the hospital. He says yes. So --
Q. What do you say to Officer Goodson after he answers that question?
A. I suggest to Officer Goodson to take him to Bon Secours or to a hospital.
Q. Can you order Officer Goodson to do anything?
A. I cannot order Officer Goodson to do anything, no.
Q. Why not?
A. He is my equal.
Q. How many years experience does he have?
A. I believe he has 17.
Q. And in April of this year, how many years of experience did you have?
A. Three years. I'm sorry, I had two years. Two years and a half --

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Q. Okay.
A. -- as of April.
Q. So as you're having this conversation with Officer Goodson, put in your own words what you suggested to Officer Goodson.
A. My -- just tell him that -MR. SCHATZOW: Objection, Your Honor. THE COURT: Sustained. BY MR. PROCTOR:
Q. What did you tell Officer Goodson? MR. SCHATZOW: Same objection, Your Honor. THE COURT: Sustained. Asked and answered. Next question. MR. PROCTOR: Okay. BY MR. PROCTOR:
Q. So after having this conversation with Officer Goodson, does anything come across the radio?
A. Lieutenant Rice asked for a 10-16 up at -- he may have said North and Carey. In that general area of Pennsylvania and North, North and Carey, he asked for a 10-16.
Q. And what's a 10-16?
A. A 10-16 is urgent backup.
Q. Okay. And Lieutenant Rice, is he your boss?
A. He -- he is my superior, yes.
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Q. So when he says $10-16$, what's your obligation as a police officer?
A. I need to respond to that 10-16.
Q. So once you hear "urgent backup," what do you do, sir?
A. I then, you know, walk briskly back to my vehicle, which is across the intersection. I get in, and I radio that $I^{\prime} m$ going to head up to that scene.
Q. Okay. And as you walk to your vehicle, where's your back in relation to the back of the wagon?
A. My back is to the back of the wagon.
Q. So as you're walking to your vehicle, can you see the wagon?
A. I can not see behind me, no.
Q. When you get in your vehicle, do you look back at the wagon at that point?
A. When I sit down in the vehicle, the -- the wagon is right in front of me, yes.
Q. And what's going on?
A. I believe Officer Goodson may be closing the door or -- or he's getting into the wagon. I can't recall at this moment.
Q. After you walked away to get back to your vehicle, do you ever see inside the vehicle again -- the wagon again?
A. Up at North Avenue is when I seen the wagon again.
Q. We'll get there in a second. But at Druid Hill and Dolphin, do you ever see inside the wagon again?
A. No.
Q. Do you know that Mr. Gray was seat belted at Druid Hill and Dolphin?
A. I'd be -- I'd make assumptions if I said yes or no.
Q. So once you get into your car, where do you go?
A. I respond back up to North Avenue and Carey or Pennsylvania.
Q. Tell the jury about that.
A. When I respond up there, there's -- I see Donta Allan. There's Nero, Miller and Lieutenant Rice. I can see them pulling bags of marijuana out of Donta Allan's pockets, and he's cuffed.
Q. And what do you do?
A. Just shortly after the wagon shows up, I then go back and just -- just to confirm with Mr. Gray, do you still want to go to the hospital, and he says yes.
Q. Why do you ask him that?
A. Just because sometimes, if it takes long enough, people will say they don't want to go to the
hospital anymore. They'd rather just go to Central Booking and get it over with.
Q. Could you explain that?
A. That -- just -- that's -- that's it. Whenever -- sometimes people feign injury just to go to the hospital, but then you realize it's going to take way too long. Sometimes at the hospital they reject any kind of treatment, and just say it's taking way too long, and I'd rather go to Central Booking.
Q. So why did you ask Mr. Gray if he still wanted to go to the hospital on North Avenue?
A. Just to see if he would, you know, if he had -if he had changed his mind. That's all.
Q. And again, maybe I could -- well, Mr. Murtha -MR. PROCTOR: Mr. Murtha, can $I$ borrow you for a second?

Would you come off the stand, please? BY MR. PROCTOR:
Q. When you got (inaudible at 12:16:32 p.m.), sir, what position is Mr. Gray in?
A. Well, his hands are behind his back. He's kneeling on this --

THE COURT: Keep your voice up.
THE WITNESS: I'm sorry.
His hands are behind his back. He's kneeling
on his feet. And very close to the wagon, kind of like in this position.

BY MR. PROCTOR:
Q. Bench?
A. I'm sorry. The bench, yeah, just kind of in this position.
Q. Now, where is the wall of the wagon?
A. The wall would have been where this -- this -the back of the chair is.
Q. Is Mr. Gray's head touching the wall?
A. No.
Q. Is his shoulder touching the wall?
A. No, it's isn't.
Q. Thank you. You can go back to the stand.

Is his head facing towards the doors or towards the cabin?
A. Towards the cabin is where his head is hitting.
Q. So how much of his face can you see?
A. Not much. Just about the side, whenever I walked the side. When I'm standing on the side, I can see just the side of his face.
Q. And the totality of your conversation with Mr. Gray, what was that?
A. Just, hey -- I said, Freddie Gray -- hey, Freddie, you just want to go back -- hey, Freddie, still
want to go to the hospital? And he says yes.
Q. And then what do you do?
A. Then Sergeant White was on the scene. I then go to her, and let her know that Freddie Gray still says he wants to go to the hospital. And that one of the arresting officers should go with him to the hospital, do the hospital detail.
Q. Okay. And totality of your -- did you ever get in the wagon at North Avenue?
A. No, I do not.
Q. The totality of your conversation with Mr. Gray, how long does that last?
A. Seconds.
Q. So after your conversation with Sergeant White, what do you do?
A. From there, I believe she goes and may check on Freddie Gray.

I -- there $I^{\prime} m$ just talking to Nero and Miller, again, let them know that Freddie Gray says he wants to go to the hospital and that --
Q. And let's talk about that for a minute, sir. If you arrest me, and I say I don't feel well, whose job is it to take me to the hospital?
A. A wagon would transport you to the hospital.

And --
Q. A wagon --

THE COURT: Well, let him answer the question. MR. PROCTOR: I'm sorry, Judge.

THE COURT: Don't interrupt him.
BY MR. PROCTOR:
Q. Continue.
A. A wagon would transport you to the hospital. And when you get to the hospital, that wagon driver will wait until the arresting officer gets to the hospital. And then he would pass custody to you, and you would take that detainee into the hospital.
Q. So what I think I'm hearing you say is you, as the arresting officer --

THE COURT: Sustained.
Ask a question. I don't need you to restate whatever he said. Just ask him a direct question. BY MR. PROCTOR:
Q. So at the hospital, that person is in the arresting officer's custody?
A. It --

THE COURT: Sustained.

Ask a question.
BY MR. PROCTOR:
Q. Whose custody is the arrestee in at the hospital?
A. He's returned back to the arresting officer's custody.
Q. Now, had you been at the hospital with arrestees?
A. I have, yes.
Q. What's the range of how long you can be there?
A. According to General Order, it says two hours. But I've been there for the entirety of their stay, which can be an hour to 10 hours.
Q. Do police officers -- do you call it the hospital detail?
A. It's called the hospital detail, yes.
Q. Do police officers like that detail?
A. It's not the most fun, no.
Q. Why not?
A. The radio doesn't work in the hospital. Cellular devices don't work in the hospital. You just have to stand by while somebody gets medical treatment. Hospitals tend to go really slow, so it's a really long, monotonous day.
Q. So when you're talking to the bike cops; right?
A. Yes. The bike cops.
Q. What are you saying to them?
A. I'm just telling them that -- or I'm suggesting that one of them do the hospital detail because they
arrested Freddie Gray.
Q. After this conversation, what happens next?
A. You know, I say again to -- or Sergeant White comes over, and she says I have to do the hospital detail because she can't split up the bike officers. There needs to be two of them. So that if you are attempting to detain someone, you have to -- someone has to watch the bikes so the bikes don't disappear.
Q. Are bicycles getting stolen in the Western a common thing?
A. Yes.
Q. So after your conversation with Sergeant White, what do you do?
A. She tells me I need to follow the wagon -- or I need to follow the wagon to the station. And from the station, we'll go to the Bon Secours.
Q. So after that conversation, where do you go next?
A. I go to Western District.
Q. Okay. And when you leave North Avenue, is the wagon still there?
A. No. It had already left before I had gone.
Q. Could you estimate how many minutes after the wagon you left?
A. Not -- it's a very short time, two to five

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    minutes or so.
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Q. How long was the drive to the Western from North Avenue take?
A. Four minutes.
Q. And let me show you what I'd like to mark as Defendant's Exhibit 12 --

THE CLERK: Eleven.
MR. PROCTOR: Eleven.
Let me show it to Mr. Schatzow first.
(Defendant's Exhibit Number 11
was marked for identification.)
BY MR. PROCTOR:
Q. And ask you if you recognize that, sir.
A. Yes, that's the Western District.
Q. Okay. And does it fairly and accurately depict it?
A. Yes.

MR. PROCTOR: Move Exhibit 11 into evidence.

THE COURT: Any objection?
MR. SCHATZOW: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: So entered.
was received in evidence.)

BY MR. PROCTOR:
Q. Can you see on this picture where you parked
your vehicle?
A. Yes. I actually parked my vehicle where that police car --
Q. Come down off the stand for just one second, sir.

And if you could, let's scoot over this way, can you see -- point on Defendant's Exhibit 11 where you parked your vehicle, if you see it.
A. My vehicle would have been where this police car is.
Q. Keep your voice up.
A. My vehicle would have been where this police vehicle is, just along the parking lot.
Q. So on the right side of the picture, next to the "No Entry" sign?
A. Yes.
Q. Can you see on this picture where the wagon was?
A. No. The wagons would be in between this side and this side. And it would go in between that building.
Q. Okay. Can you return to the stand, please? When you get to the wagon, sir, what do you do?
A. From the wagon, I believe I just -- they may be pulling Donta Allan out of one side, and I'm opening up the other.
Q. Okay. So how far is it from where you parked to where the wagon is, ballpark?
A. 50 feet.
Q. So you walk over these 50 feet, and the second arrestee is already getting out?
A. I believe he's getting out. I'm -- I'm not certain on that.
Q. Okay. And you're opening up the other side?
A. Yes.
Q. Why are you doing that?
A. Just to -- I want to put Freddie Gray into -I'm sorry, Mr. Gray into the holding cell until we were ready to go to Bon Secours.
Q. Why not just leave him in the wagon?
A. Someone's got to have, you know, custody of that prisoner. You can't just leave them in the wagon.
Q. Okay. So when you open the door to -- what side of the wagon, if you remember, was it?
A. $H e^{\prime} s$ on $--h e^{\prime} s$ on the right side.
Q. When you open the door, is -- there are two sets of doors in the wagon; right?
A. Yes. There's an exterior, and there's an interior door.
Q. When you get to the Western, are both sides of the right closed?
A. No. No, no, no. The -- the -- the -- both exterior doors are open.
Q. Okay. So when you -- do you open the interior door?
A. I believe I opened up the interior door.
Q. What do you see?
A. I see Mr. -- Mr. Gray there. I'm calling -- I call his name. He doesn't answer me. MR. PROCTOR: And for the third and final time, could I borrow Mr. Murtha to show what position Mr. Gray was in?

BY MR. PROCTOR:
Q. Could you put Mr. Murtha -- if I'm standing at the rear of the wagon, and the jury is the cabin, could you put Mr. Murtha in position?
A. His hands would have been behind his back. He
Q. Keep your voice up, please.
A. I'm sorry.

His hands would have been down. And from my
recollection, it would be a more exaggerated -- it would be way more exaggerated than he was up at North Avenue.
Q. So at this point, is his shoulder against the side?
A. I can't -- I can't remember that.
Q. Is his head against the side?
A. Is -- his head wasn't in the same position it was at North Avenue.
Q. Okay.

MR. PROCTOR: Thank you, Mr. Murtha.
BY MR. PROCTOR:
Q. Go back to the stand, please.

So when you opened the door, and you see Mr.
Gray in that position, is there anyone else around?
A. I think Nero is -- I'm sorry, Novack is coming out.
Q. Now, I don't know if we've talked about him. Who is Novak?
A. Novak is just another officer in the Western.
Q. Okay. And you say he's coming out. Where is he coming out from?
A. It would have been the holding cells. The processing -- where we process people.
Q. Okay. And when you see Mr. Gray in the position you just described, what do you do?
A. I called out to him. And at this time, he doesn't -- typically, he would answer me. But he didn't answer me this time. And I call him, and he doesn't answer.
So now I climb in, and I pull him back, and

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there's -- there's a mucus on his mouth.
Q. Let's talk about that for a second. At Stop 4, was there any mucus in his mouth?
A. At Druid Hill and Dolphin? No.
Q. Yes.
A. No. No mucus on his mouth, no.
Q. Did you see any blood, any bumps, any bruises, anything?
A. No. I didn't see any of that, no.
Q. At Stop 5, did you see anything?
A. His head was facing away from me, but no, I didn't.
Q. Okay. But at the Western, you saw this mucus?
A. Yeah. There was some kind of -- there was clear mucus around nose and mouth.
Q. So when you saw that, what did you do?
A. I think on my testimony I said, oh shit, and I tried to pull Freddie Gray out. And now he's just leaning on me. And we're standing at the -- he's not all the way out, he's just -- his upper half is outside of the wagon and I'm holding him. Trying to hold his back straight, trying to clear his airway.

