# IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND

| September Term, 2007 |
|----------------------|
| No. 122              |

#### STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS,

Appellant,

v.

CLIFFORD E. SNYDER, JR., on behalf of Carl Phillip Snyder, his son, et al.,

CLIFFORD E. SNYDER, JR, ESQUIRE 4964 Flossie Avenue Frederick, Maryland 21703 (301) 473-5408

JONATHAN S. SHURBERG, ESQUIRE 8720 Geogia Avenue, Suite 703 Silver Spring, Maryland 20910 (301) 585-0707 Attorney for Appellee Botluck DOUGLAS F. GANSLER Attorney General of Maryland

AUSTIN C. SCHLICK
MARK J. DAVIS
SANDRA B. BRANTLEY
Assistant Attorneys General
200 St. Paul Place, 20<sup>th</sup> Floor
Baltimore, Maryland 21202
(410) 576-6324
Attorneys for State Board of Elections

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## Circuit Court of Maryland Go Back

#### Case Information

Court System:

Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County - Civil System

Case Number:

02C08128760

Title:

Clifford E Snyder Jr, Et Al Vs State Board Of Elections

Case Type:

Declaratory JudgmentFiling Date:01/18/2008

Case Status:

Open/Active

Case Disposition: Disposition Date:

#### Plaintiff/Petitioner Information

(Each Plaintiff/Petitioner is displayed below)

Party Type: PlaintiffParty No.:1 Name: Snyder, Jr, Clifford E Address: 4964 Flossie Avenue

City:

FrederickState:MDZip Code:21703

Attorney(s) for the Plaintiff/Petitioner

Name:

Shurberg, Jonathan Seth

Practice Name:

Address:

Suite 700

8720 Georgia Ave

City:

Silver SpringState:MDZip Code:20910

Party Type: PlaintiffParty No.:2

Name: Snyder, Carl Philip Address: 4964 Flossie Avenue

City:

FrederickState:MDZip Code:21703

#### Defendant/Respondent Information

(Each Defendant/Respondent is displayed below)

Party Type: DefendantParty No.:1

Business or Organization Name: State Board Of Elections

Address: PO Box 6486

City: Annap

AnnapolisState:MDZip Code:21401-0486

Address: Administrator Of Elections

City: AnnapolisState:MDZip Code:21401

#### **Court Scheduling Information**

Event Type: HearingNotice Date:

Event Date: 02/01/2008Event Time:09:00 AM

Result: Held/ConcludedResult Date:02/01/2008

#### **Document Tracking**

(Each Document listed. Documents are listed in Document No./Sequence No. order)

Doc No./Seq No.: 1/0

File Date:

01/18/2008Close Date:Decision:

Party Type:

PlaintiffParty No.:1

Document Name: Complaint Under Section 12-202 Of The Election Law Article

Filed by PLT001-Snyder, PLT002-Snyder

Doc No./Seq No.: 2/0

File Date:

01/18/2008Close Date:Decision:

Party Type:

PlaintiffParty No.:1

Document Name: Case Information Sheet Filed

Filed by PLT001-Snyder, PLT002-Snyder

Doc No./Seq No.: 3/0

File Date:

01/22/2008Close Date:01/22/2008Decision:

Party Type:

DefendantParty No.:1

Document Name: Writ of Summons - Civil Issued

Doc No./Seq No.: 8/0

File Date:

02/01/2008Close Date:Decision:

Party Type:

DefendantParty No.:1

Document Name: Defendants Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment

Doc No./Seq No.: 9/0

File Date:

02/01/2008Close Date:02/01/2008Decision:

Party Type:

DefendantParty No.:1

Document Name: Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment

Doc

No./Seq

10/0

No.:

File Date: 02/01/2008Close Date:Decision:

Document

Name:

Hearing Sheet

Case called for Hearing on Declaratory Judgment in Open Court before Judge Paul A. Hackner. Counsel heard. By agreement of all parties court consolidated C-08-128755 with C-08-128760. C-08-128760 is Main Case. Appearance of John Shurberg as attorney for

Richard Boltuck filed in open court. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff Complaint filed in open court. Defendants Motion to Dismiss or for summary Judgment filed in open court. Opposition to Defendants Motion to Dismiss and Summary Judgment filed in open court. Summary filed in open court. Plaintiffs orally amended requested relief to Declaratory Judgment. Court finds that persons age 17 who will reach the age of 18 by the general elections are permitted to vote on partisan and nonpartisan items on ballot on a provisional ballot. Mr Shuberg to prepare order and submit to court.

Doc

No./Seq 11/0

No.:

File Date: 02/01/2008Close Date:02/01/2008Decision:Granted

Document

Order of Court Name:

> Ordered, that Defendants Motion to Dismiss/Motion for Summary Judgment is Denied. The Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiffs is Granted in Part. The Oral Motions for Declaratory Judgment are Granted. This court declares that all 17 year old voters, whether or not affiliated with any political party, who will be 18 on or before the November 4, 2008 general election, shall be entitled to vote in both the partisan and non-partisan primary elections on February 12, 2008. Defendant State Board of Elections may use provisional ballots in the February 12, 2008 primary elections for all 17-year old voters, whether or not affiliated with any political party, who will be 18 on or before the November 4, 2008 general election. (Copies to Atty Davis, Boltuck, & Clifford Snyder)

Doc No./Seq No.: 12/0

File Date: 02/01/2008Close Date:Decision:

Document Name: Notice of Appeal to COA filed by atty. Mark Davis, Office of the Attorney

General. (No fees due).

Fifty dollars cash, to be returned to Mark Davis, by mail, per phone conversation.

\*\*\* Case to be transmitted on an expedited basis, ASAP \*\*\*

Doc No./Seq No.: 13/0

File Date: 02/04/2008Close Date: Decision:

Document Name: Original records sent to COA including 1 Volume of Pleadings and 1 Volume of

transcript dated 2/01/08, by BWA Courier 2/05/08.

The complete case file can be obtained from the Circuit Courthouse.

## Circuit Court of Maryland Go Back

#### **Case Information**

Court System:

Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County - Civil System

Case Number:

02C08128755

Title:

Richard D Boltuck, Et Al Vs State Board Of Elections

Case Type:

Declaratory JudgmentFiling Date:01/18/2008

Case Status:

Open/Active

Case Disposition: Disposition Date:

#### Plaintiff/Petitioner Information

(Each Plaintiff/Petitioner is displayed below)

Party Type: PlaintiffParty No.:1

Name: Boltuck, Richard D

Address: 6015 Cairn Terrace

City: BethesdaState:MDZip Code:20817-5405

Attorney(s) for the Plaintiff/Petitioner

Name:

Shurberg, Jonathan Seth

Practice Name:

Address:

Suite 700

8720 Georgia Ave

City:

Silver SpringState:MDZip Code:20910

Party Type: PlaintiffParty No.:2 Name: Boltuck, Sarah Elizabeth Address: 6015 Cairn Terrace

City:

BethesdaState:MDZip Code:20817-5405

#### Defendant/Respondent Information

(Each Defendant/Respondent is displayed below)

Party Type: DefendantParty No.:1

Business or Organization Name: State Board Of Elections

Address: PO Box 6486

City: AnnapolisState:MDZip Code:21401-0486

Address: Administrator Of Elections

City: AnnapolisState:MDZip Code:21401

Attorney(s) for the Defendant/Respondent

Name:

Davis, Esq, Mark Jason

Practice Name: Assistant Attorney General, Ed Affairs Division

Address:

200 St Paul Place

17th Floor

City:

BaltimoreState:MDZip Code:21202

#### **Court Scheduling Information**

Event Type: HearingNotice Date:

Event Date: 02/01/2008Event Time:09:00 AM

Result:

Held/ConcludedResult Date:02/01/2008

#### **Document Tracking**

(Each Document listed. Documents are listed in Document No./Sequence No. order)

Doc No./Seq No.: 1/0

File Date:

01/18/2008Close Date:Decision:

Party Type:

PlaintiffParty No.:1

Document Name: Complaint Under Section 12-202 Of The Election Law Article

Filed by PLT001-Boltuck, PLT002-Boltuck

Doc No./Seq No.: 2/0

File Date:

01/18/2008Close Date: Decision:

Party Type:

PlaintiffParty No.:1

Document Name: Case Information Sheet Filed

Filed by PLT001-Boltuck, PLT002-Boltuck

Doc No./Seq No.: 3/0

File Date:

01/22/2008Close Date:01/22/2008Decision:

Party Type:

DefendantParty No.:1

Document Name: Writ of Summons - Civil Issued

Doc No./Seq No.: 4/0

File Date:

01/28/2008Close Date:Decision:

Document Name: Request to Re-Issue Writ of Summons for Defendant

Doc No./Seq No.: 5/0

File Date:

01/28/2008Close Date: 01/28/2008Decision:

Party Type:

DefendantParty No.:1

Document Name: Return of Service - Unserved

CV-Writ of Summons returned 01/28/08

Doc No./Seq No.: 6/0

File Date:

01/28/2008Close Date: 01/28/2008Decision:

Party Type:

DefendantParty No.:1

Document Name: Writ of Summons - Civil Issued

Doc

No./Seq 7/0

No.:

File Date: 02/01/2008Close Date:Decision:

Document Hearing Sheet

Name:

Case called for hearing on Declaratory Judgment in open court before Judge Paul A. Hackner. Counsel heard. By agreement of all parties court consolidated C-08-128755 with C-08-128760. C-08-128760 is main case. Appearance of John Shurberg as attorney for richard Boltuck filed in open court. Memorandum in support of Plaintiff Complaint filed in open court. Defendants Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment filed in open court. Opposition to Defendants Motion to Dismiss and Summary Judgment filed in open court. Summary filed in open court. Plaintiffs orally amended requested relief to Declaratory Judgment. Court finds that persons age 17 who will reach the age of 18 by the general elections are permitted to vote on partisan and nonpartisan items on ballot on a provisional ballot. Mr. Shuberg to prepare order and submit to court.

Doc

No./Seq

No.:

File Date: 02/01/2008Close Date:02/01/2008Decision:Granted/Denied in Part

Document

Name:

Order of Court

8/0

Ordered, that Defendants Motion to Dismiss/Motion for Summary Judgment is Denied. The Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiffs are Granted. the Oral Motions for Declaratory Judgment are Granted. This Court declares that all 17 year old voters, whether or not affiliated with any political party, who will be 18 on or before the November 4, 2008 general election, shall be entitled to vote in both the partisan and non partisan primary elections on February 12, 2008, and it is further Ordered, that Defendant State Board of Elections may use provisional ballots in the February 12, 2008 primary elections for all 17 year old voters, whether or not affiliated with any political party, who will be 18 on or before the November 4, 2008 general election. (copies to Attys Davis, Shurberg, & Clifford Snyder)

Doc No./Seq No.: 9/0

File Date:

02/01/2008Close Date: 02/04/2008Decision:

Party Type:

PlaintiffParty No.:1

Document Name: Attorney Appearance Filed

Jonathan S Shurberg

Doc No./Seq No.: 10/0

File Date:

02/04/2008Close Date:Decision:

Document Name: Notice of Appeal to COA filed by aty. Mark Davis, Office of the Attorney

General. (No fees due).

Fifty dollars cash, to be returned to Mark Davis, by mail, per phone conversartion.

\*\*\* Case to be transmitted on an expedited basis, ASAP \*\*\*

Doc No./Seq

No.:

11/0

File Date:

02/04/2008Close Date: Decision:

Document

Name:

Original Pleadings sent to COA including 1 Volume of Pealdings and 1 Volume of

transcript dated 2/01/08,

by BWA Courier.

\* Note: This case is consolidated with C-08-128760, Case C-08-128760 is the main

case.

Doc No./Seq No.: 12/0

File Date:

02/01/2008Close Date:02/04/2008Decision:

Party Type:

DefendantParty No.:1

Document Name: Attorney Appearance Filed

Mark J Davis

The complete case file can be obtained from the Circuit Courthouse.

## IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY, MARYLAND

CLIFFORD E. SNYDER, JR. on behalf of Carl Philip Snyder, his son PLAINTIFF 4964 Flossie Avenue Frederick, MD 21703 (301) 473-5408

versus

STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS DEFENDANT P.O. Box 6486 151 West Street, Suite 200 Annapolis, MD 21401-0486 (410) 269-2840

Serve: Linda H. Lamone, Administrator of Elections 151 West Street, Suite 200 Annapolis, MD 21401 CIVIL ACTION

No. C-08-128760

# COMPLAINT UNDER SECTION 12-202 OF THE ELECTION LAW ARTICLE

#### Count One – Violations of Election Law Article

- 1. Plaintiff is Clifford E. Snyder, Jr. Plaintiff's address is within the boundaries of Frederick County.
- 2. Plaintiff makes this complaint on behalf of Carl Philip Snyder ("Carl"), his son, a minor.
- 3. Carl was born on October 11, 1990 in Frederick County, Maryland and has resided there since birth.
  - 4. Carl applied for voter registration in early May 2007.

- 5. Carl received a Voter Notification Card stating a "Date of Issue" of "5/21/2007," identifying Orchard Grove Elementary School as his polling place, and indicating his association with the Democratic Party.
- 6. Said Voter Notification Card states, "Your registration in Maryland is permanent as long as you remain a resident of Maryland and keep your address current with your local election office."
- 7. Carl first became aware of a possible issue with respect to his voting status on December 2, 2007 by reading a letter from Richard Boltuck published that day in a newspaper, *The Washington Post*. Said letter was captioned, "In Maryland, A Quiet Loss of Voting Rights."
- 8. Carl consulted the web site of the State Board of Elections ("State Board") and saw under a heading for Primary Elections a statement that a voter must be 18 years old or older on or before the date of the election in which he wishes to vote, even if that election is a primary election.
- 9. Given Carl's date of birth, he will not attain the age of 18 years by February 12, 2008 but he will attain that age by the date of the Presidential election on November 4, 2008.
- 10. In view of the inconsistency between statements on said Voter
  Notification Card and the State Board's web site, Plaintiff submitted, on
  Carl's behalf, to the State Board a Petition for Declaratory Ruling on Carl's

ability to vote in the February 12, 2008 Democratic party primary.

- 11. The State Board's response, dated December 6, 2007, stated that it had declined to issue a Declaratory Ruling.
- 12. On Carl's behalf, Plaintiff sent a letter to the Frederick County Board on December 8, 2007 requesting a determination on Carl's right to vote on February 12, 2008.
- 13. The Frederick County Board sent a letter dated

  December 12, 2007 stating that Carl was not eligible to vote in the

  Democratic Party primary election on February 12, 2008.
- 14. Plaintiff submitted an administrative complaint to the State Board on or about December 15, 2007.
- 15. On December 21, 2007, the designee of the State Administrator issued a "Final Determination" that dismissed Plaintiff's administrative complaint as being moot. In a paragraph captioned, "Mootness," designee Judith Armold stated, "Because of the State Board's December 20, 2007 resolution to permit individuals in the class to which Carl Philip Snyder belongs to vote in the February 12, 2008 primary election, the Complainant has achieved the result sought by this proceeding, and his Complaint is therefore moot."
- 16. By letter dated January 8, 2008, the State Board informed Carl that he is eligible to vote by provisional ballot for "party offices in the Presidential Primary Election scheduled for Tuesday, February 12, 2008."

- 17. As of January 14, 2008, the State Board's position, as made public on its web site, is that 17 year olds (like Carl) who will be 18 years old on or before November 4, 2008 will not be permitted to cast votes in non-partisan contests in the Presidential Primary Election on February 12, 2008.
- 18. In Frederick County, there is a non-partisan contest on February 12, 2008, namely a primary election to nominate candidates for the Frederick County Board of Education.
- 19. On January 12, 2008, Plaintiff requested by e-mail that the State Board reconsider its Final Determination of his administrative complaint. In pertinent part, Plaintiff stated, "(1) Without legally sufficient reason, the State Board will require Carl to vote by provisional ballot; and (2) Without legally sufficient reason, the State Board will not allow Carl's votes in the non-partisan primary election for the Frederick County Board of Education to be counted. As to (1), the requirement to use a provisional ballot makes Carl a second-class voter, as is clear by a fair reading of Title 9, Subtitle 4: Under section 9-404(b)(1), Carl will apparently be required to declare in a written affirmation submitted with the provisional ballot that he is a registered voter in the State and is eligible to vote in that election. As to (2), there is nothing in the Election Law Article to justify a denial of Carl's right to vote in the non-partisan primary election for the Board of Education. Carl's right to vote does not depend on associational rights; he has, under settled Maryland law and decades of past practice, the right

to vote in both his party's primary election and in the non-partisan primary election."

- 20. In reply to Plaintiff's message of January 12, 2008, the State Board's Deputy Administrator Ross Goldstein by e-mail said that COMAR did not provide for reconsideration of the Final Determination of Plaintiff's administrative complaint.
- 21. On January 14, 2008 Plaintiff submitted, by electronic means, an administrative complaint regarding the State Board's imposition of a provisional ballot requirement on Carl's vote on February 12, 2008 and its action declaring Carl ineligible to vote in the non-partisan contest on that date.
- 22. By denying Carl, a duly registered voter, the use of a regular ballot and by declaring Carl ineligible to vote for candidates for the Frederick County Board of Education, the State Board has acted contrary to several provisions of the Election Law Article, including, but not necessarily limited to, sections 3-102 and 3-501, governing qualifications for voter registration and the statewide voter registration list, respectively; and section 8-802 of the Election Law Article, governing who may vote in a primary election to nominate board of education candidates.
- 23. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this case pursuant to section 12-202 of the Election Law Article. Plaintiff learned only after January 8, 2008, that Carl would have to vote by provisional ballot and that he could not

vote in a non-partisan contest. Plaintiff's request for reconsideration of dismissal of his administrative complaint has been rejected. Plaintiff expects that the State Board will decline to consider Plaintiff's administrative complaint submitted January 14, 2008. While one or more petitions for judicial review of State Board action on the administrative complaints, available under section 3-602 of the Election Law Article, might be an appropriate avenue of relief in this Court, this Complaint appears to be a more straightforward approach warranted by the need for timely judicial action before February 12, 2008. It is axiomatic that even one vote may change the outcome of an election.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests an injunction requiring the State Board to allow Carl to vote by regular ballot, and to have his votes counted in the usual way, in all contests on the ballot in Frederick County on February 12, 2008; payment by the State Board of court costs; and any and all such other relief as justice may require.

#### Count Two – Violations of Maryland Declaration of Rights

- 24. Paragraphs 1 to 22 are incorporated by reference.
- 25. When the State Board determined that Carl must use a provisional ballot and that he is not eligible to vote in the non-partisan board of education contest on February 12, 2008 it exercised legislative and judicial duties contrary to the separation of powers required by Article 8 of the Declaration of Rights.

  The State Board has purported to create election law; it then applied Board law

in derogation of Carl's right to vote, a right that was established under Maryland law in May 2007 when Carl was registered to vote. The State Board's administrative actions are not within the scope of delegated authority; they are arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, and cannot stand under Maryland law.

26. Carl's right to vote by regular ballot, and his right to vote in a non-partisan election, have been imperiled without due process of law. In May 2007, Carl became a registered voter. Since May 2007, Carl's voting status, as determined by the State Board, has been as follows: (a) Eligible to vote on February 12, 2008 in party primary contests and in relevant non-partisan contests; (b) Not eligible to vote on February 12, 2008, period; and (c) Eligible to vote on February 12, 2008 only in the party primary contests. There have been two changes of status although there have been no relevant changes in Maryland's enacted law since May 2007. The State Board's failure to provide due process as required by Article 24 of the Declaration of Rights is inexcusable.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests an injunction requiring the State Board to allow Carl to vote by regular ballot, and to have his votes counted in the usual way, in all contests on the ballot in Frederick County on February 12, 2008; payment by the State Board of court costs; and any and all such other relief as justice may require.

Respectfully submitted,

Clifford E. Snyder, Jr. Plaintiff 4964 Flossie Avenue Frederick, MD 21703 (301) 473-5408

# IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY, MARYLAND

| RICHARD D. BOLTUCK                                 | * |                                       |
|--|---|---------------------------------------|
| on behalf of                                       | * |                                       |
| Sarah Elizabeth Boltuck, his daughter              | * | •                                     |
| PLAINTIFF  | * |                                       |
| 6015 Cairn Terrace                                 | * |                                       |
| Bethesda, Maryland 20817-5405                      | * |                                       |
|  | * | •                                     |
| versus   | * |                                       |
|  | * | CIVIL                                 |
| STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS                           | * | ACTION                                |
| DEFENDANT  | * | 7.011011                              |
| P.O. Box 6486                                      | * | No.                                   |
| 151 West Street, Suite 200                         | * |                                       |
| Annapolis, MD 21401-0486                           | * |                                       |
| (410) 269-2840                                     | * | · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · |
| (1,1)  | * |                                       |
| Serve: Linda H. Lamone, Administrator of Elections | * |                                       |
| 151 West Street, Suite 200                         | * |                                       |
| Annapolis, MD 21401                                | * | •                                     |
|  | * |                                       |
|  |   | ·                                     |

# COMPLAINT UNDER SECTION 12-202 OF THE ELECTION LAW ARTICLE

# Count One - Violations of Election Law Article

- 1. Plaintiff is Richard D. Boltuck. Plaintiff's address is within the boundaries of Montgomery County.
- 2. Plaintiff makes this complaint on behalf of Sarah Elizabeth Boltuck ("Sarah"), his daughter, a minor.
- 3. Sarah was born on July 21, 1990 in Takoma Park, Maryland and has resided in the State of Maryland since birth, and in Montgomery County since 1998.

- 4. Sarah completed and submitted a Maryland Voter-Registration Application Form to the Montgomery County Board of Elections ("MCBOE") in May or June 2007.
- 5. Sarah received a letter from the MCBOE dated June 11, 2007 notifying her that her application to register to vote had been rejected. The letter stated, "[r]eview of the application indicates that you do not qualify for registration and voting in this county because you will not have reached 18 years old by the date of the next election."
- 6. On Sarah's behalf, Plaintiff consulted the web site of the State Board of Elections ("State Board") and saw under a heading for Primary Elections a statement that a voter must be 18 years old or older on or before the date of the election in which he wishes to vote, even if that election is a primary election.
- 7. Given Sarah's date of birth, she will not attain the age of 18 years by February 12, 2008 (the date of the scheduled next Maryland primary election) but he will attain that age by the date of the general election on November 4, 2008.
- 8. In view of inconsistencies between the MCBOE's rejection of Sarah's application, on the one hand, and eligibility guidance on the application form, and other related evidence of Sarah's right to register and vote in the forthcoming February 12, 2008 primary election, including historical practice in

Maryland and the language of Maryland's unchanged voter-registration statute (Election Law Article, § 3-102), on the other hand, Plaintiff contacted the MCBOE on Sarah's behalf via email message dated June 13, 2007. In this message, Plaintiff asserted that the MCBOE had erred in assessing Sarah's eligibility to register, and requested the board correct its action.

- 11. In response to Plaintiff's message, the Plaintiff received an email message from Betty Ann Lucey, a MCBOE staff member, dated June 14, 2007. This message asserted that the MCBOE had acted properly in rejecting Sarah's application, based on its then-current understanding of Maryland law.
- 12. Plaintiff then sent Ms. Lucey and the MCBOE an email message on June 15, 2007 specifically citing Election Law Article, § 3-102, and demanding that the MCBOE register Sarah.
- 13. In response, Plaintiff received an email message from Ms.

  Margaret Jurgensen, Election Director, MCBOE, dated June 26, 2007, which included an attached memorandum prepared by Mark Davis, Maryland Assistant Attorney General, dated June 19, 2007. Mr. Davis's memorandum explained why he had concluded that, notwithstanding Maryland statutory law to the contrary, citizens must be 18-year-old or older by the February 12, 2008 primary election in order to register and vote in that primary election.
  - 14. By letter dated January 11, 2008, the State Board informed Sarah

that she is eligible to vote by provisional ballot for "party offices in the Presidential Primary Election scheduled for Tuesday, February 12, 2008."

- 15. As of January 17, 2008, the State Board's position, as made public on its web site, is that 17-year-olds (like Sarah) who will be 18 years old on or before November 4, 2008 will not be permitted to cast votes in non-partisan contests in the Presidential Primary Election on February 12, 2008.
- 16. The February 12, 2007 primary election in Montgomery County will have non-partisan school board candidate-nomination contests on the ballot.
- 17. Plaintiff became aware that Clifford Snyder, acting on behalf of his son, Carl Snyder ("Carl"), had sought to bring an administrative complaint ("Snyder's complaint") challenging the State Board's actions in requiring Carl to vote on a provisional ballot, and prohibiting Carl from voting in non-partisan contests, based on longstanding Maryland statutory law. Plaintiff became aware subsequently that the State Board had declined to consider Snyder's complaint.
- 18. The basis of Snyder's complaint is summarized in paragraph 19 of the complaint to this Court by Clifford E. Snyder, Jr. in the related civil action, Clifford E. Snyder, Jr. versus State Board of Elections, to wit,
  - " 19. On January 12, 2008, Plaintiff requested by e-mail that the State Board reconsider its Final Determination of his administrative complaint. In pertinent part, Plaintiff stated, '(1) Without legally sufficient reason, the State Board will require Carl to vote by provisional ballot; and

(2) Without legally sufficient reason, the State Board will not allow Carl's votes in the non-partisan primary election for the Frederick County Board of Education to be counted.

As to (1), the requirement to use a provisional ballot makes Carl a second-class voter, as is clear by a fair reading of Title 9, Subtitle 4:

Under section 9-404(b)(1), Carl will apparently be required to declare in a written affirmation submitted with the provisional ballot that he is a registered voter in the State and is eligible to vote in that election. As to (2), there is nothing in the Election Law Article to justify a denial of Carl's right to vote in the non-partisan primary election for the Board of Education. Carl's right to vote does not depend on associational rights; he has, under settled Maryland law and decades of past practice, the right to vote in both his party's primary election and in the non-partisan primary election."

- 19. Sarah received a letter from the Montgomery County Board of Elections dated January 3, 2008 inviting her to apply to serve as an election judge. The letter stated, "[w]elcome to the Montgomery County community of citizens registered and qualified to vote."
- 20. By denying Sarah, a duly registered voter, the use of a regular ballot and by declaring Sarah ineligible to vote for candidates for the Montgomery County Board of Education, the State Board has acted contrary to

several provisions of the Election Law Article, including, but not necessarily limited to, sections 3-102 and 3-501, governing qualifications for voter registration and the statewide voter registration list, respectively; section 8-802 of the Election Law Article, governing who may vote in a primary election to nominate board of education candidates; and contrary to Article I, Section 2 of the Maryland Constitution.

21. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this case pursuant to section 12-202 of the Election Law Article. Plaintiff learned only after January 11, 2008, that Sarah would have to vote by provisional ballot and that she could not vote in a non-partisan contest. Plaintiff is aware that the State Board has declined to consider an administrative complaint filed by Clifford Snyder posing squarely the issues raised by this case. While one or more petitions for judicial review of State Board action on the administrative complaints, available under section 3-602 of the Election Law Article, might be an appropriate avenue of relief in this Court, this Complaint appears to be a more straightforward approach warranted by the need for timely judicial action before February 12, 2008. It is axiomatic that even one vote may change the outcome of an election.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests an injunction requiring the State Board to allow Sarah to vote by regular ballot, and to have his votes counted in the usual way, in all contests on the ballot in Montgomery County on February 12, 2008; payment by the State Board of court costs; and any and all such other

relief as justice may require.

#### Count Two - Violations of Maryland Declaration of Rights

- 22. Paragraphs 1 to 20 are incorporated by reference.
- 23. When the State Board determined that Sarah must use a provisional ballot and that she is not eligible to vote in the non-partisan board of education contest on February 12, 2008, it exercised legislative and judicial duties contrary to the separation of powers required by Article 8 of the Declaration of Rights. The State Board has purported to create election law; it then applied Board law in derogation of Sarah's right to vote, a right that was established under Maryland law in January 2008 when Sarah was registered to vote. The State Board's administrative actions are not within the scope of delegated authority; they are arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, and cannot stand under Maryland law.
- 24. Sarah's right to vote by regular ballot, and her right to vote in a non-partisan election, have been imperiled without due process of law. In January 2008, Sarah became a registered voter. Since May or June 2007, when Sarah first applied to register to vote in Montgomery County, Sarah's voting status, as determined by the State Board, has been as follows: (a) Not eligible to register to vote; and (b) Eligible to register and to vote on February 12, 2008 in all races; and (c) Eligible to register and vote only in the Democratic or Republican party primary contests (provided Sarah sought to affiliate with one of those two

parties). There have been two changes of status although there have been no relevant changes in Maryland's enacted law since May 2007. The State Board's failure to provide due process as required by Article 24 of the Declaration of Rights is inexcusable.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests an injunction requiring the State Board to allow Sarah to vote by regular ballot, and to have her votes counted in the usual way, in all contests on the ballot in Montgomery County on February 12, 2008; payment by the State Board of court costs; and any and all such other relief as justice may require.

