

# Amicus Curiarum

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# SUPREME COURT OF MARYLAND

*In the Matter of the Honorable April T. Ademiluyi, Judge of the Circuit Court of Maryland for Prince George’s County, 7th Judicial Circuit, JD No. 2, September Term 2023, filed August 15, 2024. Opinion by Watts, J.*

<https://mdcourts.gov/data/opinions/coa/2024/2a23jd.pdf>

JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE – SANCTIONS – REMOVAL

## **Facts:**

April T. Ademiluyi, formerly an Associate Judge of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, was elected to office in the November 2020 General Election. On June 29, 2023, Investigative Counsel charged Judge Ademiluyi with having engaged in sanctionable conduct that violated multiple provisions of the Maryland Code of Judicial Conduct (“MCJC”). Investigative Counsel alleged that, among other things, Judge Ademiluyi engaged in sanctionable misconduct as a candidate for election, misconduct as a judge in training, misconduct involving her colleagues, misconduct with her staff, misconduct as a respondent in a judicial discipline proceeding, and, most importantly, misconduct as a judge presiding in a trial and deciding matters before the circuit court. Investigative Counsel alleged that Judge Ademiluyi engaged in a pattern of behavior in direct contravention of a judge’s responsibility to promote confidence in the judiciary and maintain the dignity of judicial office.

Prior to charges being filed, the Maryland Commission on Judicial Disabilities (“the Commission”) had issued Judge Ademiluyi a “Letter of Cautionary Advice,” advising her to comply with reasonable directives from judges with supervisory authority, to conduct designated dockets so the public was not negatively impacted, and to refrain from engaging in future sanctionable conduct. After the filing of charges, the Commission held a hearing. In findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Commission concluded that Judge Ademiluyi had engaged in sanctionable conduct that violated almost all of the MCJC provisions charged by Investigative Counsel. The Commission recommended that the Supreme Court of Maryland censure Judge Ademiluyi and that she be suspended for six months without pay, with two consecutive months to be served immediately, followed by probation for one year with the conditions that Judge Ademiluyi be assigned a mentor judge and a “probation monitor”; undergo a healthcare evaluation; and attend and complete all Maryland Judiciary trainings, as well as any trainings designated by the Commission during the probationary period.

In accordance with Maryland Rule 18-435(c), the Commission referred the matter to the Supreme Court of Maryland for final disposition. Judge Ademiluyi filed in the Supreme Court exceptions to the Commission's findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations and a memorandum of law in support of the exceptions. The Commission filed a response to the exceptions.

On May 6, 2024, after a hearing on Judge Ademiluyi's exceptions, the Supreme Court of Maryland concluded that Judge Ademiluyi had engaged in egregious misconduct and issued an order removing her from the office of Judge of the Circuit Court for Prince George's County. *See Matter of Ademiluyi*, 487 Md. 133, 134-35, 314 A.3d 1259, 1260 (2024).

**Held:** Removed.

After entering a *per curiam* order removing Judge Ademiluyi from office, the Supreme Court of Maryland filed an opinion in which it concluded that the Commission's findings of fact had been established and were not clearly erroneous and it upheld the Commission's conclusions of law that Judge Ademiluyi violated Maryland Rules 18-101.1 (Compliance with the Law), 18-101.2 (Promoting Confidence in the Judiciary), 18-102.2 (Impartiality and Fairness), 18-102.3(a) (Bias, Prejudice, and Harassment), 18-102.5(b) and (c) (Competence, Diligence, and Cooperation), 18-102.8(b) (Decorum, Demeanor, and Communication with Jurors), 18-102.9(a) and (c) (Ex Parte Communications), 18-102.11(a)(4) and (c) (Disqualification), 18-102.16(a) (Cooperation with Disciplinary Authorities), and 18-104.4(a), (b), and (d) (Political Conduct of Candidate for Election).

The Supreme Court concluded that, given the wide-ranging and pervasive nature of Judge Ademiluyi's misconduct, her inability to comply with the fundamental requirement that she perform the duties of office fairly and impartially, and her lack of remorse for blatant and egregious violations of the MCJC, the Commission's recommended disposition was inadequate to protect the integrity of the judiciary and the fair and impartial administration of justice. With her misconduct and violations of the MCJC, Judge Ademiluyi showed that she could not be trusted to perform the duties of a circuit court judge. Judge Ademiluyi repeatedly violated basic principles that a judge is required to adhere to and showed no indication that she would be amenable to change or that she would ever acquit judicial duties in a manner that would be consistent with the fair administration of justice.