Novak tries to do a sternum rub. We don't get any response.
Q. Let's talk about that for a second. Let me

## E. 329

stop there. What's a sternum rub?
A. A sternum rub is just something I've seen EMTs do whenever we have a non-responsive person. They do a sternum rub. If they're, like, in an overdose or sleeping or something like that, they'll get an immediate reaction.
Q. Okay. So what I've seen you do is with your knuckles rubbing straight across the chest.
A. Yep.
Q. And so your testimony is Officer Novak did one of those?
A. Yes. He did a sternum rub, yes.
Q. And did Mr. Gray react?
A. No. He did not react, no.
Q. So based on that, what happened next?
A. From there, I believe Novak then radioed for a medic to respond to the District.

After that he began to hold Mr. Gray's head.
Q. Okay. So you're standing behind him?
A. I'm standing behind him, trying to hold his back straight so he can have a clear airway.
Q. And what's Officer Novak doing, if you know?
A. Officer Novak is just on the side of me, and he's holding his head trying to support his head.
Q. Who taught you to do it that way?
A. That was -- that was something that we learned at the academy from our LEMAT (phonetic) class.
Q. Okay. Tell the jury what did you learn at the academy in regard to how to hold a non-responsive person.
A. I believe they called it the lifesaving position. You would hold the victim's back straight, and try to hold his head straight, so he can have a clear airway and be able to breathe.
Q. So after Officer Novak calls for a medic, what happens next?
A. We wait for the medic to show up.
Q. How long did the medic take?
A. It felt like an eternity. I don't know.
Q. And by the way, at -- let's go back to Stop 4 for a minute, okay?
A. Druid Hill and Dolphin?
Q. Yeah.

Ballpark -- you've called a medic many times?
A. Yes.
Q. Ballpark, how long do they take?
A. They -- it depends on -- all right. So when I radio it goes to my dispatch. From my dispatch, it has to go to fire dispatch. From fire dispatch, they have to send it down to the ground units. They then respond.

And it -- it -- not all the time is it the closest
firehouse, it's who answers up. And so it can -- can vary as to how long it takes.
Q. Okay. Have you had one take 15 minutes or more?
A. Oh, absolutely.
Q. And from Druid Hill to Dolphin on a Sunday morning, how long would it take Officer Goodson --
A. Sunday morning, no traffic -MR. SCHATZOW: Excuse me, Your Honor. THE COURT: Sustained. BY MR. PROCTOR:
Q. To get -- what -- to Druid Hill and Dolphin, what's the nearest hospital?
A. I'm -- I'm not familiar with that part of the City. I couldn't tell you. I don't know.
Q. Okay. Bon Secours. How far to get to --
A. To get to Bon Secours, it would probably take them around 10 minutes.
Q. I'm sorry. I lost my train of thought. So you -- where we left off is you said it felt
like the medic took an eternity; right?
A. That's what it felt like, yes.
Q. When the medic arrives, what happens next?
A. She -- she then places her hand on his chest. She says she can't -- she can't -- he's not breathing,
something like that.
Q. Did you see the medic testify here today?
A. I did -- well, yesterday. Yes.
Q. And when she came and walked past the wagon, did you see her?
A. No. I didn't see her, no.
Q. Where are your eyes while awaiting for the medic to arrive?
A. I was looking down at Freddie Gray.
Q. So when she locates the prisoner, what happens?
A. She puts her hand on his chest, and says he's not breathing. And then we then pull him out of the wagon, the entire -- the whole way. And they put -- put the collar on, put him on a backboard, and they put the respirator in his mouth, started to give him air. And then put him into the ambulance.
Q. And where do you go?
A. I'm standing by because $I$ was instructed to do the hospital detail. So I have to stand by with Freddie Gray.
Q. So when he goes to the hospital, where do you go?
A. I followed behind Medic 43 to Shock Trauma.
Q. And how long do you stay at Shock Trauma?
A. It had been a while. Ballpark, six or seven
$o^{\prime}$ clock. And then I had to go and submit Mr. Gray's goods.
Q. And where did you submit his clothes and property?
A. I submitted his property at ECU.
Q. You have seen, have you not, the statement of Officer Novak?
A. I have not, no.
Q. Are you aware that Officer Novak recalls Mr. Gray being in a different position?
A. I did. MR. SCHATZOW: Objection, Your Honor. THE COURT: Sustained. Strike the question. BY MR. PROCTOR:
Q. Are you certain that Mr. Gray was in the position that you just described at the Western?
A. I can't be a hundred percent certain. It was a very traumatic thing for me also, just being the officer there, and knowing him in the neighborhood, seeing him every day, and calling his name, and not getting a response, then having to do the hospital detail, and seeing everything they had done to him. I can't be certain.
Q. The first phone call you had from Detective Teel on April $15^{\text {th }}$, did you answer her questions?

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A. Yes. I answered some questions.
Q. Did you arrange to meet with her to come in?
A. She arranged with me to come in, yes.
Q. Did there come a time when you changed the time of that meeting?
A. She changed the time.
Q. Did you agree?
A. I agreed, yes. MR. PROCTOR: Can I have a second please, Judge?
(Brief pause.)
MR. PROCTOR: Can we approach, please?
(Counsel approached the bench, and the
following ensued:)
MR. PROCTOR: I think I'm just about done. But rather than make the jury wait while I look through my 42 pages of notes, can we just break for lunch? And after lunch, I might have a couple of questions?

THE COURT: (Inaudible at 12:35:08 p.m.) MR. SCHATZOW: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: (Inaudible at 12:35:15 p.m.)
MR. PROCTOR: It's 12:35.

THE COURT: We will break.
MS. BLEDSOE: We can do that, yes.
MR. PROCTOR: Thank you.

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MR. PROCTOR: Thank you.
(Counsel returned to the trial table, and the following ensued:)

THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, we're going to take our lunch break.

Please do not discuss your testimony even among yourselves.

Please leave your notepads on the chair.

Court will resume at 1:45.

All rise for the jury.
(Whereupon, the jury was excused from the courtroom at 12:36 p.m.)

THE COURT: Thank you. Everyone may be seated. Again, we'll resume at 1:45.

MR. PROCTOR: Thank you, sir.
(Whereupon, a luncheon recess was taken at

12:36 p.m.)

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(Excerpt resumed at 1:59:27 p.m. with the
testimony of William Porter.)
THE COURT: You may remind the witness.
THE CLERK: Just reminding you you're still
under oath.
State your name for the record.
THE WITNESS: William Porter.
THE COURT: You may proceed, Counsel.
MR. PROCTOR: Thank you.
DIRECT EXAMINATION (Resumed)
Q. Officer Porter, just a few questions. I forgot to ask you earlier, at Stop 4, when you helped Mr. Gray onto the bench, you remember that?
A. I do remember that.
Q. Why didn't you seat belt him?
A. Well, in the academy and then through my experience and training as an officer, even the most docile detainee presents a risk. Any time $I$ am in an altercation with any kind of detainee, there's a gun involved, so there's always an ever present officer safety issue.
Q. Okay. And it's -- are you sorry Freddie Gray's dead?
A. Absolutely. Freddie Gray and I weren't

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friends, but we had a mutual respect for each other, and we built a rapport, you know. He -- I had a job, and he understood that. And he did things, and I understood that. And --

MR. SCHATZOW: Objection, Your Honor, to what Mr. Gray understood.

THE COURT: Sustained to anything Mr. Gray understood.

THE WITNESS: I had a job --
THE COURT: No, no. Question.
BY MR. PROCTOR:
Q. Explain your relationship with him.
A. I had a job to do, and he did things. And we -- I built a rapport. And we weren't friends, but we definitely had respect -- or I had respect for Mr. Gray.

And absolutely am sorry to see -- any kind of
loss of life, $I^{\prime \prime m}$ sorry to see that.
Q. Do you like being a police officer?
A. Absolutely.
Q. Would you do anything to jeopardize that?
A. Never.

MR. PROCTOR: That's all I have, Judge.
THE COURT: You may cross.
CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. SCHATZOW:
Q. Did you just say that you didn't seatbelt Mr. Gray because even though he was docile, he was still a risk?
A. I didn't say Mr. Gray specifically, but prisoners -- I mean, there's a reason why the -- the deputies walk with two people or the prisoner through the courthouse, and he's shackled and restrained. They -there's an ever present risk.
Q. Excuse me. Mr. Goodson, did you understand --
A. My name is Porter.
Q. Excuse me. Mr. Porter, did you understand my question to be about the sheriffs in the courthouse?
A. Just giving -MR. PROCTOR: Objection. THE COURT: Overruled. THE WITNESS: Giving you just -- using my training and experience. BY MR. SCHATZOW:
Q. But the question that your lawyer asked you was at Stop 4, why didn't you seatbelt Mr. Gray. And didn't you say that even though he was docile, you were still concerned about some risk?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. Now, the vans, the police transport wagons, are equipped with seatbelts; aren't they?

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A. They are.
Q. And you have said that Mr. Gray was docile, and you previously said he was not combative, and that he was calm at Stop 4; correct?
A. That is correct.
Q. If you weren't going to seatbelt Mr. Gray at Stop 4, I guess that means you would never seatbelt anyone?
A. I'm not typically a wagon driver. I -- the primary responsibility for the wagon driver is to make sure the safety of a detainee from Point A to Point B.
Q. Again, Officer Porter, I'm talking about you. My question is about you. You testified that you didn't seatbelt him even though he was docile because you were concerned of a risk.

And my question to you is does that mean that you would never seatbelt anyone in a wagon?
A. No. That isn't -- that isn't -- that's not what that means, no.
Q. But you never have?
A. I haven't before. I'm not typically a wagon driver.
Q. But --
A. But, no, I haven't before, no.
Q. So you haven't. Okay.
outside the wagon; correct?
A. He was behind the wagon, yes.
Q. You didn't hand him your gun when you first went into the wagon; did you?
A. That's ridiculous. I would never hand anyone my gun.
Q. A fellow officer. If you were concerned about somebody taking your gun, you wouldn't hand it to a fellow officer; is that you're saying -- what you're saying?
A. I wouldn't hand my gun to anyone is what I'm saying.
Q. Okay. All right. That's fine. Now, you said you worked at a computer company. What did you do for a computer company?
A. I -- there I built computers, and I reimaged them. That's what -- reimaged.
Q. Okay. And on April $12^{\text {th }}--$ well, let's take the period between April $9^{\text {th }}$ of 2015 and April $12^{\text {th }}$ of 2015, did you have a home computer?
A. I do have a home computer, yes.
Q. Did you have one then?
A. Yes, I did then. Yes.
Q. Okay. Did you have a cell phone?
A. I -- I had a cell phone, yes.
Q. Okay. Now, you don't like hospital details; right? They're long and boring.
A. No, I don't like hospital details. No.
Q. But when you testified you said that the General Order provides that when you're on a hospital detail, you only have to be there for two hours; is that correct?
A. There's something in it about that. It also says -- states that there need to be two officers, and some other things.
Q. Right. And so let's take a look at Exhibit 11, in evidence, which is 11-14 on page 8, "One of the directives is do not guard detainees for more than two consecutive hours. When the hospital detail nears or exceeds two hours, notify your supervisor and request a replacement member"; is that correct?
A. That is correct.
Q. Okay. So you're familiar with what 11-14 provides.
A. No, sir. I'm not familiar. That was probably adopted from the previous General Order.
Q. Here's Exhibit 8, take as much time as you want, tell me where the two hour limitation is in there.
A. I don't know. I can't find it in here.
Q. It's not in there; is it?
A. It isn't, no.
Q. Now, you deny that you told Detective Teel that Mr. Gray, at the fourth stop, said I can't breathe.
A. Yes, that is true.
Q. If he had said I can't breathe, and you heard him say $I$ can't breathe, would you agree that that would be a reason to get medical attention?
A. I do agree, yes.
Q. You know Detective Teel from when she was at the Western District; correct?
A. I do, yes.
Q. When she saw you at Shock Trauma on April $12^{\text {th }}$, 2015, she gave you a hug; didn't she?
A. Perhaps. I'm not certain.
Q. And when she saw you, when you came down to Police Headquarters to give the statement that was video and audio recorded, she gave you a hug then, too; didn't she, before the statement?
A. I can't say if she did.
Q. You heard her testify she did.
A. I heard her testify, yes.
Q. You don't deny that she did?
A. I'm sorry?
Q. You don't deny that she did?
A. That she did what?
Q. Gave you a hug.
A. I can't confirm nor deny.
Q. She -- you guys were friendly; weren't you?
A. I'm friendly with my fellow officer, yes, I am.
Q. Well, with Officer Teel.
A. With the general public, I tend to be friendly with the general public.
Q. When Officer Teel called you, on or about April $15^{\text {th }}$, she called you specifically to talk to you about Druid Hill and Dolphin Street, what we've been calling Stop 4; didn't she?
A. That's not true. She asked me about the incident.
Q. She called you because she had seen the KGA that said 43 was responding to Officer Goodson's request for assistance to check out the prisoner; isn't that right?
A. I can't confirm it nor deny it. I don't know that answer. I don't know why she called me. She could -- she could tell you that. MR. SCHATZOW: Could I have Exhibit 31-D, please? BY MR. SCHATZOW:
Q. You heard her testify about her reason.
A. I heard her testify. But, you know --
Q. Okay. Didn't you confirm to her that you were the unit that responded to the call for assistance that came from Unit 7B91?
A. I'm sorry. Repeat the question.
Q. Didn't you confirm to her that you were the unit on April $12^{\text {th }}$ who responded to the call to assist Unit 7B91?
A. That is true, yes.
Q. And 7 B 91 was Goodson as the van driver; correct, Officer Goodson?
A. Officer Goodson was the wagon operator that day, yes.
Q. And 7 B 91 is an identification number; correct?
A. That is true, yes.
Q. And you told her that when you arrived, Officer Goodson got out and responded to the rear of the wagon; correct?
A. I -- that's one of the things I told her, yes.
Q. Okay. And responded to the rear of the wagon for people who aren't police officers, simply means he got out and walked to the back of the wagon; is that right?
A. That is true.
Q. Okay. And you told her that as the doors
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opened, you observed Mr. Gray lying on his stomach, head facing the front of wagon, with his feat towards the doors, saying help; is that what you told her?
A. I did tell her that, yes.
Q. And then you further advised that you asked Mr. Gray what he needed, at which time he said he couldn't breathe.
A. No. That's not true, no.
Q. She got that wrong?
A. She got that wrong, yes. She --
Q. And, Officer Porter, you -- you then told her that you asked Mr. Gray if he needed a medic, and Mr. Gray said -- stated yeah.
A. This is -- that's like -- a condensed version of our conversation. It doesn't go in chronological order, but it's a condensed version of what we spoke on the phone.
Q. Thank you, Officer. If you could please just listen to my question. Did you tell her that you then asked Mr. Gray again -- excuse me. That you asked Mr. Gray if he needed a medic, and Mr. Gray stated yeah?
A. That's a part of this conversation, yes.
Q. And that you then asked -- you then asked Mr. Gray again if he needed a medic, and you asked Mr. Gray
to get up; is that what you told her?
A. I -- I don't believe I told her that, no. It wasn't phrased that way.
Q. How was it phrased?
A. I asked him -- like I testified to earlier, what do you need, and when he asked me -- he said can you help me up. I helped him up. And afterwards, I asked him how are we getting to the hospital today? Do we need -- do you need a medic or do you need a hospital? He responded yes.
Q. So he stated I can't get up; didn't he?
A. No. He said can you help me up, is what he said.
Q. Uh-huh. I see.