### Count Three - Violation of Maryland Constitution

- 25. Paragraphs 1 through 20 are incorporated by reference.
- 26. The State Board's determination that Sarah must vote by provisional ballot, and cannot vote in the February 12, 2007 non-partisan primary races, violates Article I, Section 2 of the Maryland Constitution, which guarantees that voter registration "shall be conclusive evidence to the Judges of Election of the right of every person, thus registered, to vote at any election thereafter held in this State; . . . "

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests an injunction requiring the State Board to allow Sarah to vote by regular ballot, and to have her votes counted in the usual way, in all contests on the ballot in Montgomery County on February 12,

2008; payment by the State Board of court costs; and any and all such other relief as justice may require.

Respectfully submitted,

Richard D. Boltuck

Plaintiff

6015 Cairn Terrace

Bethesda, MD 20817

(301) 320-0349

### IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY, MARYLAND

CLIFFORD E. SNYDER, JR. on behalf of Carl Philip Snyder, his son PLAINTIFF

CIVIL ACTION

Versus

02-C-08-128760

STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS DEFENDANT

MOTION FOR EXPEDITED HEARING AND DECISION PURSUANT TO SECTION 12-203 OF THE ELECTION LAW ARTICLE and

## MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME REQUIREMENTS

- Plaintiff has sought judicial relief in this proceeding pursuant to section 12-202 of the Election Law Article (ELA).
- Section 12-203 of ELA provides, in pertinent part, "the
  proceeding shall be heard and decided without a jury and as
  expeditiously as the circumstances require."
- Plaintiff's Complaint has requested injunctive relief pertaining to his son's right to vote on February 12, 2008.
- 4. It is evident that the circumstances require expedited hearing and decision prior to February 12, 2008. Accordingly, Plaintiff requests issuance of an Order establishing the following schedule: Defendant to file its answer with the court by

February 1, 2008, with a hearing to be conducted by February 5, 2008.

## MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME REQUIREMENTS

- As noted above, time is of the essence in deciding Plaintiff's Complaint.
- Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 1-204, Plaintiff requests issuance of an Order requiring Defendant to respond to the above-stated MOTION FOR EXPEDITED HEARING AND DECISION PURSUANT TO SECTION 12-203 OF THE ELECTION LAW ARTICLE by February 1, 2008.

Respectfully submitted,

Clifford E. Snyder, Jr. Plaintiff 4964 Flossie Avenue Frederick, MD 21703 (301) 473-5408

## CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this day, January 28, 2008, I mailed, postage prepaid, a copy of the foregoing to Mark J. Davis, Esquire, Office of the Attorney General, 200 Saint Paul Place, Baltimore, MD 21202.

Clifford E. Snyder, Jr.

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY, MARYLAND

RICHARD BOLTUCK, etc.,

Plaintiff.

Case No. 02-C-08-128755

STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS, :

Defendant.

#### LINE

THE CLERK OF THE COURT will please enter the appearance of Jonathan S. Shurberg and Jonathan S. Shurberg, P.C. as counsel for the Plaintiff in the above-captioned matter.

Date: January 29, 2008

Respectfully submitted,

JONATHAN S. SHURBERG, P.C.

By: Jonathan S. Shurberg, 14365

8720 Georgia Avenue

Suite 703

Silver Spring, MD 20910

(301) 585-0707

## **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on January 29, 2008, a copy of the foregoing was sent by fax and first-class mail, postage prepaid, to: Mark J. Davis, Esquire, Assistant Attorney General, Counsel for State Election Laws, 200 Saint Paul Place, Baltimore MD, 21202.

Jonathan S. Shurberg

LAW OFFICES

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SILVER SPRING, MARYLAND 20910

(301) 585-0707 FAX (301) 608-9018

# IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY, MARYLAND

| OLIEFORD E CANADED ID                   | * |                |
|---|---|----------------|
| CLIFFORD E. SNYDER, JR. on behalf of    | * |                |
| Carl Philip Snyder, his son             | * |                |
| PLAINTIFF                               | * | CIVIL          |
| · <del>-</del>                          | * | ACTION         |
| Versus                                  | * |                |
|   | * | 02-C-08-128760 |
| STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS                | * |                |
| DEFENDANT                               | * |                |
|   | * |                |
| * | * |                |

# **BRIEF TO THE COURT**

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#### SUMMARY

The State Board of Elections (State Board) has without legally sufficient reason determined that Carl Philip Snyder (Carl), a registered voter, is not entitled to vote on February 12, 2008 in the nominating contest for the Frederick County Board of Education, a non-partisan primary election. Additionally, the State Board has wrongfully determined that Carl may not vote on February 12, 2008 by regular ballot. The State Board's actions run contrary to the provisions of sections 3-102, 3-501, 8-802, 9-404, 9-405, 9-406 and 10-312 of the Election Law Article; Article I of the Constitution of Maryland; and Articles 8 and 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Judicial action as requested in Plaintiff's Complaint would be justified by reasons of law and public policy.

#### STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

Plaintiff is not aware of any dispute regarding the essential facts of this case, which are Carl's age (17 years old now and on February 12, 2008; age 18 by the time of the general election in November 2008); his

registration as a voter in May 2007; the contests on the ballot on February 12, 2008 in Frederick County; and the State Board's actions mandating that Carl vote by provisional ballot and declaring him ineligible to vote for Board of Education candidates.

#### **ARGUMENT**

#### 1. The State Board Violated the Election Law Article

#### A. Violation of § 3–102

Carl met the statutory requirements for voter registration at the time he applied in May 2007 and he still meets them. With reference to the requirements stated in § 3–102 of the Election Law Article, Carl was a citizen of the United States; by the passage of time Carl would be 18 years old before the day of the next general election; Carl was a resident of Maryland as of the day he sought to register; and Carl registered pursuant to Title 3. None of the disqualifying factors applied to Carl, or apply now: Carl has not been convicted of a felony; he is not under guardianship for mental disability; and he has not been convicted of buying or selling votes. The State Board has correctly determined that Carl is eligible to vote on February 12, 2008 in the partisan primary contests, but incorrectly determined that he is not also eligible to vote in the primary contest for the Frederick County Board of Education; it has placed him in a voter registration category unknown to Maryland law. The State Board's action should be remedied.

#### B. Violation of § 3-501

Carl was duly registered as a voter pursuant to the specific terms of § 3–102 and was given a Voter Notification Card that, under § 3–301, is evidence of registration. There is no statutory basis for the State Board's determination that Carl, a registered voter, is not eligible to vote on February 12, 2008 for Board of Education candidates. There has not been any basis for removal of Carl from the list of registered voters, standards and procedures for which are established by § 3–501 of the Election Law Article. Applying the statute to the facts, Carl has made no request for removal from the list; there is no issue of felony and imprisonment, mental disability, or conviction for buying or selling votes; there is no issue of moving outside the state, or of inactive voter status; and there has been no determination, pursuant to an administrative complaint process initiated by the Frederick County Board, that Carl is not qualified to register to vote.

The right to vote is one of, if not the most, important and fundamental rights granted to Maryland citizens. Nader for President 2004 v. Maryland State Board of Elections, 399 Md. 681 (2007). The State Board has acted to deprive Carl of a fundamental right and its action runs contrary to the intention of the Election Law Article, expressed in § 1–201, that the conduct of elections "should inspire public confidence and trust." Since there is no legal basis for removing Carl from the list of voters eligible to vote in Frederick County on February 12, 2008 for school board candidates, judicial relief would be merited.

## C. Violation of § 8-802

This section says, in pertinent part, "In a primary election to nominate board of education candidates, any registered voter of the county, regardless of party affiliation or lack of party affiliation, is eligible to vote in those contests for nomination." Given the clarity of the statutory text, there can be no question that Carl, a registered voter, is eligible to vote for Frederick County Board of Education candidates on February 12, 2008. The State Board's declaration of Carl's ineligibility to vote for those candidates runs contrary to statute and should be remedied.

# D. Violation of § 9-404, § 9-405, § 9-406 and § 10-312

The State Board has determined that Carl, a registered voter, must vote by provisional ballot. The use of provisional ballot appears to be limited by statute to situations in which the individual's right to vote has been challenged (§ 10-312); the individual is disabled or unable to vote by regular ballot (§ 9-406); or voting is during a period established by court or other order (§ 9-404). None of these situations apply to Carl; while Carl is "disabled" in the sense that he has not reached the age of majority, the legal disability of infancy does not appear to be the kind of disability contemplated by these subsections; in any case, Carl would be eligible to use a regular ballot, according to the State Board's position, if he were a voter in Prince George's County or any county without a non-partisan primary contest. There is no legally acceptable reason to require Carl to

votes by regular ballot. Under Maryland law, it appears that Carl would have to apply for a provisional ballot in order to vote by such ballot (§ 9-405); the State Board has invented a procedure whereby Carl will be given a provisional ballot even though he has not applied for one. The State Board's imposition of a provisional ballot requirement on Carl has no basis in Maryland law and should be remedied.

# 2. The State Board Violated Article I of the Constitution of Maryland A. Article I Permits Voting by Persons Under Age 18

The Court of Appeals has stated that Article I, § 1, "defines who may vote, where he or she may vote, and the qualifications for doing so." Lamone v. Capozzi, 396 Md. 53 (2006). As a preliminary matter, that seems to be an oversimplification, since Article I, § 1 says nothing that would allow the General Assembly to restrict voting in a partisan primary to persons affiliated with that party. Article I, §1, tells citizens who are 18 years old or older that they are entitled to vote in Maryland. It contains no language prohibiting younger citizens from voting. In this respect, the language of Article I, §1, is permissive with respect to voting age, and contrast sharply, for example, with the clearly prohibitory language of Article 2, Section 1, Clause 5 of the United States Constitution, which establishes the qualifications for President:

No person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United

States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President; <u>neither shall any Person</u> be eligible to that Office <u>who shall not have</u> attained to the Age of thirty-five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the United States (emphasis supplied).

It would be reasonable, in view of the example of prohibitory language in the United States Constitution cited above, which clearly requires the President to be at least 35 years old, to believe that the persons who drafted Article I, § 1 of the Maryland Constitution were aware of language that could be used to prohibit persons under age 18 from voting. The absence of prohibitory language suggests the absence of prohibitory intent. Given the absence of prohibitory language in Article I, § 1, one must search elsewhere within the Maryland Constitution for evidence of intent to exclude persons under age 18 from voting. Plaintiff has found no such evidence.

The reference to age incorporated within Article I, § 1, helps Maryland conform to the requirements of the 26<sup>th</sup> Amendment to the United States

Constitution, the supreme law of the land under its Article VI. Article I, § 2, commands the General Assembly to enact voter registration legislation to provide for uniform registration of persons who "possess" (note the use of the present tense) the required qualifications; it further says that the list of registered voters is conclusive evidence of their right to vote. If §2 were interpreted as allowing the

registration of only those citizens who are at least 18 years old at the time of registration, citizens who attain the age of 18 years after registration but before an election would be denied the right to vote in that election, and Maryland would not conform to the requirements of the United States and Maryland constitutions. Thus, Maryland must permit citizens under the age of 18 years to register to vote. As mandated by Article I, § 2, Carl, a duly registered voter, must be allowed to vote on February 12, 2008. The State Board's error threatens to unravel the tapestry created by the Maryland and United States Constitutions. This Court can, and should, place the stitch in time.

# B. Capozzi Does Not Support the State Board's Actions

A reading of the Court of Appeals opinion in <u>Capozzi</u>, particularly part B.4. of that opinion, might lead to the conclusion that the Court of Appeals has interpreted Article I, § 1 as a bar to voting by persons under the age of 18 years. That conclusion would be unwarranted for three reasons: (1) <u>Capozzi</u> did not involve the issue of age of voting; thus, any part of the opinion that touched on age should be regarded as *dicta* and not determinative of Carl's right to vote. <u>Capozzi</u> presented the Court of Appeals with an obvious conflict between the Constitution of Maryland, which in Article XV, § 7 specifically identifies the day for general elections (the Tuesday after the first Monday in November), and a recently enacted statute that allowed for voting in advance of that day. The Court of Appeals declined to interpret the Constitution of Maryland broadly enough to

turn one day into several days. (2) <u>Capozzi</u> involved the issue of location of voting, not at issue here. (3) Plaintiff has no quarrel with the conclusion reached in the <u>Capozzi</u> opinion on the issue of whether primary elections come within the scope of Article I, § 1: Plaintiff agrees that Article I, § 1 applies to primary elections in Maryland and contends that, as to voting age, Article I, § 1 permits Carl to vote in the February 12, 2008 primary, in both party and non-partisan contests.

Unlike <u>Capozzi</u>, which involved new legislation, this case challenges the State Board's departure from its past practice of allowing persons under age 18 to vote, a change in practice not occasioned by new statutes or new judicial interpretation of Maryland law as it relates specifically and explicitly to voting age. To Plaintiff's knowledge, no Maryland appellate court has used Article I, § 1 of the Maryland Constitution to restrict the voting rights of persons eligible to vote under § 3-102 of the Election Law Article. Thus, this is a matter of first impression. To the extent, however, that <u>Capozzi</u> is regarded by this Court as having precedential value as to the issues raised in this case, and to the extent that <u>Capozzi</u> is used to justify denial of Carl's right to vote, Plaintiff respectfully states his intention to seek a change in law from the Court of Appeals.

#### C. Considerations of Policy

To the best of Plaintiff's knowledge, the Court of Appeals has never analyzed the interplay between § 1 and § 2 of Article I, and the relationship of

these provisions to the 26<sup>th</sup> Amendment to the United States Constitution, which plainly requires that persons be permitted to vote at age 18 years but does not require that persons be at least 18 years old to vote. The Court of Appeals has not considered whether eligibility in terms of voting age for a non-partisan primary may rationally be distinguished from eligibility in terms of voting age for a party primary and, if so, whether the consequences of such a distinction would include legal issues. Finally, the Court of Appeals has not dealt with the legal issues implicated by changing a voter's registration in the way the State Board has acted with respect to Carl. In the absence of such guidance from the Court of Appeals, the following considerations of policy may have some value to this Court's determination.

(1) Carl May Vote in Partisan Contests; There Is No Reason Why He and Others So Situated Are Not Equally Competent to Vote in Non-Partisan Contests

There is no obvious reason why a person under age 18 should be permitted to vote in a party primary but not in a non-partisan primary election held on the same day; there is, for example, no reason to believe that the wisdom needed for voting in a non-partisan contest is greater than that needed for voting in a party primary. Carl should be permitted to vote in both his party's primary and in the non-partisan primary.

(2) The Non-Partisan School Board Primary is Structured to be the First Part of a Two-Part Election; Nature of Party Primaries

The election of members of the Board of Education could be considered a

process that begins on primary day on February 12, 2008 and culminates on the day of the general election in November 2008. Seen that way, the relevant question is whether Carl will be 18 by November, not whether he will be 18 on February 12. Since Carl will be permitted to vote at the culmination of the process, there is no reason to prohibit him from participating in the beginning of the process on February 12, 2008; such participation would be consistent with the rule in Maryland that anyone who may vote in the general election for Board of Education candidates may vote in the primary contest for the Board of Education. Note well that the nine month interval between primary day and general election day captures more people in an "ineligible to vote in nonpartisan primary election because of age" category than would be the case with, say, a two week interval between the non-partisan primary and the general election. It may be asked whether, if exclusion of people under the age of 18 from the non-partisan primary must be done pursuant to the Maryland Constitution, the interval between the non-partisan primary and the general election should be the shortest feasible interval, so as to minimize the number of people permitted to vote in one but not the other.

The election of persons to office that begins with a partisan primary election that enables the association of individuals in ways permitted by Maryland election law and culminates in a general election could be characterized as a two-step process, with voting requirements applied to each of the elections. In

such an analysis, the voting requirements need not be the same; for example, one could rationally restrict voting in a party's primary election to individuals who have affiliated themselves with that party, unless a political party sought broader participation in its primary election, in which case the party's associational rights could be implicated. Other departures from the standards established for the general election could be justified on the basis of associational interests. One need not analyze every possible departure from such standards in order to determine whether any given departure would be legally permitted.

# (3) Public Confidence and Trust in Maryland's Elections

Plaintiff believes that, for over 30 years, those 17 year-olds who would turn 18 by the next general election have voted in Maryland, and they have voted without jeopardizing the integrity of the Maryland Constitution or the public institutions created pursuant to its provisions. Carl's first vote may be seen as a rite of passage on the way to being an adult, one anticipated on the basis of stability in relevant law, practice, and tradition. Carl's first vote can generate attachment to an electoral system in which Carl, and others like him, will participate for a lifetime. In that context, the State Board's determinations on voting by persons under the age of 18 in the February 12, 2008 primary election could not do anything but engender consternation and frustration in Carl and other young citizens of Maryland who had well-founded expectations that they would be permitted to participate fully in the February 12, 2008 primary elections.

# (4) There Is a Need for Judicial Action to Determine this Issue

The State Board's actions with respect to Carl's right to vote on February 12, 2008, and the rights of others under the age of 18, have created the need for judicial action. The State Board has affected the voting rights of thousands of Maryland citizens; the State and local boards have had to scramble since December 20, 2007 to register persons who, but for the State Board's actions earlier in 2007, would have been registered several months ago. The changes in Carl's status have not come as a result of changes in enacted law or as a result of judicial determination of the issue of voting age; they have come because of the State Board's actions. Plaintiff welcomes the opportunity to obtain judicial determination of Carl's status and thus, it is hoped, illuminate relevant Maryland Constitutional and statutory law for the benefit of the people of Maryland and their elected representatives.

#### 3. The State Board Violated Article 8 of the Declaration of Rights

When the State Board determined, contrary to the relevant provisions of the Constitution of Maryland and the Election Law Article, that Carl is not eligible to vote on February 12, 2008 in the non-partisan primary contest, it exercised legislative and judicial duties in a way that violated the separation of powers required by Article 8 of the Declaration of Rights. In essence, the State Board created election law and then applied it in derogation of Carl's right to vote, a right that had been established several months previously. The courts will act

where an administrative decision is not supported by facts, or where an action is not within the scope of delegated authority, or is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. Baltimore Import Car Service & Storage, Inc. v. Maryland Port Authority, 258 Md. 335 (1970). Here, the State Board's determination of Carl's voting status was unsupported, not within the scope of its authority, and demonstrably unreasonable. It cannot withstand an informed judicial review.

# 4. The State Board Violated Article 24 of the Declaration of Rights

Carl has been deprived of a fundamental right in clear violation of due process requirements. In May 2007, Carl became a registered voter. Without prior notice and a hearing, his rights to vote on February 12, 2008 by regular ballot and for Board of Education candidates have been threatened. This Court will give Carl the due consideration that the State Board clearly has not provided.

#### CONCLUSION

The State Board of Elections acted contrary to provisions of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, the Constitution of Maryland, and the Election Law Article when it determined that Carl Philip Snyder is not eligible to vote by regular ballot for Board of Education candidates in the primary election of February 12, 2008. The appropriate remedy for these violations is the issuance of an order requiring the State Board to permit Carl to cast his votes by regular ballot in the Democratic party primary and in the non-partisan primary on February 12, 2008. Respectfully submitted,

15

Clifford E. Snyder, Jr. Plaintiff 4964 Flossie Avenue Frederick, MD 21703 (301) 473-5408

#### TEXT OF RELEVANT PROVISIONS

#### Constitution of the United States

Article 2, Section 1, Clause 5. No person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President; neither shall any Person be eligible to that Office who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty-five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the United States.

Article 6, Clause 2. This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.

Amendment XXVI. Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States, who are 18 years of age or older, to vote, shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any state on account of age. Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

## Maryland Declaration of Rights

- § 8. That the Legislative, Executive and Judicial powers of Government ought to be forever separate and distinct from each other; and no person exercising the functions of one of said Departments shall assume or discharge the duties of any other.
- § 24. That no man ought to be taken or imprisoned or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or, in any manner, destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the judgment of his peers, or by the Law of the land.

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# Maryland Constitution

# Article | (Elective Franchise)

- § 1. All elections shall be by ballot. Every citizen of the United States, of the age of 18 years or upwards, who is a resident of the State as of the time for the closing of registration next preceding the election, shall be entitled to vote in the ward or election district in which he resides at all elections to be held in this State. A person once entitled to vote in any election district, shall be entitled to vote there until he shall have acquired a residence in another election district or ward in this State.
- § 2. The General Assembly shall provide by law for a uniform Registration of the names of all the voters in this State, who possess the qualifications prescribed in this Article, which Registration shall be conclusive evidence to the Judges of Election of the right of every person, thus registered, to vote at any election thereafter held in this State; but no person shall vote, at any election, Federal or State, hereafter to be held in this State, or at any municipal election in the City of Baltimore, unless his name appears in the list of registered voters; the names of all persons shall be added to the list of qualified voters by the officers of Registration, who have the qualifications prescribed in the first section of this Article, and who are not disqualified under the provisions of the second and third sections thereof.

# Election Law Article. Maryland Code

- § 1–201. The intention of this article is that the conduct of elections should inspire public confidence and trust by assuring that: (1) all persons served by the election system are treated fairly and equitably; (2) all qualified persons may register and vote and that those who are not qualified do not vote; (3) those who administer elections are well-trained, that they serve both those who vote and those who seek votes, and that they put the public interest ahead of partisan interests; (4) full information on elections is provided to the public, including disclosure of campaign receipts and expenditures; (5) citizen convenience is emphasized in all aspects of the election process; (6) security and integrity are maintained in the casting of ballots, canvass of votes, and reporting of election results; (7) the prevention of fraud and corruption is diligently pursued; and (8) any offenses that occur are prosecuted.
- § 3–102. (a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, an individual may become registered to vote if the individual: (1) is a citizen of the United States; (2) is at least 18 years old or will be 18 years old on or before the

day of the next succeeding general or special election; (3) is a resident of the State as of the day the individual seeks to register; and (4) registers pursuant to this title. (b) An individual is not qualified to be a registered voter if the individual: (1) has been convicted of a felony and is actually serving a court—ordered sentence of imprisonment, including any term of parole or probation, for the conviction; (2) is under guardianship for mental disability; or (3) has been convicted of buying or selling votes.

§ 3–301. (a) When a voter registration application is received by a local board, the local board shall: (1) if the applicant resides in the county of the local board, determine whether the applicant is qualified to become a registered voter; or (2) if the applicant resides in a different county in the State, immediately forward the application to the proper county. (b) A qualified applicant shall be electronically entered into the statewide voter registration list on an expedited basis at the time voter registration information is provided to the local board and shall be assigned to the county in which the applicant resides unless registration is closed pursuant to § 3-302 of this subtitle. (c) (1) The election director in the county where an applicant resides shall send a voter acknowledgment notice, in a format prescribed by the State Board, to each applicant informing the applicant whether he or she is qualified to become registered, and, if not qualified, the reasons why. (2) (i) A voter notification card sent to a qualified applicant may serve as a voter acknowledgment notice. (ii) 1. The voter notification card shall contain the name and address of the voter, the date of issue, and the district or ward and precinct of the voter. 2. The card is evidence that the individual to whom it is issued is a registered voter on the date appearing on the card. 3. The election director shall issue a replacement card on request of the voter and a new card when a relevant change is made in the voter's registration record if the voter continues to reside in the county.

§ 3–501. (a) An election director may remove a voter from the statewide voter registration list only: (1) at the request of the voter, provided the request is: (i) signed by the voter; (ii) authenticated by the election director; and (iii) in a format acceptable to the State Board or on a cancellation notice provided by the voter on a voter registration application; (2) upon determining, based on information provided pursuant to § 3-503 of this subtitle, that the voter is no longer eligible because: (i) the voter is not qualified to be a registered voter as provided in § 3-102(b) of this title; or (ii) the voter is deceased; (3) if the voter has moved outside the State, as determined by conducting the procedures established in § 3-502 of this subtitle; or (4) if, in accordance with the administrative complaint process under § 3-602 of this title, the local board has determined that the voter is not qualified to be registered to vote. (b) An election director may not remove a voter from the list in accordance with subsection (a)(2)

- or (3) of this section during the period that: (1) begins 30 days before the close of registration before an election; and (2) ends at the close of the polls on the day of the election.
- § 8–802. (a)(1)(i) Members of boards of education shall be elected on a nonpartisan basis. (ii) In a primary election to nominate board of education candidates, any registered voter of the county, regardless of party affiliation or lack of party affiliation, is eligible to vote in those contests for nomination. (2) Candidates for election to boards of education shall, without party designation or regard to party affiliation: (i) file certificates of candidacy;(ii) be certified to the ballot;(iii) appear on the ballot; (iv) be voted on; and (v) be nominated and elected. (b) This section does not apply to candidates for nomination or election to a board of education if Title 3 of the Education Article requires a partisan election.
- § 9–404. (a) If an individual is eligible under subsection (b) of this section, the individual shall be issued and may cast a provisional ballot: (1) at a polling place on election day; or (2) at the local board office in the county where the individual resides after the close of registration and before the closing of the polls on election day. (b) An individual is eligible to cast a provisional ballot if: (1) the individual declares in a written affirmation submitted with the provisional ballot that the individual is a registered voter in the State and is eligible to vote in that election; and (2) (i) the individual's name does not appear on the precinct register; (ii) an election official asserts that the individual is not eligible to vote; or (iii) the individual does not have the necessary identification. (c) In addition to the individuals who cast provisional ballots under subsections (a) and (b) of this section, any individual who appears to vote during a period covered by a court order or other order extending the time for closing the polls shall cast a provisional ballot. A provisional ballot cast under this subsection shall be separated and held apart from other provisional ballots cast by those not affected by the order.
- § 9–405. Before an individual casts a provisional ballot: (1) the individual shall complete and sign the provisional ballot application prescribed by the State Board; and (2) the election official issuing the ballot shall give the individual written information advising the individual that, and describing how, the individual will be able to ascertain whether the vote was counted and, if it was not counted, the reason it was not.
- § 9–406. (a) A voter who requires assistance in casting a provisional ballot by reason of disability, inability to write, or inability to read the ballot may be assisted by any individual other than: (1) a candidate who is on that ballot;

(2) the individual's employer or an agent of the employer; or (3) an officer or agent of the individual's union. (b) An individual rendering assistance under this section shall execute a certification as prescribed by the State Board and included in the instructions under § 9-408 of this subtitle.

§ 10-312. (a) (1) The right of an individual to vote may be challenged at the polls only on the grounds of identity. (2) An individual whose right to vote is challenged at the polls may establish the individual's identity by presenting any of the following forms of identification:(i) the individual's voter registration card;(ii) the individual's Social Security card;(iii) the individual's valid Maryland driver's license; (iv) any identification card issued to the individual by a political subdivision of the State, the State, the federal government, or any unit of a political subdivision of the State, the State, or the federal government; (v) Any employee identification card of the individual that contains a photograph of the individual and is issued by the employer of the individual in the ordinary course of the employer's business; or (vi) a copy of a current bill, bank statement, government check, paycheck, or other government document that shows the name and current address of the individual. (3) If an individual establishes the individual's identity under paragraph (2) of this subsection, an election judge shall authorize the individual to vote a regular ballot. (b) A challenge to an individual's right to vote shall be made before the individual is issued a ballot or a voting authority card. (c) If a challenge is made, and the challenged individual does not present any of the forms of identification specified under subsection (a)(2) of this section, the election judge receiving the challenge shall: (1) require the challenger to provide in writing, under penalty of perjury, the reasons for the challenge; (2) offer the challenged individual the opportunity to: (i) cast a provisional ballot; and (ii) submit an attestation, witnessed by the election judge, of the individual's identity; and (3) submit the provisional ballot and other materials related to the challenge to the local board. (d) During the canvass of provisional ballots, the local board shall determine, based on the information submitted by the challenger and the challenged individual, whether the challenged individual is: (1) the registered voter he or she claims to be; and (2) otherwise qualified to vote.

#### **ACKNOWLEDGMENT**

Plaintiff thanks Richard Boltuck for his attention to voters' rights and contributions to the developments of the arguments presented herein.

#### CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this day, January 29, 2008, I mailed, postage

prepaid, a copy of the foregoing to Mark J. Davis, Esquire, Office of the Attorney General, 200 Saint Paul Place, Baltimore, MD 21202.

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Clifford E. Snyder, Jr.

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY, MARYLAND

RICHARD BOLTUCK, etc.,

Plaintiff,

V

Case No. 02-C-08-128755

STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS,

Defendant.

# MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT UNDER SECTION12-202 OF THE ELECTION LAW ARTICLE

COMES NOW the Plaintiff, RICHARD BOLTUCK, as parent and guardian of SARAH ELIZABETH BOLTUCK, a minor child, and submits the following Memorandum in support of his Complaint in the above-captioned matter. For the reasons set forth herein, Plaintiff respectfully submits that the relief requested in the Complaint should be granted, and his daughter should be permitted to vote without restriction in the primary election scheduled for February 12, 2008.

#### Introduction

For more than 40 years, 17 year olds in Maryland have been able to vote in state primary elections if they will be 18 at the time of the November general election. This practice has taken place as a matter of explicit statutory right. Md. Election Law Code Ann., § 3-102. Then, in December, 2006, a single lawyer in the Attorney General's office extrapolated from one sentence of dicta in a Court of Appeals decision on a different question of law to find that this long-standing statutory command and practice was suddenly unconstitutional. See Exhibit 1 (memorandum from Mark Davis, Esquire to Linda Lamone, administrator of the State Board of Elections, dated December 18, 2006).

Mr. Davis' conclusions, set forth in Exhibit 1, were reaffirmed by him in a subsequent memorandum to Ms. Lamone dated June 19, 2007. See Exhibit 2.

As public outrage spread about the denial of this right, the Maryland Democratic and Republican Parties adopted internal rules restoring the right of 17 year olds to vote in their primary elections. The Attorney General, in response to a letter seeking advice from a State Senator, agreed that the 17 year olds could indeed vote in the party primaries as a matter of First Amendment law. See Exhibit 3 (letter dated December 19, 2007 from Attorney General Douglas Gansler to State Senator Jamie Raskin). However, Exhibit 3 expressly reaffirmed the conclusions of Mr. Davis in Exhibits 1 and 2, blocking 17 year olds from voting in nonpartisan school board elections under the new finding about the unconstitutionality of state law. That is the sole point of controversy in this case.

It is the plaintiff's position that (1) the Attorney General has no constitutional authority to declare a Maryland law unconstitutional and to refuse to enforce it; on the contrary, his exclusive role is to defend the constitutionality of laws passed by the General Assembly; and (2) even if the Attorney General had the authority and responsibility to approve or disapprove the constitutionality of laws passed by the General Assembly, the Attorney General has erred egregiously in finding that the Court of Appeals' ruling in the Capozzi decision silently implies and compels the invalidation of the law granting 17 year olds the right to vote in primary elections.

#### **Undisputed Facts**

- 1. SARAH BOLTUCK was born on July 21, 1990.
- 2. SARAH BOLTUCK is a resident of Montgomery County.
- 3. SARAH BOLTUCK applied to register as a voter with the Montgomery County Board of Elections in May or June, 2007.
- 4. Via a letter from the Montgomery County Board of Elections dated June 11, 2007, SARAH BOLTUCK was advised that her registration application had been rejected. The letter stated in pertinent part that "[r]eview of the application indicates that you do not qualify for registration and voting in this county because you will not have reached 18 years old by the date of the next election."
- 5. Maryland Election Law Code Ann. (hereinafter, "ELC"), § 3-102 states as follows:
  - "(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, an individual may become registered to vote if the individual: (1) is a citizen of the United States; (2) is at least 18 years old or will be 18 years old on or before the day of the next succeeding general or special election; (3) is a resident of the State as of the day the individual seeks to register; and (4) registers pursuant to this title. (b) An individual is not qualified to be a registered voter if the individual: (1) has been convicted of a felony and is actually serving a court–ordered sentence of imprisonment, including any term of parole or probation, for the conviction; (2) is under guardianship for mental disability; or (3) has been convicted of buying or selling votes."

Pursuant to this statute, SARAH BOLTUCK was and is eligible to vote in the February 12, 2008 primary, as she will be 18 years of age "on or before the day of the next succeeding general or special election."

6. Subsequent to receipt of the June 11, 2007 letter from the Montgomery

County Board of Elections, Plaintiff RICHARD BOLTUCK contacted the local Board and expressed his view that § 3-102 expressly permitted SARAH BOLTUCK to vote in the February 12, 2008 primary.

- 7. In response to Plaintiff's inquiries, Plaintiff received an e-mail from Margaret Jurgensen, Director of the local Board, with an attached memorandum from Mark Davis, Esquire, an Assistant Attorney General. See Exhibit 2.
- 8. Exhibit 2 expresses the view that the Court of Appeals' decision in *Lamone v. Capozzi*, 396 Md. 53, 912 A.2d 674 (2006) compelled the conclusion that (1) Section 3-102 of the Election Code is unconstitutional; and (2) despite several decades of practice to the contrary, 17 year olds who will be 18 before the general election are no longer constitutionally permitted to vote in primary elections. As a result, Mr. Davis advised the State Board of Elections (hereinafter, "SBE") to change its practice and to no longer allow such individuals to register to vote in the primary election prior to their 18<sup>th</sup> birthday.
- 9. By subsequent letter dated December 19, 2007, the Attorney General refined the view set forth in Exhibits 1 and 2, and concluded that, as to partisan primary elections, the federal constitutional associational rights of the respective political parties trumps the Maryland constitutional provision as construed in Exhibit 1, and that 17 year olds who will be 18 prior to the general election will be allowed to vote in partisan primary elections. See Exhibit 3.
- 10. In Montgomery County, where SARAH BOLTUCK resides, in addition to partisan primary elections, there are several non-partisan elections taking place on

February 12, 2008, and even following Exhibit 2, SARAH BOLTUCK will be barred from voting in these electoral contests based on a decision of the SBE or its staff first announced in early January, 2008.

9. Plaintiff has brought this action to challenge the extraordinary action of the State Board of Elections in refusing to follow the clear dictates of a properly enacted statutory provision.

# Argument<sup>1</sup>

As an initial matter, Plaintiff notes that the Attorney General in this matter has taken an action, unilaterally, that it does not have standing to pursue in Court. *See State of Maryland v. Burning Tree Club, Inc.*, 301 Md. 9, 34, 481 A.2d 785, 797 (1984) (Attorney General's "duties include prosecuting and defending cases on behalf of the State in order to promote and protect the State's policies, determinations, and rights.") If the Attorney General cannot bring a declaratory judgment action to have a statute declared to be unconstitutional, how can it possibly have the power to do so unilaterally through an advice letter to a state agency? Plaintiff submits that the Attorney General has usurped the role of the judiciary and violated the separation of powers — only a court has the power to declare a statute unconstitutional, not an executive branch officer such as the Attorney General.

In addition to the arguments set forth herein, Plaintiff adopts by reference, to the maximum allowable extent, the arguments put forth by Cliff Snyder in the companion case of *Snyder v. State Board of Elections*, Case No. 02-C-08-128760, which is being heard simultaneously with this case.

Turning to the merits, based on the undisputed facts set forth above, SARAH BOLTUCK is eligible to register and to vote pursuant to § 3-102. What is in dispute, however, is whether the provisions of that statute are constitutional in light of the Court of Appeals' ruling in *Lamone v. Capozzi*. Examination of that opinion is therefore the next step of the process in this case.

Capozzi involved a challenge to the General Assembly's 2006 action in passing what is known as an "early voting" law. That challenge was based in part<sup>2</sup> on Md. Constitution, Art. I, § 1, which states as follows:

"All elections shall be by ballot. Every citizen of the United States, of the age of 18 years or upwards, who is a resident of the State as of the time for the closing of registration next preceding the election, shall be entitled to vote in the ward or election district in which he resides at all elections to be held in this State. A person once entitled to vote in any election district, shall be entitled to vote there until he shall have acquired a residence in another election district or ward in this State."

Exhibit 1 argues that, pursuant to *Capozzi*, this constitutional provision invalidates § 3-102 of the Election Code. Plaintiff submits that it does no such thing.

Plaintiff agrees with the conclusions of Exhibit 1 insofar as Exhibit 1 states that: (1) the statute must not be in conflict with the constitutional provision; (2) the constitutional provision applies to primary as well as general elections; and (3) for purposes of the argument presented in this memorandum, assumes that Art. I, § 1 establishes the minimum age for voting as "18 years or upwards." What Exhibits 1, 2 and 3 fail to analyze in any way, however, is what is the relevant date for determining **when** a voter must have

The challenge in Capozzi was also based on other constitutional provisions not pertinent in this case.

attained the age of 18.

On this point, the constitutional provision is silent. It does not state <u>when</u> a voter must have reached the age of 18. In short, it is ambiguous on this point. As a result, the General Assembly, within bounds of reasonable interpretation of the constitutional provision, was and is free to make such a determination consistent with the language and the intentions of the constitutional provision.

The legislative determination, set forth in § 3-102, is that the relevant date for determining the age eligibility for voters is "on or before the day of the next succeeding general or special election." Plaintiff submits that this interpretation is in complete harmony with the constitutional provision – what other date would make more sense?

The General Assembly in § 3-102 further made the determination that being eligible to vote in such a general election also makes the voter eligible for participation in the primary election that determines the choices available in the general election.<sup>3</sup>

Is this a rational reading of the constitutional provision? Plaintiff submits that it is.

In this regard, the Court should note the significance of the difference between partisan and non-partisan primary elections. A partisan primary is conducted as part of the decision-making process of a political party, so that those voters who the party wishes to take part have the opportunity to select the party-endorsed nominee, or standard-

Md. Constitution, Art. I, § 2 provides that: "The General Assembly shall provide by law for a uniform Registration of the names of all the voters in this State, who possess the qualifications prescribed in this Article, which Registration shall be conclusive evidence to the Judges of Election of the right of every person, thus registered, to vote at any election thereafter held in this State." (emphasis added) The SBE interpretation of Capozzi would run afoul of this provision. 17 year olds would be allowed to vote in some elections, but not all elections.

bearer, in the general election. In most cases in Maryland, for instance, voters in a party primary are restricted to those who have chosen to affiliate with the party through the voter-registration process. Exhibit 3 explicitly recognizes this fact.

By contrast, a non-partisan primary (for example, a Board of Education primary) is, in fact, the first part of a two-part election. Every candidate who seeks election must appear on the primary ballot. The outcome of the primary winnows the field to twice the number of candidates as positions to be filled. (ELC, § 8-804). Voters who take part in the first part of the election, the primary, are not restricted by party affiliation or any other criteria; all registered voters may vote in the non-partisan primary. The Board of Education contest on the day of the general election, the second part of the Board of Education election, then selects the winners of Board of Education seats from among these remaining candidates.

It is important to appreciate that every person who wishes to be considered for election to a Board of Education seat must be on the primary ballot, and cannot otherwise eventually be elected. It is also important that voters in both parts of the election, primary and general election, are not restricted by any criteria other than the requirement to be a registered voter. Finally, candidates who appear on the ballot in the contest on general election day have won nothing other than the right to contest the second part of the election; for instance, they are not the endorsed candidates of any party or organization as a result of having prevailed in the primary election.

In crafting a two-part election procedure, the General Assembly recognized that

it is both inequitable and illogical for a voter to be eligible to participate in the second part of this procedure and not the first part, particularly based on an arbitrary qualification such as the timing of one's birthday. Restricting a voter to participation in only the general election deprives the voter of the opportunity to have a say in the selection of the candidates who will appear on the ballot for the general election. As a result, the General Assembly made the determination, unchallenged for over 40 years by anyone save for a single Assistant Attorney General, that eligibility to participate in a general election is tantamount to eligibility to participate in the primary election preceding that general election. Nothing in Art. I, § 1 bars such a policy; the constitutional provision is wholly silent on this question.

In short, the General Assembly made a legislative determination that for any given election process, the general and primary elections are to be treated as one process, and that eligibility for the general election shall be treated as eligibility for the primary election as well.

Exhibit 1 contends that *Capozzi* made this legislative determination unconstitutional.<sup>4</sup> Exhibit 1 spends a great deal of time hammering home the point that

As an initial matter, Plaintiff submits that Exhibit 1 is entitled to no deference whatsoever from this Court. While the Attorney General is authorized to issue advisory opinions at the request of state agencies or public officials, none of the three memoranda promulgated by the Attorney General are in fact a formal opinion of the Attorney General. The Attorney General's website (<a href="http://www.oag.state.md.us/Opinions/faq.htm">http://www.oag.state.md.us/Opinions/faq.htm</a>) states as follows:

<sup>&</sup>quot;The Maryland Constitution directs that the Attorney General is to give an 'opinion in writing whenever required by the General Assembly ... the Governor, the Comptroller, the Treasurer or any State's Attorney on any legal matter or subject.' Article V, §3. An Opinion of the Attorney General represents the considered views of the Attorney General on a significant legal question, generally involving Maryland law or other law that governs the actions of public officials in Maryland.

Capozzi made clear that "[a]ny prior interpretation that 'election' only referred to general or special elections has been overruled." This point was a minor one in Capozzi, almost an afterthought, as the following makes clear:

"We adopt the analysis offered by the Circuit Court in holding that primary elections are included within the meaning of 'at all elections to be held in this State' in Article I, § 1: if Article I, § 1 were read to exclude primary elections, 'such a reading could lead to an absurd result, as it would eliminate all Constitutional qualifications for primary elections. Thus, a 12 year-old, non-U.S. citizen, residing in Virginia, would not be barred by the [Maryland] Constitution from voting in the Maryland primary election.' <u>Such a reading simply cannot be correct</u>."

Capozzi, supra, 396 Md. at 89, 912 A.2d at 695 (emphasis added). It cannot have come as a surprise that the Court of Appeals ruled as it did with respect to the application of the constitutional provision to primary elections. As a result, if § 3-102 is in conflict with Art. I, § 1, it has been unconstitutional since it was enacted. Considering that no such

<sup>&</sup>quot;An Opinion of the Attorney General is usually drafted by an Assistant Attorney General and undergoes an extensive process of editing and review by other lawyers in this office who are knowledgeable about the subject matter before it is reviewed and adopted by the Attorney General.

<sup>&</sup>quot;A formal Opinion of the Attorney General should be distinguished from a letter of legal advice written by an attorney in this office. Because the Office of the Attorney General is the legal adviser to most State agencies, its lawyers write many letters and memoranda each day to State officials analyzing legal issues. Only a letter that has undergone the review process described above and has been adopted by the Attorney General is an Opinion of the Attorney General.

<sup>&</sup>quot;Formal Opinions are labeled as such and consecutively numbered. After an Opinion is issued, it is sent to the official who requested it and is posted on this web site. Opinions are ultimately compiled for each year in hardbound volumes that may be found in local law libraries. Copies of Opinions can also be obtained through legal research subscription services such as Westlaw and Lexis."

None of Exhibits 1, 2 and 3 are Formal Opinions. Exhibits 1 and 2 have never been published and are is not numbered. While Exhibit 3 has in fact been published on the Attorney General's website (http://www.oag.state.md.us/Topics/Raskin%20advice%20letter.pdf), it is not a numbered Formal Opinion, nor is it included in the section of the website containing the 2007 Formal Opinions of the Attorney General (http://www.oag.state.md.us/Opinions/2007/07index.htm).

suggestion has ever been made, either prior to or subsequent to *Capozzi*, except for a single memorandum written by an Assistant Attorney General whose office is charged with defending rather than attacking such statutes, such a conclusion is inherently suspect.

As noted above, *Capozzi* dealt solely with the issue of early voting. It did not address in any fashion the question of eligibility to vote based on age, and it did not in any manner address the interpretation of § 3-102 of the Election Code. Nevertheless, based on nothing more than the opinion of a single Assistant Attorney General, the State Board of Elections, charged with administering the Election Code, overturned decades of its own practice and proceeded to disenfranchise an entire class of voters. Plaintiff notes that there was not even a complaint raised from the public or from any other entity that prompted the promulgation of Exhibit 1.

As a final point, Plaintiff notes two legal principles of construction that support his argument: first, "the right to vote is accorded extraordinary treatment because it is, in equal protection terms, an extraordinary right: a citizen cannot hope to achieve any meaningful degree of individual political equality if granted an inferior right of participation in the political process." *Plyler v. Doe*, 457 U.S. 202, 233, 102 S. Ct. 2382, 2403 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring). Second, as a matter of statutory and constitutional construction, "[i]t is well settled that we should construe the statute so that it will survive the test of constitutionality." *Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission v. McCaw*, 246 Md. 662, 685, 229 A.2d 584, 596 (1967). *Capozzi* was a case that dealt

solely with the manner and time of voting; it in no way suggested that an entire group of otherwise qualified citizens should be barred from voting, which is what the State Board of Elections and the Attorney General seek to accomplish in this case.<sup>5</sup>

#### Conclusion

Plaintiff submits that nothing in *Capozzi* even suggests, much less mandates, the abrogation of a properly enacted statute and the disenfranchisement of an entire class of potential voters. In this case, SARAH BOLTUCK is eligible to vote based on the clear language of § 3-102, and that statute is no way violative of Art. I, § 1 of the Maryland Constitution. Plaintiff therefore respectfully requests this Court to enter an injunction directing the State Board of Elections to allow SARAH BOLTUCK to vote without restriction in the February 12, 2008 primary election, and for such other and further relief as the Court deems proper in the circumstances of this case.

Plaintiff notes that if the Attorney General's interpretation of Capozzi and Art. I, § 1 of the Constitution is upheld, this will not be a one-time problem. Instead, every two years, certain individuals who would otherwise be qualified to vote in the primary under § 3-102 will have to vote by provisional ballot for partisan races, while being barred from voting for non-partisan races. Even more dismally, this jerry-rigged vote will in all cases be those individuals' first involvement with the right to vote. What kind of message does it send to first-time voters for the Attorney General and the State Board of Elections to hobble their right to vote in this haphazard fashion? This cannot be what the authors of the Maryland Constitution, § 3-102 or Capozzi had in mind. Moreoever, such unequal treatment of otherwise qualified voters would, Plaintiff submits, raise serious equal protection issues under both the federal and state Constitutions.

Date: January 30, 2008

Respectfully submitted,

JONATHAN S. SHURBERG, P.C.

By: Jonathan S. Shurberg 8720 Georgia Avenue Suite 703 Silver Spring, MD 20910 (301) 585-0707

Jamin B. Raskin, *of counsel* 7209 Holly Avenue Takoma Park, MD 20912

# **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on January 30, 2008, a copy of the foregoing was sent by e-mail and first-class mail, postage prepaid, to: Mark J. Davis, Esquire, Assistant Attorney General, Counsel for State Election Laws, 200 Saint Paul Place, Baltimore MD 21202.

Jonathan S. Shurberg

#### OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

OPINIONS AND ADVICE 200 Saint Paul Place Baltimore, Maryland 21202 (410) 576-6356 (410) 576-7036

e-mail: mdavis@oag.state.md.us

#### MEMORANDUM

December 18, 2006

TO:

Linda Lamone

FROM:

Mark J. Davis

SUBJECT: Analysis of Court of Appeals Decision in Lamone v. Capozzi

On December 11, 2006, the Court of Appeals issued its opinion explaining its order dated August 25, which affirmed a circuit court order that declared the early voting statute unconstitutional. As I explain below, the Court's opinion has ramifications for provisional voting, absentee balloting, and voter registration.

# I. The Opinion

On April 9, 2005, the General Assembly passed Senate Bill 478, which authorized early voting in Maryland. The Governor vetoed the bill on May 20, 2005. On January 16, 2006, both houses of the General Assembly overrode the veto, enacting Senate Bill 478 as Chapter 5, Maryland Laws 2006, and adding a new §10-301.1 to the Election Law Article ("EL"). During the 2006 legislative session, HB 1368, another early voting bill, was passed as emergency legislation and vetoed by the Governor. That veto, too, was overridden and the bill became Chapter 61, Laws of Maryland 2006. The bill repealed and reenacted §10-301.1 with amendments, creating early voting as follows: a voting period for eleven hours each day for a five-day period beginning the Tuesday before a primary or general election through the Saturday before election day at designated sites.

On July 16, 2006, plaintiffs filed suit alleging that the early voting legislation violated various state constitutional provisions, claiming essentially that Article I only permitted inperson ballot voting and absentee voting. On August 8, 2006, the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County declared §10-301.1 unconstitutional and void. On August 25, 2006, the

Court of Appeals heard argument and affirmed the circuit court in an order for reasons to be stated in an opinion to follow.

In the opinion that followed on December 11, the Court emphasized importance of the plain language principle of constitutional interpretation. Slip Op. at 18-20. Thus, the Court held that authorizing voters to cast ballots beginning the Tuesday through the Saturday before the election "is clearly inconsistent with the words of, and the plain meaning of Article XV, §7 and the other constitutional provisions that designate the "Tuesday next after the first Monday of November," as the date of the general election." *Id.* at 24-25. The Court read §7 to require that "the election shall be held *on* a specific day. . [and] any statute that allows for a ballot to be cast before the prescribed day must be in derogation of the Constitution." *Id.* at 33.

The Court also literally interpreted Art. I, §1, which provides that a voter can only vote in the election district or ward in which he resides. Noting that EL §10-301.1allows for early voting to occur outside of a person's district or ward, the Court held that the statute violated Art. I, §1, because "[w]e view the language in Article I, §1, as a mandatory requirement, not as a mere 'entitlement,' capable of being waived." *Id.* at 35-36.

Finally, the Court held that "primary elections are included within the meaning of 'at all elections to be held in this State' in Article I, §1," id. at 40; and that early voting is not a form of absentee voting, holding that "Article I, §3 clearly indicates that the inability to vote personally applies to 'absent' voters, not those who find the voting day to be inconvenient." Id. at 41.

#### II. Ramifications of the Opinion.

#### A. Provisional Voting.

The opinion makes clear that a provisional ballot cast outside the voter's district cannot be counted, even for candidates, such as statewide candidates, that the voter would be eligible to vote for in his or her district. As explained below, EL §§9-404(a) and 11-303(e) must be interpreted to apply to circumstances where a voter who is at the wrong polling place is in the same district as the correct polling place.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> A polling place is located within a district or ward which may consist of multiple precincts. A local board may combine or abolish precincts, see EL §2-303, but may not change a district or ward, which are established by local government.

Although provisional ballots are required by the federal Help American Vote Act (HAVA), "the individual's vote shall be counted as a vote . . . in accordance with state law." HAVA, §302(a)(4). Maryland law provides that an individual is eligible to cast a provisional ballot if the individual declares that he or she is a registered voter in the State and is eligible to vote in the election; and the individual's name does not appear on the precinct register, an election official asserts the individual is not eligible to vote, or the individual does not have the necessary identification. EL §9-404(b). An individual who is eligible may cast a provisional ballot at a polling place on election day; or at the local board office in the county where the individual resides. EL §9-404(a).

Under Capozzi, a ballot cast at other than the voter's correct district or ward may not be counted, which requires that the EL §11-303(e) be interpreted differently than it has been in recent elections. That provision states:

#### A local board shall count:

- (1) the entire provisional ballot if the address on the provisional ballot application is within the precinct where the provisional ballot was cast; or
- (2) only the votes cast by the voter for each candidate or question applicable to the precinct in which the voter resides, as determined by the address on the provisional ballot application of the voter.

SBE issued guidelines for the 2006 November elections that mirrored the language of the statute. See Guidelines for the Administration of Provisional Voting (June 21, 2006), §7.4D.<sup>2</sup> SBE instructed local boards to count ballots that the voter would have been eligible to vote for in his home precinct. For example, a vote cast by a Towson resident at a polling place in Essex would have been counted for the statewide races and for county executive, but not for any of the local races (e.g., House of Delegates, State Senate or County Council) that were not on the ballot at the voter's Towson precinct.

As a result of *Capozzi*, however, no votes cast by the Towson voter would be counted; his vote will count only if his out-of-precinct vote is cast in the same Towson district in which he resides. The election judges at the Essex polling place should be instructed to advise the Towson voter to go to his correct polling place or his vote will not be counted.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> EL §11-303(a) provides that the canvass is to be conducted in accordance with the regulations and guidelines established by the State Board. SBE regulations relating to provisional ballots—found at COMAR 33.16—do not describe how provisional ballots are to be counted.

Although an individual who is eligible to vote a provisional ballot may do so at the local board office, see EL §9-404(a), that vote will not count if the board office is outside the voter's ward or district. An absentee ballot cast at the local board offices beginning on the Wednesday before the election until the closing of the polls on election day, see EL §9-305(c), is not subject to Capozzi and will be counted. Thus, local board staff should inform voters of their option to cast an absentee ballot to avoid the Capozzi problem and assure that their votes are counted.

## B. Absentee Voting

Capozzi did not involve the constitutionality of the new no-excuse absentee voting statute, EL §9-304, but the Court read Article I, §3 very strictly.<sup>3</sup> The Court held that early voting is not a form of absentee voting and that "the inability to vote personally applies to 'absent' voters, not those who find the voting day to be inconvenient." Sip. Op. at 41.

The current language of the absentee voter's oath does not contain a statement that the voter will be absent or will be unable to vote in person on election day.<sup>4</sup> We therefore recommend that the absentee voter's oath be changed to track the language of Article I, §3.

#### C. Voter Registration.

Article I, §1 provides that an individual must be 18 in order to vote. Capozzi holds that "primary elections are included within the meaning of 'at all elections to be held in this State' in Article I, §1." Slip Op. at 40. EL §3-102(a) provides that a qualified voter includes an individual who "is at least 18 years or will be 18 years old on or before the day of the next succeeding general or special election."

The statute thus violates §1 because it permits an individual who has not yet turned 18 to vote in a primary election. The statute should be amended to add the word "primary" so that the pertinent phrase reads "next succeeding general, primary, or special election." In any event, only individuals who will turn 18 before the next election should be permitted to register.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Article I, §3 provides in part that the General Assembly may provides for voting by qualified voters "who are absent at the time of any election in which they are entitled to vote and for voting by other qualified voters who are unable to vote personally."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> COMAR 33.11.03.03 provides that the State Board prescribe the form and content of the instructions for marking and returning the absentee ballots.

Please let me know if you require clarification of these issues or require further assistance.

cc: Ross Goldstein Donna Duncan Nikki Trella Mary Wagner

#### OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

OPINIONS AND ADVICE 200 Saint Paul Place Baltimore, Maryland 21202 (410) 576-6356 (410) 576-7036

e-mail: mdavis@oag.state.md.us

#### **MEMORANDUM**

June 19, 2007

TO:

Linda Lamone

FROM:

Mark J. Davis

SUBJECT: Age Requirement for Voting

You asked me to respond to questions about the recent change which prohibits individuals who fulfill the statutory age requirement set forth in the Election Law Article §3-102, but will not be eighteen by the primary election, to register and to vote in a primary election. In my view, and as I advised in my memorandum to you dated December 19, 2006, an individual who is not eighteen on the date of the primary may not vote in the primary election without violating Article 1, Sections 1 and 2 of the Maryland Constitution and the Court of Appeals decision in Lamone v. Capozzi, 396 Md. 53 (2006).

In Capozzi, the Court of Appeals reiterated that "[i]t is well settled that a State Legislature may not enact laws that are in derogation of the [State] Constitution." Capozzi, 396 Md. at 73. The Constitution provides that an individual may only vote if he or she is eighteen or older. Thus, the General Assembly lacks the authority to permit someone who is less than eighteen to vote.

Article 1, Section 1 of the Constitution specifies those individuals who may vote in the state; it does not, as some have suggested, only address the rights of voters who are eighteen and older. This interpretation of Article 1, Section 1 dates back to Southerland v. Norris, 74 Md. 326, 22 A. 137 (1891), where the Court of Appeals stated that "the qualifications of a voter in this state are prescribed by the first section of article 1 of the constitution of Maryland." 22 A. at 137. This interpretation was most recently affirmed by the Court of Appeals in Capozzi, where the Court stated that "Article 1, §1, for example, states simply who can vote..." Capozzi, 396 Md. at 83.

June 19, 2007 Page 2

Article 1, Section 1 provides that "[e]very citizen of the United States, of the age of 18 years or upwards, who is a resident of the State as of the time for the closing of registration next preceding the election, shall be entitled to vote in the ward or election district in which he resides at all elections to be held in this State." This section sets forth three qualifications an individual must meet to be eligible to vote. First, the individual must be a citizen of the United States. Second, the individual must be 18 years old or older. Third, the individual must be a resident of the State as of the time for the closing of registration before the election.

From the plain reading of the section, if an individual is not 18 years old or older, then he or she is not qualified to vote. This interpretation stems from the placement of the commas, which sets off the age qualification from a connection to the phrase "as of the time for the closing of registration next preceding the election." That phrase qualifies the residency requirement.

Even if, however, the phrase regarding the closing of registration before the election is connected to the age qualification, the result remains the same in light of Capozzi. Any prior interpretation that "election" only referred to general or special elections has been overruled. In Capozzi, the Court of Appeals adopted the view that the phrase "at all elections to be held in this State" includes primaries. The Court stated that all voter qualification requirements would be eliminated for primary elections if the phrase only referred to general or special elections. Capozzi, 364 Md. at 89. The phrase that was interpreted by the Court appears in the same sentence as the age qualification and the phrase regarding the close of registration before the election. Because the Court interpreted the word "election" in one part of the sentence as including primary elections, it must be interpreted that way throughout the rest of the sentence. Therefore, even if Article 1, Section 1 is read so that an individual must be eighteen or older by the end of registration preceding the election, a seventeen-year-old would still not be allowed to vote in a primary election because he or she would be required to be eighteen by the end of registration preceding the primary election.