The Supreme Court concluded that Judge Ademiluyi's removal from office was the only disposition sufficient to preserve the integrity, independence, and impartiality of the Judiciary and assure the public that the Judiciary will not, and does not, condone such egregious judicial misconduct. As such, on May 6, 2024, the Supreme Court issued an order removing Judge Ademiluyi from office.

# APPELLATE COURT OF MARYLAND

*Jennifer Adalakun v. Adeniyi Adalakun*, No. 33, September Term 2024, filed September 26, 2024. Opinion by Graeff, J.

<https://www.mdcourts.gov/data/opinions/cosa/2024/0033s24.pdf>

APPEALABILITY – INTERLOCUTORY ORDER – PENDENTE LITE CHILD SUPPORT & ALIMONY

**Facts:**

Mother appealed from an order issued by the Circuit Court for Howard County denying Mother’s request for pendente lite alimony and pendente lite child support.

**Held:** Dismissed.

An interlocutory order denying pendente lite alimony and child support is not a final judgment, and it is not appealable as an order for the payment of money pursuant to Md. Code Ann., Courts and Judicial Proceedings (“CJ”) § 12-303(3)(v) (2023 Supp.). Although interlocutory orders to pay alimony and child support are appealable orders, CJ § 12 303(3)(v) provides a right to appeal only from orders that require a party to pay a specific sum of money to another person. The order here, denying the pendente lite request for alimony and child support, was not such an order.

*Tyrone Harvin v. State of Maryland*, No. 1951, September Term 2022, filed September 26, 2024. Opinion by Ripken, J.

<https://www.mdcourts.gov/data/opinions/cosa/2024/1951s22.pdf>

EXPERT WITNESSES – ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY – MARYLAND  
RULE 5-702 – ABUSE OF DISCRETION

**Facts:**

In August of 2018, officers from the Baltimore City Police Department (“BPD”) performed a wellbeing check on the resident of an apartment building. Inside the apartment, officers discovered a bloodied unclothed woman lying on the floor, unresponsive and struggling to breathe. She was transported to a hospital, where she succumbed to her injuries. An autopsy revealed that the victim suffered multiple injuries and that she had been sexually assaulted.

Christina Hurley (“Hurley”), a BPD forensic scientist, analyzed the DNA swabs taken during the investigation from items inside the apartment, the victim, and Appellant. Among other evidence, Hurley identified three samples that contained mixtures of DNA sources. Hurley ran the identified samples through TrueAllele, a probabilistic genotyping software designed to develop a DNA profile from an evidentiary sample, that can then be compared against a known DNA profile. Using TrueAllele, Hurley developed a probable genotype for a contributor other than the victim in each of the three samples. In each sample, Appellant’s DNA matched the inferred genotype.

In a pretrial motion *in limine*, Appellant asserted that the State’s use of TrueAllele to aid in DNA interpretation was inadmissible under Maryland Rule 5-702. The circuit court held a hearing to evaluate the reliability and admissibility of the expert’s testimony based on the factors adopted in *Rochkind v. Stevenson*, 471 Md. 1 (2020) and its progeny.

During the hearing, Hurley explained the BPD’s procedure for analyzing DNA evidence, which first requires analysts to draw conclusions from manual interpretation of the data. If a sample includes a mixture of DNA, analysts can use TrueAllele to aid with interpretation. Hurley testified that TrueAllele evaluates the data generated from a physical DNA sample and assigns a probability as to each possible allele present at each locus in the sample.

Hurley testified that the BPD lab had been using TrueAllele as part of its DNA analysis procedure since 2015, when the software was internally validated as effective. The validation was conducted in accordance with nationally recognized standards and was run using samples that included multiple contributors. The validation data was shared with an outside lab, which completed a parallel test producing concordant results. Hurley also testified that TrueAllele had been the subject of several peer-reviewed publications.

Hurley testified that data inputs are reviewed by multiple analysts to ensure the data quality is sufficiently high. BPD policy requires at least two different runs of the TrueAllele program using the same data to show concordant results in order to be reportable. Hurley noted that the electrophoresis machines that perform the genetic analysis receive yearly calibration and maintenance, as well as additional recalibration if needed.