And --
MR. MURTHA: Objection.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. SCHATZOW: Oh, to the comment? I'm sorry,
Your Honor.
THE COURT: Yes. Please let's not have any
comments. Just ask questions from both sides.
MR. SCHATZOW: I apologize, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Apology accepted.
BY MR. SCHATZOW:
Q. So let me -- excuse me. BY MR. SCHATZOW:
Q. Both at Stop 4 and at Stop 5, Mr. Gray never asked you for a medic; did he?
A. No, he did not. I -- I asked him if he wanted
Q. I'm sorry.
A. $\quad I^{\prime} m$ sorry. I asked him -- offered one to him.
Q. Right. And at Stop 4 and Stop 5, Mr. Gray never asked you to take him to the hospital; correct?
A. No, he didn't. No.
Q. You are the one who introduced the term medic to the conversation you were having with Mr. Gray; correct?
A. That is true, yes.
Q. And you are the one who introduced the term hospital to the conversation you were having with Mr . Gray; correct?
A. That is true, yes.
Q. Okay. Now, what you've been telling us here today is that you didn't tell Detective Teel that Mr. Gray said I can't breathe at Stop 4, but that she got confused because you told her you heard him saying I can't breathe at Stop 1; isn't that right?
A. When she asked me to begin about my -- when she said can you tell me what happened, I started from the beginning.
Q. Well, when you sat for the video and recorded interview on April 17 ${ }^{\text {th }}$, 2005, Detective Teel and Detective Anderson were there; correct?
A. That is true, yes.
Q. And you went down there voluntarily; correct?
A. I -- well, she asked me to come in.
Q. She asked you to come, but she didn't force you to come in; did she?
A. No, she didn't. No.
Q. She didn't threaten you with anything if you didn't come in?
A. She didn't, no.
Q. She didn't promise you anything if you would come in?
A. No, sir.
Q. She asked you to come in?
A. Yes.
Q. And during that interview, she and Detective Anderson asked you questions about all -- everything that happened that day insofar as you and Mr. Gray were concerned; is that right?
A. Yes, that's true. Yes.

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Q. And you never told them that you heard Mr. Gray say I can't breathe when you were at Stop 1; correct?
A. That's correct. I did not tell them that, no.
Q. You didn't tell that. What you told them, at least three times, was that all you could hear was yelling and screaming; correct? Isn't that what you told them?
A. I'm not certain. Could you produce that for me?
Q. Sure. We could. Let's start with page 6. You want to listen to it?
A. No. I don't need to listen to it, no. MR. SCHATZOW: Your Honor, this is the transcript that we used simply as an aid to listening. I can use that, or I can play it, Your Honor, whichever you prefer.

THE COURT: It's your witness. He said he didn't need to hear but, but that's -- you're crossing. MR. SCHATZOW: Thank you. THE COURT: Just identify it for the record. MR. SCHATZOW: Yes, Your Honor. This is a transcript of -- it's entitled "In the Matter of Freddie Gray Investigation, William Porter, April $17^{\text {th }}$, 2015." It's a transcript prepared of the audio and video interview that took place that day.

THE COURT: Hasn't it already been marked?
MR. SCHATZOW: I don't think it was actually marked, Your Honor.

MR. MURTHA: It was used as a demonstrative exhibit.

MR. SCHATZOW: It was used as a demonstrative exhibit for the jury during the playing of it.

THE COURT: All right. It will be marked as State's 34-A for identification only.
(State's Exhibit Number 34-A
was marked for identification.)
MR. SCHATZOW: Thank you.
THE CLERK: You're welcome.

BY MR. SCHATZOW:
Q. Now, I'm directing your attention to Page 6, and I'm specifically -- this is line 12. And it's talking about the time that you testified that you were on Westwood and Bruce, and you were looking for someone else.
A. All right.
Q. And don't you say he was just yelling and screaming?
A. That is on the paper, yes.
Q. Okay. Isn't that what you told them, or do you want to hear it?

MR. MURTHA: Objection.
THE COURT: Sustained.

BY MR. SCHATZOW:
Q. Are you questioning whether this is --
A. No. I'm not questioning it. That's -- that's on the -- yes.
Q. Okay. And then on -- on Page 12, lines 1 and 2, you said, "The entire time I could hear that there was someone one street over just yelling"; is that what you said?
A. You can yell, "I can't breathe." That's --
Q. Did you --
A. You can yell that. But --
Q. -- say --
A. No. I didn't elaborate, no. They didn't ask me to elaborate. But you can yell, "I can't breathe."
Q. One can yell, "I can't breathe." But did you ever tell anybody until you came to this court today that Detective Teel was wrong, and you had heard Mr. Gray yelling, "I can't breathe," when you were at Stop 1?
A. Had I told anyone before today? Yes, I have. Yes.
Q. Well, I don't mean about your -- I don't mean your attorneys. I -- had you gone -- these officers, at the end of this interview --

MR. MURTHA: Objection.
THE COURT: Sustained.

BY MR. SCHATZOW:
Q. Okay. At the end of this interview -THE COURT: Sustained. Get to a question. MR. SCHATZOW: Yes, Your Honor. BY MR. SCHATZOW:
Q. You were asked this day, at the end of the interview, whether there was anything you cared to add which may aid in the investigation or clarify anything I've asked of you, or clarifying anything you said; weren't you?
A. I was asked that, yes.
Q. And you said, "No, sir"; didn't you?
A. I think I might have said something about seatbelting afterwards.
Q. Well, here's where it is, sir, if you'll direct your attention to Page 79, at the bottom of the page, going up to Page 80, which is --
A. If I could -- could I manipulate this?
Q. Could you what?
A. Manipulate this. Can I --
Q. No. I'm just -- I'm asking you about this -this section, sir.
A. But on my statement --
Q. This page where you said -- did you -- what the transcript reflects is that Detective Anderson said, "All right. I just want to clarify anything you -- else you care to add at this time, which may aid in this investigation or clarify anything I've asked of you or clarify anything you said"; isn't that what he asked you?
A. He did ask me that. And that's the second time he asked me that.
Q. Right. And you said, "No, sir"; correct?
A. Yes. The second time, yes.
Q. The second time. And this was at the end of the interview. There's no more interview after that.
A. After that part, no, there's no more interview from there.
Q. Okay. And then on Page 15 -- at Page 15, you say, starting on line 18 through line 23, "Because the -I guess they had called for more units because the crowd was -- was -- I was more concerned with the crowd than I was with whomever they were arresting. I could hear that he was yelling or whatever. But I -- I was trying to keep the crowd back from getting to those officers"; is that what you said, sir?
A. I did say that, yes.
Q. When you arrived at Stop 2 you told -- well, strike that question.

When you met with Detectives Teel and Anderson, you told them that when you arrived at Stop 2, you parked about 20 feet away from the van. Stop 2 being the stop at Baker and Mount Street; is that right?
A. Yes, that is true.
Q. Okay. And you told them that you got about halfway to the van when Mr . Gray was put into the van; correct?
A. Perhaps. Yes.
Q. And you told them that you couldn't -- you weren't close enough to see whether Mr. Gray had leg irons on; correct?
A. That is correct.
Q. And you told them that you couldn't identify the officers who were putting him into the van; correct?
A. That is -- that is not correct, no.
Q. Okay. I'm going to direct your attention -I'm sorry --

MR. MURTHA: What page is that, sir? MR. SCHATZOW: I think if we -- it depends on how much -- we'll start on 33. MR. MURTHA: Okay. BY MR. SCHATZOW:
Q. Detective Anderson says, "So what side was this officer standing on, the right side of Mr . Gray or the left side? I mean, if -- if the wagon was facing south; right?"

And you say, "South, right."
A. True.
Q. I'm reading accurately; correct?
A. That is accurate. Yes, sir.
Q. Okay. And so Detective Anderson says, "So is he -- was he on the, like, the west side of Mr. Gray or the east side."

And then Mr. Anderson interrupts you and says, "You understand what I'm saying?"

And you say, "I don't -- I don't recall. I don't know, man."

So Anderson -- you then say, "So he's standing
behind him, is what I thought." And him is Mr. Gray there; right? The officer is standing behind him who is putting him in the car; correct? That's what you're talking about?
A. No.
Q. No?
A. In the wagon is what I'm talking about.
Q. Putting him in the wagon.
A. Yes.
Q. Yes.

Okay. At Stop 2.
A. I -- I believe this is at Stop 2. I don't know where we're -- where in reference we're talking about.
Q. And he said -- well, here's where -- "So you know west would be facing towards, like, the Fulton side; right?"
A. That's what it says.
Q. So --
A. No. I didn't say that. Detective Anderson said that.
Q. Right. But that helps you orient yourself. He then goes on, you say "Right," and he says, "And East would be toward, like, I guess toward, what, Mount Street?"

So doesn't that orient you that we're talking about stop 2 now?
A. That's -- yes.
Q. Okay. And he says -- you say, "He was behind him."

And Detective Anderson says, "Okay. So he was -- he was more like on -- on this side of him, or I guess, but if he's facing this way, I guess he'd be on his right side. Was he on the right side of Mr. Gray?" And you say, "He was -- he was on neither left
nor right. He was behind him. He was directly behind him, grabbing him from behind."

And Detective Anderson says, "Oh, directly behind him."

And then he asks you where his feet were positioned, and you tell him that.

And then you say -- well, he asked you where the feet were positioned, and you say, "All right. So -so picture people were at the wagon." This is you talking.
A. That's me.
Q. "All right. So you need to get this prisoner, who is facing southbound, and the wagon here facing southbound at the wagon. The officer is behind him. He grabs him from behind. The door is already open. He's pushing him and pulling him into the wagon. He pushes him into the wagon. He tries to, like, kick his feet out or whatever. Then the officer goes on the other side of him and pulls him into the wagon is what I saw."

Detective Anderson, "So the officer got into the wagon and pulls him in."

And you say, "Right."
That's accurate so far?
A. That is accurate so far.
Q. Okay. And Detective Anderson says, "So someone
climbed up in the wagon and pulls him in."
And you say, "After he had tried to pull him in, he got him halfway in through the doors, and he's, like, kicking his feet -- his feet. And the officer goes around him, and then pulls him into the wagon."