Article 1, Section 2 of the Constitution charges the General Assembly with the responsibility of providing "by law for a uniform Registration of the names of all voters in this State, who possess the qualifications prescribed in this Article." Election Law Article §3-102 provides who can register to vote. Those qualifications include an age requirement that allows an individual to register if he or she will be eighteen by the next general or special

June 19, 2007 Page 3

election. To interpret the provision to allow individuals to register and vote who do not meet the constitutional age requirement would violate Article 1, Section 1.1

In conclusion, an individual who is not eighteen on the date of the primary may not vote in the primary election without violating Article 1, Sections 1 and 2 of the Maryland Constitution and the Court of Appeals decision.<sup>2</sup>

cc: Ross Goldstein Donna Duncan Nikki Trella Mary Wagner

Objections have been made to this conclusion on the basis that if the Legislature cannot allow seventeen year olds to vote, then Article 1, Section 1 must guarantee the right of all people, including felons and those with mental disabilities who meet the qualifications in that section to vote. Election Law Article §3-102 excludes felons and those under guardianship for mental disability from being able to register. This provision is constitutional, however, because the General Assembly is given the power to regulate or prohibit the vote of those categories of people in Article 1, Section 4 of the Constitution. Also, Article 1, Section 2 states that those who meet the qualifications in Section 1 and are not disqualified under other sections may be registered.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> I wish to acknowledge the contributions of Jodie Chilson, a law clerk in the Office of the Attorney General to this memorandum.

DOUGLAS F. GANSLER Attorney General



KATHERINE WINFREE
Chief Deputy Attorney General

JOHN B. HOWARD, JR. Deputy Attorney General

# STATE OF MARYLAND OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

(410) 576-7036

(410) 576-6311

TELECOPIER NO.

December 19, 2007

WRITER'S DIRECT DIAL NO.

The Honorable Jamie Raskin Room 122 James Senate Office Building Annapolis, Maryland 21401

Dear Senator Raskin:

You asked whether recent changes in the rules of the State's two principal political parties affect the advice of this Office to the State Board of Elections ("SBE") concerning the application of Annotated Code of Maryland, Election Law Article ("EL"), §3-102(a). That statute provides, among other things, that an individual may register to vote if the individual will be 18 or older on the date of the next general or special election. In the past, the election boards have allowed individuals who will be 18 by the time of a general election to vote in a primary election even if the individual was not 18 at the time of the primary. However, a recent Court of Appeals decision held that a State constitutional provision that, among other things, requires a voter to be 18 or older, applies to primary elections. This Office advised SBE of the implications of that decision and, following that advice, SBE required voters to be 18 to vote in a primary election.

Your letter raises two issues, one of which this Office has previously addressed in the advice letter to SBE and one of which has arisen in the past week as a result of the changes adopted by the State's two principal political parties. As explained below, this Office reaffirms the advice previously given to SBE that the Maryland Constitution, as construed in a recent Court of Appeals case, requires that voters be 18 to vote in primary elections. Nonetheless, because the political parties have, in recent days, asserted their federal constitutional rights to freedom of association, you have asked the Office to address the different question whether the Maryland Constitution as recently construed – at least with regard to the voter-age requirement – violates the parties' First Amendment associational rights to include in their primaries certain voters under the age of 18.

For the reasons explained below, it is my view that the conflict between the Maryland constitutional provision and the First Amendment rights now asserted by the parties requires that SBE permit 17-year-olds who will be 18 by the next general election to vote in the parties' primary elections.

# Background

Article I, §1 of the Maryland Constitution sets forth the basic qualifications for voting in Maryland. It provides:

Every citizen of the United States, of the age of 18 years or upwards, who is a resident of the State as of the time for the closing of registration next preceding the election, shall be entitled to vote in the ward or election district in which he resides at all elections to be held in this State.

In the past it had been assumed that the qualifications set forth in Article I, §1 applied only to general elections and that, pursuant to EL §3-102(a), an individual who would be 18 by the general election could vote in a primary, even if not 18 by the date of the primary.

On December 11, 2006, the Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Lamone v. Capozzi, 396 Md. 53, 912 A.2d 674 (2006). In that case, the Court held that an "early voting" system created by the Legislature was unconstitutional. In extending that holding to primary elections, the Court held that Article I, §1 applied to primary elections. It stated:

[P]rimary elections are included within the meaning of "at all elections to be held in this State" in Article I, § 1: if Article I, § 1 were read to exclude primary elections, "such a reading could lead to an absurd result, as it would eliminate all Constitutional qualifications for primary elections. Thus, a 12 year-old, non-U.S. citizen, residing in Virginia, would not be barred by the [Maryland] Constitution from voting in the Maryland primary election." Such a reading simply cannot be correct.

396 Md. at 89, 912 A.2d at 695 (quoting from circuit court opinion). Although the *Capozzi* case itself did not concern the age of primary voters, one ramification of its holding that the qualifications set forth in Article I, §1 apply to primary elections was that a voter must be 18 in order to vote in a primary election. This Office promptly advised SBE of the implications of the *Capozzi* decision and, following the advice of counsel, SBE instituted a policy stating

that a voter must be 18 on or before the day of any election in which the individual wishes to vote. While that advice was correct, you have advised that the parties have recently changed their rules and have therefore introduced the second question raised by your inquiry.

#### Party Rule Changes

Under the State election law, the two principal parties in the State, the Democratic and Republican parties, are required to select their candidates for most offices through primary elections. EL §8-202. Until recently, the two principal political parties simply adopted the primary system established by State law. However, we understand that the Democratic party has changed its rules to allow 17-year olds to vote in its primary election if they will be 18 at the time of the general election. You state in your letter that the Republican party is going to make a similar change. Both parties have requested that the SBE allow all individuals who meet the qualifications of EL § 3-102(a) be allowed to register and vote in all elections, including the primary election on February 12, 2008. Thus, both principal political parties have indicated that they wish to open their nomination processes to individuals who will be 18 by the time of the general election even if they are not 18 on the date of the primary.

## Analysis

Maryland law recognizes that the United States Constitution "shall be the Supreme Law of the State ... anything in the Constitution or Law of this State to the contrary notwithstanding." Maryland Declaration of Rights, Article 2. The federal constitution recognizes certain rights possessed by political parties, including First Amendment associational rights. Your request, together with the recent rule changes adopted by the Democratic and Republican parties, requires that we consider those rights in advising how SBE should implement EL §3-102(a).

The Supreme Court has held that political parties have a First Amendment right of association to determine who will participate in "the basic function of selecting the Party's candidates." Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, 479 U.S. 208, 216 (1986); see also Eu v. San Francisco Co. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 224 (1989)("[P]artisan political organizations enjoy freedom of association protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments"). The Court has outlined the tests to be applied to state regulation of elections as follows:

Regulations that impose severe burdens on association rights must be narrowly tailored to serve a state government interest. ... [W]hen regulations impose lesser burdens, "a state's important regulatory interests will usually be enough to justify reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions."

Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 586-87 (2005) (citations omitted).

Here, the two principal parties, which are compelled by State law to use the State's primary election apparatus to select their nominees, have indicated that they wish to ensure the participation in that selection process of certain members who will be eligible to vote in the general election – i.e., individuals who will be 18 by the time of the general election but who have not attained that age by the time of the primary. The exclusion of those individuals from the primary undeniably burdens the associational rights of Maryland's political parties. "[I]t is '[t]he moment of choosing the party's nominee' that matters ... for that is 'the crucial juncture at which the appeal to common principles may be translated into concerted action, and hence to political power in the community." Id. at 590 (citations omitted); see also id. at 599 ("It is here that the parties invite voters to join in selecting their standard bearers. The outcome is pivotal, of course, for it dictates the range of choices available at – and often the presumptive winner of – the general election") (O'Connor, J., concurring).

Under the analysis established by the Supreme Court, a burden on associational rights is weighed against the State interest in the policy that affects those rights. Here, however, it is not necessary to determine whether application of an 18-year old age requirement to primary elections would impose a severe or lesser burden. Under either test, it is my view that no State interest is implicated that would override the parties' rights of association under the First Amendment. Indeed, the General Assembly, in enacting EL § 3-102(a), expressed a legislative policy in favor of permitting such voters to exercise the franchise in the primary - a policy that coincides with the associational interests recently embraced by the parties. The Court of Appeals in Capozzi did not articulate a State interest in excluding these voters from the parties' primary elections; rather, it simply applied Article I, §1, of the State Constitution to primary elections. To our knowledge, nothing in the history of Article I, §1, indicates a specific State interest in excluding from primary elections those 17-year olds who will be 18 by the time of the general election. Faced with this conflict between a longstanding legislative enactment, reinforced by the United States Constitution on one hand, and the Court of Appeals' general holding with respect to Article I, §1 of the State Constitution on the other, the new party rules and legislative policy reflected in EL §3-102(a) should be given effect.

### Conclusion

In short, it is my view that, in light of the recent party rule changes that implicate the parties' associational rights under the federal constitution, SBE should implement EL §3-102(a) as it has in the past – by registering and allowing to vote those persons who are at least 18 years old or will be 18 years old on or before the day of the next succeeding general or special election.

Sincerely,

Douglas F. Gansler Attorney General

cc: State Board of Elections

# IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY, MARYLAND

CLIFFORD E. SNYDER, JR. on behalf of

Carl Philip Snyder, his son

ν.

**PLAINTIFF** 

Civil Action Nos. C-08-128760

STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS
DEFENDANT

RICHARD D. BOLTUCK on behalf of

Sarah Elizabeth Boltuck, his daughter

PLAINTIFF

Civil Action No. C-08-128755

STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS

DEFENDANT

CONSENT MOTION FOR CONSOLIDATION

Defendant State Board of Elections, by its undersigned counsel, moves pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-503, to consolidate the two above-captioned cases on the grounds that the complaints raise common questions of fact, law, and subject matter. Both complaints allege that the two 17-year old voters who will be 18 by the general election have been unlawfully denied the right to vote in the nonpartisan school board election and required to vote a provisional ballot for the February 12, 2008 primary. Defendant's counsel has obtained the consent of plaintiffs Clifford Snyder and Richard Boltuck to a consolidation of these actions.

WHEREFORE, Defendant requests that the Court grant its Motion. A proposed Order is attached.

Respectfully Submitted,

DOUGLAS F. GANSLER Attorney General of Maryland

Mark J. Davis

Assistant Attorney General

200 Saint Paul Place

Baltimore MD 21202

(410) 576-6356

fax (410) 576-7036

## CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 30th day of January, 2008 a true and accurate copy of defendant's Consent Motion to Consolidate was mailed first-class postage prepaid and transmitted by email to: Clifford E. Snyder, Jr., Esquire, 4964 Flossie Avenue, Frederick MD 21703, plaintiff; and Jonathan S. Shurberg, Esq., 8720 Georgia Avenue, Suite 700, Silver Spring MD 20910, attorney for plaintiff Richard Boltuck.

Mark I Davis

# IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY, MARYLAND

| CLIFFORD E. SNYDER, JR.                     | *             |  |
|---|---------------|--|
| on behalf of<br>Carl Philip Snyder, his son | *             | O': 11 A (1 - 27 - G 00 10070)             |
| PLAINTIFF                                   | Ψ.            | Civil Action Nos. C-08-128760              |
| V.  | *             |  |
|   | *             |  |
| STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS<br>DEFENDANT       | *             |  |
| * * *                                       |               |  |
| RICHARD D. BOLTUCK on behalf of             | *,            |  |
| Sarah Elizabeth Boltuck, his daughter       | *             |  |
| PLAINTIFF                                   | *             |  |
| v.  | *             |  |
| STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS                    | *             | Civil Action No. C-08-128755               |
| DEFENDANT                                   | *             |  |
| * * * * * * * * * * * * *                   | •             | * * * * * * * * * * *                      |
|   | ORDER         |  |
| Having considered defendant's               | Consent Mo    | tion for Consolidation, the parties having |
| agreed to consolidation, it is thisd        | lay           | , 2008, <b>ORDERED</b> that the Motion     |
| is GRANTED, and the Clerk shall ac          | cept for fili | ng all papers bearing the above captions   |
| in a single docket.                         |               |  |
|   |               |  |
|   |               | •  |
|   |               |  |
|   | · C           | ircuit Court Judge                         |

# IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY, MARYLAND

CLIFFORD E. SNYDER, JR.

on behalf of
Carl Philip Snyder, his son

PLAINTIFF

v.

\* Civil Action No. C-08-128760

STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS

DEFENDANT

\*

RICHARD D. BOLTUCK

on behalf of
Sarah Elizabeth Boltuck, his daughter

PLAINTIFF

\*

Civil Action No. C-08-128755

STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS

DEFENDANT

# DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS OR FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendant State Board of Elections ("State Board"), by its undersigned counsel, moves pursuant to Md. Rule 2-322 to dismiss or for summary judgment. As grounds for the motion, defendant refers the Court to its attached memorandum in support, and states:

1. Plaintiffs Clifford E. Snyder, Jr., and Richard Boltuck on behalf of their 17-year old children Carl Philip Snyder ("Carl") and Sarah Elizabeth Boltuck ("Sarah") claim an

entitlement under state law to vote in their counties' nonpartisan school board primary elections on February 12, 2008, and to cast all their votes using a regular ballot rather than a provisional ballot.

- 2. Carl and Sarah are ineligible to vote in the nonpartisan primary and state no claim that voting on a provisional ballot denies them any rights under the Declaration of Rights of the Maryland Constitution or the Election Law Article.
- 3. In Lamone v. Capozzi, 396 Md. 53, 89 (2006), the Court of Appeals held that "primary elections are included within the meaning of 'at all elections to be held in the State' in Article I, §1 [of the Maryland Constitution]." Article I, §1 requires that a citizen be at least 18 in order to be eligible to vote.
- 4. On December 19, 2007, Attorney General Gansler reaffirmed advice from his Office the prior year that, in light of the *Capozzi* decision, voters be 18 to vote in primary elections and recommended that, in view of the two principal political parties' recent rule changes and assertion of their First Amendment associational rights, 17 year olds who will be 18 by the next general election ("17-year olds") be permitted to vote in the parties' primary elections on February 12, 2008.
- 5. In an attempt to implement this advice, the State Board notified 17-year olds that they would be permitted to vote in the parties' primary elections, remained ineligible to vote in the nonpartisan primary elections, and would be required to cast provisional ballots. Should the Court wish to review the State Board's decision to require the use of provisional

ballots, and treat this motion as one for summary judgment, it may consider the two declarations of Donna Duncan, Direction of the State Board's Election Management Division, which explain: 1) why using provisional ballots after the ballot styles were finalized is the only practical means of assuring that 17-year olds do not vote in contests in which they are ineligible; and 2) why it is impossible before the February 12, 2008 primary to reprogram electronic pollbooks to enable Carl and Sarah to vote on the electronic voting units.

WHEREFORE, defendant requests that the Court grant its Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment. A proposed Order is attached.

Respectfully Submitted,

DOUGLAS F. GANSLER Attorney General of Maryland

Mark J. Davis

Assistant Attorney General

200 Saint Paul Place

Baltimore MD 21202

(410) 576-6356

fax (410) 576-7036

# CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 30th day of January, 2008 a true and accurate copy of defendant's Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment, Memorandum in Support,

Declaration of Donna Duncan, and Order was mailed first-class postage prepaid and

transmitted by email to: Clifford E. Snyder, Jr., Esquire, 4964 Flossie Avenue, Frederick MD 21703, plaintiff; and Jonathan S. Shurberg, Esq., 8720 Georgia Avenue, Suite 700, Silver Spring MD 20910, attorney for plaintiff Richard Boltuck.

Mark J. Davis

# IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY, MARYLAND

CLIFFORD E. SNYDER, JR.
on behalf of
Carl Philip Snyder, his son

PLAINTIFF

v.

\* Civil Action No. C-08-128760

STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS

\*

RICHARD D. BOLTUCK
on behalf of
Sarah Elizabeth Boltuck, his daughter

PLAINTIFF

v.

Civil Action No. C-08-128755

STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS

\*

Civil Action No. C-08-128755

# MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS OR FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendant State Board of Elections ("State Board"), by its undersigned counsel, files this memorandum in support of its motion to dismiss or for summary judgment.

Plaintiffs Clifford E. Snyder, Jr. and Richard Boltuck on behalf of their 17-year old children Carl Philip Snyder ("Carl") and Sarah Elizabeth Boltuck ("Sarah"), claim an entitlement under state law to vote in their counties' nonpartisan school board primary elections on February 12, 2008, and to cast all their votes using a regular ballot rather than a provisional ballot. The Court should dismiss the complaint because Carl and Sarah are ineligible to vote in the nonpartisan primary and their fathers state no claim that voting in partisan elections on a provisional ballot denies Carl and Sarah any right protected under the Declaration of Rights of the Maryland Constitution or the Election Law Article. Furthermore, if this Court reaches the merits of the State Board's decision to use provisional ballots, the declaration of Donna Duncan demonstrates that using provisional ballots is the only practical means of assuring that 17-year olds do not cast voters in the nonpartisan contests for which they are ineligible. Under Maryland law as applied by the State Board, however, 17-year olds like Sarah and Carl, who will turn 18 by the time of the general election ("17-year olds"), may vote in their own party's partisan primary election.

### STATEMENT OF FACTS

### A. The State's Board's Initial Policy Concerning 17-Year Old Voters.

Article I, §1 of the Maryland Constitution sets forth the basic qualifications for voting in Maryland. It provides in part:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> See Hrehorovich v. Harbor Hsp. Ctr., 93 Md. App. 772, 782 (1992), cert. denied, 330 Md. 319 (1993) ("If the court does not exclude the outside matters... [Rule 2-322(c)] mandates that 'the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment.") (emphasis in original).

Every citizen of the United States, of the age of 18 years or upwards, who is a resident of the State as of the time for the closing of registration next preceding the election, shall be entitled to vote in the ward or election district in which he resides at all elections to be held in this State.

Before 2006, the State Board understood that the qualifications set forth in Article I, §1 applied only to general elections and that, pursuant to Election Law Article ("EL") §3-102(a), an individual who would be 18 by the general election could vote in a primary, even if not 18 by the date of the primary. EL §3-102(a) provides that a qualified voter includes an individual who "is at least 18 years or will be 18 years old on or before the day of the next succeeding general or special election."

On December 11, 2006, the Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Lamone v. Capozzi, 396 Md. 53, 912 A.2d 674 (2006). In that case, the Court held that an "early voting" system created by the Legislature was unconstitutional. In extending that holding to primary elections, the Court held that Article I, §1 applied to primary elections. It stated:

[P]rimary elections are included within the meaning of "at all elections to be held in this State" in Article I, §1: if Article I, §1 were read to exclude primary elections, "such a reading could lead to an absurd result, as it would eliminate all Constitutional qualifications for primary elections. Thus, a 12 year-old, non-U.S. citizen, residing in Virginia, would not be barred by the [Maryland] Constitution from voting in the Maryland primary election." Such a reading simply cannot be correct.

396 Md. at 89 (quoting from circuit court opinion). Although the *Capozzi* case itself did not concern the age of primary voters, its holding that the qualifications set forth in Article I, §1,

apply to primary elections means that a voter must be 18 in order to vote in a primary election.

On December 18, 2006, the Office of the Attorney General advised the State Board that the *Capozzi* decision only individuals who will turn 18 before the next primary election should be permitted to register. *See* Exhibit 1 at 4, attached hereto. The parties' associational rights were not a consideration in that advice because the parties did not then have rules that permitted 17-year olds to participate in their primaries.

Based on this advice from the Office of the Attorney General, the State Board immediately notified 17-year old voters who would not be 18 years or older by the date of the 2008 primary that they were not eligible to vote in that election. See Exhibit 2.

# B. The State Board's Current Policy Concerning 17-Year Old Voters.

On December 10, 2007, the Maryland Democratic Party adopted a resolution – now a Party rule – to allow 17-year olds to vote in its primary election. The Maryland Republican Party advised the Attorney General on December 18, 2007, that it was adopting the same policy. Both parties requested that the State Board allow all individuals who meet the qualifications of EL §3-102(a) be allowed to register and vote in all elections, including the primary election on February 12, 2008.

These developments prompted State Senator Jamie Raskin to ask whether the newly adopted rules of the State's two principal political parties affected the Office of Attorney General's prior advice that *Capozzi* had the effect of barring primary participation by

potential voters who were not yet 18 years old. On December 19, 2007, Attorney General Douglas Gansler issued an advice letter responding to that inquiry. See Exhibit 3. The Attorney General first reaffirmed the advice previously given to the State Board that the Maryland Constitution, as construed in Capozzi, generally requires that voters be 18 to vote in primary elections. He then noted, however, that the parties' recent rule changes constituted assertions by those parties of their federal rights of freedom of association under the First Amendment. Attorney General Gansler advised that no state interest was implicated that would override the parties' rights of association because, in enacting EL §3-102(a), the General Assembly expressed a policy in favor of allowing such voters to participate in the primary. Accordingly, he recommended that the State Board permit 17-year olds to vote in the primary.

As noted, the basis for the Attorney General's conclusion that the statutory authorization of primary voting by certain 17-year olds, as set out in EL § 3-102(a), survives Carpozzi, was that the political parties had asserted a paramount, federally protected First Amendment right to associate with 17-year olds in their primaries. That conclusion does not

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> The Supreme Court has held that political parties have a First Amendment right of association to determine who will participate in "the 'basic function' of selecting the Party's candidates." Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, 479 U.S. 208, 216 (1986); see also Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 224 (1989)("[P]artisan political organizations enjoy freedom of association protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments"). In a case involving a primary election, the Court of Appeals has characterized the parties' First Amendment rights as "indisputable." Suessman v. Lamone, 383 Md. 697, 722 (2004).

apply to nonpartisan elections in which the political parties play no role.<sup>3</sup> Accordingly, the State Board adopted a resolution on December 20, 2007, allowing 17-year olds to vote in party primaries and decided on January 3, 2008 that:

A 17-year old who is a Democrat or Republican may vote in a primary election. However, if the voter lives in a county with nonpartisan contests on the ballot, the voter must vote by provisional ballot so that the local board of elections can ensure that the voter did not cast votes in the nonpartisan contests. If a vote was cast in a non-partisan contest, this vote will not be counted, and only votes that the 17-year old casts in the party races will be counted.

See Exhibit 2.

# C. Plaintiffs' Allegations

## 1. The Snyder Complaint

Carl was born on October 11, 1990 in Frederick County and has resided there since birth. Complaint, ¶3. He applied for voter registration in early May 2007 and received a Voter Notification Card (VNC) issued on May 21, 2007, which indicated his association with the Democratic Party. *Id.*, ¶¶ 4-6.

In December 2007, Carl became aware from the State Board's web site that, under the State Board's policy at that time, a voter had to be at least 18 years old on the date of the election in which he wishes to vote, even if that election is a primary election. Complaint,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Allegany, Calvert, Carroll, Cecil, Frederick, Howard, Montgomery, Queen Anne's, Talbot and Washington Counties have non-partisan contests on all or some of the primary ballots. All of the contests are school board races, except that Allegany County also has municipal races.

¶ 8. Carl's father pursued administrative remedies with the Frederick County Board of Elections and the State Board. *Id.*, ¶¶ 10-14.

On December 21, a State Board hearing officer dismissed the complaint as moot, in light of the State Board's adoption of a resolution on December 20 allowing individuals in Carl's situation to vote in the February 12, 2008 party primary election. Complaint, ¶ 15. By letter dated January 8, 2008, the State Board informed Carl that he was eligible to vote for party offices in the primary. *Id.*, ¶ 16.

In Frederick County, there will be a nonpartisan primary election on February 12, 2008 to nominate candidates for the Frederick County Board of Education in which Carl wishes to vote. Complaint, ¶ 18. Carl's father sought a ruling that Carl could vote in the nonpartisan school board election, in addition to the Democratic Party primary. When the State Board refused to reconsider the complaint it dismissed as moot, Carl's father filed a complaint addressing this additional issue. *Id.*, ¶¶ 19-22. The State Board dismissed the second complaint because he did not allege any violations of the Election Law Article.

In this case, Carl's father requests an injunction requiring the State Board to allow Carl to vote by regular ballot and to have his votes counted "in the usual way, in all contests on the ballot in Frederick County on February 12, 2008." Complaint, ¶¶ 23, 26.

#### 2. The Boltuck Complaint

Sarah was born on July 21, 1990, and has resided in Montgomery County since 1998.

Complaint, ¶ 3. She submitted an application to register to vote to the Montgomery County

Board of Elections in May or June 2007 and received a letter dated June 11, 2007 notifying her that her application had been rejected under the State Board's former policy that predated the Party rule changes. Id., ¶¶ 4, 5. The rejection letter explained that "you do not qualify for registration and voting in this county because you will not have reached 18 years old by the date of the next election." Id., ¶ 5.

After correspondence between Sarah's father and the Montgomery County Board of Elections, the State Board informed Sarah on January 11, 2008, that she is eligible to vote for party offices in the February 2008 primary. Complaint, ¶ 14. As in Frederick County, the primary election in Montgomery County will have nonpartisan school board contest in which Sarah allegedly wishes to vote. Id., ¶¶ 15, 16. On January 18, 2008, Sarah's father filed a complaint with this Court that echoed and adopted the claims made by Carl's father. Id., ¶ 18.

#### ARGUMENT

There is no dispute in this case that the State Board is correctly applying Maryland's election law, and the applicable federal and state constitutional provisions, to permit Carl and Sarah to participate in their own political party's partisan primary election. The only questions before the Court are whether (1) Carl and Sarah also have a right to participate in nonpartisan elections where their party's associational rights are not implicated and (2) Carl and Sarah have a protected right to use standard ballots rather than provisional ones. The answer to both questions is "no."

As a general matter, Article I, § 1 of the Maryland Constitution, as interpreted by the Court of Appeals in *Capozzi*, limits the right to vote in both primary and general elections to those who are 18 years old and otherwise qualified. As determined by the Attorney General and implemented by the State Board, there is an exception to this general rule that allows some 17-year olds to vote in the Democratic and Republican primary elections. That exception is necessary in order to respect the parties' First Amendment associational rights given the absence of any overriding state interest in excluding 17-year old party members from voting. Because the political parties have no associational interest with respect to nonpartisan primary races, however, the general rule applies to those races and, accordingly, Article I, § 1 and *Capozzi* together dictate that all voters in nonpartisan primaries must be at least 18 years old.

The State Board has adopted a provisional ballot process that allows eligible 17-year olds to vote in partisan primary elections consistent with First Amendment requirements, but not nonpartisan elections to which those First Amendment requirements do not apply. The State Board's use of provisional ballots fully respects Carl's and Sarah's constitutional and statutory rights. Carl's and Sarah's vote in their party's primary will be counted just as fully as if they were to cast their votes on the electronic voting units that most (but not all) older voters use. Using provisional ballots is the only practical means available to the State Board to assure that only eligible voters vote in the nonpartisan races, in which 17-year olds are not eligible to vote.

# I. CARL'S AND SARAH'S DERIVATIVE RIGHT TO VOTE IN THEIR PARTY'S PRIMARY DOES NOT ENTITLE THEM TO VOTE IN THE NONPARTISAN RACES.

In Capozzi the Court of Appeals determined that Article I, §1 applies to all elections in the State, including primary elections. 396 Md. at 89. In general, in order to vote in a primary election, an individual must be 18 years old. While the Attorney General recently recognized an exception to this rule when a political party determines who may participate in its primaries and invites 17-year olds who are eligible to vote under EL §3-102(a), that exception does not apply to nonpartisan races in which the political parties have no interest. Accordingly, the State Board correctly decided that a voter must be 18 on primary day to vote in a nonpartisan race.

EL §8-802(a)(1)(i) provides that members of boards of education are elected on a nonpartisan basis. In a primary election to nominate board of education candidates, any registered voter of the county may vote in those contests for nomination regardless of party affiliation or lack of party affiliation. EL §8-802(a)(1)(ii). Thus, candidates for the school board are to file certificates of candidacy, be certified on and appear on the ballot, be voted on, nominated and elected without regard to party affiliation or lack thereof. EL §8-802(a)(2).

The Attorney General's December 19, 2007, advice letter correctly reaffirmed that, except for these associational rights, an individual must be 18 to vote in a primary election.