Hurley testified that while some of the samples in this case included impurities in the DNA, this was not out of the ordinary. She testified that these artifacts could result in peaks in the TrueAllele-produced graphs that did not represent alleles actually present in the sample. Although Hurley testified that manual analysis could be used to determine whether a peak was a real allele or the product of an artifact in the sample, she explained that TrueAllele assigns a probability to everything, including the possibility that a presumptive artifact in the data is an actual allele from a DNA contributor. Hurley also testified as to how she input the data from the three samples into the TrueAllele software. Hurley explained the parameters she used to instruct TrueAllele when running the data on each sample before TrueAllele generated an inferred profile matching Appellant.

During the hearing, Appellant presented testimony from his own expert, who raised reliability concerns with TrueAllele, particularly as to its peer review process. Appellant's expert also testified that he was concerned about potential artifacts in DNA samples, and that allele peaks caused by artifacts should never occur in a correctly calibrated instrument.

After the hearing, the circuit court issued a written memorandum denying the motion to exclude the TrueAllele evidence. The court addressed each of the *Daubert-Rochkind* factors. Where disagreements between the experts arose—for example, the calibration of the machine and whether artifacts in the data were misidentified as actual alleles—the court concluded that these were fodder for cross-examination rather than a basis for exclusion. After evaluating each factor, the circuit court concluded that the results from the TrueAllele software as applied by Hurley were sufficiently reliable to be useful to a trier of fact.

A trial was held in June of 2022, and a jury found Appellant guilty of the rape and murder of the victim. Appellant filed a timely appeal. He sought review of whether the circuit court erred in concluding that the results of the TrueAllele analysis were admissible under Maryland Rule 5-702.

**Held:** Affirmed.

The Appellate Court of Maryland held that under the *Daubert-Rochkind* framework, trial courts evaluate admissibility of expert testimony by a flexible inquiry into an expert's reliability, focusing on the expert's principles and methodology as opposed to their conclusions. The Court acknowledged that an expert's methodology is a critical aspect of reliability and the center of a *Daubert-Rochkind* analysis. The Court recognized that the question of whether an expert's methodology is sufficiently reliable will sometimes require a trial court to consider data and

assumptions that the expert has employed in applying that methodology. The Court held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony because there was ample evidence from which the court could properly conclude that the expert's assumptions and parameters for testing did not render the TrueAllele data inadmissible.

The Court also recognized that the focus of an inquiry into admissibility of evidence under Rule 5-702 must be solely on the expert's principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate. When Appellant challenged some of the data generated by TrueAllele as allegedly not comporting with his DNA profile, the circuit court heard testimony from Hurley explaining why TrueAllele might have produced such results and how she interpreted and validated those results into the final analysis. The circuit court determined that the potential discrepancies in the data were not fatal to the admissibility of the TrueAllele testimony. As the circuit court's decision was supported by the record, the Court held that it acted within its discretion in admitting the State's expert testimony.

In addition, the Court held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that True Allele was peer reviewed. The record contained evidence of internal validation and multiple peer-reviewed studies, including studies that used samples exhibiting real-world conditions. Thus, the circuit court did not act outside the bounds of reason in determining that the TrueAllele software had been peer reviewed.

Finally, the Court held that when an expert's scientific testimony rests upon reliable grounds, it should be tested by the adversary process, to include competing expert testimony and active cross-examination, rather than excluding the testimony from jurors' scrutiny. Appellant challenged the admission of the expert's testimony on the TrueAllele test results due to the allegation that the electrophoresis machine producing the data subjected to TrueAllele analysis was improperly calibrated. Appellant's challenge was based on his expert's testimony, and his assertion that the State's expert failed to follow laboratory procedures. Yet, the circuit court also had evidence from Hurley that the machine did not require calibration under the circumstances. The circuit court noted that the experts disagreed on the issue of calibration but found that Hurley properly applied principles and methods required by the BPD's lab, which made this testimony proper to submit to the jury. As the circuit court was not required to disregard Hurley's testimony based on the competing explanation of Appellant's expert, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony.

*Ancil Tony Hamrick v. State of Maryland*, No. 1780, September Term 2022, filed September 4, 2024. Opinion by Leahy, J.