And Detective Anderson says, "So the officer did it by himself?"

And you say, "Right."
And Detective Anderson says, "You saw all of that, and you don't know which officer it was?"

And you say, "I don't know. I was back out far, man."

Isn't that right?
A. That's what it says. Yes, that's what it reads.
Q. Okay. And that's what you -- and it reads that way because that's what you actually said; isn't it?
A. Well, you're leaving out parts. But sure, yes. And then it goes on to say that it's a bicycle officer who has the -- who happens to be slender, so it's either Nero or Lieutenant Rice. But, yes, you're leaving out things.
Q. Well, I'm not leaving anything out in what we just read.
A. In what we just read, no. No.
Q. And you didn't identify the officer because you told them I was too far back, man.
A. It was -- I said it was a white, slender officer, Nero or Lieutenant Rice, is what I said. MR. SCHATZOW: Excuse me one second, Your Honor. BY MR. SCHATZOW:
Q. When he said -- when Detective Anderson said you saw all that and you don't know which officer it was, your response was, "I don't know. I was back out far" -MR. MURTHA: Objection. THE COURT: Sustained. Sustained. Ask another question. MR. SCHATZOW: Okay. THE COURT: That hasn't already been answered. BY MR. SCHATZOW:
Q. But the fact of the matter is you wasn't -- you weren't back out far; were you?
A. I -- I don't -- I wasn't back out far?
Q. From the wagon?
A. I walked up to the wagon.
Q. You were right up at the back of the wagon; weren't you?
A. I walked up to the wagon.
Q. Right. Even though you told the officers when

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they interviewed you you were only halfway back.
A. I'm sorry. It was -- it was about a week ago when I had done that testimony.
Q. It was --
A. It was a week later.
Q. It was -- it was five days later.
A. Oh, I'm sorry.
Q. It was on Friday; right? Correct?
A. I can't remember. Perhaps.
Q. It was April $17^{\text {th }}$; wasn't it?
A. All right. Yes.
Q. And that's five days after April $12^{\text {th }}$; can you agree with that?
A. Yes. That is five days after April $12^{\text {th }}$, yes. MR. SCHATZOW: In fact, if we could see which exhibit number is it, the cell phone video, 25 , Your Honor?

THE COURT: Okay.
(Brief pause.)
(Whereupon, a portion of Exhibit 25, the cell
phone video, was played in open court, but is untranscribed herein.)

BY MR. SCHATZOW:
Q. Stop right there. That's you getting out of the car; isn't it, sir?
A. That is me getting out of the car. Yes, sir.
Q. Okay.

MR. SCHATZOW: Would you continue to roll it?
(Whereupon, a portion of Exhibit 25, the cell
phone video, was played in open court, but is untranscribed herein.)

MR. SCHATZOW: Stop it.
BY MR. SCHATZOW:
Q. And then, sir, in the -- in the dark blue uniform, back to the camera, something coming out of his back pocket, that's you, sir?
A. That is me, yes.
Q. Okay. And you're right on back of the camera camera.

MR. SCHATZOW: If you could keep rolling, please.
(Whereupon, a portion of Exhibit 25, the cell phone video, was played in open court, but is untranscribed herein.)

BY MR. SCHATZOW:
Q. You were right there, and you didn't see Lieutenant Rice come out of the wagon?
A. At that that point in time, I didn't know it was Lieutenant Rice. I just knew it was a white, slender officer.
Q. Didn't you have -- but Lieutenant Rice is a shift commander there.
A. He is a shift commander, yes.
Q. There were only -- I don't know what Mr. Proctor said, 11 people working that day; right?
A. That is true, yes.
Q. You'd been there for two years.
A. Yes.
Q. Right. But you couldn't identify -- you didn't identify him to the --
A. I didn't identify him. I said it was one of the bike officers that was present at that arrest.
Q. One of the bike officers.

Sir, were you -- you had talked about, in your testimony in response to a question, you said something about the don't snitch culture in Baltimore; do you remember being asked about that?
A. There was a -- not -- don't -- stop snitching is what it's called. Yeah.
Q. Stop snitching. Right.

Is that a culture in the Baltimore Police

Department?
A. Absolutely not. I'm actually offended that you would say something like that.
Q. Well, sir, did you not tell the officers who
were investigating this truth the truth about where you were standing and what you saw because you didn't want to involve other officers?
A. No, that's not true. I -- I identified the officers. I said they were -- I said everyone's name. I gave all the officer's names. Lieutenant Rice, Nero, Miller. I said every officer that was there.
Q. You didn't say the officer who was coming out of the wagon --
A. I -- I --
Q. -- right while you were standing at the back of wagon; did you?
A. I didn't know who it was. I'd be assuming if I -- if I said who -- which one it was. I didn't know.
Q. And would it be fair to say that, at the time, you were as close to that officer as I am to you now?
A. Possibly.
Q. When -- after Mr. Gray went into the wagon, at Stop 2, there came a time when you had a conversation with Brandon Ross; correct?
A. That is true. I -- yes.
Q. You say that you told Brandon Ross to call 911?
A. I said to him to call 911 for a supervisor complaint, yes.
Q. Did you -- you listened to the cell phone video
that was played here in court; correct?
A. I -- I did listen to it, yes.
Q. And you've listened to it before then; haven't you? Before today in court and before we played it?
A. No. I hadn't seen this video before we got to court, no.
Q. Okay. You didn't hear anything on that video about telling Brandon Ross to call 911; did you?
A. You can't really hear any other voices other than Brandon Ross because he's yelling, but I'm having a conversation with him, much like I'm having with you.
Q. You didn't hear on the cell phone Brandon Ross -- you -- you didn't hear yourself telling Brandon Ross to call 911 on the cell phone video; did you?
A. You don't hear much on the -- on the recording because it's in Brandon Ross' pocket, and he's yelling. And I'm having a conversation like I'm having with you right now.
Q. Sir, my question is what you heard. You didn't hear on the cell phone video Brandon Ross -- excuse me, you telling Brandon Ross to call 911.
A. You didn't hear much, other than Brandon Ross yelling, because he was yelling. The pocket was in his phone.
posed to you, please.

THE WITNESS: No. BY MR. SCHATZOW:
Q. And, in fact, when Brandon Ross -- when you told Brandon Ross the supervisor here is Lieutenant Rice, and Brandon Ross says, in effect, he's the guy who was -who's here who's involved; I need somebody else. What you told him to do was go to the media; right?
A. That's what I instructed him to do, yes.
Q. You didn't tell him to call Internal Affairs, did you, at the police department?
A. No, I didn't tell him that. No.
Q. No. And your telling him to go to the media was like telling him to go fly a kite; wasn't it? MR. MURTHA: Objection. MR. SCHATZOW: You just wanted to get rid of him.

THE COURT: Overruled. Did you?

THE WITNESS: No. That is not -- I didn't want to just get rid of him. No.

BY MR. SCHATZOW:
Q. You thought you were being helpful to him?
A. Yes. Absolutely.
Q. He wanted -- he wanted somebody from the police department to intervene in this situation. And what you told him to do was go talk to the media; right?
A. No. I instructed him who my superior was, and I gave him that information.
Q. Right. And then you told him go talk the media. You know what to do. Not go to the police department and seek help from the way the situation is being handled, but go to the media; that's what you told him?
A. After $I$ instructed him to talk to my supervisor, yes.
Q. When you arrive at Druid Hill and Dolphin Street, what we've been referring to as Stop 4, you were aware that Officer Goodson had made a radio call for someone to come because he -- I need to check out this prisoner; isn't that what he said?
A. Those are the words he said, yes.
Q. And when you arrived there, didn't you ask Mr. Goodson why do you need my help to check out this prisoner?
A. I did not, no.
Q. You didn't ask him anything about why he was seeking assistance from another unit; did you?
A. When I walked up he said, hey, help me check on
this prisoner, is what he said.
Q. My question, sir, is you didn't ask him any questions about why --
A. No, I didn't. I didn't ask him any questions. No.
Q. And when you were interviewed -- let me strike that.

When you did the demonstration with your two lawyers today about how you got Mr. Gray off the floor of the van at Stop 4 and onto the bench, you said that you were just assisting Mr. Gray because he was using his own muscles to get up; is that right?
A. Those are the words I said, yes.
Q. Okay. But, in fact, when you were interviewed by Detectives Teel and Anderson on April 17 th , you never say that Mr. Gray helped in any way to get from the floor to the bench; did you?
A. No. I didn't elaborate on how I got him from the floor to the bench. I thought it was obvious.
Q. In -- in fact -- but you thought it was obvious to Detectives Teel and Anderson without explaining it to them?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. In fact, didn't you repeatedly tell them, "I put him on the bench"?
A. Those are my words, yes. But it would be physically impossible for me to place someone onto a bench in that tight of a space.
Q. You -- you told them you put him on the bench, you placed him on the bench; correct? He was on the bench.
A. He was on the bench; that is correct, yes.
Q. And you told them that you put him there?
A. I assisted him there, yes.
Q. But you never told them that Mr. Gray played any role in getting himself from the floor to the bench; did you?
A. I apologize. They didn't ask me that question, no.
Q. And -- well, they ask you whether you put him on the bench. And when you said yes, or when you said, "I put him on the bench," you never said, "I put him on the bench, but it was really with his assistance. He was, you know, actively involved in getting on the bench." You never said anything about that in words or substance; did you?
A. That didn't come into question until today, no.
Q. The question, "Did you put him on the bench," would not have generated that response from you because that's what you were asked; wasn't it?
A. No. That would not generate that response, no.
Q. You would have had to have been specifically asked, "To what extend did Mr. Gray use his own muscle power to get on the bench?"
A. That didn't come into question until today, sir.
Q. Please listen to my question. Let's -- let's get the exact question.

If we could go to -- in fact, why don't we just
--

MR. SCHATZOW: Your Honor, with the Court's
permission, I think it's easier to just play the audio
portions. I think -- do we have the video --
THE COURT: It's your witness.
MR. SCHATZOW: -- (Inaudible at 2:37:58 p.m.)?
THE COURT: What's the -- there's no question.
So I don't understand what you mean.
MR. SCHATZOW: I'm about to ask the question,
Your Honor. I apologize.
BY MR. SCHATZOW:
Q. Weren't -- weren't -- didn't you describe what you did?

MR. MURTHA: Who -- can I get a page, please? MR. SCHATZOW: Sure. 42, line 5. BY MR. SCHATZOW:
Q. Page 42, line 5. The question that Detective Teel asks is, "Okay. And what did you -- take me from that point, what happened?" We're at Dolphin and Druid Hill.

And you start talking about what happened. You're giving your own narrative about it. And you say, "And he doesn't say anything. And he's like, help me, help me up. So I was, like, what -- what's the deal. So I pulled him up"; isn't that what you said?
A. If I could -- if $I$ could go along with you if you don't mind. I'm sorry. I can't see what you're reading. I apologize, sir.
Q. Well -- you haven't -- you haven't studied this statement --

MR. MURTHA: Objection.
MR. SCHATZOW: -- when --
THE COURT: Sustained. Strike the question.
Ask a question.
BY MR. SCHATZOW:
Q. Sir, weren't you -- weren't you asked by

Detective Teel to --

MR. MURTHA: Line and page?
MR. SCHATZOW: -- from --
THE COURT: Line and page.
MR. SCHATZOW: Page 41.
Q. She said -- you say that, on 41, line 12, "I think I may have been, like, right at the intersection of Dolphin and Druid Hill"; correct?
A. That is what it says, yes.
Q. And Detective Teel says, "Were you behind the" -- and you say, "I was behind, yes"; is that what -what's said?
A. That's what it says, yes, sir.
Q. Okay. And then Detective Teel says, "Okay. And what did you -- take me from that point, what happened"; isn't that her question?
A. That is what happens, yes.
Q. And then you proceed to tell her what happened; correct?
A. That's -- yes.
Q. And part of what you tell her when it comes to putting Mr. Gray on the bench, you say, "So I pull him up"; correct?
A. If you skip everything else I've said, and go there, then yes, that's what it's says.
Q. Well, is there -- is there anywhere where you told them that Mr . Gray played any role in getting on the bench?
A. That didn't come into question until today,
sir, no.
Q. Well, she asked you what happened; didn't she?
A. She did ask me what happened, yes.
Q. When you were asked today by your lawyers what happened, you told them that you were merely assisting Mr. Gray, that he was using his own power to get to the bench.
A. Because that came --
Q. Correct?
A. -- into the question, yes.
Q. No. They just -- they asked you what happened, and she asked you what happened, and you gave two different answers; didn't you?
A. No. I didn't give -- I further explained my answer from here.
Q. But you didn't have that explanation anywhere in this statement; correct?
A. When I made that statement, I was making it as a witness. I didn't know I was a suspect in the case.
Q. Was that a reason to provide less information?
A. I didn't know I needed to defend myself in that statement, no.
Q. Because I -- did you think that you had an obligation to tell them the truth?
A. Absolutely. I told them the truth.
Q. Did you think you had an obligation to tell them the complete truth?
A. Absolutely.
Q. So why didn't you tell them about Mr. Gray helping you up -- Mr. Gray helping himself up, as you helped him up?
A. Why didn't $I$ tell them that he was assisting? I thought it was obvious.
Q. Now, you had -- at Stop 4, you had the opportunity to put that seatbelt around Mr. Gray; didn't you?
A. That is true.
Q. And you didn't do it; correct?
A. I did not, no.
Q. And you didn't call a medic?
A. No, I didn't.
Q. And your testimony is that you got this call for an urgent backup, and that's when you got out of the van?
A. No. That's not -- no.
Q. You were already out of the van?
A. I was already out of the van, yes.
Q. All right. And the call for urgent -- it wasn't an urgent backup. It was a call for 10-16. It's just a backup; isn't it?
A. There was some urgency.
Q. Single 13 is an emergency -MR. MURTHA: Objection. THE COURT: Sustained. MR. SCHATZOW: I'm asking a question. BY MR. SCHATZOW:
Q. Isn't single 13 the emergency call? MR. MURTHA: Objection. THE COURT: Overruled. THE WITNESS: That is officer down, send assistance.