Unless these associational rights apply, the right of a 17-year old to vote is controlled by the

Capozzi holding. Under Capozzi, unaffiliated voters must be at least 18 to participate in the nonpartisan primary. Plaintiffs' claim of an entitlement to vote in nonpartisan primaries is foreclosed by Capozzi.

# II. PLAINTIFFS' CHALLENGE TO THE USE OF PROVISIONAL BALLOTS FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM.

The State Board's use of provisional ballots in this situation is the only practical means of assuring that 17-year olds do not cast votes in the nonpartisan contests for which they are ineligible. Under Maryland law, a provisional ballot is available to a voter when an election judge asserts that an individual is not eligible to vote. EL §9-404. Far from depriving Carl and Sarah of their constitutional or statutory rights, using provisional ballots is consistent with law and assures that Carl's and Sarah's vote in their party's primary will be counted just as fully as if they were to cast their votes on the electronic voting units. See Nader for President 2004 v. Md. State Bd. of Elections, 399 Md. 681, 702 (2007) (acknowledging that when a voter is given a provisional ballot, that ballot "is counted, if the address, and thus the right to vote, is later verified").

No court has ever held that casting a provisional ballot—as opposed to voting on an electronic voting unit—deprives a voter of his or her constitutional rights.<sup>4</sup> Congress created a system of provisional balloting under which a ballot would be submitted on election day

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> So long as the ballot is counted, the form of the ballot is immaterial. See, e.g., Hammond v. Hickel, 588 P.2d 256, 270 (Alaska 1978) (rejecting argument that ballots should have been cast on paper rather than punch cards).

but counted only if the person was later determined to have been entitled to vote. See, e.g., Sandusky County Democratic Party v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 565, 569 (6th Cir. 2004) (explaining the Help American Vote Act (HAVA)). This is the approach that the State Board has adopted to count Carl's and Sarah's votes.

Under Maryland law, an individual is eligible to cast a provisional ballot if:

- (1) the individual declares in a written affirmation submitted with the provisional ballot that the individual is a registered voter in the State and is eligible to vote in the election; and ...
- (2) (ii) an election official asserts that the individual is not eligible to vote.

  EL §9-404. Provisional ballots are counted by the canvassing board of a local board of elections on the first Monday after an election. COMAR 33.16.04.03. While the local board may not reject a provisional ballot except by unanimous vote, the local board must reject the ballot if an individual is not eligible to cast it. EL §11-303(d)(1), (d)(2)(i).

The State Board has previously used provisional ballots in other situations, including when a voter has moved 21 days before an election and that change is not reflected in the voter registry, as well as when, during the 2006 gubernatorial primary, Montgomery County neglected to supply polling places with sufficient voter access cards. The State Board's interpretation of the statute it administers to permit the use of provisional ballots in these and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> HAVA leaves it up to state and local officials to determine if the an individual is eligible "under State law to vote" and whether a provisional ballot "shall be counted in that election *in accordance with State law.*" 42 U.S.C. §15482(a)(4) (emphasis added).

the instant situation is entitled to deference and "considerable weight." See Fowler v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 394 Md. 331, 343 (2006).

Consistent with the Attorney General's December 19, 2007 advice, SBE has directed election judges that 17-year olds are eligible to vote in their party's primary and ineligible to vote in the nonpartisan contests. The ballot style for the electronic voting units combines these races on a single ballot. Duncan Declaration, ¶ 9. Because of the timing of the Attorney General's advice, it was already too late to create new ballot styles for the electronic voting units which separate party and nonpartisan races without disrupting the election schedule and orderly election preparation. § Id., ¶ 8. If a voter is eligible to vote a particular race, the provisional ballot is counted just as fully as a vote from an electronic voting unit. Id. However, because a ballot is sealed in the envelope of an identifiable voter, the canvassing board can determine if the voter is eligible to vote in the nonpartisan races and ensure that only those votes that the 17-year old voter is eligible to cast will be counted. Id. This ability to exclude votes in particular races does not exist if the 17-year old votes on the electronic voting units, where the ballot style combines the party and nonpartisan races. Id.

Because Carl's and Sarah's votes in their party's primary will be counted, plaintiffs fail to state a claim for relief. Accordingly, the Court should dismiss their complaint.

Furthermore, it is simply too late for the 17-year olds to vote on the electronic voting units, even if plaintiffs were to prevail on their claims. The Court of Appeals has recognized

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Ms. Duncan explains the sequence of events necessary to create 100 separate ballot styles and voter access cards for 17,000 voting units. Declaration, ¶¶ 3-8.

that injunctive relief "may be inappropriate in an elections case if the election is too close for the State, realistically, to implement the necessary pragmatic changes before the election." Liddy v. Lamone, 398 Md. 233, 250 (2007). As explained in the accompanying Second Declaration of Donna Duncan, the reprogramming and database changes necessary to enable 17-year olds to vote on the electronic voting units cannot be accomplished before the primary election on February 12. Second Duncan Decl., ¶ 2.

In order to vote on an electronic voting unit, a voter access card has to be encoded for the voter after he or she checks in to vote. Second Duncan Decl., ¶3. Voter access cards are encoded by the electronic pollbooks. *Id.* Programming and database for the electronic pollbooks was finalized on January 28, 2008, and sent to the local boards of elections for loading onto the pollbooks on February 1, 2008. *Id.* The pollbooks will be programmed so that the 17-year olds can only receive a provisional ballot, not a voter access card. *Id.* The only option that would allow 17-year olds to vote on the electronic voting units is to reprogram the pollbooks. *Id.* This option is administratively infeasible at this late date because it will require: reprogramming the pollbooks to allow the 17-year olds to vote on electronic voting unit; testing the programing changes, including detailed logic and accuracy testingl redistributing the database to the local boards of election; and reloading the database and programming changes on 1300 pollbooks. *Id.* 

# CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should grant defendant's motion to dismiss or for summary judgment.

Respectfully Submitted,

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## MEMORANDUM

December 18, 2006

TO:

Linda Lamone

FROM:

Mark J. Davis

SUBJECT: Analysis of Court of Appeals Decision in Lamone v. Capozzi

On December 11, 2006, the Court of Appeals issued its opinion explaining its order dated August 25, which affirmed a circuit court order that declared the early voting statute unconstitutional. As I explain below, the Court's opinion has ramifications for provisional voting, absentee balloting, and voter registration.

# I. The Opinion

On April 9, 2005, the General Assembly passed Senate Bill 478, which authorized early voting in Maryland. The Governor vetoed the bill on May 20, 2005. On January 16, 2006, both houses of the General Assembly overrode the veto, enacting Senate Bill 478 as Chapter 5, Maryland Laws 2006, and adding a new §10-301.1 to the Election Law Article ("EL"). During the 2006 legislative session, HB 1368, another early voting bill, was passed as emergency legislation and vetoed by the Governor. That veto, too, was overridden and the bill became Chapter 61, Laws of Maryland 2006. The bill repealed and reenacted §10-301.1 with amendments, creating early voting as follows: a voting period for eleven hours each day for a five-day period beginning the Tuesday before a primary or general election through the Saturday before election day at designated sites.

On July 16, 2006, plaintiffs filed suit alleging that the early voting legislation violated various state constitutional provisions, claiming essentially that Article I only permitted inperson ballot voting and absentee voting. On August 8, 2006, the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County declared §10-301.1 unconstitutional and void. On August 25, 2006, the

Exhibit 1

Court of Appeals heard argument and affirmed the circuit court in an order for reasons to be stated in an opinion to follow.

In the opinion that followed on December 11, the Court emphasized importance of the plain language principle of constitutional interpretation. Slip Op. at 18-20. Thus, the Court held that authorizing voters to cast ballots beginning the Tuesday through the Saturday before the election "is clearly inconsistent with the words of, and the plain meaning of Article XV, §7 and the other constitutional provisions that designate the "Tuesday next after the first Monday of November," as the date of the general election." *Id.* at 24-25. The Court read §7 to require that "the election shall be held *on* a specific day. . . [and] any statute that allows for a ballot to be cast before the prescribed day must be in derogation of the Constitution." *Id.* at 33.

The Court also literally interpreted Art. I, §1, which provides that a voter can only vote in the election district or ward in which he resides. Noting that EL §10-301.1 allows for early voting to occur outside of a person's district or ward, the Court held that the statute violated Art. I, §1, because "[w]e view the language in Article I, §1, as a mandatory requirement, not as a mere 'entitlement,' capable of being waived." *Id.* at 35-36.

Finally, the Court held that "primary elections are included within the meaning of 'at all elections to be held in this State' in Article I, §1," *id.* at 40; and that early voting is not a form of absentee voting, holding that "Article I, §3 clearly indicates that the inability to vote personally applies to 'absent' voters, not those who find the voting day to be inconvenient." *Id.* at 41.

### II. Ramifications of the Opinion.

## A. Provisional Voting.

The opinion makes clear that a provisional ballot cast outside the voter's district cannot be counted, even for candidates, such as statewide candidates, that the voter would be eligible to vote for in his or her district. As explained below, EL §§9-404(a) and 11-303(e) must be interpreted to apply to circumstances where a voter who is at the wrong polling place is in the same district as the correct polling place.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> A polling place is located within a district or ward which may consist of multiple precincts. A local board may combine or abolish precincts, *see* EL §2-303, but may not change a district or ward, which are established by local government.

Although provisional ballots are required by the federal Help American Vote Act (HAVA), "the individual's vote shall be counted as a vote... in accordance with state law." HAVA, §302(a)(4). Maryland law provides that an individual is eligible to cast a provisional ballot if the individual declares that he or she is a registered voter in the State and is eligible to vote in the election; and the individual's name does not appear on the precinct register, an election official asserts the individual is not eligible to vote, or the individual does not have the necessary identification. EL §9-404(b). An individual who is eligible may cast a provisional ballot at a polling place on election day; or at the local board office in the county where the individual resides. EL §9-404(a).

Under Capozzi, a ballot cast at other than the voter's correct district or ward may not be counted, which requires that the EL §11-303(e) be interpreted differently than it has been in recent elections. That provision states:

#### A local board shall count:

- (1) the entire provisional ballot if the address on the provisional ballot application is within the precinct where the provisional ballot was cast; or
- (2) only the votes cast by the voter for each candidate or question applicable to the precinct in which the voter resides, as determined by the address on the provisional ballot application of the voter.

SBE issued guidelines for the 2006 November elections that mirrored the language of the statute. See Guidelines for the Administration of Provisional Voting (June 21, 2006), §7.4D.<sup>2</sup> SBE instructed local boards to count ballots that the voter would have been eligible to vote for in his home precinct. For example, a vote cast by a Towson resident at a polling place in Essex would have been counted for the statewide races and for county executive, but not for any of the local races (e.g., House of Delegates, State Senate or County Council) that were not on the ballot at the voter's Towson precinct.

As a result of *Capozzi*, however, no votes cast by the Towson voter would be counted; his vote will count only if his out-of-precinct vote is cast in the same Towson district in which he resides. The election judges at the Essex polling place should be instructed to advise the Towson voter to go to his correct polling place or his vote will not be counted.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> EL §11-303(a) provides that the canvass is to be conducted in accordance with the regulations and guidelines established by the State Board. SBE regulations relating to provisional ballots-found at COMAR 33.16-do not describe how provisional ballots are to be counted.

Although an individual who is eligible to vote a provisional ballot may do so at the local board office, see EL §9-404(a), that vote will not count if the board office is outside the voter's ward or district. An absentee ballot cast at the local board offices beginning on the Wednesday before the election until the closing of the polls on election day, see EL §9-305(c), is not subject to Capozzi and will be counted. Thus, local board staff should inform voters of their option to cast an absentee ballot to avoid the Capozzi problem and assure that their votes are counted.

### B. Absentee Voting

Capozzi did not involve the constitutionality of the new no-excuse absentee voting statute, EL §9-304, but the Court read Article I, §3 very strictly.<sup>3</sup> The Court held that early voting is not a form of absentee voting and that "the inability to vote personally applies to 'absent' voters, not those who find the voting day to be inconvenient." Sip. Op. at 41.

The current language of the absentee voter's oath does not contain a statement that the voter will be absent or will be unable to vote in person on election day.<sup>4</sup> We therefore recommend that the absentee voter's oath be changed to track the language of Article I, §3.

# C. Voter Registration.

Article I, §1 provides that an individual must be 18 in order to vote. Capozzi holds that "primary elections are included within the meaning of 'at all elections to be held in this State' in Article I, §1." Slip Op. at 40. EL §3-102(a) provides that a qualified voter includes an individual who "is at least 18 years or will be 18 years old on or before the day of the next succeeding general or special election."

The statute thus violates §1 because it permits an individual who has not yet turned 18 to vote in a primary election. The statute should be amended to add the word "primary" so that the pertinent phrase reads "next succeeding general, *primary*, or special election." In any event, only individuals who will turn 18 before the next election should be permitted to register.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Article I, §3 provides in part that the General Assembly may provides for voting by qualified voters "who are absent at the time of any election in which they are entitled to vote and for voting by other qualified voters who are unable to vote personally."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> COMAR 33.11.03.03 provides that the State Board prescribe the form and content of the instructions for marking and returning the absentee ballots.

Please let me know if you require clarification of these issues or require further assistance.

cc: Ross Goldstein Donna Duncan Nikki Trella Mary Wagner Skip to Main Content

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#### **VOTER REGISTRATION**

# Voting Rights for 17 Year Olds

#### Introduction

Restoration of Voting Rights in Maryland

Students enrolled in a Maryland institution of higher education

Voter Registration Application
Voter Registration Statistics

#### Overview

An individual who is 17 years old may vote in the 2008 Presidential Primary Election, provided:

- The individual will be 18 years old on or before November 4, 2008 (the date of the Presidential General Election); and
- . The individual is registered to vote and is affiliated with the Democratic or Republican Party.

As explained in detail below, 17 year olds are only permitted to cast votes for partisan races (i.e. President, Congress, Delegates to the National Conventions). They are not permitted to cast votes in non-partisan contests (i.e. school board races, ballot issues, and municipal elections). Since ballots contain both partisan and non-partisan contests, a 17 year old who resides in a county (or part of a county) that has a non-partisan contest on the ballot will be given a provisional ballot. That ballot will be counted after the local board of elections inspects the ballot to ensure that no votes are cast for non-partisan contests. If a vote is cast for a non-partisan contest, those votes will not be counted, but the rest of the ballot will be counted.

#### **Background and Explanation**

**December 11, 2006** – The Maryland Court of Appeals filed its formal written opinion in <u>Lamone v. Capozzl</u>, the lawsuit that challenged the constitutionality of early voting. One of the questions that the Court addressed was whether early voting, even if it was determined to be unconstitutional, could still be used in a primary election. The Court, in answering that question, concluded that "primary elections are included within the meaning of 'at all elections to be held in this State' in Article 1, §1." That section of the Constitution also provides that an individual must be 18 years of age or older to vote.

December 18, 2006 – The Office of the Attorney General wrote an <u>analysis of the ramifications</u> of the Capozzi decision. That analysis concluded that, since the Court of Appeals determined that primary elections must comply with Article 1, §1 of the Maryland Constitution, it is unconstitutional to allow 17 year olds to vote in primary elections (as required under Election Law Article § 3-102(a) of the Annotated Code of Maryland). Based on this advice, the State Board of Elections began to administer the law accordingly and notified 17 year old voters who would not be 18 years old or older by the 2008 Presidential Primary Election that they were not eligible to vote in that election.

**December 19, 2007** – The Attorney General, in response to an inquiry by State Senator Jamie Raskin dated December 17, 2007, drafted a <u>second letter of advice</u> on the issue of allowing 17 year olds to vote in primary elections. In the opinion, the Attorney General reaffirmed the advice previously given that voters must be 18 years of age or older to vote in primary elections. However, because the Democratic and Republican Parties (on December 10, 2007) asserted their federal constitutional rights to freedom of association, the Attorney General concluded that prohibiting 17 year olds from registering and voting in a primary election violated the political parties' First Amendment associational rights to include in their primary elections certain voters under the age of 18. Based on this new interpretation, the members of the State Board of Elections convened on <u>December 20, 2007</u>, and determined to follow the advice of the Attorney General and allow 17 year olds who will be 18 on or before the Presidential General Election to register and vote in the upcoming Presidential

January 2, 2008 – In Attorney General Doug Gansler's letter to Senator Raskin, he concluded that, "SBE should implement § 3-102(a) as it has in the past - by registering and allowing to vote those persons who are at least 18 years old or will be 18 years old on or before the day of the next succeeding general or special election." In the past, all 17 year olds who would be 18 years old or older on or before the next general election were permitted to vote in a primary election. This included allowing 17 years olds who were unaffiliated with either the Democratic or Republican Parties to vote in a non-partisan (i.e., school board or municipal) election.

Since the basis for allowing 17 year olds to vote in a primary election is the associational rights of the principal political parties, staff members asked for clarification on whether a 17 year old voter who will be 18 on or before the next general election **and** who is unaffiliated with the Democratic or Republican Parties is permitted to vote in a primary election. Similarly, clarification was requested on whether a 17 year old who

will be 18 on or before the next general election **and** who is affiliated with either the Democratic or Republican Party can vote for any non-partisan primary contests on the ballot (i.e. School board or municipal contest).

January 3, 2008 – The Office of the Attorney General advised that 17 year olds who will be 18 on or before a general election may vote in a primary election only if they are affiliated with either the Democratic or Republican Party and may only vote for partisan contests – not non-partisan contests. Following this advice:

- A 17 year old who is not affiliated with either the Republican or Democratic Party is not registered and may not vote in a primary election; and
- 2. A 17 year old who is a Democrat or Republican may vote in a primary election. However, if the voter lives in Allegany, Calvert, Carroll, Cecil, Frederick, Howard, Montgomery, Queen Anne's, Talbot, or Washington Counties (counties with non-partisan contests on all or some of the Presidential Primary Election ballots), the voter must vote by provisional ballot so that the local board of elections can ensure that he or she did not cast any votes in the non-partisan contests. If a vote was cast in a non-partisan contest, this vote will not be counted, and only votes that the 17 year old is entitled to cast (i.e., partisan contests) will be counted.

The following table shows who can vote in the upcoming Presidential Primary Election and how the voter will vote.

|  | Age  | Party<br>Affiliation   | County  | Method of<br>Voting  | Explanation   |
|--|--|--|---|--|---|
| 17 but will be 18<br>on or before 2008<br>Presidential<br>General Election<br>(Nov. 4, 2008) | 1  | Democrat or<br>Republican  | Montgomery or county with non-partisan contest - see list of counties above | Provisional<br>Ballot  | Since the voter will be 18 on or before the 2008 Presidential General Election and she is affiliated with either the Democratic or Republican Party, she can vote in the upcoming Primary Election. Since Montgomery County has a non-partisan school board contest on the primary election ballot, the voter must vote a provisional ballot. |
|  | Democrat or<br>Republican  | Prince George's<br>or county<br>without a<br>non-partisan<br>contest | Reguiar ballot<br>cast on<br>touchscreen                                    | Since the voter will be 18 on or before the 2008 Presidential General Election and he is affiliated with either the Democratic or Republican Party, he can vote in the upcoming Primary Election. Since there is no non-partisan contest in Prince George's County, he can vote a regular ballot on the touchscreen. |   |
|  |  | Unaffiliated or<br>Affiliated with<br>Other Party                    | Any county  | Not registered<br>and cannot<br>vote.  | Since the voter is not affiliated with a party that nominates candidates at the primary election, he cannot register at this time and may not vote in the upcoming Primary Election.  |
|  | 17 but will be 18<br>after the<br>Presidential<br>General Election | Any party or unaffiliated  | Any county  | Not registered<br>and cannot<br>vote.  | Since the voter will not be 18 by the 2008<br>Presidential General Election, she cannot<br>vote in the upcoming Primary Election.   |

#### Questions and Answers for Provisional Voters

#### How will you know whether your ballot is counted?

You can go online 10 days after election day to the State Board of Elections' website (<a href="www.elections.state.md.us">www.elections.state.md.us</a>) to find out whether your provisional ballot application was accepted and whether it was counted. Please note that Maryland always counts provisional and absentee ballots, regardless of whether or not they will make a difference in the outcome of the election.

#### How will the privacy of your vote be protected?

The local boards of elections take great care to open and remove provisional and absentee ballots in a manner that protects the secrecy of the voter's ballot. For example, the voted absentee or provisional ballot is separated from the absentee or provisional ballot envelope before any ballot review is conducted.

DOUGLAS F. GANSLER Attorney General



KATHERINE WINFREE
Chief Deputy Attorney General

JOHN B. HOWARD, JR. Deputy Attorney General

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December 19, 2007

WRITER'S DIRECT DIAL NO.

The Honorable Jamie Raskin Room 122 James Senate Office Building Annapolis, Maryland 21401

Dear Senator Raskin:

You asked whether recent changes in the rules of the State's two principal political parties affect the advice of this Office to the State Board of Elections ("SBE") concerning the application of Annotated Code of Maryland, Election Law Article ("EL"), §3-102(a). That statute provides, among other things, that an individual may register to vote if the individual will be 18 or older on the date of the next general or special election. In the past, the election boards have allowed individuals who will be 18 by the time of a general election to vote in a primary election even if the individual was not 18 at the time of the primary. However, a recent Court of Appeals decision held that a State constitutional provision that, among other things, requires a voter to be 18 or older, applies to primary elections. This Office advised SBE of the implications of that decision and, following that advice, SBE required voters to be 18 to vote in a primary election.

Your letter raises two issues, one of which this Office has previously addressed in the advice letter to SBE and one of which has arisen in the past week as a result of the changes adopted by the State's two principal political parties. As explained below, this Office reaffirms the advice previously given to SBE that the Maryland Constitution, as construed in a recent Court of Appeals case, requires that voters be 18 to vote in primary elections. Nonetheless, because the political parties have, in recent days, asserted their federal constitutional rights to freedom of association, you have asked the Office to address the different question whether the Maryland Constitution as recently construed – at least with regard to the voter-age requirement – violates the parties' First Amendment associational rights to include in their primaries certain voters under the age of 18.

200 Saint Paul Place \* Baltimore, Maryland, 21202-2021
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Exhibit 3

For the reasons explained below, it is my view that the conflict between the Maryland constitutional provision and the First Amendment rights now asserted by the parties requires that SBE permit 17-year-olds who will be 18 by the next general election to vote in the parties' primary elections.

## Background

Article I, §1 of the Maryland Constitution sets forth the basic qualifications for voting in Maryland. It provides:

Every citizen of the United States, of the age of 18 years or upwards, who is a resident of the State as of the time for the closing of registration next preceding the election, shall be entitled to vote in the ward or election district in which he resides at all elections to be held in this State.

In the past it had been assumed that the qualifications set forth in Article I, §1 applied only to general elections and that, pursuant to EL §3-102(a), an individual who would be 18 by the general election could vote in a primary, even if not 18 by the date of the primary.

On December 11, 2006, the Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Lamone v. Capozzi, 396 Md. 53, 912 A.2d 674 (2006). In that case, the Court held that an "early voting" system created by the Legislature was unconstitutional. In extending that holding to primary elections, the Court held that Article I, §1 applied to primary elections. It stated:

[P]rimary elections are included within the meaning of "at all elections to be held in this State" in Article I, § 1: if Article I, § 1 were read to exclude primary elections, "such a reading could lead to an absurd result, as it would eliminate all Constitutional qualifications for primary elections. Thus, a 12 year-old, non-U.S. citizen, residing in Virginia, would not be barred by the [Maryland] Constitution from voting in the Maryland primary election." Such a reading simply cannot be correct.

396 Md. at 89, 912 A.2d at 695 (quoting from circuit court opinion). Although the *Capozzi* case itself did not concern the age of primary voters, one ramification of its holding that the qualifications set forth in Article I, §1 apply to primary elections was that a voter must be 18 in order to vote in a primary election. This Office promptly advised SBE of the implications of the *Capozzi* decision and, following the advice of counsel, SBE instituted a policy stating

The Honorable Jamie Raskin December 19, 2007 Page 3

that a voter must be 18 on or before the day of any election in which the individual wishes to vote. While that advice was correct, you have advised that the parties have recently changed their rules and have therefore introduced the second question raised by your inquiry.

#### Party Rule Changes

Under the State election law, the two principal parties in the State, the Democratic and Republican parties, are required to select their candidates for most offices through primary elections. EL §8-202. Until recently, the two principal political parties simply adopted the primary system established by State law. However, we understand that the Democratic party has changed its rules to allow 17-year olds to vote in its primary election if they will be 18 at the time of the general election. You state in your letter that the Republican party is going to make a similar change. Both parties have requested that the SBE allow all individuals who meet the qualifications of EL § 3-102(a) be allowed to register and vote in all elections, including the primary election on February 12, 2008. Thus, both principal political parties have indicated that they wish to open their nomination processes to individuals who will be 18 by the time of the general election even if they are not 18 on the date of the primary.

#### Analysis

Maryland law recognizes that the United States Constitution "shall be the Supreme Law of the State ... anything in the Constitution or Law of this State to the contrary notwithstanding." Maryland Declaration of Rights, Article 2. The federal constitution recognizes certain rights possessed by political parties, including First Amendment associational rights. Your request, together with the recent rule changes adopted by the Democratic and Republican parties, requires that we consider those rights in advising how SBE should implement EL §3-102(a).

The Supreme Court has held that political parties have a First Amendment right of association to determine who will participate in "the basic function of selecting the Party's candidates." Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, 479 U.S. 208, 216 (1986); see also Eu v. San Francisco Co. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 224 (1989)("[P]artisan political organizations enjoy freedom of association protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments"). The Court has outlined the tests to be applied to state regulation of elections as follows:

The Honorable Jamie Raskin December 19, 2007 Page 4

Regulations that impose severe burdens on association rights must be narrowly tailored to serve a state government interest. ... [W]hen regulations impose lesser burdens, "a state's important regulatory interests will usually be enough to justify reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions."

Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 586-87 (2005) (citations omitted).

Here, the two principal parties, which are compelled by State law to use the State's primary election apparatus to select their nominees, have indicated that they wish to ensure the participation in that selection process of certain members who will be eligible to vote in the general election – i.e., individuals who will be 18 by the time of the general election but who have not attained that age by the time of the primary. The exclusion of those individuals from the primary undeniably burdens the associational rights of Maryland's political parties. "[I]t is '[t]he moment of choosing the party's nominee' that matters ... for that is 'the crucial juncture at which the appeal to common principles may be translated into concerted action, and hence to political power in the community." Id. at 590 (citations omitted); see also id. at 599 ("It is here that the parties invite voters to join in selecting their standard bearers. The outcome is pivotal, of course, for it dictates the range of choices available at – and often the presumptive winner of – the general election") (O'Connor, J., concurring).

Under the analysis established by the Supreme Court, a burden on associational rights is weighed against the State interest in the policy that affects those rights. Here, however, it is not necessary to determine whether application of an 18-year old age requirement to primary elections would impose a severe or lesser burden. Under either test, it is my view that no State interest is implicated that would override the parties' rights of association under the First Amendment. Indeed, the General Assembly, in enacting EL § 3-102(a), expressed a legislative policy in favor of permitting such voters to exercise the franchise in the primary - a policy that coincides with the associational interests recently embraced by the parties. The Court of Appeals in Capozzi did not articulate a State interest in excluding these voters from the parties' primary elections; rather, it simply applied Article I, §1, of the State Constitution to primary elections. To our knowledge, nothing in the history of Article I, §1, indicates a specific State interest in excluding from primary elections those 17-year olds who will be 18 by the time of the general election. Faced with this conflict between a longstanding legislative enactment, reinforced by the United States Constitution on one hand, and the Court of Appeals' general holding with respect to Article I, §1 of the State Constitution on the other, the new party rules and legislative policy reflected in EL §3-102(a) should be given effect,

The Honorable Jamie Raskin December 19, 2007 Page 5

#### Conclusion

In short, it is my view that, in light of the recent party rule changes that implicate the parties' associational rights under the federal constitution, SBE should implement EL §3-102(a) as it has in the past — by registering and allowing to vote those persons who are at least 18 years old or will be 18 years old on or before the day of the next succeeding general or special election.

Sincerely,

Douglas F. Gansler Attorney General

cc: State Board of Elections

#### DECLARATION OF DONNA DUNCAN

- I, Donna Duncan, state as follows:
- 1. I am over the age of 18 and am competent to be a witness.
- 2. I am the Director of the Election Management Division for the Maryland State Board of Elections ("State Board"). In that capacity, I am responsible for supervising the design of the ballots for the February 12, 2008 primary. In Maryland there are two methods of voting: the AccuVote Touchscreen Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) units for polling place voting; and paper Optical Scan (OS) ballots for absentee and provisional voting.
- 3. A ballot style is a unique set of candidates and/or ballot questions for a certain group of voters. Nearly 100 separate ballot styles in the State have been created for the February primary. Approximately 17,000 DRE units will be used in the upcoming primary statewide; voter access cards must be created for each unit to reflect each of the ballot styles used in the jurisdiction in which the unit will be deployed.
- 4. The process of ballot design follows a carefully planned schedule which cannot be disturbed without causing significant confusion and jeopardizing the integrity of the election. A specialized ballot programmer is contracted to come to Maryland for a scheduled period of time to design and produce each of the ballots. The programmer performs this function for many states and is only available for the scheduled period of

time. This schedule is established up to a year in advance. Outside of the existing contract, the 2008 rate of pay for this person is \$200.00 per hour.