<https://www.mdcourts.gov/data/opinions/cosa/2024/1780s22.pdf>

CRIMINAL LAW – NATURE AND ELEMENTS OF CRIME – REDUNDANT  
CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES

**Facts:**

Ancil Tony Hamrick (“Appellant”) was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder, first-degree felony murder, and first-degree burglary after he broke into the home of Darlene Turney and killed her. On direct appeal, his sentence for the felony murder conviction was vacated on the ground that it was redundant with the sentence he received for the premeditated murder conviction. Appellant’s consecutive sentences for his premeditated murder and burglary convictions remained.

Years later, Appellant filed a “Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence” in the Circuit Court for Cecil County, claiming that his burglary sentence was inherently illegal because its underlying conviction should have been merged into the felony murder conviction. Invoking the rule of lenity, Appellant suggested two scenarios: first, his premeditated murder sentence should have been vacated instead of the felony murder sentence so that the burglary conviction could merge into the felony murder conviction for sentencing purposes; second, alternatively, his burglary sentence should have been vacated altogether with the felony murder sentence. The circuit court held a hearing on the motion and denied it.

**Held:** Affirmed.

The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed the circuit court’s denial of the motion, holding that when there is a verdict of first-degree murder on both theories of premeditated and felony murder, the conviction of the underlying felony does not merge.

The Court reasoned that Appellant’s premeditated murder and felony murder convictions were based on alternative theories of guilt, not separate offenses, since “units of prosecution are dead bodies” in a murder trial. *Burroughs v. State*, 88 Md. App. 229, 247 (1991). Unlike *State v. Frye*, 283 Md. 709, 720 (1978), where the record provided “no foundation” to determine whether the defendant’s first-degree murder conviction was based on felony murder or on premeditated murder, the jury in this case was instructed on both premeditated murder and felony murder, and Appellant was convicted of both. As such, the Court reasoned that Appellant’s felony murder conviction (and sentence) was “redundant” and therefore properly vacated. *Burroughs*, 88 Md. App. at 247

The Court held that while the rule of lenity is a “standard for determining merger for sentencing purposes[,]” it did not apply to this case. *State v. Johnson*, 442 Md. 211, 218 (2015). Since there was only a single offense of murder, Appellant’s two murder convictions were not “capable of merging into each other.” *Burroughs*, 88 Md. App. at 247. Even if the rule of lenity could apply, the Court found that Appellant’s premeditated murder conviction did not need to be vacated, as it requires a specific intent to kill – a more culpable mens rea than that required for felony murder. Finally, because Appellant’s first-degree murder conviction was appropriately based on the theory of premeditated murder rather than felony murder, the Court concluded that the burglary conviction did not merge into the first-degree murder conviction for sentencing purposes.

*Sergejs Hripunovs v. Elena Maximova*, No. 1169, September Term 2023, filed September 3, 2024. Opinion by Leahy, J.

<https://www.mdcourts.gov/data/opinions/cosa/2024/1169s23.pdf>

PROTECTION OF ENDANGERED PERSONS – SECURITY OR ORDER FOR PEACE OR PROTECTION – PROCEEDINGS – EVIDENCE – ADMISSIBILITY

PRECLUSION IN GENERAL – *RES JUDICATA* AND CLAIM PRECLUSION IN GENERAL

PRECLUSION IN GENERAL – COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND ISSUE PRECLUSION IN GENERAL

**Facts:**

The Circuit Court for Montgomery County entered a final protective order on July 21, 2023, against Mr. Sergejs Hripunovs (“Husband”) on the petition of Ms. Elena Maximova (“Wife”). Wife had filed for a final protective order against Husband previously in the district court, but that petition was denied on June 14, 2023. Five days later, on June 19, Wife filed a new petition in the district court.

Although the second petition repeated some of the allegations contained in the prior petition, it also included new allegations regarding Husband’s emotional abuse and threats towards Wife. The case was transferred to the circuit court, where a hearing was held on July 20, 2023. During the hearing, Wife presented evidence of Husband’s physical abuse that allegedly occurred before June 14, 2023. Wife also alleged that after the June 14 denial of her previous petition for a final protective order, Husband threatened to kill her. Husband argued that the doctrine of *res judicata* barred Wife from raising any allegations of abuse that occurred prior to the denial of her previous petition on June 14, but the court overruled Husband’s objection.

In granting the Wife’s second petition for the final protective order, the court found that Husband’s threat to kill her put Wife in fear of imminent serious bodily harm. The court also found Wife’s allegations of prior abuse credible and ruled that the testimony was “admissible and relevant because it predicts future abuse.” Husband timely appealed.