BY MR. SCHATZOW:
Q. Right. And $10-16$ is -- is I need a backup. And it could be an emergency, or it could not be an emergency; right?
A. Would you like for me to explain to you the 10 codes, and how they go?
Q. I would like --

THE COURT: No. Probably what he wants you to do is answer the question that he poses, and not ask him a question.

THE WITNESS: All right. Can you repeat your question?

BY MR. SCHATZOW:
Q. Yes. A $10-16$ is the way one calls for backup,

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whether it's an emergency or non-emergency; isn't it?
A. The way $I$ understand it, in my training and experience, 10-16 is urgent backup.
Q. Okay. Let's talk about your training a little bit.

Do you remember the part of your medical training that Officer Carson-Johnson testified about teaching you involving calling a medic when someone requests a medic?
A. I recall her testimony, yes.
Q. No. Do you recall that part of your training?
A. Hmm. It's not vivid, but I got that training.
Q. When you say it's not vivid, do you recall some part of it?
A. Some parts of it, of the LEMAT (phonetic) class, yes.
Q. No. I don't mean parts of the -- I mean part of you call a medic when somebody requests a medic.
A. No. I think what she said -- I'm sorry. No, no. I --
Q. You don't recall it?
A. She said you've got to be a detective, I think the words that she used. You've got to be a detective and use your discretion is what she said when she testified.
Q. You also heard her say, didn't you, that when somebody requests a medic, you get them a medic, and then you ask them questions so you can get information to give to the medic?
A. I did hear her say that, yes.
Q. Okay. Do you remember that from your training?
A. I -- I remember that here, not necessarily in my training, no. No.
Q. But you do remember parts of your medical training; don't you?
A. I do, yes.
Q. Just not that part?
A. Just not that part, no.
Q. And also in your training, you were trained to put a seatbelt on anybody you transport unless it would be a safety issue. Dangerous for you; correct?
A. I -- I never -- until Agent Bilheimer (phonetic) got up here, I -- I never heard that. We had no wagon training. There was no such things as a wag -we didn't have a wagon training.
Q. Well, he was teaching you vehicle procedures; wasn't he?
A. Yeah. He was teaching you vehicle procedures; wasn't he?
A. Yeah. He was -- he was the EVOC (phonetic)
teacher; that is true, yes.
Q. Right. So you don't recall him teaching what he said he taught about seatbelts; is that right?
A. No. I don't. I'm sorry, I don't. No.
Q. But it is what's right in that $\mathrm{K}-14$ order, which you say you received on flash drive?
A. I received the General Orders on a flash drive, yes.
Q. Right. And during the 11 months you were in the academy, did you ever look on the flash drive at any of the Orders?
A. Just the specific ones that they asked us to. There's a lot of General Orders.
Q. Well, this one involves persons in custody. Did you think it was important to look at the one called Persons in Custody?
A. I looked at the specific General Orders that they asked us to do for -- as far as our curricular in the -- in the academy.
Q. My question is did you think it was important to look at an Order called Persons in Custody?
A. There's no way -- I don't know what the General Orders are called until -- until they -- I think I don't -- there's no guide that says Persons in Custody. It says General Order, whatever the number is, and then they
tell us to look it up.
Q. So if you -- you didn't look at the General Orders?
A. I looked at the General Orders specifically for the classes in the academy.
Q. And let me show you what's in evidence as Exhibit 5, which is a receipt. Is that your signature on the bottom of the receipt?
A. That's my signature at the bottom, yes.
Q. And you signed for acknowledging receiving the General Orders; correct, among other things?
A. I did sign there, yes.
Q. My question, did you sign it acknowledging receipt of the General Orders, among other things?
A. Yes. Yes. I said yes.
Q. Okay. When you were interviewed by Detectives Teel and Anderson on April $17^{\text {th }}$ of this year, you never said anything about concern about your gun being a reason why you didn't seatbelt Mr. Gray; did you?
A. That is true.
Q. When you were at Stop 5 -- well, excuse me. Before we get to Stop 5, you were at -- let's go back to Stop 4.

You're outside the wagon, and you say you had a conversation with an Officer Goodson about the prisoner

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and going to the hospital; correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Okay. And then you say you got called away by the call for backup; is that right?
A. Everyone got the call for backup.
Q. Okay. There was a call for backup. But, in fact, someone responded to that call before you did; didn't they?
A. Yes.
Q. And there was a call for a wagon; wasn't there?
A. There was. Immediately after the backup, there was a call for a wagon.
Q. Right. And then Officer Goodson responded to the call for the wagon before you responded; didn't he?
A. Yes.
Q. And, in fact, then Lieutenant Rice, who was the one who was making the call, indicated that he didn't need any more back up, and then there was a subsequent call where he asked for somebody to do crowd control at North and Carey; correct?
A. I can't say for certain.
Q. Okay.

MR. SCHATZOW: If we could have the -- that portion of the KGA played. Do we have Exhibit 30? It's Exhibit 30. Can we have transcript --

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Your Honor, the transcript of this will be on the screen. It's Exhibit 30. BY MR. SCHATZOW:
Q. If you'd take a look at this, sir. Can you see it from where you are?
A. Kind of.

MR. SCHATZOW: Your Honor, may he get closer if he needs to? THE COURT: He may. BY MR. SCHATZOW:
Q. Now, at 9:06 and 57 seconds, where it says, "09", that's Lieutenant Rice; correct?
A. I'm sorry.
Q. First line. Top line.
A. Yes. Yes.
Q. Okay. And he says 10-16, that's the backup call; correct?
A. That is correct.
Q. 1600 North is the address; correct?
A. That is the address he gave, yes.
Q. Okay. Then on the next line, four seconds later, that's the dispatcher; correct? Saying 1600 North need a 10-16; correct?
A. That is correct.
Q. And the next thing that happens, five seconds

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    after that, is 22, I'm in route; correct?
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A. That is correct.
Q. And that is the officer who is Number 22 that day? That's -- he's identifying himself, and he's saying he's on route; correct?
A. That is 7 Baker 22.

MR. SCHATZOW: We're going to play it in just a minute. Well, actually, why don't you -- why don't you play it, so we can --

BY MR. SCHATZOW:
Q. And then there's a $10-4$ from the dispatcher; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay.

MR. SCHATZOW: Why don't you go ahead and play that for him.
(Whereupon, the call was played in open court, but remains untranscribed herein.)

MR. SCHATZOW: Stop there. BY MR. SCHATZOW:
Q. Okay. Then the next thing that happens is about two seconds after the dispatcher says -- yes, two seconds after the dispatcher says $10-4$, the request is for a wagon; correct?
A. Umm --
Q. If you look at the time?
A. Yeah, yeah. I see it. Yes, I see it. Sorry. Yes.
Q. 9:07:09. You got it?
A. I got it, yes.
Q. Okay. And there's a request for a wagon; right?
A. Yes. It says, "And a wagon and a wagon."
Q. And a wagon and a wagon. And then, just about a second after that, there's a call for 91; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And seven seconds after that, because there's no response, there's a call Baker 91; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And Baker 91 is Officer Goodson; correct?
A. He is.
Q. And then about two seconds after that, you hear someone say, "Hang on, I'm going to have to turn around and come back up there, 1600 North"; you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. We'll play that for a moment -- in a minute --

MR. SCHATZOW: Well, why don't we run it, play

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it through, and you can tell me whether that's Officer Goodson.
(Whereupon, the call was played in open court, but remains untranscribed herein.)

BY MR. SCHATZOW:
Q. Okay. Then -- and then you hear the dispatcher say that 1600 North --

MR. SCHATZOW: Why don't you -- Joe, play it all the way through for us.
(Whereupon, the call was played in open court, but remains untranscribed herein.)

BY MR. SCHATZOW:
Q. So, sir, what happened was --
A. Can I take a seat?
Q. Yes, please.

Lieutenant Rice, who is 09, says we have things contained, but we have a crowd forming, and we need North and Carey covered; correct?
A. He does say that, yes.
Q. And you're the one who responds to that when the dispatcher says, okay, I need a unit at North and Carey, you identify yourself by saying 43; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Because that is who you were that day, that was your number; correct?
A. That is true.
Q. Okay. And you say I'm coming behind 91 up there; right?
A. Yes.
Q. And 91 is the wagon, Officer Goodson; correct?
A. That is true, yes.
Q. All right. And you are coming behind him; correct?
A. I -- at the time when I said that, I was behind where the wagon was, yes.
Q. Right. And at no time did you call Officer Goodson, or when you were talking -- well, let me ask you this. Did you hear all of this conversation while you were talking with Officer Goodson behind the wagon?
A. I think as a soon as -- I can't really recall, but I'm going -- as soon as it came out 10-16, I would have been heading back to my vehicle at that time. And those seven seconds would have been getting in my car.
Q. At any time, did you radio dispatch or Officer Goodson, wait a minute, you can't go respond to this, you've got a prisoner you've got to take to the hospital?
A. I can't do that. I -- I can't do that.
Q. What do you mean you can't do that? Your radio worked; didn't it?
A. There's -- there's a hierarchy. I can't tell

Officer Goodson what to do. And -- and -- I can't tell Officer Goodson what to do.
Q. Okay. Now, my question is did you ever make an effort to use your radio to contact Officer Goodson and say you're supposed to take this guy to the hospital?
A. No, I didn't. No. There never came a time I did that.
Q. All right. And did you -- there are other -there were no other wagons in the Western that day?
A. There were no other wagons in the Western that day.
Q. But there are other wagons in the City; aren't there?
A. That is true, yes. There are other wagons.
Q. And if a wagon is out of service because it's taking someone to the hospital or because it got a flat tire, then the dispatcher can get another wagon from another district; can't they?
A. I don't make that decision.
Q. Sir, $I^{\prime} m$ not asking you whether you made the decision. I'm asking you if a dispatcher can ask for a wagon from another district.
A. Yes. Yes. A dispatcher can -- has the power to do that, yes.
Q. Okay. So did you really have a conversation

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with Officer Goodson about taking Mr. Gray to the hospital?
A. I think I already answered that. And the answer to that is yes, I did have a conversation.
Q. But you went to this scene, North and Carey, behind the wagon, knowing full well that the wagon was not going to the hospital; correct?
A. I -- no. That's not true.
Q. You did know the wagon was not going to the hospital?
A. I got to the scene before the wagon got to the scene.
Q. Right. But you left behind the wagon; didn't you?
A. I was behind the wagon when I left, yes.
Q. Right. And you weren't -- you said I'm coming behind 91 up there; correct?
A. Be -- be -- yes. That's what I said, yes.
Q. And you said it because you were behind 91; correct?
A. My car was parked behind 91, yes.
Q. Well, you said, "I'm coming behind 91." You didn't say, "I'm parked behind 91"; did you?
A. No. No. I didn't say that, no.
Q. And you knew that 91 had just said that he was
going to the scene; correct?
A. Yes. That's what it says, yes.
Q. And at Stop 5, you say that Sergeant White ordered you to follow the wagon to the station house; right?
A. She --
Q. Western District.
A. She said -- she ordered me to do the hospital detail, yes.
Q. Didn't she also order you to follow the wagon?
A. I'm sorry? She ordered me to do the hospital detail.
Q. Right. Didn't she order you to follow the wagon to the District?
A. Not that I can recall, no. It would have been to do the hospital detail, and I would have gone behind the wagon. But she didn't order me to do that. She ordered me to do the hospital detail.
Q. You couldn't -- you couldn't very well do the hospital detail if you weren't with the wagon; could you? The wagon would -- would -- could get to wherever the wagon was going to go, and you wouldn't be there.
A. I'm sorry. Repeat your question.
Q. Didn't Sergeant White tell you that you have to take over the hospital detail, and just to follow the
wagon down to the station?
A. She did tell me to do the hospital detail. She -- there -- she never said anything about the wagon.
Q. When you met with Detectives Teel and Anderson on April 17 th, 2015 --

MR. SCHATZOW: At page 47, lines 2 through 7, Counsel.