- 5. On December 19, data was loaded into the election management system (GEMS) and ballots styles were generated assigning a unique number to each ballot style. Thus, on the same day that the Attorney General recommended that 17 year olds who would be 18 by the date of the general election ("17 year olds") and who are affiliated with a principal political party be permitted to vote in the primary, a crucial step in the schedule had already been completed. After these numbers were assigned, the numbers were exported from GEMS to other software applications such as MDVoters, the computerized voter registration system, and used throughout the election administration process to properly identify the correct ballot for a particular voter and to determine the number of printed ballots to order.
- 6. On December 20, the first set of ballot proofs were distributed to the local boards of election, and the same ballot data was transmitted to an audio recording studio for final preparation of the ballot data bases. The final ballot data base must include audio reading of all offices and candidates as well as operational instructions to allow blind and visually-impaired voters to vote on the DRE units. A Maryland primary ballot is designed to contain both party primary and the nonpartisan contests.
- 7. On December 28, the local boards of election received electronic copies of the touch screen ballots for printing the specimen ballot mailed out to voters or for other

printed notices of election and the OS ballots to be faxed to military and overseas voters.

These ballots are also used in the program to assist nursing home residents to cast their absentee ballots or for voters that may require a ballot prior to the local boards of election receiving the printed OS ballots.

- 8. During the first two weeks of January, final ballot data bases for the DREs were distributed to the local boards to enable the boards to begin creating the voter access cards for each of the 17,000 units. During the first week of January, the company responsible for printing was given the ballot styles and directed to begin printing the OS ballots. On January 14, the local boards began testing the DREs loaded with these ballots styles for logic and accuracy.
- 10. Because the ballot styles do not separate races in which a 17 year old voter is eligible to participate, new ballot styles which separate party and nonpartisan races would have to be created. Yet, by December 19, 2007, the date of the Attorney General's advice letter, it was already too late to create these new ballot styles without disrupting the schedule and orderly election preparation.
- 11. As a result of the Attorney General's December 19, 2007, advice letter and his Office's January 3, 2008, clarification of that advice as applied to nonpartisan races, the State Board decided to permit the 17 year olds to vote by provisional ballots using the printed OS paper ballots. If a voter is eligible to vote in a particular race, the ballot is counted just as fully as a vote from a DRE unit. However, because a ballot is sealed in

the envelope of an identifiable voter, the canvassing board can determine if the voter is eligible to vote in the nonpartisan races and ensure that only those votes that the 17 year old is eligible to cast will be counted. This ability to exclude votes in particular races does not exist if the 17 year old votes on the DRE, where the ballot style combines the party and nonpartisan races.

I solemnly affirm under the penalties of perjury that the contents of the foregoing paper are true to the best of knowledge, information and belief.

Dated:

DONNA DUNCAN

#### SECOND DECLARATION OF DONNA DUNCAN

- I, Donna Duncan, state as follows:
- 1. I am over the age of 18 and am competent to be a witness.
- 2. I wish to make an additional declaration to discuss the feasibility of reprogramming the electronic pollbooks to permit 17-year olds who will be 18 by the general election to vote on the electronic voting units. As I explain in the next paragraph, it is simply impossible to do so before February 12, 2008.
- 3. In order to vote on an electronic voting unit, a voter access card has to be encoded for the voter after he checks in to vote. Currently, voter access cards are encoded by the electronic pollbooks. The programming and database for the electronic pollbooks was finalized on January 28, 2008, and sent to the local boards of elections for loading onto the pollbooks on February 1, 2008. The pollbooks will be programmed so that the 17-year olds can only receive a provisional ballot, not a voter access card. The only option that would allow 17-year olds to vote on the electronic voting units is to reprogram the pollbooks.
- 4. This option is administratively infeasible because it will require: reprogramming the pollbooks to allow the 17-year olds to vote on electronic voting unit; testing the programing changes, including detailed logic and accuracy testing redistributing the database to the local boards of election; and reloading the database and programming changes on 1300 pollbooks.

I solemnly affirm under the penalties of perjury that the contents of this declaration are true to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief.

Dated

Donna Duncan

# IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY, MARYLAND

| CLIFFORD E. SNYDER, JR. on behalf of    | *   |  |
|---|---|--|
| Carl Philip Snyder, his son             | *   |  |
| PLAINTIFF                               | *   |  |
| versus                                  | * Civil Action No. C-08-128760                    |  |
| STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS                | *   |  |
| DEFENDANT                               | *   |  |
| **************************************  |   |  |
| Having considered Defendant's M         | otion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment, and the |  |
| opposition thereto it is ORDERED this _ | day of, 2008, that the Motion is                  |  |
| GRANTED and:                            |   |  |
| 1. The Complaint is <b>DISMISSEI</b>    | O; or   |  |
| 2. Summary Judgment is entered          | on behalf of Defendant State Board of Elections.  |  |
|   |   |  |
|   | Circuit Court for Anne<br>Arundel County          |  |

### IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY, MARYLAND

CLIFFORD E. SNYDER, JR. on behalf of Carl Philip Snyder, his son PLAINTIFF

CIVIL ACTION

Versus

02-C-08-128760

STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS DEFENDANT

OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS OR FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff opposes Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment and cites in support of this Opposition a paper entitled "Brief to the Court" mailed on January 29, 2008 by Plaintiff to the Clerk for filing in this case.

Respectfully submitted,

Clifford E. Snyder, Jr. Plaintiff 4964 Flossie Avenue Frederick, MD 21703 (301) 473-5408

#### CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this day, January 30, 2008, I mailed, postage prepaid, a copy of the foregoing to Mark J. Davis, Esquire, Office of the Attorney General, 200 Saint Paul Place, Baltimore, MD 21202 and also transmitted a copy

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to Mr. Davis by e-mail.

Clifford E. Snyder, Jr.

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY, MARYLAND

CLIFFORD E. SNYDER, JR. and RICHARD BOLTUCK,

: Civil Nos. C-08-128755

C-08-128760

Plaintiffs,

STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS,

Defendants. : Annapolis, Maryland

--- x February 1, 2008

#### HEARING

WHEREUPON, proceedings in the above-entitled matter commenced.

BEFORE: THE HONORABLE PAUL A. HACKNER, Judge

APPEARANCES:

#### FOR THE PLAINTIFFS:

JONATHAN SHURBERG, Esq. 8720 Georgia Avenue Suite 700 Silver Spring, Maryland 20910

# FOR THE DEFENDANTS:

MARK DAVIS, Esq. AUSTIN SCHLICK, Esq. Attorney General's Office 200 St. Paul Street, 20th Floor Baltimore, Maryland 21202

> CompuScribe (301) 577-5882

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KEYNOTE: "---" Indicates inaudible in transcript.

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# PROCEEDINGS

THE CLERK: All rise.

THE COURT: Good morning, please be seated. Court is going to call two cases that are set for a hearing this morning. Richard Boltuck, et al. versus the State Board of Elections, C-08-128755 and Clifford E. Snyder, Jr., et al. versus State Board of Elections, C-08-128760. Could I please ask counsel and the parties to identify yourselves and spell your last names for the record.

MR. SHURBERG: Good morning, Your Honor, Jonathan Shurberg and the last name is S-h-u-r-b-e-r-g on behalf of Richard Boltuck who is sitting to my right.

THE COURT: All right, good morning sir.

MR. BOLTUCK: Richard Boltuck, last name is spelled B-o-l-t-u-c-k.

THE COURT: All right, sir?

MR. SNYDER: Good morning, Your Honor, Clifford E. Snyder, Jr., S-n-y-d-e-r.

THE COURT: All right, very good sir. Thank you. Counsel, good morning.

MR. DAVIS: Good morning, Your Honor, Mark Davis, D-a-v-i-s, Assistant Attorney General on behalf of Defendant, State Board of Elections, with me is Luna Lamone, the administrator on the State Board.

THE COURT: All right, good morning.

MS. LAMONE: Good morning.

THE COURT: I guess we can address a couple --

MR. DAVIS: And --

THE COURT: Oh, I am sorry, I am sorry. I thought he was just going to ignore you.

MR. SCHLICK: Austin A-u-s-t-i-n Schlick S-c-h-l-i-c-k, Office of Attorney General on behalf of the Defendant State Board. .

THE COURT: All right, thank you very much sir. I guess as a preliminary matter, we have two cases and I gather there is no objection to consolidating them, is that correct? Both parties are in agreement with that?

MR. SNYDER: That is correct, Your Honor.

MR. SHURBERG: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: That is agreeable to the State Board as well?

MR. DAVIS: Correct.

THE COURT: So, the Court has, I think there is an order in the file and I will assign it consolidating the matter and I am not sure whether there is likely to be any additional pleadings filed from this point on. I suppose we should indicate a main case, exactly. I am just trying to figure out whether — how do you all refer to this? What is your preference, it doesn't matter to me. Do you want to call it the Snyder case or the Boltuck case?

MR. SHURBERG: We have no preference Your Honor. I think Snyder appears on the top of the caption.

THE COURT: For that reason and no other reason, we will call that the main case. So, any pleadings that get filed should be filed in that Court file, okay? I apologize, I am sorry, I am fighting something that is going to keep me coughing here while we are at it. Mr. Shurberg, are you going to be representing both of the parties or just one, or how does that work?

MR. SHURBERG: I am not, Your Honor. I am representing Mr. Boltuck. I have met Mr. Snyder before, however, he has elected to represent himself before Your Honor here this morning. Your Honor, if I may, just so I am complete, if I may approach the Clerk I have a line entering my appearance and a hard copy of the memorandum that was sent by email to the Court administrator and if I may just approach?

THE COURT: Yes, sure.

 $$\operatorname{MR}.$$  SHURBERG: Those have been served on the State Board of Elections.

MR. DAVIS: Your Honor, I would like to follow him and give the Court opposition to the Defendant's motion to dismiss or for summary judgment.

THE COURT: All right, you are welcome to give it up to the Clerk.

MR. DAVIS: As well as the brief to the Court. Both of these, at least the brief to the Court was sent earlier but may not have reached the Clerk in time for filling.

THE COURT: Okay, well, I am going to tell you in a minute what I have received and we will see what we have.

What I have received as of yesterday was the opposition to the Defendant's motion to dismiss or for summary judgment filed by Mr. Snyder and his brief. I have received the Defendant's motion to dismiss or motion for summary judgment, the alternative filed on behalf of the Board in both of the cases. Did you file a pleading today other than your entry of appearance?

MR. SHURBERG: I did, Your Honor and that was sent by email to Mr. Sheridan, I believe, the night before last which was a memorandum in support of Plaintiff's complaint under section 12-202 of the Election Articles, the captioned title.

THE COURT: Well, I got this case assigned to me yesterday and as of 4:30 yesterday I asked my Clerk to call and make sure there wasn't another pleading floating around the building and I was assured that I had everything there was supposed to be. So, I have not seen your pleading and I don't want to put you at a disadvantage but, I am happy to do whatever you would like. If you want to make your argument

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before or after I take a look at it. I am happy to just take a break and look at it. I don't want to put you in a position where I don't have the benefit of your --

MR. SHURBERG: Your Honor, I am not suggesting anything, I just want to make the record clear. I don't have a copy of the email with me but I did send it to Tim Sheridan to Mr. Snyder and to Mr. Davis. My recollection is it was about five after six on Wednesday evening, January 30, 2008 and I am saying that for the record, not suggesting —

THE COURT: I don't doubt for a minute that you did it, I am just telling you --

MR. SHURBERG: And I did not receive any indication via my email that it had bounced back, that it had not been delivered. So, Your Honor, what I would respectfully request is that I would like you to take the opportunity to read my memorandum because I think it adds -- well, to say I think it takes a little bit of a different

THE COURT: Well, I would like to do that and I will take the liberty of turning page 10 upside down.

approach than does either of the other pleadings.

MR. SHURBERG: Yes, Your Honor, I noticed that this morning and I didn't have a staple remover. I noticed that in the car as I was reading it and I apologize. On all my copies it was right, there is a long story behind it and I won't bore the Court with it, but I apologize for that.

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THE COURT: Let me take a brief recess then because

I do want to have the benefit of the memorandum before I hear
argument and I am sorry that I did not get it earlier but,
like I said, I had the forethought of asking around the
building but I was told I had everything there was. So, I
will excuse myself.

THE CLERK: All rise.

(Whereupon, a brief recess was taken.)

THE CLERK: All rise.

THE COURT: Thank you, be seated please. I am going to recall the matter of Clifford Snyder, et al. versus State Board of Elections, C-08-128760, which has been consolidated with Richard Boltuck, et al. versus State Board of Elections, C-08-128755. Would you identify yourselves again please? I am sorry to make you do that again.

MR. SHURBERG: Good morning, Your Honor, Jonathan Shurberg on behalf of Plaintiff Richard Boltuck.

MR. BOLTUCK: Plaintiff Richard Boltuck.

MR. SNYDER: Plaintiff Clifford E. Snyder, Jr., here on behalf of Carl Phillip Snyder, my son.

MR. DAVIS: Mark Davis, Assistant Attorney General on behalf of the State Board of Elections.

MR. SCHLICK: Austin Schlick, Office of the Attorney General on behalf of the State Board.

THE COURT: All right. Now, I have had the

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opportunity to read the memorandum that was submitted on behalf of the Plaintiff Boltuck and I appreciate you giving me the time to do that. I am happy to hear the argument.

Let me just make a couple other housekeeping observations.

Am I correct in assuming that everyone is in agreement that there are no disputes of fact material to this case? That all the facts are agreed upon and that this case is in the posture where the Court could grant a conclusive decision one way or the other. Are we in agreement on the Plaintiff's side?

MR. SHURBERG: Certainly, on behalf of Plaintiff Boltuck. I don't want to speak for anyone else.

MR. SNYDER: Yes, Your Honor.

MR. DAVIS: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay, fine. I just want to make sure that no one felt there was a factual dispute that needed to be resolved in this case.

MR. SHURBERG: Your Honor, if I may just procedurally, in the event that this matter goes further which I have a feeling it probably will.

THE COURT: I suspect, yes.

MR. SHURBERG: I would ask Your Honor, and just for the record, since we all submitted sort of simultaneously and sort of -- it was not a case where a motion was filed and an opposition was filed, I would ask Your Honor to treat the

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memorandum that you have now had the opportunity to read as two things, even though it is not captioned as such.

I would ask you to treat it as an opposition to the State Board's motion to dismiss or in the alternative for motion for summary judgment. Secondly, I would ask you to treat it as a cross motion for summary judgment on behalf of the Plaintiff for the reasons, Your Honor, as just stated that there really are no disputes. But, I just want the record to be clear that we are proceeding it essentially on cross motions for either to dismiss or for summary judgment filed by both sides.

THE COURT: Fine. Any objections from State on that?

MR. DAVIS: No objections.

THE COURT: All right, very good. Well, then let's begin with Plaintiff's arguments and I am happy to begin with either side. If you would like to start with Mr. Shurberg?

MR. SHURBERG: Your Honor, I will defer to Mr. Snyder initially.

THE COURT: All right, Mr. Snyder if you would like to address the Court first, you are welcome to. You can do it from there or from the podium, wherever you are more comfortable is fine.

MR. SNYDER: Well, thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: But, the one thing I want you to do is

not walk around here because otherwise the microphone will not pick up your voice. So, just pick a spot anywhere in the building and just go at it. Thank you, sir.

MR. SNYDER: All right, Your Honor. Good morning, my name is Clifford Snyder, Jr. I am the father of Carl Phillip Snyder. He suffers the disability of infancy and that is why I am here as the Plaintiff.

I would like to start out by thanking Richard
Boltuck for his attention to voting rights and, of course,
his attorney Jonathan Shurberg. I would also like to thank
Mark Davis from the State Board of Elections council for
helping us get a hearing this morning. He did help advance
this case. He has been more than fair so, I really
appreciate that.

Your Honor, what I have this morning is a little bit of a statement about the posture and then I have what I have counted as seven points I would like to make. Of course, I submitted the brief to the Clerk. It will take me 10 to 15 minutes, I believe to go through this.

THE COURT: That is fine.

MR. SNYDER: All right, thank you. Now, Your Honor I am here defending my son's right to vote from attack by the State Board of Elections and its counsel, the Attorney General of Maryland. I am also here defending provisions of the election law article from attack by the Attorney General,

quite an interesting posture.

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Now, what is the Attorney General using to attack my son's right to vote? Is it the election law article, positive, enacted, statutory law? No, Your Honor, it is not. Is it a Court decision that involved a dispute over voting by persons under the age of 18 years? No, Your Honor, it is not. This appears to be a case of first impression where what is at issue, clearly at issue, is the right of persons under the age of 18 to vote.

Now, what the State Board of Elections and counsel are using against my son's right to vote is an interpretation of article 1 section 1 of the Maryland constitution. not my interpretation. I submit it's not a correct interpretation and I hope that it doesn't turn out to be the Court's interpretation.

Now, I will proceed to the major points. You cannot view, one cannot properly view, article 1 section 1 of the constitution in isolation. It doesn't say everything there is to say about election law or the relevant constitutional provisions. In particular, one must take a look at article 1 section 2 which empowers the General Assembly to provide for the registration of qualified voters.

So, when you look at article 1 section 1, look at what follows, article 1 section 2. Also, take a look at the 26th Amendment to the United States Constitution which says

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that 18 year olds must be allowed to vote.

Now, it is an interesting feature of Maryland's election system that Maryland uses a registration procedure followed by an election. It is a matter of pure logic, as I see it, that if 18 year olds are to be allowed to vote guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution persons younger than 18 must be registered. Unless there is some sort of instantaneous registration, which apparently is not possible and certainly isn't a feature of Maryland's election system.

So, I submit that Maryland has to allow persons under 18 to register to vote because Maryland has chosen to use a registration system. Article 2 section 2 of the Maryland constitution says that a registered voter is allowed to vote in all succeeding elections. Carl Snyder, my son, was a registered voter, is a registered voter, and he is allowed to vote in the primary both in the Democratic party primary and in the non-partisan election, which is at issue here in Frederick County at the Board of Education.

I would like the Court to take a careful look at the language of article 1 section 1. It does not say to me that persons under 18 cannot vote. It does not have prohibitory language. When I was reading the U.S. Constitution, and I was looking for something that was relevant, I looked at article 2 section 1 clause 5 of the U.S. Constitution which specifies that the President must be

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prohibitory words.

35 years old. Now, that is the kind of language I expect to see -- the U.S. Constitution, the prohibitory language, therein is the kind of language that I look for if Maryland's constitution intends to prohibit my son from voting, and it's not there. A Court or someone else would have to read a prohibitory intent or prohibitory meaning in the absence of

I do want to be clear, and I think I have already made this point, I will repeat. Carl met the registration requirements of the election law article section 3-102. He met them in May 2007, he was registered to vote and he has not been in any way disqualified from voting.

Let's also be clear that section 8-802 of the election law article, it deals specifically with the Board of Education contests. It says very explicitly that any registered voter, any registered voter, now Carl is a registered voter, regardless of party affiliation, regardless of party affiliation, or lack of party affiliation is eligible to vote in the primary election. Again, there is really no dispute that everything that Carl has sought by registration and is seeking in Court, he is entitled to under the positive enacted statutory law of Maryland.

Which brings us to the question, given Carl's status how can the State of Maryland keep him from voting? This is the first time that Carl has really had a hearing,

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particularly on this issue and I have to ask this question, is the right to vote in Maryland so uncertain that it can properly be changed as to Carl's status twice since May 2007 without any change in statutory law and without any judicial determination of a dispute involving voting age? Recall, Carl was registered in May 2007 and eligible to vote under article 2 section 2 of the Maryland constitution and, at any election thereafter held.

The first change in his status was one that Carl found out and I found out by reading in the <u>Washington Post</u> an article written by Mr. Boltuck. December 2<sup>nd</sup> is when I first learned that my son's right to vote in the primary had been stripped from him. No communications from the State Board of Elections prior to that point.

The second change was that following the State
Board of Elections change in policy on or about December 20<sup>th</sup>
a couple of weeks thereafter following staff inquiry at the
State Board of Elections, the policy says, now says, that
Carl can vote in the Democratic party primary but he cannot
vote in a non-partisan election.

So, he started out as a registered voter, his status was changed to deny him a vote in the primary at all, either partisan or non-partisan, then it changed to allow him to vote in the partisan but not in the non-partisan primary. There have been two changes in his status without

any change in law and without any case directly on point.

I would like to conclude by saying that Carl's right to vote in the primary, on February the 12<sup>th</sup>, has never, I repeat, never depended on the associational rights of the Democratic party. When the Court looks at article 1 section 1 of the Maryland constitution, article 1 section 2 of the Maryland constitution and at the 26<sup>th</sup> Amendment to the United States Constitution, Carl is entitled to vote. One need not invoke the theory of associational rights to vote in the Democratic party. He had that right independently of associational rights. Because of that, it does not matter one wit that what is at issue here is a non-partisan primary.

Your Honor, I request that you deny the Defendant's motion to dismiss. I request that you grant my motion for summary judgment. I ask that you enter judgment on my behalf and order the State Board to permit Carl to vote for the Board of Education candidates and since it appears to be impossible to reprogram the voting machines at this step, it's okay if Carl has to use a provisional ballot.

So, the relief I am asking is an injunction ordering the State Board of Elections to allow Carl to vote on all issues on the ballot in Frederick County including the Board of Education primary. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you, sir. Do you want to hear argument from both Plaintiffs and then address them both or

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do you want --

2 MR. SHURBERG: That would be acceptable, Your 3 Honor.

THE COURT: All right, Mr. Shurberg.

MR. SHURBERG: Your Honor, I will try very hard not to repeat things that Mr. Snyder said because I agree with him in total so, I will try not to and if you find me doing that, please do not hesitate to tell me.

This interpretation of the statute that Mr. Snyder has set forth, and that I agree with, is, in fact, one that has stood for more than 40 years. As far as I can tell, it's a little bit hard to tell exactly when this statute was enacted because things are enacted and re-enacted but it has been going on for a long time and nobody in any of that time has ever said, hey, wait a minute, this doesn't work. In fact, nobody with the authority to come before Your Honor is even making it today.

What has happened is, is that, and I mentioned in my brief Your Honor, the case of the <u>Burning Tree</u> case which is that the Attorney General does not have the power to come before Your Honor or any other Judge and say, we think this statute is unconstitutional, please declare it so and we will go on with our business. The Court of Appeals said, you don't have the power to do that in 1984, that is some 23, 24 years ago.

I submit that what has been done in this case is a step more egregious than coming before Your Honor and saying, please declare the statute unconstitutional. They did it themselves. They just said, we are not going to enforce this statute anymore, we are not going to apply this statute anymore and if you look at Exhibit 1, Your Honor, which is the original memorandum from Mr. Davis and it is the next to last page, excuse me, where it says "voter registration."

Not only are they refusing to enforce the statute, they are amending it. The memorandum reads, "The statute should be amended." What in the world is the Attorney General of Maryland doing, a) not doing what it was told to do in <u>Burning Tree</u>, which is, un order to promote and protect the State's policies, determinations and rights.

Among those policies, determinations, and rights is the election law code and it says that a person who will be 18 by the next general election, shall be entitled to register and there is a separate section of the code that says once you are registered you get to vote. That is pretty clear.

It is the State's Attorney General's office's job to defend that. Respectfully, we are standing here,

Mr. Snyder and I, doing the job that the Court of Appeals has told the Attorney General they ought to be doing. What they have done here, Your Honor, I submit and I don't want to be

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flippant in any way is, they have created a solution for which there is no problem. This is not, I submit Lamone versus Capozzi where a voter, Capozzi, came forward and went before a Court and said, I believe that early voting is unconstitutional. That is the quintessential situation when it comes before a Court.

Who is the voter here who is saying, I believe allowing 17 year olds, who will be 18 by the general election, but not by the primary to still vote in the primary? Who is saying that? Nobody is saying that. Attorney General is simply saying, well, we are going to be a roving truth squad and we are going to look through the statutes and see that there might be a statute that is unconstitutional and we are going to rewrite it and we are going to tell the State Board of Elections not to enforce it. That is not their job, Your Honor.

The job of determining whether a statute is constitutional or not and whether it ought to be applied, is not the Executive Branch and the Attorney General, it is your job, Your Honor. It is the Court of Appeals and the Court of Special Appeals and all the Judges of the state. I feel a little foolish standing here, I mean, that is one of the first things we learn in constitutional law is the executive applies to law, the legislature passes the law and the judiciary interprets and applies the law.

Well, the Attorney General here has sought to say, well, we are going to take the law that the legislature passed, we are going to rewrite it and we are going to not apply it as it is written.

When this first came to me my thought was, wait a minute. Marbury versus Madison, all the cases, if not the exclusive it is the primary function of the judiciary to determine what is the law and if the Attorney General cannot come before Your Honor and ask Your Honor to say that a law is unconstitutional certainly they cannot just unilaterally say it's unconstitutional and refuse to apply it. So, I think that is something we need to keep in mind here, Your Honor, is —

THE COURT: Well, it is not the Attorney General that is refusing to allow your client's --

MR. SHURBERG: It is the State Board of Elections, excuse me, Your Honor.

THE COURT: They have a client.

 $$\operatorname{MR}.$$  SHURBERG: On the advice of the Attorney General.

THE COURT: Isn't that what the AG is supposed to do, is advise their client whether depending it is right or wrong is a different issue. I am not sure that I necessarily would elevate their advice to their client to be some ultra virus act on their part.

MR. SHURBERG: Well, Your Honor, they have to give advice but their purpose is to defend the policy's rights and determinations of the State of Maryland. One of those groups that does that is the General Assembly. The General Assembly passes laws. The General Assembly passed a law here, this is not a question simply of constitutional interpretation, for example, me saying, we have a right, they say, no, you don't. That is a different question. This is a situation where they unilaterally undertook to, in their own words, amend the statute to put in a word that is not there.

THE COURT: Well, they didn't amend the statute, they wrote a letter to their client saying, now that we have read <u>Capozzi</u>, <u>Lamone versus Capozzi</u>, we are of the opinion that the Court of Appeals means the article 1 section 1 strictures on voting to apply to primaries as well as generals, primary elections as well as general elections, and therefore it is our opinion that the statute is inconsistent with it and therefore, the statute ought to be fixed. Isn't that what every lawyer would tell every client if that is what they believe?

 $$\operatorname{MR}.$$  SHURBERG: Then go to the General Assembly and ask them to fix the statute.

THE COURT: That is what they were recommending.

MR. SHURBERG: Well, what they have done Your Honor, is not go to the General Assembly and say, fix the

statute, they told the State Board of Elections, their client, to interpret the statute as if it had words in it that it doesn't have.

THE COURT: Okay, we may be a little bit off on a tangent but I just  $\ensuremath{\mathsf{--}}$ 

MR. SHURBERG: And I was thinking the same thing, Your Honor. I raise the point because I think it is rather extraordinary for the Attorney General to not be making the argument that, quite frankly, I am making.

THE COURT: I don't know if it is extraordinary but it is unusual.

MR. SHURBERG: And it is the Plaintiffs, private citizens, who are defending the prerogative of the General Assembly as against the state. Another state agency was essentially saying, they weren't supposed to do that and at that point, Your Honor, I will move to the merits.

THE COURT: I appreciate the irony of your being in that position.

MR. SHURBERG: Your Honor, let me talk about

Capozzi for a minute. Capozzi was a decision that dealt with the time, the place, the manner of voting. It did not deal with who may vote, it dealt with how those who are entitled to vote may vote. It is not a situation where one group of voters was eligible to vote and they tried to make a new group of people eligible to vote. I think that is an

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important distinction, Your Honor because speaking the language of <u>Capozzi</u> which said, "You must strictly follow the constitution as to how voting is held," where, when, in what wards, in what election districts is a far different issue constitutionally from them saying based on that decision, which did not address age or who may vote in any way, shape, or fashion, to them saying, we are now going to exclude an entire class of people.

Your Honor, originally we were talking about 50,000 voters in the State of Maryland before the Attorney General modified his advice in December to allow voters to vote in the partisan primary. We were talking about 50,000 voters being excluded from voting. That is a significant constitutional issue.

Your Honor has had a chance to look at the brief, see what justice Blackman wrote in it and that is one of probably thousands of similar sentiments. Voting is fundamental.