**Held:** Affirmed

The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed the circuit court’s judgment.

The Court held that the doctrine of *res judicata* did not apply to this case. Under Maryland law, *res judicata* precludes a party from relitigating a *claim* when: “(1) the parties in the present litigation are the same or in privity with the parties to the earlier action; (2) the claim in the

current action is identical to the one determined in the prior adjudication; and (3) there was a final judgment on the merits in the previous action.” *Powell v. Breslin*, 430 Md. 52, 63-64 (2013). The Court explained that Wife’s second petition constituted a different cause of action because it raised new allegations of threats that arose after the June 14 denial of her first petition.

Similarly, the Court held that the doctrine of collateral estoppel did not apply. The doctrine of collateral estoppel prevents relitigating of an issue when: (1) the issue decided in the prior adjudication is identical with the one presented in the action in question; (2) there is a final judgment on the merits; (3) the party against whom the doctrine is asserted is a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication; and (4) the party against whom the doctrine is asserted was given a fair opportunity to be heard on the issue. *Garrity v. Md. State Bd. of Plumbing*, 447 Md. 359, 369 (2016). The Court explained that because Wife alleged that Husband put Wife in fear of imminent serious bodily harm through acts that occurred after the denial of her first petition, her second final protective order petition presented issues not identical with the ones previously adjudicated.

The Court also explained that “excluding evidence of past abuse would violate the fundamental purpose” of the domestic violence statute, “which is to prevent future abuse.” *Coburn v. Coburn*, 342 Md. 244, 258 (1996). The Court noted that title 4, subsection 5 of the Family Law Article, which governs domestic violence, aims “to prevent further harm” to victims of abuse. *Id.* at 252. The domestic violence statute defines “abuse” as: “an act that places a person eligible for relief in fear of imminent serious bodily harm[.]” Maryland Code (1984, 2019 Repl. Vol., 2023 Supp.), Family Law Article, § 4-506(c)(1)(ii). Thus, the Court recognized that a victim of abuse “may well be sensitive to non-verbal signals or code words that have proved threatening in the past to that victim but which someone else, not having that experience, would not perceive to be threatening.” *Katsenelenbogen v. Katsenelenbogen*, 365 Md. 122, 139 (2001).

*In the Matter of the Petition of Maryland Bio Energy LLC, et al.*, No. 251, September Term 2023, filed September 3, 2024. Opinion by Albright, J.

<https://www.courts.state.md.us/data/opinions/cosa/2024/0251s23.pdf>

MARYLAND STATE PROCUREMENT CONTRACTS – PARTIES TO A CONTRACT – RESPONSIBLE OFFEROR VERSUS SIGNATORY TO CONTRACT

MARYLAND STATE PROCUREMENT CONTRACTS – VOID CONTRACT – STATUTORY DAMAGES – DIRECTLY CONTRIBUTE – MARYLAND CODE, STATE FINANCE AND PROCUREMENT § 11-204(b)(2)

**Facts:**

Green Planet Power Solutions, Inc. (“GPPS, Inc.”) is a California corporation that develops renewable energy facilities. It responded to a Request for Proposals from Maryland’s Department of General Services (“DGS”) with a proposal for a facility that processes chicken litter for energy. In its proposal, GPPS, Inc. mentioned using a special purpose subsidiary for the project. DGS awarded GPPS, Inc. the contract based on its proposal. GPPS, Inc. then created Maryland Bio Energy, LLC (“MBE”) as a wholly owned special purpose subsidiary to carry out the contract. During the parties’ subsequent negotiations, GPPS, Inc. substituted its name in the contract for MBE’s. MBE signed the final contract, and GPPS, Inc. did not.

The same day that MBE signed the contract (but before DGS signed the contract), GPPS, Inc. created a new LLC—Green Planet Power Solutions, LLC (“GPPS, LLC”). GPPS, Inc. then transferred all its membership interests in MBE and MBE’s assets and liabilities to GPPS, LLC. The resulting makeup of the companies was as follows: GPPS, Inc. owned 83% of GPPS, LLC, and GPPS, LLC owned 100% of MBE.