Thank you. BY MR. SCHATZOW:
Q. Weren't you asked the following question, and didn't you give the following answer?
A. I'm sorry --
Q. Detective --
A. -- hold on. What -- where was it?
Q. 47 , lines 2 through 7. Detective Teel: "After she finished to talking to Mr. Gray what happened?" Officer Porter: "Uh. Well, she told me that I would have to take over the hospital detail, and just to follow the wagon down to the station."

Is that what you said?
A. That's what it says, yes.
Q. But you didn't do that; did you?
A. Yes, I did do that.
Q. Your own testimony this morning was that you

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waited two to five minutes --
A. I --
Q. -- before you went down to the station; correct?
A. That is correct, yes.
Q. And -- and when you went down to the station, you didn't go down Mount Street; you went down Pennsylvania Avenue; didn't you?
A. No. No.
Q. Okay. MR. SCHATZOW: You've got that? BY MR. SCHATZOW:
Q. Your car number -- I think I already asked you this. Just to be clear, your car number that you were driving that day is 9239; isn't it?
A. $\quad \mathrm{Mmm}$.
Q. I've handed you Exhibit 5, the run sheet.
A. Yes. It says 9239. That's what it says, yes.
Q. And on the top of Baltimore Police cars, the number of the car appears, but only the last three digits; correct?
A. Yeah. That's true, yes. MR. SCHATZOW: What's our next exhibit number? THE CLERK: 77. MR. SCHATZOW: Your Honor, at this time,

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pursuant to stipulation, I offer a CCTV disc, which is
Exhibit --
    I'm sorry?
    THE CLERK: 77.
    MR. SCHATZOW: -- 77.
            (State's Exhibit Number 77
                    was marked for identification.)
        THE COURT: And specifically what?
        MR. SCHATZOW: This is a -- this is a scene --
    this -- CCTV of the wagon and the police cars, the wagon
    leaving the scene at North and Pennsylvania. And --
        THE COURT: Okay.
        MR. SCHATZOW: -- showing the delay -- the
        timing and the direction of Officer Porter's car, Your
        Honor.
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        THE COURT: Okay.
        Any objection?
        MR. MURTHA: I believe it's stipulated to, Your
    Honor. No, Your Honor.
    THE COURT: I hear it, right, a stipulation.
    That's fine. Okay.
        No objection. So entered.
        (State's Exhibit Number 77
        was received in evidence.)
        MR. SCHATZOW: Okay.
    E. 391 (Whereupon, the CCTV video was played in open court.)

MR. SCHATZOW: Stop it right there.
BY MR. SCHATZOW:
Q. This is the wagon leaving the scene that we've called Stop Number 5; isn't it, Officer Porter?
A. Yes. That is, yes.
Q. Okay. And your car was the first car in front of the wagon; wasn't it?
A. I -- I can't -- I don't know. I can't remember.
Q. Okay. We'll have a shot in a moment that will let you see the numbers.

MR. SCHATZOW: Go ahead, please.
(Whereupon, the CCTV video was played in open court.)

MR. SCHATZOW: Stop it there for just one second.

BY MR. SCHATZOW:
Q. Sir, what -- what is this -- this street here, that we're looking down?
A. That's North Avenue.
Q. Okay.

MR. SCHATZOW: Go ahead.
(Whereupon, the CCTV video was played in open
court.)
BY MR. SCHATZOW:
Q. Excuse me, sir. That's your car, or one of those cars is -- one of those cars --
A. One of those cars are mine. Yes, that's true.
Q. -- is yours. And that's on North Avenue, facing eastbound; correct?
A. That would be westbound.
Q. Westbound. I'm sorry. Westbound. Fine. (Whereupon, the CCTV video was played in open court.) MR. SCHATZOW: Stop it there for a second. BY MR. SCHATZOW:
Q. Officer, you see that the officer for the first car is now getting into his car?
A. I can see that, yes.
Q. Okay. MR. SCHATZOW: You can keep rolling. (Whereupon, the CCTV video was played in open court.)

BY MR. SCHATZOW:
Q. Sir, isn't this your car, 239 -- get up as close as you need to to see it -- turning down Pennsylvania Avenue?
A. I see nine -- I see 239, yes.
Q. Turning down Pennsylvania?
A. Yes. He turned onto Pennsylvania; yeah.
Q. And that's you. 239 is your car; right?
A. Can I see that again?
Q. The run sheet? Sure.
A. Yes. Can I see the run sheet?
Q. It's State's Exhibit 29.
A. It says 9239, yep.
Q. When you got to the Western District, you opened up the door for Mr. Allan?
A. No.
Q. You opened up the door for Mr. Gray?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And when you opened the door at the Western District, which we've been referring to as Stop 6, you saw Mr. Gray in the same position that you had seen him at Stop 5; correct?
A. As I explained earlier, it was -- it was more exaggerated.
Q. When you were interviewed by Detectives Teel and Anderson on April $17^{\text {th }}$ of 2015, you did not indicate that it was more exaggerated. You simply said, "He was in the same position"; didn't you?
A. Yes. I -- I elaborated today.
Q. But you didn't elaborate to them on April $17^{\text {th }}$ ?
A. I did not, no.
Q. All you told them was that he was in the same position.

And so what your testimony today is is different than the information you gave to Detectives Teel and Anderson; correct?
A. Not correct, no. I just elaborated today.
Q. Well, isn't that different? Didn't you add something to what you told them?
A. I just expounded upon what I said.
Q. Well, but all you had told them was the same position. Isn't same position different than same position but more -- more exaggerated?
Q. I think you just said exactly what I've been saying. The same position, but more exaggerated.
Q. Could you --
A. You just said that.
Q. Sir, answer the question. What -- is what -when Detective Anderson, on April $17^{\text {th }}$, asked you, "What did you see," didn't you say the same was he was -- he was --

MR. MURTHA: Excuse me.
MR. SCHATZOW: -- still sitting there leaning
against --
MR. MURTHA: Excuse me.

MR. SCHATZOW: I'm just going to play it, Your
Honor, if you don't mind. I think that will be easier.
THE COURT: Well, no.
MR. SCHATZOW: Can you get that queued up?

THE COURT: Is there an objection?
MR. MURTHA: I'm just -- when he starts
reading, I would ask that --
MR. SCHATZOW: I'm sorry.
MR. MURTHA: That's all I'm asking for.
MR. SCHATZOW: 62, 11 -- well, let's go back to
line 8.

MR. MURTHA: Okay. Thank you.
MR. SCHATZOW: Start at 62 on line 8.

And, Your Honor, in order to demonstrate what he said, if we could play the video of that portion alone.

You've got it? 62, page 8.
MR. MURTHA: Line 8.
MR. SCHATZOW: I'm sorry. Page 62, line 8.
Your Honor, we'll go back to the old tape now.
BY MR. SCHATZOW:
Q. 62, line 8. Detective Anderson says, "So when you opened the door for Mr. Gray, Officer Porter" --

You say, "Yeah."
Detective Anderson says, "What did you see?"

And you say, "The same was -- he was -- he was
still sitting there leaning against the bench."
Isn't that what you say?
A. That is -- that's what I said, yes.
Q. Okay.

MR. SCHATZOW: Your Honor, if I could have a Court's indulgence for a moment?

THE COURT: You may.
(Brief pause.)
MR. SCHATZOW: I'm sorry, Your Honor. I'm
apparently looking at 6 when I should have been looking at 9.

And I think, Your Honor, I'm ready to conclude now, if I can.

THE COURT: Okay.
BY MR. SCHATZOW:
Q. Officer Porter, this is State's Exhibit 9. I want to show you what's marked as State's Exhibit 9 on page that's numbered P0677.
A. Uh-huh.
Q. There's some typed information there, and then there's handwriting; do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. Is that your handwriting?
A. That is my handwriting, yes.
Q. And that's something you wrote when you were in the training academy; correct?
A. That is something I wrote in the training academy.
Q. And what you wrote when you were in the training academy was, "We do not transport injured people. We rendered aid -- we render aid per our training, and contact the medic. We cannot render aid while driving. There are civil liabilities. We risk bodily fluid exposure." Is that what you wrote?
A. That is an answer that $I$ wrote that question, yes.
Q. And also, when you were in the academy, you said that you only looked at the General Orders that were referenced in the materials that you had; correct?
A. That is what I said.
Q. And, in fact, in State's Exhibit 7, which is the course materials for the vehicle procedure course you took that was taught by Officer Bilheimer (phonetic) -THE COURT: Identify for the record. MR. SCHATZOW: Yeah. I'm sorry, Your Honor. Exhibit 7, State's Exhibit 7 in evidence. BY MR. SCHATZOW:
Q. On page marked 0013013, there's a reference
to -- there's an X next to reference documents. And on the next page, under the reference materials, there's a specific reference to K14; isn't there?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, finally, you said that what was ingrained in you as a police officer was to protect life; isn't that right?
A. That is true. That is ingrained in every police officer.
Q. But at Stop 4 and Stop 5 on April 12 ${ }^{\text {th }}$ 2015, you did not protect Freddie Gray's life; did you?
A. Mister -- I'm sorry? Repeat that question.
Q. At Stops 4 and Stops 5 on April $12^{\text {th }}$, 2015, you did not protect Freddie Gray's life; did you?
A. Untrue.

MR. SCHATZOW: That's all I have, Your Honor. THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, we'll take our afternoon break. Please do not discuss the testimony you've heard, even among yourselves. Please leave your notepads on the chair. We'll take about 10 -minute break. All rise for the jury.
(Whereupon, the jury was excused from the
courtroom at 3:17 p.m.)

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THE COURT: Everyone may be seated.

Take a 10 minute recess.

Counsel, approach for one -- don't -- don't worry about it.

Actually, I just need -- let's do one of each.

Let's do one of each.
(Counsel approached the bench, and the
following ensued:)

THE COURT: Does he have any voice left?

MR. MURTHA: He does.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Just checking to see if he had a voice.

MR. MURTHA: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: You don't know how long he's going to be?

MR. MURTHA: I don't think it's going to be really long. We're sending for our next witness.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MURTHA: Just to have him around.

THE COURT: Good enough. Okay.

MR. MURTHA: Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you.
(Counsel returned to the trial table, and the following ensued:)
(Whereupon, a brief recess was taken at 3:18
p.m., and the matter resumed at 3:42 p.m.)
(At 3:42 p.m., a bench conference was held, but remains untranscribed herein, and the testimony resumed as follows at 3:46 p.m.)

THE COURT: You may remind the witness.
THE CLERK: Just reminding you you're still under oath.

State your name for the record. THE WITNESS: William Porter. THE COURT: You may proceed with redirect. REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. PROCTOR:
Q. Officer Porter, let's finish -- let's start where Mr. Schatzow finished. His last question to you was at Stops 4 and 5, you failed to protect Mr. Gray's life, and you said that was untrue.
A. That is untrue.
Q. Why is it untrue?
A. It's untrue because Freddie Gray wasn't injured at Stop 4 or 5. It's just that simple.
Q. And if he had been, what would you have done?
A. Had he been injured, I would have called for a medic.
Q. Now, right before that, Mr. Schatzow showed you a State exhibit, I think it was 9; do you remember that,
E. 401
sir?
A. Yes.
Q. And this answer you wrote?
A. Yes.
Q. Was that test an open book test?
A. It was an open book test, yes.
Q. So when you wrote, "We don't transport injured people," where did you get that information from?
A. Probably the EVOC manual. I don't recall.
Q. You just copied it?
A. Yes.
Q. Right before that, he asked you about the position at the Western District; do you remember those questions?
A. I do.
Q. And on -MR. PROCTOR: Counsel, page 62. BY MR. PROCTOR:
Q. And he pointed out you said Mr. Gray was in the same position; do you see that?
A. Yes, I see that. THE COURT: Well, what is the page and line, so the State has -MR. PROCTOR: Page 62, line 8. BY MR. PROCTOR:

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Q. Do you see that, sir?
A. I do see that, yes.
Q. What did you say right after that?
A. "I pulled him back, kind of. He went limp.

Like completely limp."
Q. So if Mr. Schatzow had read on a little
further, you would have described how he was different; right?
A. Yes, sir.

MR. SCHATZOW: Objection, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Overruled.

BY MR. PROCTOR:
Q. Do you remember the questions about why didn't
you use your radio to tell Goodson to go to the hospital?
A. I do remember those questions.
Q. What's the answer?
A. I can't tell Goodson to do anything. I'm not Goodson's supervisor.
Q. And at those points, at Stop 4 and Stop 5, did you see any emergent need?
A. No. I didn't see any need for the medic for Mr. Gray.
Q. Did you tell the wagon to go anywhere that day?
A. No. I suggested for Officer Goodson to just go to the hospital so he doesn't waste time, you know.