The right to vote is one that is — everything else comes out of that. If you can't vote, if your vote is hobbled, if your vote is restricted improperly then you basically are upsetting the entire foundation of the society we like to think we live in. Capozzi doesn't deal with any of those issues. The Court of Appeals wasn't faced with any of those issues.

So, I think you have to keep that in mind in terms of simply looking at the language. It was dealing with one set of issues that were facing it and it decided those issues.

So, I would submit that the statute, as we have argued in the brief Your Honor, is, in fact, not inconsistent with the constitution because the constitution simply says that those who will be the age of 18 and upwards shall be entitled to vote. It does not say when that determination is to be made. It does not say how that determination is to be made and particularly for the issues that we are dealing within this case, Your Honor, we are dealing with a situation where we are not dealing with parties, we are dealing with simply taking a certain number of candidates and winnowing them down from a certain number to a smaller number.

If there is one Board of Education seat available, you are going to take the top two vote getters and in the primary you are going to move them forward to the general.

If you have three seats available you are going to take the top six people and you are going to move them into the general election.

So, this is different. I submit as we have said in the brief, from a party primary which is who is going to be the standard bearer of that party. I submit that the determination by the General Assembly was a proper one, a

reasonable one. It was not inconsistent with article 1 section 1. It is one that is expansive of voting rights and, Your Honor, let me just note parenthetically that after I wrote this I looked to see if there were other states that had similar constitutional language and a similar statute to this. I was told there were a number of them.

I was able to find one and the state that I found, Your Honor, was the State of Mississippi that uses the upwards of 18, 18 and upwards, uses the same age qualification and has a statute that allows for voting in a primary even though one is not 18 but will be 18 before the general election. It is a little more detailed than Maryland's, it goes into a little more specifics than Maryland's.

That statute has been on the books as far as I can tell for over 50 years in the State of Mississippi. It has never been challenged. With all due respect to anyone who might be from the State of Mississippi, it is not a state exactly noted for people not being willing to challenge voting rights for any number of different reasons over the last 50 years.

Election litigation in the deep South, as we know, is something that comes up all the time. If people believed that that statute was unconstitutional and wanted to disenfranchise people, they have had a long time to do it and

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there has never been a case. At least, certainly not a case at the appellate level that I could find that was reported. If Your Honor would like to look at the statute, I did bring a copy of it.

I think materially speaking, identical language in the constitution and a statute that accomplishes precisely the same purpose is Maryland's and it has never been challenged. I submit as I did earlier that we are not even being challenged here today.

Now, I want to agree and I want to sort of stress my agreement with Mr. Snyder on one point. The language of the constitution does not say, as some state constitutions do, you must be 18 to vote. The language of our constitution says, "Citizens of the age of 18 or upwards," and I am striking out some of the words here, "Shall be entitled to vote." It does not say, you must be 18 to vote. It says, "Citizens who are 18 shall be entitled to vote."

So, there is the suggestion that not necessarily as the Court of Appeals said in <u>Capozzi</u>, a 12 year old Virginia non-citizen can come in and vote in a primary but certainly that the legislature can within reason, without doing violence, if you will, to the constitutional language say that if we are going to use 18 and we are going to use the general election date, which I submitted as I said in the brief, is eminently reasonable, is eminently consistent with

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the statute to say, well, we are going to let those people also vote in the primary because the primary is the process by which we get to the general.

In order to get to the general election as a candidate, whether as a party or in a non-partisan election, you have to go through the primary and you have to prevail. So, the question is why, therefore, as a matter of legislative determination, not inconsistent with the language of the constitution, should the legislature not be allowed to say, we are going to let that class of people vote in both the general and the immediately proceeding primary. Not at age 12 but at age 17 and, well I think in this case, you are going to have to be at least 17 and 3 months, or there about, 3 or 4 months.

THE COURT: Isn't that just by administrative happenstance that the registration process is what it is? What if the registration process were that you have to register 18 months before the next election, then would you argue that you could be 16½ and vote at the primaries?

MR. SHURBERG: No, because that is not what the statute says. The statute says, you have to be 18 by the next election.

THE COURT: But the question is whether the statute and the constitution are at odds with each other. I am saying under the constitution, under article 1 section 1,

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would you say that the legislature would have been within its rights to require, let's say, registration much farther in advance than they do now and say you could be 16? I am picking numbers out of thin air obviously, but you could be 16 when you register as long as you are 18 before the general election.

MR. SHURBERG: To register?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. SHURBERG: Yes, there is nothing in this constitution that says anything about a prohibition about when you can register.

In fact, there was a statute that was proposed by Senator Raskin last legislative session to call for the allowance of people to register at age 16 so that they would be registered for whatever election they will then be eligible for. If you register at 16 but the next election is when you are 16½, I submit, I don't want to speak for him but certainly my interpretation would be even though you are registered, you cannot vote until you are eligible under the statute which is the general election when you will be 18.

THE COURT: Set aside the statute, I am supposing an instance where the statute says something different because I am challenging you as to the interpretation of the constitutional interpretation. You started off by saying that you agreed with Mr. Snyder's argument and Mr. Snyder's

argument, in part, was that if you are properly registered then ergo you have the right to vote whether it is the primary or whether it is the general election.

MR. SHURBERG: As the statute is currently written.

THE COURT: Okay, and I say to you, what if the statute -- do you feel that the constitution would permit the legislature to permit registration sooner than 17 and 3 months and then would you follow that with the argument that therefore, somebody who is 16 should be able to vote or 15, or 14, or 13?

MR. SHURBERG: No, I would not, Your Honor. With all due respect to Mr. Snyder to the extent that that is his argument, I would submit that at some point you would do violence to the constitutional language if you allowed people to vote in primaries further and further back. You get to the point, at some point, I think the Court of Appeals analogies was one of extremist where you go to 12 years old non-resident --

THE COURT: Well, obviously they were picking a dramatic example but the point is, is it any worse to say that somebody who is 17½ cannot vote then somebody who is 17 and a third. Isn't there necessarily an arbitrariness about imposing a birth date requirement?

MR. SHURBERG: Not when the person will be eligible to vote in part of the process, Your Honor, but not the other

part. In other words, this legislature I submit has the power, it has the power to regulate elections, it has the power to pass laws, to determine how elections will be had. Capozzi makes it absolutely clear you still have to pay attention to the constitution, you can't just ignore that language.

However, when you have a primary process — now normally, Your Honor, in state elections in 2006 and in 2010, the primary will not be in February. The primary is in February this year because of the exigencies of the presidential primary. Maryland, like every other state wanted to move it up. It used to be in March, I think in the past it has been even later than that. In a gubernatorial election, in the off years, 2006, 2010, 2014, the primaries are in September, difference between September and November is relatively minimal.

THE COURT: That just happens to be that way.

MR. SHURBERG: That just happens to be. Now, at some point -- let's put it this way, I think we are about as far back as we can go, I mean, some states are --

THE COURT: Well, let's say Maryland wanted to beat Iowa and New Hampshire to the punch and be the first one on CNN to predict who the president is going to be. So, then they would say, well, you know what, we are going to have our primaries before anybody even thinks about it and then those

17 year olds would be that much younger, right?

MR. SHURBERG: They will still be 17, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, I guess you are right.

MR. SHURBERG: And they will still be eligible to vote in the general election. There is only a certain amount of elasticity that this can have. We cannot go back beyond the prior election. We cannot hold the 2008 primary in 2005.

THE COURT: Okay, I will grant you that.

MR. SHURBERG: At some point after the November 2006 election that would have been the earliest possible time. So, in other words, there is not an infinite elasticity to we cannot vote today for 2020 fortunately because otherwise somebody would probably think of it and decide to go ahead and do it. But, we have to wait for the one election to be over before we get to the next one.

THE COURT: If you set aside for a minute, if you can compartmentalize the argument a little bit like I would like to, if you set aside the statute for a minute and you look strictly at article 1 section 1, I gather you would not read this to say that a person must be 18 to vote at all elections.

MR. SHURBERG: I would not, Your Honor, for two reasons. One is the one, very well put forward, by Mr. Snyder and as I touch on which is that, those who are 18 years or upwards shall be entitled. There are constitutions,

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it is saying, and I am paraphrasing, they probably don't say it as bluntly as this, you must be "X" years old to vote.

That would be prohibitory, Your Honor, and I would be standing here making a different argument if I would be making any argument at all. But, that is not what the constitution says, it says, "Those who are 18 shall be entitled." So, number one, it's not prohibitory.

THE COURT: That implies that those who are not 18 may possibly be able to vote? Is that the way you would read the constitution?

MR. SHURBERG: And the second point, Your Honor, is, let me add on to it because I think they go together, is it does not say when over the age of 18, when? It doesn't say.

When Mr. Boltuck first came to me I read it four or five times and I said, this is not a model of perfect draftsmanship, it was written, I think, originally in 1876, I think it has been modified a few times so I don't want to speak ill of the 148 some year old drafters but it does not say when is the trigger. It could say, and some do, you have to be 18 by some point slightly before the election, in other words, for purposes of registration. Some states that have same day registration or don't have same day registration, some say you have to be 18 by a date prior to the election. They spell it out in their constitution. Some say, you must

be 18 as of the date of the election to vote. This doesn't say that.

Now, the question is, okay the legislature now has to apply this because the General Assembly is charged with, okay we are going to implement this. You can't just leave this and say, we are done. We need to now pass laws and we have passed -- the General Assembly has passed an election law code to implement elections consistent with this.

So, as long as one does not do violence to the constitutional language, the legislature is free within constitutional bounds. You can't say, as some states did many years ago, only certain people of a race can vote and things like that. You can't do that.

But, other than constitutional principles the legislature is free to apply this consistent with the constitutional language. I submit, as I have written, that the legislature chose, the General Assembly chose, to use the date of the general election as the trigger date. I think that is the most reasonable reading. I think that is the one that puts things most in harmony.

But, what they did Your Honor, is they did it with a little bit of a twist and I have mentioned it and I will just touch on it briefly again which is that, that is the date but we know that there is a primary and that primary is going to be some amount of time prior to the general

election. We don't have instant run off voting. If we did, quite frankly, we would solve this whole problem and we would be talking about something else. But, we don't and nobody does, quite frankly, in terms of primaries.

So, we know that there is going to be a period of time prior to the general election when we are going to have a primary. Maybe it's September, maybe it's April or May or March as it used to be, and now it is February. We know there is some period of time and the legislature, the General Assembly has said, okay, we are going to use this 18 as the election date, the general election date as the cutoff but we are going to also allow those who are eligible at that date, not some other date, not earlier, to vote in that primary because we, I submit their rationale was, that we treat these elections as one process.

We go through a primary, we go through a general and we get a winner. Only one person gets the Board of Education seat. Only one person gets the House of Delegates or the State Senate or the Governorship or any other race, or the Congressional race. Only one person wins. It is one process that we go through.

THE COURT: Do you think the Court of Appeals would agree with you though given that in <a href="Lamone versus Capozzi">Lamone versus Capozzi</a>, they made it pretty clear that an election is when you go and you pull the lever, it's not a process. I understand that in

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the same day.

a different context but that was the argument made in that

case, was that the whole early voting process was something

that had a beginning and an end that was not necessarily on

MR. SHURBERG: Well, Your Honor, I think the Court of Appeals, as I mentioned at the outset, was dealing with questions of --- manner. How are we going to hold elections? Now, we are dealing with an issue of who may vote and I think the Court of Appeals, well, I hope the Court of Appeals, will look at this in a fundamentally different fashion. Because, given what has transpired through Exhibit 1 to my brief, Exhibit 2, Exhibit 3, we now have a class of voters, approximately 50,000, that every two years, and it may grow or it may shrink, is going to be introduced to the voting system by being told, you know what, you get to vote for some things but not for other things, welcome to the voting system. I don't think that is what the constitution intended. I don't think that is what the legislature intended in 3-102 in the rest of the election law code. don't think that is what the Court of Appeals intended in Capozzi because I don't think the Court of Appeals was faced with that issue in Capozzi.

So, we are going to tell these voters, that is really not -- I would say by telling the voters that, it is not exactly making them enthusiastic first time voters. I

don't think that is appropriate, number one. Number two, I don't think it is constitutional.

I would submit, Your Honor, that I would defy anyone -- I looked to find a voting system anywhere in this country, I am sure we could probably find one somewhere else, in this country, with our constitution and our laws for the last 200 years, that says to people for reasons other than where they live, you live in Anne Arundel County, you get to vote for the state Senator in your district in Anne Arundel County. I live in Montgomery County, I vote for my state Senator and mine, that is obviously different, we vote for different races based on where we live.

But, this is telling people, you get to not vote for races, not based on where you live, or by district or ward, as the constitution says, but by age. You only get to vote for these things but not the other things and your neighbor and your parent and your friend, who just by fortuity, happened to be born in January of 1990 as opposed to July of 1990. He or she gets to vote but you don't. That is not a system, Your Honor, that the constitution either intended, that ought to be done or, quite frankly, that is constitutional because that is so arbitrary, supports no state interest whatsoever other than reading the words of a constitutional provision that with all due respect to the 1867 drafters, is now 141 years old and many states, Your

Honor, have recognized these constitutions were written at a time when there was no such thing as a primary. People didn't have primaries.

Parties put forward their candidates and people voted in November. That was it. They didn't have primaries. If this is the result that we are going to have, if the Court of Appeals says so, then we obviously will move on but what will happen honestly is that we are going to go through a legislative process of amending this.

This cannot be what anybody intended. It is not what the constitution intended. It is not appropriate. It sends the wrong message to voters and, quite frankly, I think it is unconstitutional under both the federal constitution and the state constitution to tell a first time voter, you can't vote for this on an arbitrary classification. I defy anyone to find a state system anywhere in this country, federal or state, that calls for voting under those kinds of circumstances.

With that, Your Honor, I will conclude.

THE COURT: Thank you very much, Mr. Shurberg. All right, Mr. Davis.

MR. DAVIS: Your Honor, may I please the Court. We are here today a little over a year after the Court of Appeals set in motion the chain of events that has led to this litigation in less than two weeks before the election.

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From the State Board of Elections, the issue is whether the Court of Appeals meant what it said. Ultimately, we have come full circle because only the Court of Appeals can finally decide that question and in the best of all possible worlds, we would receive guidance from the Court of Appeals more than 11 days before th election.

This case really turns on the meaning of the second sentence of article 1 section 1 of the Maryland constitution. The very same sentence that was interpreted by the Court of Appeals decision in <a href="Lamone versus Capozzi">Lamone versus Capozzi</a> in December of 2006. Now, the relevant language is the same sentence that the Court of Appeals decided and it is important to focus very clearly on that language because I think this Court's decision and ultimately the Court of Appeals review of this decision, will turn on that language.

The language reads, "Of every citizen of the United States of the age of 18 years or upwards, who is a resident of the state, as of the time of the closing of registration next proceeding the election shall be entitled to vote in the ward or election district in which he resides at all elections to be held in this state."

Now, counsel for Plaintiffs have focused on the "shall be entitled" language and have argued that that language is not a prohibition and, in fact, that the General Assembly may expand that language by permitting 17 year olds

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to vote. However, we made that same argument in <u>Capozzi</u>, we argued that the "shall be entitled" language did not restrict elections to simply the ward or election district and the Court of Appeals rejected that argument. They held that the "shall be entitled" language, the very same language from the same sentence, which is at issue here today did constitute a restriction and the Court of Appeals held quite clearly that the "shall be entitled" language did limit voting to the ward or election district in which a voter resides.

Now, when we explain how we came full circle we can see that there are, in fact, five milestones each supported by a very reasonable decision of the State Board of Elections and, of course, the State Board of Elections is required, its members are required, to take an oath to support the constitution of Maryland that is found in election article 2-101D.

Now, the first milestone is the historic practice of the Board. In the past, the State Board had assumed that the statute which Plaintiff's counsel has discussed at great length of election article 3-102A, did permit 17 year olds to vote in the primary and had assumed that article 1 section 1 referred only to general elections and, in fact, the language of election article 3-102A provides that a qualified voter includes an individual who is at least 18 years old or who will be 18 years old on or before the day of the next

succeeding general or special election. Of course, it had been historic practice that and historic understanding of the State Board that that did not exclude 17 year olds from voting.

The second milestone in this case, of course, was the 2006 decision of the Court of Appeals when the Court decided Lamone versus Capozzi. The Court, of course, did strike down early voting as a violation of various provisions of the Maryland Constitution including the one at issue here today, article 1 section 1. The Court in holding that early voting was unconstitutional also considered the question of whether even if early voting was unconstitutional whether it can still be used in a primary election and our office, of course, argued contrary to the position of the Plaintiffs, that primaries had historically been treated differently from the general elections.

But, of course, in <u>Capozzi</u> the Court rejected that argument just as we argued — we made the same argument that counsel for Mr. Boltuck made today that the elections were a continuous process but as the Court correctly recognized in <u>Capozzi</u> the Court of Appeals rejected that argument as well.

So, the Court's precise language in <u>Capozzi</u>, I think here is worth focusing on and quoting because we think it really leads only to one conclusion and on page 89 of the Court's opinion, the Court states that primary elections are

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included within the meaning of, "At all elections to be held in the state," in article 1 section 1. If article 1 section 1 were read to exclude primary elections, "Such a reading," and here the Court is quoting from the Circuit Court, "Could lead to an absurd result as it would eliminate all," all emphasized, "all constitutional qualifications for primary elections," and then the Court refers to the case of the 12 year old, "thus, a 12 year old non U.S. citizen residing in Virginia would not be barred by the Maryland Constitution from voting in Maryland primary elections."

Such a result simply cannot be correct."

Of course, article 1 section 1 is the very same constitutional provision and, in fact, the very same sentence of the provision that requires that an individual be 18 years of age to vote.

The Court of Appeals, of course, held that article 1 section 1 applies, "to all elections to be held in the state."

Now, to our office the inclusion was inescapable that a person must be 18 to vote, "in all elections to be held in the state." That is what the constitution says. So, we gave that advice to the State Board of Elections. Now, I heard counsel for the Plaintiffs argue certain policy considerations that we need to welcome 17 year olds into the political process and indeed neither the Attorney General nor

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the State Board of Elections has any policy objections to 17 year olds voting in primaries.

In fact, the State Board of Elections aggressively have contacts and recruits high school students and encourages them to register. Of course, that registration, as the Court pointed out, is an administrative mechanism to have somebody be part of the computerized voting list does not mean that the 16 year olds can vote.

But, this case is really not about policy, it is about the meaning of the Maryland Constitution and as much as we tried to reconcile <u>Capozzi</u> with the Maryland statute, the conclusion was inescapable. It is clear that the Court of Appeals met the requirement of, "age of 18 years and upward," it didn't say 18 years downward, it uses the word upward, to apply, "to all elections to be held in the state," and that any election included a primary election.

Now, if the Court of Appeals didn't mean that, we hope it will tell us and do it so properly so that we can clear all of this up. If the Court of Appeals did mean it then the remedy is certainly a constitutional amendment.

There was some discussion during last session when this advice and this decision of the State Board of Elections became known about whether there would be a constitutional amendment and it didn't happen so that is why we are here before you today.

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The third milestone, the third part of the story, is that as a result of the Capozzi decision, the State Board did inform 17 year olds that they were not eligible to vote in the February 2008 primary. This was well known to the 17 year old community. I don't know why Mr. Snyder's son did not get notice. We know that Frederick County, pursuant to the directors of the State Board, did send out notices to all of the 17 year olds and indeed Mr. Boltuck in his complaint alleges in paragraph 11 that Sarah did learn on June 14, 2007 of the State Board's action, long before Mr. Boltuck filed suit on January 18th so close to the election. Now, the history of SB's implementation of the statute is set forth in Exhibit 2 to our motion to summary judgment.

Now, the fourth milestone in this case happened in December of 2007 when it was not until that date that the political parties actually came forward and asserted their rights under the First Amendment to associate with 17 year old members. The Attorney General received a request from Senator Raskin who is actually one of the counsel to Mr. Boltuck, to allow 17 year olds to vote in their political party's primary. Now, as a result of that the Attorney General recognized that the Democrats and the Republicans constitutionally are entitled to establish their own rules as to who may participate in their primaries. Basically, in this advice letter the Attorney General made two points and

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this is Exhibit 3 to our memorandum in support of summary judgment.

First, Your Honor, he reaffirmed that the 2006 advice that under <u>Capozzi</u> an individual must be 18 years old to vote in a primary and that is why we are here today. Second, the Attorney General considered a question that had not been asserted before by the political parties and that is the First Amendment right of those parties to associate with 17 year olds.

Now, I don't believe that exploring -- the reasoning behind that is really at issue here. I think everyone agrees that 17 year olds should be permitted to vote in their political party's primary. I think we come at that objective from different places. I heard Mr. Snyder take issue with the necessity for the Attorney General's analysis but the bottom line is that we will be allowing 17 year olds to participate in the primary.

One clarification I heard Mr. Shurberg say that the number was 50,000. In fact, the number is considerably less than that, it is 15,000. But, what happened after the Attorney General carved out an exception to the <u>Capozzi</u> decision is that we came to milestone number five and that is based on this advice and further clarification the State Board, less than two months before the election had to shift gears and adopt a policy by resolution, and I have got the

minutes from that State Board meeting, at its December 20, 2007 meeting and sent out thousands and thousands of letters.

When I was at the State Board two weeks ago for the State Board of Election there were people in the back room that were still stuffing the envelopes, still stuffing the thousands and thousands of letters notifying the 17 year old political party members that they could vote in their party primary.

But, of course, because of <u>Capozzi</u> because of article 1 section 1, because of that very clear language, because of the way the Court of Appeals decided the "shall be entitled" issue in the context of early voting, it was the State Board's position, based on the advice from our office, that the 17 year olds remained ineligible to vote in races in which there is no political party interest at stake, such as the non-partisan school board races.

So, we think the State Board correctly applied the law as interpreted by the Court of Appeals. If the Court of Appeals does not believe that our interpretation was correct, they need to tell the State Board so the political party's First Amendment association rights only issued in a political party primary. They are not at issue in a non-partisan race and, of course, the political parties who have benefitted most from the Attorney General's 2007 advice letter are not parties to this litigation here today and are

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not involved in this law suit.

Now, the second point that I want to make and I just want to clarify my understanding that Mr. Snyder has argued that he is not seeking the right of the 17 year olds to vote on the electronic ballots and I did not hear Mr. Boltuck's attorney make a similar representation. But, that really does create a nightmare scenario for the State Board if, less than two weeks before the election this Court were to order that the 17 year olds are permitted to vote on regular electronic ballots because there simply is not enough time to do that.

As the Court of Appeals recognized in the <u>Liddy</u> case, it may be inappropriate to grant an injunction in an election case if the election is so close that the state cannot realistically or pragmatically institute the necessary changes before the election. That is clearly the case here.

We have established by affidavit evidence the two declarations of Donna Duncan, the Director of Election

Management, that it is simply too late first, to reprogram the ballot styles and the reason why 17 year olds have to vote provisionally is that the ballot styles were basically put to bed in mid December at the time the Attorney General rendered the advice letter and by then it was already too late to redesign and to shift gears and to separate the ballots for the political party races and the non-partisan

races.

Now, the second problem we had was this case, once it was filed on January 18<sup>th</sup>, proceeded in a rather leisurely manner even though we were less than a month before the primary and we really did want to expedite the case because as Ms. Duncan's second declaration points out, on January 28<sup>th</sup>, the State Board, pursuant to its normal processes had to send the computerized electronic data base to the local Boards of Election and it is today, as a matter of fact, that the local Boards received the data base and load into their epoll books.

What that means is, there is no physical way, this close to the election for the 17 year olds to vote on the electronic machines if this Court were to disagree with our view of the merits of this case. Now, that Duncan declaration is essentially undisputed and I didn't hear Mr. Boltuck's attorney disagree with Mr. Snyder as far as expressing no objection to having the 17 year olds vote on provisional ballots if the Court were to find against us on the merits. Thank you very much, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Before you sit down, I always worry when I think of something that I didn't hear you folks argue that I am off on a wild goose chase so I want to make sure that I do not go off on a wild goose chase. But, in my reading of article 1 section 1, the annotation refers to an

old case, the case of <u>Hannah</u> <u>versus</u> <u>Young</u> which is an 1896 Court of Appeals case and that case in a much different era and a much different context holds that only those elections which are subject of the Maryland Constitution are governed by section 1, article 1.

So, my question to you is, what effect, if any, does article 1 section 1 have on the non-partisan Board of Education elections which I presume are not constitutionally mandated. Those are set up by a creature of the Board of Elections. Why does the Constitution even matter in that context?

MR. DAVIS: Your Honor, I do not have my

Constitution with me but it is my understanding that members

of the Boards of Education are constitutional officers as

created by the Constitution.

THE COURT: I do want to give you time to explore that because again I am not trying to stir things up.

 $$\operatorname{MR}.$$  DAVIS: Right, it is an interesting question. I do not know off hand the answer to it.

THE COURT: I have had all of half a day to think about this case and you have thought about it longer but in my first review, each county elects members to the Board of Education. In some cases actually elected and some cases they are appointed, and I thought that was completely a creature of statute.

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Let me give you a few minutes to address that because I would really like to explore that because I may come to this from a completely different perspective than you all and just have you reach a conclusion that perhaps may be the same result as they want for different reasons. I might end up doing the same thing. So, let me take a recess and you folks holler at me and I will give you all a chance to address the argument some more.

MR. SHURBERG: Your Honor, do you have the site for that case because I would like to go take a look at it?

THE COURT: I don't claim any great research here,

I just looked at the annotations, it is <u>Hannah v. Young</u>, 84

Maryland 179. What is says, it is listed here for the

proposition that this section, meaning article 1 section 1,

relates only to elections which the Constitution itself

requires to be held and hence, it has not application to

municipal corporations other than Baltimore City.

The <u>Hannah</u> case dealt with an election for the commissioners, or whatever they were called of the City of Bel Air. In that case, there was an issue as to whether you could vote or not without being a property owner and so the world was backwards and upside down at that time but the point made was that — the question raised, I should say, in the <u>Hannah</u> case was whether or not article 1 section 1 applied and whether the election could require criteria of

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the electorate that were beyond what the Constitution required.

So, the argument was made, well, if the

Constitution doesn't say you have to be a property owner, or

doesn't say you have to be a male, or doesn't say some other

criteria that perhaps might have been required in the local

election. But, the argument there was, well, this

Constitution doesn't apply to an election for something other

than a Constitutional officer. So, my question, quite

simply, is whether or not the Constitution applies to the

Board of Education and if it doesn't then the next step is

the statute says you can vote and why are we here?

MR. SHURBERG: Your Honor, just so the record is clear, in my brief I refer consistently to Board of Education elections and I realized afterwards that, at least, in Montgomery County where Mr. Boltuck lives, there are also local ballot questions that are on primary elections that I think would also fall within the rubric you are talking about. I want to be clear about that.

THE COURT: Well, again, I guess I am trying to figure out whether all of the various things that appear on a ballot, or let me rephrase that, how many of those things that appear on a ballot are Constitutional entitlements versus they just happen to be on a ballot for convenience sake.

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MR. DAVIS: Your Honor raises an extraordinary possibility and that is that in primaries, we are not electing anybody to a position. All we are doing is selecting people who will move forward in the process. So, it is, at least, arguable under the Court's observation that it would not apply to primaries, partisan, or non-partisan because they are not elections to office. They are merely part of a process.

THE COURT: But, for the fact that the Court of Appeals has made it pretty clear in my mind that the primaries are among the elections that article 1 contemplates, that would be the appealing argument. But, on that point I think the folks down the street have made it pretty clear to me that primaries do count. So, do you need more time? I don't mind, I am not trying to pressure you into a quick response. I would be happy to step down just like you gave me time.

MR. DAVIS: Well, maybe it does make sense to review this with a little more care rather than jumping the gun.

THE COURT: Okay, that is fine. I am going to take a recess and let me know when you are ready to resume, okay?

THE CLERK: All rise.

(Whereupon, a brief recess was taken.)

THE CLERK: All rise.

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| THE COURT: Thank you, be seated please. All                   |
| right, the Court is resuming the cases of Clifford Snyder, et |
| al. versus State Board of Elections, C-08-128760 consolidated |
| with Richard Boltuck, et al. versus State Board of Elections, |
| C-08-128755. Could I ask you to please identify yourselves    |
| again for the record?   |
| MR. SHURBERG: Good morning, Your Honor. Jonathan              |
| Shurberg on behalf of Plaintiff Richard Boltuck.              |
| MR. BOLTUCK: Your Honor, Richard Boltuck,                     |
| Plaintiff.  |
| MR. SNYDER: Clifford E. Snyder, Jr., Plaintiff.               |
| MR. DAVIS: Mark Davis on behalf of the State Board            |
| of Elections  |

MR. SCHLICK: Austin Schlick, State Board of Elections.