The parties began to carry out the contract, but DGS eventually terminated it for convenience. GPPS, Inc. and MBE submitted a claim to DGS for damages pursuant to the termination for convenience clause in the contract. DGS denied this claim, explaining that the contract was void because GPPS, Inc. had not signed the contract, so the contract had been awarded to someone other than the responsible offeror, in violation of Maryland Code, State Finance and Procurement § 13-104(f). DGS also denied any statutory damages to GPPS, Inc. and MBE because it said the companies did not meet the requirements set forth under Maryland Code, State Finance and Procurement § 11-204(b)(2).

The companies appealed to the Maryland State Board of Contract Appeals (“MSBCA”). On summary decision, the MSBCA held that the contract was void because GPPS, Inc. had not signed it. It further held that GPPS, Inc. was not a party to the contract and thus not a proper party to the appeal, and it dismissed GPPS, Inc. as a party to the appeal. After a hearing on the merits, the MSBCA also held that MBE had failed to carry its burden of proving it did not

directly contribute to the violation that voided the contract, so it could not be awarded statutory damages pursuant to Maryland Code, State Finance and Procurement § 11-204(b)(2).

The companies appealed both decisions to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. The circuit court reversed the MSBCA's summary decision and held that GPPS, Inc. was a party to the contract because GPPS, Inc. was one and the same entity as MBE. Since GPPS, Inc. was a party to the contract, it was not void.

DGS timely filed this appeal.

**Held:** Affirmed.

The Appellate Court affirmed the decisions of the Maryland State Board of Contract Appeals.

First, the Appellate Court held that GPPS, Inc. was not a party to the contract. GPPS, Inc.'s not being a party to the contract was in violation of Maryland Code, State Finance and Procurement § 13-104(f) because the offeror responsible for the winning proposal should be the party who is awarded the contract. GPPS, Inc. was not a party to the contract because it and MBE had requested that GPPS, Inc. be replaced in the contract with MBE. GPPS, Inc. also did not sign the contract and stated that it was not a party to the contract. Since it was not a party to the contract, it was also not a proper party to the appeal.

Second, the Appellate Court held that MBE had failed to carry its burden of proving that it did not directly contribute to the violation that voided the contract. Pursuant to Maryland Code, State Finance and Procurement § 11-204(b)(2), the term "directly contribute" is plain and unambiguous, so the Appellate Court gave it the meaning the MSBCA used, which was the dictionary definition. Thus, "directly contribute" means to be an important step in or help to cause the violation in a direct way or manner. Since MBE had asked for GPPS, Inc. to be substituted for MBE, it directly contributed to the violation that voided the contract. Therefore, MBE was not entitled to statutory damages under Maryland Code, State Finance and Procurement § 11-204(b)(2).

# **ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE**

## **REINSTATEMENTS**

By Order of the Supreme Court of Maryland

**CAROL MARIE GORDON**

has been replaced on the register of attorneys permitted to practice law in this State as of September 24, 2024.

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By Order of the Supreme Court of Maryland

**KEVIN MBEH TABE**

has been replaced on the register of attorneys permitted to practice law in this State as of September 24, 2024.

\*

## **DISBARMENTS/SUSPENSIONS/INACTIVE STATUS**

By an Order of the Supreme Court of Maryland dated September 23, 2024, the following attorney has been indefinitely suspended by consent:

**MICHELE YVONNE GALLAGHER**

\*

By an Order of the Supreme Court of Maryland dated September 23, 2024, the following attorney has been temporarily suspended:

**SHIELA BRIDGET THURMOND MAYERS**

\*

\*

By an Order of the Supreme Court of Maryland dated September 24, 2024, the following attorney has been disbarred:

BRIAN DAVID O'NEILL

\*

# JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS

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On September 6, 2024, the Governor announced the appointment of **Kimberly Charon McBride** to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. Judge McBride was sworn in on September 24, 2024, and fills the vacancy created by the retirement of the Hon. Melissa M. Phinn.

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On September 6, 2024, the Governor announced the appointment of **Piper Faith McKeithen** to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. Judge McKeithen was sworn in on September 25, 2024, and fills the vacancy created by the retirement of the Hon. Philip S. Jackson.

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# RULES ORDERS

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A Rules Order pertaining to the 222<sup>nd</sup> Report and Category 1 of the 223<sup>rd</sup> Report of the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure was filed on September 13, 2024.

<https://www.mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/rules/order/ro222nd.pdf>

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# UNREPORTED OPINIONS

The full text of Appellate Court unreported opinions can be found online:

<https://mdcourts.gov/appellate/unreportedopinions>

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