We're about efficiency.
Q. Now, Mr. Schatzow talked about following the wagon to the Western; do you remember those questions?
A. I do.
Q. What is your understanding -- when you were told to follow what did you think it meant?
A. Just to meet the Western -- I'm sorry, meet the wagon at the station.
Q. Does it mean to keep eyes on the wagon at all times?
A. No. MR. SCHATZOW: Objection. THE COURT: Sustained. Leading. Strike the question and the answer. BY MR. PROCTOR:
Q. What did you believe your obligation was with regard to following the wagon?
A. Well, up on North Avenue, I continued to talk to the sergeant, and she was directing me to do things. And then after $I^{\prime} d$ gone to the District, I was to follow that wagon to -- to a hospital, Bon Secours, specifically.
Q. Okay. MR. SCHATZOW: I move to strike as nonresponsive, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Overruled.

BY MR. PROCTOR:
Q. So when you were asked questions about coming behind 91; do you remember those questions?
A. I do, yes.
Q. Describe your journey between Stop 5 and Stop 6.
A. Well, when I say I'm going behind 91 is because 91 answered up right before me. So I was right behind him, and physically I was right behind where the wagon was when I had answered that question.
Q. Okay. And who gets to North Avenue first?
A. I get to North Avenue first.
Q. And how did you get there before the wagon?
A. I don't remember the direct route that I took, but -- I -- I drove faster than the wagon did to get there.
Q. Do you remember the question Mr. Schatzow asked you about you didn't say you were concerned about your gun; do you remember those questions?
A. Somewhat, yes.
Q. Is there ever a time when you're not concerned about your gun?
A. No. Basically, any time I'm talking to any citizen, any police officer, or anytime, there's always a
gun involved because I bring the gun there. So I'm always concerned about my gun on my hip.
Q. Now, Mr. Schatzow showed you Exhibit 5; do you remember that? Let me show it to you.
A. I do remember that, yes.
Q. And what is it?
A. It just says -- I don't know. It says the below listed benefits of Interior General Orders and Police Commissioner's memorandums pertaining to sworn police personnel of this agency has been -- have been provided to," and I wrote my name.
Q. Okay. What's the date on that, sir?
A. July 23, 2012.
Q. What date did you start at the academy?
A. I don't remember specifically, but it was in -it was either in late August or early September.
Q. Of which year?
A. Of 2012 .
Q. So you signed that document before you even entered the academy?
A. A few months before $I$ entered the -- the academy.
Q. You said, when Mr. Schatzow asked you a question about stop snitching, that you were offended by that; do you remember?
A. Absolutely. Absolutely was offended by that. Some prosecution --

THE COURT: No question.
BY MR. PROCTOR:
Q. Why were you offended by that?
A. I was offended by that because the prosecution works directly with police officers. So why would he -why would he ever say that the police officers lie? That's a contradictory on himself.
Q. Have you ever covered up for another police officer?
A. Absolutely not. I would never do that.
Q. You remember saying to Mr. Schatzow that you were -- may I explain 10 codes? Why don't you explain them now. What's a 10 code?
A. A 10 code is just a short version -- we just -just so -- for efficiency we use 10 codes to -- just so we can communicate with others efficiently.
Q. When did you first become aware that anyone was saying that Mr. Gray's neck was broken by Stop 4?
A. I'm sorry?
Q. You're aware that Dr. Allan believes by Stop 4 that Mr. Gray's neck was broken?
A. Yes.
Q. My question is when did you first become aware of that?
A. During this court trial.
Q. So when you were questioned back on April $17^{\text {th }}$, were you aware that it was believed that Mr. Gray's neck would have been broken at Stop 4?
A. No. I -- we didn't -- we didn't know where his neck had been broken.
Q. So when you're being asked questions by Detective Teel and others, and Mr. Schatzow asked you -do you remember the questions about is this the first time you ever said he used his legs?
A. Yes, I do remember those questions.
Q. Were you aware that it might be significant at that point whether he used his legs or not?
A. I was not aware that that would have made any significance.
Q. Mr. Schatzow said you never said that you helped him onto the bench; do you remember those questions?
A. I do remember that, yes.
Q. Did you ever say you lifted and carried him?
A. I never said that either.
Q. Do you remember the questions about you told Brandon Ross to go to the media?
A. I do remember that, yes.
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Q. What did Brandon Ross say to you to make you say that?
A. He just said he's got it on tape. He's got it on camera. He recorded the entire thing.
Q. So why did you tell him to go to the media?
A. Because he had a -- he said he had a recording of what happened there.
Q. Remember Mr. Schatzow asked you if Lieutenant Rice was as close from me to you, and he stood about here in terms of those questions?
A. I do remember, yes.
Q. Mr. Schatzow have a bicycle helmet on when he asked you that?
A. He did not, no.
Q. Did he have two similar people standing next to you when he asked you that?
A. He was standing alone.
Q. At Stop 2, what was your primary focus on, sir?
A. Just crowd control. I could hear the crowd. I mean, from the video, you can hear Brandon Ross yelling pretty loudly and saying obscenities. And so my focus was on the crowd more so than the detainee.
Q. Why were you not concerned about the detainee?
A. There were -- he was -- there were three officers, and there was one detainee.
Q. When and how did you learn that it was

Lieutenant Rice lifting him in?
A. I believe Detective Anderson told me on -on -- in my -- during the interview.
Q. When was the first time you learned -- wait a second. I'm showing you what's been marked for identification as State's Exhibit 31. Did you see that, sir?
A. Yes.
Q. And you've seen that before; right?
A. I have, yes.
Q. And that report says that Mr. Gray -- well, the State believes that report says that Mr. Gray told you he couldn't breathe at Stop 4; is that correct?
A. That is correct.
Q. When was the first time you learned that Detective Teel attributed to you that the can't breathe was at Stop 4?
A. During motion hearing.
Q. So when you're being asked questions on a April $15^{\text {th }}$, do you have any knowledge of what Detective Teel believed your conversation concerned a few days earlier?
A. I'm sorry. Can you re -MR. SCHATZOW: Objection, Your Honor. THE COURT: Overruled.
Q. When you're talking to Detective Teel on video
A. $\quad \mathrm{Mmm}-\mathrm{hmm}$.
Q. -- do you know the contents of that report?
A. No, I do not. No.
Q. Do you know that she wrote down that you said Mr. Gray couldn't breathe at Stop 4?
A. No, I didn't know that. No.
Q. Did you know there was any discrepancy to clear up?
A. No, I did not know there was any discrepancy to clear up. No.
Q. And let's talk a little bit more about that report. Where does Detective Teel say that conversation occurred?
A. It says Dolphin and Baker Street.
Q. And again, do Dolphin and Baker Street ever meet?
A. They do not.
Q. How does Detective Teel spell Mr. Gray's last name?
A. From the report here in front of me it says $G-r-e-y$.
Q. So she got the location wrong; right?
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A. Yes. That's what's on the paper, yes.
Q. And she got Mr. Gray's last name wrong?

MR. SCHATZOW: Objection, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Sustained. Strike the question.
BY MR. PROCTOR:
Q. In the course of preparing this case, you've met with Mr. Murtha and I; have you not?
A. I have, yes.
Q. And one of the things, State's Exhibit 11, we asked you to look at and discuss with us, Policy 1114; isn't it?
A. Yes. This is Policy 1114.
Q. So when you talked about two hours at the hospital; do you remember those questions?
A. Yes, I do remember those questions.
Q. Did you read that while preparing for testifying?

MR. SCHATZOW: Objection, Your Honor. THE COURT: Overruled. THE WITNESS: Yes, I did, yes. BY MR. PROCTOR:
Q. On April $12^{\text {th }}--$ THE COURT: Actually, sustained, as to form. MR. PROCTOR: Okay. THE COURT: I switch people around sometimes.
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BY MR. PROCTOR:
Q. Let me see if I can -- were you aware -THE COURT: Mr. Proctor, hold on one second. MR. PROCTOR: Sorry, Judge.

THE COURT: Counsel, approach, while my sheriffs do what they need to do. I just need a moment with Counsel.
(Counsel approached the bench, and the
following ensued:)
MR. SCHATZOW: Oh geez. Don't let it be the blind man. Please, Lord Jesus, don't let it be the blind man. Don't let it be the blind man.

MR. MURTHA: It is.
MS. BLEDSOE: Who is it?
MR. SCHATZOW: Please don't let it be the blind man. Please, Father, don't let it be the blind man. MS. BLEDSOE: Who is it? It is. It is. It is.

MR. SCHATZOW: Oh, geez. Oh, geez. Really?
Seriously?
MS. BLEDSOE: Yes. It is.
THE COURT: Well, pray that I did not scream.
I didn't scream.
MS. BLEDSOE: Don't scream.
THE COURT: I'm not. I'm not. I'm not. I'm
not. But, really, of all people, seriously? It had to be the blind man. This is like, oh Lord, help me. Now I look like the scrooge, the ogre, the wrong person. MS. BLEDSOE: It's okay. THE COURT: Did they walk him out? MR. PROCTOR: He's almost there, 10 steps from the door.

THE COURT: Don't look. Don't look. Don't
look. Don't look. Don't look.
MS. BLEDSOE: Are we all good?
THE COURT: See. Now I look all bad and everything, oh, Jesus. MS. BLEDSOE: Take a deep breath. THE COURT: Go get out, and bring him back in. And they're going to stay up here with me. They got -if I've got to go through this, they've got to go through. Hook it up. Thanks. MR. PROCTOR: Just put him next door. THE COURT: See? See? MS. BLEDSOE: Nice. THE COURT: See? Right, right. See? THE COURT: See. MS. BLEDSOE: That's really nice. MR. PROCTOR: Motion to reconsider. THE COURT: See? I know. Motion to
reconsider; right.
MS. BLEDSOE: Kicked him out of the courtroom. Keep the evidence away.

THE COURT: I know. I know. I know. But, notice, you've got to give me credit. Because what I was about to do is just scream and say, I told -- but I didn't.

MS. BLEDSOE: I know. That was good. There was something there.

THE COURT: There was something. There was
something that said just bring it down a little bit. I
have you all as my shields.

MS. BLEDSOE: That counting works.
THE COURT: It does.
MS. BLEDSOE: It does.
THE COURT: It really does.
Are you almost done?
MR. PROCTOR: I have about two questions left.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. SCHATZOW: I have about four.
THE COURT: That's fine.
And then what do you have after? Do you have a witness in the hallway?

MR. MURTHA: Yes, right outside.
THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SCHATZOW: Is Novak next?
MR. MURTHA: Yes.
MR. SCHATZOW: It's still Novak next.
THE COURT: Is he back in yet? Okay.
MS. BLEDSOE: I'm not going to look. So --
THE COURT: No, you're not. He's at the edge, so that's his job.

MS. BLEDSOE: Right. Nice.
THE COURT: Well, thank you. And you want to make me feel any worse? Okay. So now that we're up here and we're waiting for him, here's a quick story.

I'm young on the bench. I don't really care about people standing up or sitting down when $I$ come out, but my sheriff is a stickler. No. When you come out, they have to stand up. Blah, blah, blah.

Okay. So, fine, so finally I get used to it. I come out. Everyone is standing. Everyone except one person. Me, the man who doesn't care. Sir, stand up. I see the sheriff going like this.
(Laughter.)
THE COURT: And I'm, like, he is blind and deaf. Oh, Lord, now what else is going on.

MR. PROCTOR: Someone else is talking out loud, Judge.

MS. BLEDSOE: Well, at least he wasn't
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paralyzed.

MR. PROCTOR: Judge, do you want to consider sending the jury out. Someone else is mouthing off. I can hear them over the husher.

THE COURT: Yeah, it will be all right. Well, we've got one coming in. We're taking one out, so it's a one for one. It's a one for one.

MR. MURTHA: I'm less sympathetic to that guy being escorted out.

THE COURT: Right. Oh, so you want to go there? You want to put the cane on me? Okay, fine, thanks. Because I wanted to take a break now, but I want to like --

MR. PROCTOR: If he hits you with that cane, Judge, we'll prosecute him.

THE COURT: Well, I know him well, actually. I see him all the time. (Inaudible at 4:02:45 p.m.) resolve that issue.

THE COURT: I guess he's sitting right here. Do I need to take a break? Cause here's the thing. They don't know whose side that person is on, so it doesn't matter.

THE COURT: Well, I know well, actually. I see him all the time. That resolves that issue.

MR. MURTHA: Maybe we should take a break
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because it looks like he's --
MS. BLEDSOE: Yeah, let's take a break.
(Counsel returned to the trial table, and the following ensued:)

THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, we're going to take a break.

Put your notepads --
Go that way now.
THE CLERK: All rise.
(Whereupon, the jury was excused from the
courtroom at 4:03 p.m.)
MR. SCHATZOW: We don't need to --
THE COURT: No. I need you all for second.
MR. SCHATZOW: Oh, you do?
THE COURT: Yes. Because there's no reason for you all to be involved in that.

Once he's out, everyone remain in the courtroom until the sheriff tells you can leave the courtroom for the moment.
(Counsel approached the bench, and the following ensued:)

THE COURT: (Inaudible at 4:04:12 p.m.) hadn't caused the issue. I would have had time for that. Hang on one second.

Darlene, go tell them that I'm not letting
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anyone out until the sheriff will let people out. Tell the sheriffs that I'm not letting anyone out until the sheriff allows it. Go tell them that.

MR. SCHATZOW: Judge, this case has moved.
THE COURT: Oh, no, it has. No, no. I'm just saying --

I'm going to leave -- I'm leaving the white noise on so don't leave. Someone has to share my pain. It may as well be you all.
(Laughter.)
THE COURT: Well, because see, if the white noise is on, then we're talking about something, and it gives a reason for them to stay. If I leave, then they want to run out.

MS. BLEDSOE: I understand. I understand.
THE COURT: I think it was -- just so that you
know, I think he was saying something, I'm family, but anyone, you know, that's North Carolina. I got that. That's what I'm saying. But I think that's what he was saying.

MS. BLEDSOE: Because I immediately identified the family and --

THE COURT: Right.
MS. BLEDSOE: -- I was like it's not.
THE COURT: Yeah.

MS. BLEDSOE: Okay?
THE COURT: Yeah. I understand.
MS. BLEDSOE: I don't know --
THE COURT: All right. So who's next, just out
of curiosity?
MR. PROCTOR: Another police officer.
THE COURT: Another police officer.
MR. MURTHA: I think -- I think in assessing
it, we probably are going to carry over to Friday.
THE COURT: Okay. That's fine.
MR. PROCTOR: We'll be done Friday. Definitely
Friday.
MR. MURTHA: We'll definitely be done Friday.
THE COURT: Okay. Then we can tell our jury instructions on Friday. I'm actually going over some of them now. Not now. But I'd like to go over them now, but I have to actually listen to you all, so.
(Brief pause.)
THE COURT: Okay. So can they leave the courtroom now?

THE SHERIFF: Yes. They can.
THE COURT: Five minute recess, ladies and gentlemen. You may leave the courtroom if you so desire.
(Whereupon, a brief recess was taken at 4:06 p.m., and the matter resumed at 4:17 p.m.)

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
Everyone may be seated.
You may remind the witness.
THE CLERK: You may be seated.
Just reminding you you're still under oath.
State your name for the record.
THE WITNESS: William Porter.

THE COURT: You may proceed. DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued)

BY MR. PROCTOR:
Q. Officer Porter, do you remember the questions Mr. Schatzow asked you about working at the computer company?
A. Yes.
Q. Back on April $12^{\text {th }}$, did you know whether or not you were able to check your BPD emails remotely?
A. No, I did not know that. No.

MR. PROCTOR: That's all I have.

THE COURT: Recross based on redirect?
MR. SCHATZOW: Yes, Your Honor.
Your Honor, based on the redirect, we would offer into evidence Exhibit 31, which was read to the jury -- was read from during his redirect examination. THE COURT: Any objection. MR. PROCTOR: Object. Still object.
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MR. MURTHA: Can I just see?
THE COURT: Yes.
Objection sustained.
MR. MURTHA: Thank you.

RECROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. SCHATZOW:
Q. You were furnished the flash drive before you went to the academy?
A. I'm sorry?
Q. You were furnished the flash drive before you went to the academy?
A. No, sir. No, sir.
Q. Didn't -- didn't you just say that you had signed the receipt for it two months before you entered the academy?
A. No. I signed the receipt for various things, including the General Orders. But I hadn't received that until $I$ was in the academy.
Q. Are you saying you signed the receipt before you got to the academy, but you got the materials when you got to the academy; is that your testimony?
A. That is what I'm saying, yes.
Q. Okay. When you were asked questions about whether you were concerned about Mr. Gray at Baker and Mount; you remember your lawyer asking those questions?
A. I don't remember him asking me about Baker and Mount specifically.
Q. You don't remember him asking you about why you weren't concerned because it having something to do with other officers being present?
A. Oh, yes. Yes, I remember that.
Q. Well, when you walked up to the back of the wagon at Baker and Mount, and you saw Mr. Gray with his hands cuffed behind his back and his legs shackled, being put into the van, on the floor of the van, did you say to any of the other officers there, isn't there a better way to transport him than like an animal on the ground? MR. MURTHA: Objection. THE COURT: Sustained. Strike the question as inappropriate. BY MR. SCHATZOW:
Q. When you were interviewed by Detectives Teel and Anderson on April $17^{\text {th }}$ of 2015, you were aware that Mr. Gray had suffered a broken neck; weren't you?
A. I was aware, yes.
Q. And then, finally, you were asked some questions about whether -- what -- about what you had told the officers on April $17^{\text {th }}$ about whether Mr. Gray was in the same position at Stop 5 -- in Stop 6 as he was in Stop 5. And I think you were asked about the upper
part of page 62. I'm going to ask you about the bottom of it.

You're the one who opened the door on the side that Mr. Gray was on at -- at the Western District; right?
A. That is true, yes.
Q. Okay.

MR. PROCTOR: I would object.
MR. SCHATZOW: And --
THE COURT: Overruled.

BY MR. SCHATZOW:
Q. Your lawyer pointed you to some language here on page 62, at about line 12. But at line 24 , isn't it a fact that Detective Anderson said to you, "Okay. But when you opened the wagon, he was still in that same position?"

And your answer was, "Yeah. He was still"; right? That's what you told him.
A. And that he -- he interjects me --
Q. And then he said, "Did you call his name?" And you say, "Yeah." But there's nothing else here about the position. You said he was still in the same position; correct?
A. But he, as you read right here, it says he
interjected me. That's what that says.
Q. Yeah. Did you say, "Yeah"?
A. I said yes, but $I$ was interjected. Like you just cut me off, he cut me off also.
(Laughter.)
A. That's what happened, sir.
Q. He -- he --

THE COURT: Quiet, ladies and gentlemen.
MR. SCHATZOW: Never mind, Your Honor. That's
all I have for Officer --

THE COURT: Next witness.
MR. PROCTOR: Very limited area, a couple questions.

THE COURT: Oh no.
MR. PROCTOR: That's all I have.
THE COURT: It works for both sides.
You may step down.
(End of Excerpt - Testimony of William Porter
concluded at 4:22 p.m.)

## REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

I, Patricia A. Trikeriotis, Chief Court

Reporter of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, do hereby certify that the proceedings in the matter of State of Maryland vs. William Porter, Case Number 115141037, on December 9, 2015, before the Honorable Barry G. Williams, Associate Judge, were duly recorded by means of digital recording.

I further certify that the page numbers 1 through 178 constitute the official transcript of an excerpt of the proceedings as transcribed by me or under my direction from the digital recording to the within typewritten matter in a complete and accurate manner.

In Witness Whereof, I have affixed my signature this 4th day of January, 2016.

## Patricia Trikeriotis

Patricia A. Trikeriotis
Chief Court Reporter


WHEREAS, on January 6, 2016, the Circuit Court for Baltimore City issued an order granting the "State's Motion to Compel a Witness to Testify Pursuant to Section 9123 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article" (the "Motion to Compel") in State of Maryland v. Caesar Goodson, Case No. 115141032; and

WHEREAS, on January 7, 2016, Appellant William Porter ${ }^{1}$, the witness subject to the circuit court's order, noted an interlocutory appeal from the circuit court's order granting of that motion; and

WHEREAS, following the noting of the appeal, appellant, on the same day, filed in this Court a "Motion for Injunction Pending Appeal" (the "Motion for Injunction"); and

WHEREAS, on January 8, 2016, this Court issued an order temporarily staying the circuit court's granting the State's Motion to Compel pending a decision by this Court on Appellant's Motion for Injunction; and

[^3]WHEREAS the State has now responded to the Motion for Injunction and appellant, in turn, has filed a reply to the State's response to the Motion for Injunction; and

WHEREAS the trial in State of Maryland v. Caesar Goodson, Case No. 115141032 is scheduled to commence today, Monday, January 11, 2016 at 9:30 a.m.; and

WHEREAS it is presumably in the interests of all parties that appellant's interlocutory appeal of the circuit court's order granting the State's motion to compel the testimony of William Porter be decided before the commencement of trial; and

WHEREAS if any party to the proceedings in the circuit court or to this interlocutory appeal disagrees with this order, they may file a motion, for this Court's consideration, to lift the stay.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS this $11^{\text {th }}$ day of Janvary 2016, by the Court of Special Appeals,

ORDERED that the trial in State of Maryland v. Caesar Goodson, Case No. 115141032, now pending in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, be and hereby is stayed pending a resolution of the above-captioned interlocutory appeal or further order of this Court.

# FOR A PANEL OF THE COURT 

PETER B. KRAUSER, CHIEF JUDGE

## STATE OF MARYLAND

v.

* IN THE
* CIRCUIT COURT FOR ${ }^{\text {20ib JAH }-7 \text { A } 11: 21}$
* BALTIMORE CITY


## ALICIA WHITE

## ORDER

On January 6, 2016, during a pre-trial motions hearing for State v. Caesar Goodson, Case No. 115141032 , the State presented this Court with its written Motion to Compel a Witness to Testify Pursuant to Section 9-123 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article in order to compel Officer William Porter to testify as a State's witness during the Goodson case. During this hearing, counsel for the Defendant incorporated their arguments from their Motion to Quash Trial Subpoena of Officer William Porter. Counsel for the Defendant and the State incorporated their arguments for application to the above-captioned case. After the hearing, the State presented this Court with its written Motion to Compel a Witness to Testify Pursuant to Section 9-123 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, in order to compel Officer William Porter to testify in the above-captioned case.

Based on the motions, arguments, and testimony presented during the hearing, this Court finds that the State plans to call Officer William Porter, D.O.B. 6/29/1989, as a witness to testify in the above-captioned case but that Officer Porter is likely to refuse to testify on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination. This Court further finds that the State's Motion to Compel Officer Porter's testimony complies with the requirements of Section 9-123 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. For these reasons, it is this 7 th day of January, 2016, by the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, hereby

ORDERED that the State's Motion to Compel a Witness to Testify Pursuant to Section 9-123 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article is GRANTED, and further

ORDERED that Officer William Porter, D.O.B. 6/26/1989, shall testify as a witness for the State in the above-captioned case and may not refuse to comply with this Order on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination, and further

ORDERED that no testimony of Officer William Porter, D.O.B. 6/26/1989, compelled pursuant to this Order, and no information directly or indirectly derived from the testimony of Officer Porter compelled pursuant to this Order, may be used against Officer Porter in any criminal case, except in a prosecution for perjury, obstruction of justice, or otherwise failing to comply with this Order.

Judge Barry G. Williams
Judge's Signature appears on the original document

BAR'RY G. WILLIAMS
JUDGE, CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY

Clerk, please mail copies to the following:
Joseph Murtha, Attorney for William Porter
Janice Bledsoe, Deputy State's Attorney, Office of the State's Attorney for Baltimore City


On January 7, 2016, this Court granted the State's Motion to Compel a Witness to Testify Pursuant to Section 9-123 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. By this Court's order, Officer William Porter, D.O.B. 6/26/1989 is ordered to testify as a witness for the State in the above-captioned case and may not refuse to comply with this Court's order on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination. This Court further ordered that no testimony of Officer William Porter, compelled pursuant to the Court's order, and no information directly or indirectly derived from the testimony of Officer Porter compelled pursuant to the Court's order, may be used against Officer Porter in any criminal case, except in a prosecution for perjury, obstruction of justice, or otherwise failing to comply with this Order.

On January 12, 2016, this Court received Witness William Porter's Motion for Injunction Pending Appeal, asking this Court to stay its ruling pending Officer Porter's interlocutory appeal in this matter.

Having reviewed the Defendant's motion, and in light of the Court of Special Appeals order of January 11, 2016, granting a stay in Goodson v. State, Case No. 115141032, pending the interlocutory appeal, and noting that the legal issues involved in the two cases are the
same, this Court finds that it is appropriate to grant a stay in the above-captioned matter. Therefore, it is this 20th day of January, 2016, hereby

ORDERED that Witness William Porter's Motion for Injunction Pending Appeal is

## GRANTED.

## Judge Barry G. Williams

 Judge's Signature appears on the original documentBARRY G. WILLIAMS
JUDGE, CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY

Clerk, please mail copies to the following:
Ivan Bates, Attorney for Alicia White
Joseph Murtha, Attorney for William Porter
Janice Bledsoe, Deputy State's Attorney, Office of the State's Attorney for Baltimore City


[^0]:    ' Even assuming that granting a stay would result in a tral delay of several months, the Defendant was indicted less than nune months ago and so would stull come to trial on a date that would barely be sufficient to even Ingeer a legitumate speedy tnal challenge, much less actually deprive the Defendant of that right given the complexity of the ussues in this case. See Glover v. State, 386 Md. 211.223 (2002) ("While no specific duration of delay constitutes a per se delay of constitutional dimension, we have employed the proposition that a pre-rial delay greater than one year and fourteen days was 'presumptively prejudictial' on several occasions ") (intemal citations omitted).

[^1]:    ${ }^{2}$ The Position Paper bears no author but was contained within the microfilm legislative bill history for HB 1311 on file at the Library of the Department of Legislative Services in Annapolis

[^2]:    Judge, Circuit Court for Baltimore City

[^3]:    ${ }^{1}$ Pursuant to Maryland Rule 8-111, William Porter is designated as appellant in this appeal.