THE COURT: Thank you. So, when we last parted company, I had imposed on Mr. Davis to address a case of <a href="Hannah versus Young">Hannah versus Young</a> and I would be happy to hear your research Mr. Schlick?

MR. SCHLICK: Thank you, Your Honor and we do appreciate the opportunity to follow up on that question and to inspect our own assumptions. We did come to the conclusion that article 1 section 1 does apply under <a href="Hannah">Hannah</a> against Young. Page 183 of that case in the Maryland reports provides that article 1 section 1 applies to elections which

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the Constitution itself requires to be held or which the legislature under the mandate of the Constitution makes provision for.

Your Honor we believe these actions certainly fall within that second category of elections which the legislature under the mandate of the Constitution has made provision for. Article 8 section 1 requires the General Assembly to establish by law throughout the state a thorough and efficient system of free public schools. Under that authority the General Assembly has provided in education article section 3-114, that members of the county board shall be elected in counties including the counties at issue here, Frederick and Montgomery counties.

Furthermore, under the election law article section 8-802, members of the Board of Election shall be elected on a non-partisan basis. So, our position, Your Honor, is these elections are being conducted pursuant to the General Assembly's instruction under the mandate of the Constitution and accordingly section 1 of article 1 does apply and we note that that historically has been the position of the State Board.

THE COURT: Can I just ask you to rewind, just to make sure I catch up with you. Under what Constitutional mandate did the legislature create the Board of Elections?

MR. SCHLICK: That would be article 8 section 1,

page 451 in my volume. "The General Assembly shall by law establish a system of free public schools," essentially public education.

THE COURT: All right, okay, thank you.

MR. SCHLICK: Thank you.

THE COURT: Would anyone on the Plaintiff's side care to address that point?

MR. SHURBERG: I would Your Honor, if I may help
Mr. Boltuck. Constitutionally, mandate is to establish a
system of free public schools. It doesn't say anything about
elections. It doesn't say anything about establishing for
elections. In fact, in some counties, still to this day in
Maryland Boards of Education are appointed and not elected.
There is no requirement that there actually be an election.
The fact of having free public schools, under article 8
section 1, in no way implies or directs that there, in fact,
be an election at all or how it ought to be held, number one.

So, it is not a mandate, Your Honor. The mandate to create free public schools is not a mandate to hold elections because if it were, there are counties in the state today that would be in violation of that implied mandate because there are counties that still have appointed school boards.

Your Honor, if I may, in looking at the -- I can't even remember the name of the case now, I did look at it

though --

THE COURT: The one I mentioned <u>Hannah versus</u>
Young?

MR. SHURBERG: Yes, <u>Hannah versus Young</u>, I found two other cases, Your Honor, and I am always chagrined when I find them because the Judge suggested it because I always like to think that I am pretty good at finding cases. But, there are two cases I would like to bring to Your Honor's attention that relates to this, about primaries generally because I looked at that question because basically the Court of Appeals was suggesting in that case that primaries and that certain kinds of elections are simply not within the Constitution in the <u>Hannah</u> case.

The two other cases, one is called <u>Kenneweg</u>

K-e-n-n-e-w-e-g <u>versus County Commissioners of Alleghany</u>

County, which is a 1905 case of the Court of Appeals reported at 102 Maryland reports 119. It says that the legislature of Maryland, unlike the Federal Congress, has all the legislative power that there is unless there are restrictions as opposed to the Federal Congress which has only the powers that the Federal Constitution gives it.

One of the things they said in the <a href="Kenneweg">Kenneweg</a> case, the Court of Appeals did, is that the power to enact a primary election law, and they used somewhat antiquatel language, lies back of and beyond this provision. They are

talking about what is now article 1 section 7 of the Constitution which talks about the purity of elections.

I think in a general sense, that is kind of what we are fighting about here is are we doing this right? Are we doing this as the Constitution has mandated? The Court said in the Kenneweg case, that the power to enact a primary election law lies back of and beyond this provision. It was a different provision, I think it was article 42 or something. They reorganized the Constitution. It is not derived from it at all, i.e. a primary election is something different. It lies back beyond the Constitution. They did not cite article 1 section 1 and they did not suggest that there was any limitation in article 1 section 1.

Subsequently, in this case, Your Honor, interestingly enough, dealt with the question of who may vote. You Honor will recall that in my initial argument I talked about difference between time, place, and manner of restrictions. How one may vote. You can't vote here but you can down the street and you can vote there, is a different thing than you may or you may not vote.

The second is a much more fundamental question.

The <u>Kenneweq</u> case dealt with who may vote and this essentially said that the legislature has plenary power in a primary election to decide that question. Both <u>Kenneweq</u> and the other case I will get to, the Court of Appeals was

dealing with situations where the legislature had imposed greater requirements than the Constitutional requirement.

Property requirements, being enrolled with a party and declaring certain things about their party preference in a party primary. In both cases the Court said the legislature has the power to do this and that the Constitution doesn't bar it.

The second case to get to it is <a href="Hennegan">Hennegan</a>
Hennegan versus, I am sure I am pronouncing this wrong, <a href="Geartner">Geartner</a> Geartner Geartner Geartner Geartner Geartner, which is a 1946 case reported at 186 Maryland 551. "The legislature has the power to create and regulate primary elections subject only to such prohibitions that may be found in the state Constitution."

Now, I know you can argue article 1 section 1 is that prohibition but we come back to that prohibition versus non-prohibition argument, number one. But, number two, once again, the Court of Appeals was upholding in the <a href="Hennegan">Hennegan</a> case a requirement that was not in the Constitution. In both <a href="Hennegan">Hennegan</a> and in <a href="Kenneweq">Kenneweq</a> they said, additional requirements above and beyond the Constitution are okay in primaries, and <a href="Hennegan">Hennegan</a> cited to <a href="Kenneweq">Kenneweq</a>.

Now, Your Honor, we go back to <u>Capozzi</u>, which said, election is election is election. Well, when you look at <u>Capozzi</u> and you look at when they cite to, when the Court of Appeals cites to article 1 section 1 which is, bear with me I

want to get you the right page site where they actually reference it which I believe is -- pardon me, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. SHURBERG: It looks like page 59, actually it is 59 and 60 and it cites to it, it highlights and emphasizes the language shall be entitled to vote in the ward or election district in which he resides at all elections to be held in this state. That is what the Court was focusing on in Capozzi. They emphasize it. That is not my emphasis, that is their emphasis as to what they were interested in. They weren't interested in that case, in the remainder of it.

So, Your Honor, now that we are dealing with a situation not like <u>Capozzi</u>, time, place, manner, where you may vote, how you may vote, what day you may vote, but who may vote. You have two cases of the Court of Appeals, <u>Kennewed</u> and <u>Hennegan</u> that say that, in fact, the legislature has authority to regulate primaries. So, somebody, and maybe it is only the Court of Appeals, but I think Your Honor that until the Court of Appeals says these cases are no longer good law that they are good law. They have not been overruled. They have not been superseded by statute.

They are, in fact, the law of the State of Maryland which is that at least as to who may vote, and both cases dealt with that, primaries are different. If the legislature can impose greater requirements than the Constitution,

property requirement, fees to be paid, poll taxes, in the old days. Now, there may be federal limits to those now but as to the general principle that in primaries more requirements that don't run afoul perhaps with the Federal Constitution.

For example, residency requirements are not in the Constitution but, those cases are still good law as a general principle. The particulars of some of them may no longer be good law. The <u>Hennegan</u> case dealt with, again party primaries but the general principle is primaries, as to who may vote, are different and those cases remain good law and I think —

THE COURT: Why do you say residency requirements are not in the Constitution? I mean, in article 1 in talks about residency right in the middle of it.

MR. SHURBERG: Right, it says, "Who is a resident as of the time for closing of registration." The legislature may impose requirements as to how long they have lived there.

THE COURT: Oh, I see in that regard.

MR. SHURBERG: Almost every state does. In the Federal Constitution, the U.S. Supreme Court has said that is okay. That does not run afoul of the right to vote. In fact, Maryland at one point there was a case back in the '60's that I ran across, not specifically germaine where there was actually a two year residency requirement. I think it might have been in the Constitution at one point. It was

taken out and a lesser residency requirement was imposed pursuant to statute as opposed to by Constitution. Federal Court basically said, we may not like this but it is the law and there is nothing unconstitutional about a pretty lengthy residency requirement.

So, there are still some things that the legislature can do that are more. So, the question then simply is under <a href="Kenneweq">Kenneweq</a> and <a href="Henneqan">Henneqan</a>, can they grant more rights in a primary election because we are not granting any more rights in the general election, 3-102 grants nothing inconsistent with the Constitution in the general election.

I think we can all agree on that. Because it says only those who will be 18 by the date of the general election. So, the only question is the granting of rights in a primary election.

I would ask Your Honor respectfully to take a look at those cases because I think they strengthen the argument I made earlier more than abstraction that time, place, and manner is different than the actual right to vote, yes or no you may vote or you may not vote. But, I think these cases make it clear that the legislature may do that and for whatever reason, the Court of Appeals in <a href="Capozzi">Capozzi</a> did not address it perhaps did not address <a href="Kenneweg">Kenneweg</a> and did not address <a href="Hennegan">Hennegan</a> because they were not dealing with who may vote, they were dealing only with the express language in the

Constitution which was you have to vote in your ward, you have to vote in your district. You can only vote on certain days, you have to have the first Tuesday in November, those are all in the Constitution.

They weren't dealing with the question of primary versus general, certainly, time, place, manner. An election is an election. But, as to who may vote, the legislature has in time imposed more requirements.

I submit that the right to impose greater requirements also implies the right to allow more voting rights. If you can go one way, you certainly can go the other way without going afoul of the expressed language of the Constitution which the legislature in 3-102 has not.

So, I would also say, Your Honor, that the Constitution, as far as mandates go, and I think Kennewed and Hennegan go to this point, is that elections are only mandated by the Constitution if they are literally in the Constitution. I think the State Board of Elections has said, well, you have to have an educational system so, therefore, the election requirement is implied. I would submit that that is not the case. It is where it is mandated because Kennewed says, this purity of elections, the General Assembly, shall take care to make sure that purity of elections is preserved. It is simply how the execute it.

It is not directing them to do anything, it is

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simply telling them, you are going to execute the right you already have. This is in the <u>Kenneweg</u> case. You are going to imply the right you already have in a certain fashion. It is not mandating any particular thing, it is simply saying, you need to keep this in mind as you go about your duties to regulate elections, at least as to primaries.

So, Your Honor, I would submit that the Board of Education and any other non-partisan primaries that may exist in any particular county are not, in fact, pursuant to the, I keep wanting to say Harris --

THE COURT: <u>Hannah</u>?

MR. SHURBERG: <u>Hannah</u>, I don't know why I keep wanting to say Harris but I do, the <u>Hannah</u> case that, in fact, the Constitution applies to Constitutional elections. That case has not been overruled.

I think the State agrees with that. They have not proffered any suggestion that that case has been overruled in any way and that, therefore, Your Honor the other point I would note is that with respect to elections generally, the Constitution does provide an article, I think it is 17, section 2, that certain elections are to be held every four years for state and local officials.

In theory, we could read state and local officials to include Board of Education. However, section 7 of article 17 specifically excludes elected Boards of Education from

section 2 of that same article. It says it is not applicable. So, to the extent that they are mentioned at all in the Constitution, they are then five sections later, excluded the Board of Education specifically from that possible reading so state and local officials could conceivably include Boards of Education.

So, Your Honor, I submit without in any way withdrawing any of my earlier arguments that the point, Your Honor, has raised for the reasons I have just stated now compel the conclusion that, in fact, both my client, Mr. Boltuck and Mr. Snyder, not to speak for him, his son should be allowed to vote without restriction. Your Honor, let me address a point that the State raised about a question of provisional ballots.

It was my understanding that, in fact, it would be easier for people to vote without restriction because then you don't have to tell them you can't vote for this, and this, and this. You can vote for everything. But, the State, I think, raises a good point given the timing of where we are right now, that because of the electronic poll books and that only certain people are going to be in that and that the 17 year olds who were, at least at the time the poll books were finalized were basically not in the electronic poll books but we are presumably on a list to be allowed to vote by provisional ballot.

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It does seem reasonable to say that it is not feasible for purposes of the February 12<sup>th</sup> election for 17 year olds to be allowed to vote electronically for the reasons I just stated. But, certainly in terms of any future elections it will be easier. The result we want in this case is actually simpler for the Boards of Election. Everybody gets to vote for everything as opposed to these people only

But, certainly for this election, it does seem reasonable to say that it would not be feasible so, I can't really take issue with that and I will not.

THE COURT: All right, thank you. Mr. Snyder, did you want to add anything?

MR. SNYDER: Your Honor, were you looking for argument just on the point whether the Constitution covers Board of Education or general argument?

THE COURT: Well, I am looking for any argument you would like to make without repeating something that has already been said.

MR. SNYDER: Okay.

get to vote for certain things.

THE COURT: Since you are the Petitioners I am giving you the last word essentially.

MR. SNYDER: It is really unfair to use the hypothetical in <u>Capozzi</u>, the non-resident of Maryland age 12 or 14 or whatever, really unfair, fundamentally unfair to use

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a hypothetical in an unrelated case. The case did not center on voting age against a real live citizen of Maryland, my son, 17 years old been a resident of Maryland since birth and a registered voter since May 2007.

I am asking the Court to decide this case, not to do some sort of comprehensive analysis of all possible ramifications, I am asking the Court to grant relief to Carl Phillip Snyder. An observation, as far as I can tell the United States Constitution, the supreme law of the land, contains no prohibition against voting by persons under 18. Is it not curious that a Maryland Court, I submit that it is not really appropriate for a Maryland Court to concern itself over much with a similar lack of prohibition in the Maryland Constitution.

The people who ratified the United States

Constitution, and the 26<sup>th</sup> Amendment, did not see fit to

impose a minimum voting age. It is unseemly that a Maryland

Court would find the absence of a prohibition in the Maryland

Constitution.

I would remind everyone that there are other aspects of the complaint. The violations of article 8 and article 24, which I think are clear, the separation of powers violation. The fact that the State Board of Elections has rewritten election law or rewritten the Constitution to its own satisfaction. I would emphasize again article 24, the

lack of due process, Carl Phillip Snyder was registered as a voter. He is entitled under article 1 section 2 to vote in all subsequent elections in Maryland and that right has not yet been stripped from him in a way that we recognize in Maryland as due process.

Now, I am asking the Court if Your Honor finds this to be a close case, I respectfully request that you give the benefit of the doubt to my son who took the trouble, excuse me, at the urging of the State Board of Elections when he sought his drivers license, he took advantage of a procedure established by the State Board of Elections. He went to the trouble to register to vote.

I am asking you, if you find this a close case put the burden of appeal on the State. These people are on the state payroll, let them worry about the next step in this litigation. I have already had to go to Court. I have already had to file an administrative complaint. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you. All right, anything else? MR. DAVIS: Your Honor, we do have two very quick points on the  $\underline{\text{Hannah}}$  question.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. DAVIS: Thank you sir. First, Your Honor, on the argument that the <u>Hannah</u> language applies only to elections that are specifically mandated upon the Constitution, that cannot be correct because what the

language of the case says is, elections which the

Constitution itself requires to be held or which the

legislature under the mandate of the Constitution makes

provision for. So, that second category is elections which,

although, not mandated by the Constitution are required by

the General Assembly pursuant to some other mandate of the

Constitution.

Second, Your Honor, with respect to Mr. Shurberg's rather nuanced argument about the plenary powers of the legislature about the primary elections, we think it is a good argument. We thought it was a good argument in <a href="Capozzi">Capozzi</a>. It was made by the State Board in <a href="Capozzi">Capozzi</a> at page 88 the Court of Appeals recognized, "The appellants argue that article 1 section 1 of the Maryland Constitution does not apply to primary elections," and then it quoted the State Board arguing that, "The legislature has plenary powers which are not restricted by the provisions of article 1 of the Constitution with regard to both primary and municipal elections." So, that argument was made, it was then rejected by the Court.

THE COURT: How do you address Mr. Shurberg's argument though that the Boards of Educations are not elected in every county, they are just in some and some not. So, how would you derive a mandate that there must be some sort of an election from the Constitution?

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1 MR. DAVIS: Because the General Assembly in its 2 wisdom, has seen fit to mandate elections in some counties 3 but not others. That is a legitimate implementation of the Constitutional mandate to establish a system of public The Hannah case, again, is clearly contemplating a category of elections that are not required by the 6 Constitution, and therefore, presumably the General Assembly would have some discretion to require them, or not, it is in this category where the General Assembly is implementing a 10 Constitutional mandate to carry out some public purpose and 11 determine through that public purpose if that is defectuated 12 through a system of elections that that second part of the sentence in <u>Hannah</u> would apply. 13

THE COURT: All right, thank you very much. I have said this before in the context of another election case and I will say it again, and I don't mean to be flip about it because I know this is a serious matter to all involved but, what I am about to say, I hope, is not misinterpreted.

It is my sincere belief that I am not going to be the last word on the subject and that it is in everybody's best interest that I give you a decision sooner rather than later and whether I turn out to be right or wrong is ultimately going to be somewhat academic because the Court of Appeals is going to be the one who is going to determine what the law of the land is in connection with this election.

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So, for that reason given that we are really coming up on the heels of the primary elections very quickly, I am going to give you a verbal decision rather than taking the time to write something which I would like to think might be more articulate than what I am about to say. But, I hope that both you and my colleagues on Rowe Boulevard will understand the circumstances under which I render this decision.

I guess first things first. What is not before me is the question of whether the 17 year olds who will become 18 by the date of the next general election should be allowed to vote in the primary elections for the partisan portions of the ballot. Quite candidly, and this is a complete aside, I am not sure that if I were faced with that question I would necessarily conclude the way that the Attorney General has that Capozzi does not preclude those young people from voting. But, I say that as an aside and because it is not an issue that is the subject of the dispute. I am not rendering a decision on that point.

So, I am dealing with the issue that is before me, which has clearly been limited by the pleadings, to the question of whether the 17 year olds that are in this category will be permitted to vote on the non-partisan items on the ballot.

As we have discussed, there are different ways that

both of the parties reach some of the conclusions in this case. Mr. Snyder argues that the right to vote is across the board as a result of the statute, the election statute, and is not impaired in any way by a reading of the <u>Capozzi</u> case.

Now, to some degree that is an academic discussion because as the Board has interpreted <a href="Capozzi">Capozzi</a>, I am sorry, as the Board has concluded for other reasons, for First

Amendment reasons, those young people have a right to vote in the primaries on the partisan issues so, it is an interesting issue but not one that I necessarily have to address. So, it leaves sort of carved out of the equation the question of, do they vote for the Board of Education members at the primaries? I think Mr. Shurberg also mentioned there might be some other items on the ballot in Montgomery County which I am candidly not familiar with.

My view is as follows: Starting with <u>Capozzi</u>, and some of the points that the Court of Appeals makes which have to do with sort of general rules of interpretation. As you look at the statute and you look at the language of the statute and you interpret it in difference to the plain meaning of the words and a Constitutional provision is interpreted no differently than a statute when it comes to that analysis.

<u>Capozzi</u> was clearly a case that involved a different set of facts and it involved a question of not who

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could vote as Mr. Shurberg described, where and how and so forth the vote could be taken but there is a question that 2 3 Capozzi asked and I believe answered and that is stated in part 4 of the Capozzi decision where the Court of Appeals says, "The appellants argue that article 1 section 1 of the 5 Maryland Constitution does not apply to the primary elections 6 in Maryland." That statement was made -- well, a question was raised by the Court of Appeals not in a limited fashion although obviously they were doing it in the context of the 10 case before it. But, they posed that question and then they 11 answered it by stating that we adopt the analysis offered by 12 the Circuit Court in holding that primary elections are 13 included within the meaning of "at all elections to be held in this state," which is the language that we are focusing on 14 in article 1 section 1. 15

So, it would be my view that notwithstanding the election article 3-102, a person would have to be the age of 18 at any election including a primary election. As again, I have said this is somewhat of an aside but I just want you to understand the flow of whatever logic I apply to this.

We then go to the second phase of the analysis which the Attorney General proposes which is that because of a supremacy clause issue that the First Amendment of the United States Constitution would say that even if the Maryland Constitution would preclude people under the age of

18 from voting at the primary, there is the right of association called for by the First Amendment which it is the State's position carves out an exception to Capozzi which therefore, permits the 17 year olds to vote at the primary and whether I agree or disagree with that is somewhat academic. Whether I would consider the age restriction to be an undue burden on the voting rights of any citizen is an academic exercise.

Then we come to the point where that issue is no longer on the table. In other words, everyone agrees for different reasons perhaps, that 17 year olds can vote at the primary on the partisan issues. The question then becomes, is there any limitation on their right to vote on the non-partisan issues?

That brings me to the question that I posed earlier, which is whether or not the Maryland Constitution applies to those issues at all. Although, I certainly am appreciative of the arguments made on behalf of the State, I am not convinced that article 8 of the Maryland Constitution mandates the Board of Education elections that are being held in those counties in which Board of Educations are elected.

The Constitution mandates the establishment of schools and certainly there are lots of things that come and go from that mandate including the most mundane to the most lofty in terms of decisions that have to be made. But, as I

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read in <u>Hannah</u>, I am not convinced that when <u>Hannah</u> says, "It is only at elections which the Constitution itself requires to be held or which the legislature, under the mandate of the Constitution makes provisions for."

I am not clear, and I am not convinced, I should say, that that necessarily means that Boards of Education must be elected or that the extent to which they are elected is as a mandate created by the Constitution.

The requirements of the Board of Education elections are set out in the educational article of the Maryland code and I certainly don't think there is anything unlawful about those requirements but I don't think they are Constitutionally mandated and for that reason, I believe that article 1 section 1 does not apply to the non-partisan matters that are going to be on the primary ballot and ergo, I believe, that the 17 year olds who are entitled to vote at the primary on the partisan matters for reasons that we have already discussed are equally entitled to vote on the non-partisan matters. Because, they are not prohibited by the Constitution from doing so and are, in fact, permitted by the election law article 3-102 to do so.

So, I don't know and I hope for the sake of all of us that there isn't some other item on those election ballots in some county that falls between the cracks between the non-partisan and the partisan. I can't envision how they

would, but, to the extent that I am aware of these items they are either, in other words, if it is something that could be a non-partisan item that yet would be mandated by the Constitution, that would fit in a category that doesn't squarely meet with my opinion on the subject.

Now, with respect to the question of the provisional ballots, I think the parties have graciously conceded that point but I would make the finding in any event that under the circumstances established by the uncontested affidavit in this case, that the practical limitations and the time limitations that we are all facing would prohibit changing that method and the Court would not enjoin a method that is really the only practical method of accomplishing the election at this point. So, I would declare that the provisional balloting would be permitted.

I do not take any issue with the fact that the Attorney General's office has taken whatever positions it has in this matter, I think that is incumbent upon the Attorney General to advise its client, which in this case is the Board of Elections, as to how to interpret not only statutory and Constitutional law, but also the decisional law from the Court of Appeals.

So, I do not find in any way that the procedural posture of this case is any way suspect and so, unless there is something I have overlooked, it would be my intention to

declare verbally and I will sign any order that you care to propose, that number one, provisional ballots can be used in the election coming up. The primary election for members of the voting public who are 17 but will reach the age of 18 by the date of the general election and that those members of the voting public who are 17 but will reach the age of 18 by the general election are permitted to vote at the primary elections on both the partisan and the non-partisan issues.

Aside from being wrong, is there anything that I have overlooked?

MS. LAMONE: Your Honor, may I have a minute please?

THE COURT: Sure, I want to give you an order to let you go down the street as well.

MS. LAMONE: Your Honor, just a second.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

(Pause.)

MR. DAVIS: Your Honor, there is an issue that is not raised by any of the pleadings in this case. However, given the Court's order I would be remiss if I didn't at least raise it and that is that there are unaffiliated 17 year olds who, of course, who are not voting in the party primary that have never had --

THE COURT: Good point. Yes, I am sorry, not to

cut you off but I am glad you brought it up. I believe that the law on the subject is still intact, which is that only affiliated persons can vote at the primary.

MR. DAVIS: Correct.

THE COURT: I don't think there is anything that has been argued or that would be changed.

MS. LAMONE: No, that's not --

MR. DAVIS: I think the point Your Honor is that there are 17 year olds who are unaffiliated with either party but if I understand the Court's order, you are ordering they be permitted to vote in the school board elections.

THE COURT: In the non-partisan stuff.

MS. LAMONE: People that are unaffiliated or the non-principle party may vote for the school board races if they, under your ruling, if they are 18 years of age or older. We now have this class of voters, however many of them --

THE COURT: Unless you all mind, I don't mind

Ms. Lamone just speaking out loud instead of --

MS. LAMONE: Your Honor, in the school board races, in the jurisdictions where they are held, unaffiliated or other voters, as we call them, may if they are eligible to vote, may vote for the school board races. We now have a class that has not been addressed here of the unaffiliated or other 17 year old registered voters who we have said and

advised may not vote for anything.

THE COURT: Well, those are those unintended consequence that we sometimes get. I guess one, perhaps facile way to address it is that is not before me. I am not here to give advisory opinions, I am here to judicate the issue before me.

MR. DAVIS: Very well, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So, good luck and godspeed.

MS. LAMONE: Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. SHURBERG: Your Honor, I just want to go over it so we can at least agree, I know I want to make sure I got it right, I was trying to write down what Your Honor wrote so that we can then turn that into an order and get Your Honor to sign hopefully today since we are heading into a weekend. What I have written down is, 17 year olds who will be 18 by the general election may vote in both the partisan and non-partisan primary elections on February 12<sup>th</sup>. I am certainly happy to discuss other language but, at least, that is the fundamentals.

THE COURT: I guess I would have to modify that by saying, and I don't know whether you said it or not, affiliated voters because the action in this case has been brought on behalf of affiliated voters. No? Am I wrong?

MR. SNYDER: Sir, I hesitate to say you may be going beyond the Plaintiffs here and treating this as a class

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1 action.

THE COURT: No, I had no intentions of doing that.

It is my understanding that the parties that brought the suit are affiliated and are asking to vote in the primary.

MR. SNYDER: Yes.

THE COURT: So, I am limiting my decision to those, that universe.

MR. SNYDER: To the parties before the Court, or are you reaching out to all those other people's similar situations?

THE COURT: I see what you are saying.

MR. SNYDER: Because I have an order crafted that I believe reflects your judgment or reflects your stated judgment for my son Carl.

THE COURT: I see your point and I guess that is a good point. It is not a class action but do I say that Carl gets to vote, is that the decision you want?

MR. SNYDER: Well, that is why I came to this

Court. If the State Board of Elections chooses not to apply
that example, shall we say, that is their choice.

MR. SHURBERG: Your Honor, let me say on behalf of Mr. Boltuck we take a different approach and that is one of the reasons why I am representing one party here and not two and that is absolutely fine.

Mr. Boltuck on the other hand is requesting, and I

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too, let me do it.

am now requesting on his behalf, that others, and again it is not a class action but it ought to be generally applicable. If Sarah Boltuck can vote then others who are in her situation ought to similarly be able to vote and that otherwise this Court, or some other Court, conceivably to the extent of being reported in the media, which I have a feeling it probably will, will then be flooded with potentially, who knows how many, individual people saying, well, let me do it

THE COURT: Well, 15,000 by his estimate and 50,000 by yours.

MR. SHURBERG: Your Honor, let me be clear, 50,000 was the class of people who were eligible but some of them didn't register.

THE COURT: I understand.

MR. SHURBERG: Of course, the question might be why they didn't, but you are right. The State is correct.

THE COURT: Let me hear from the State in terms of how to cast this net as maybe appropriate. I don't want to overstep my bounds but by the same token it would be folly to issue a decision that applies only to two individuals in the State of Maryland.

MR. DAVIS: Your Honor, as I understand it, neither of the complaints has a request for declaratory judgment here.

THE COURT: No, I thought they did actually. I hope I didn't dream that up.

MR. DAVIS: There is a pray for an injunction -
THE COURT: Maybe I was dreaming but I thought it
was a declaratory judgment action.

MR. DAVIS: I think the State would have no objection if Plaintiffs were orally to move for a declaratory judgment that would solve the problem. I mean, it is not in the complaint.

THE COURT: All right, I will take your word for it. For some reason, I just derived that notion when I read these yesterday and as I told you earlier I didn't see these papers until about 3:00 yesterday afternoon.

MR. SNYDER: Your Honor, I was in no way suggesting that other people not benefit from this. It was simply that I didn't want an additional issue to be raised on appeal.

THE COURT: No, that's fine. I suspect that that is going to be the least of the Court of Appeals issues on this matter.

MR. SHURBERG: Your Honor, at the suggestion of the State and I think Your Honor would agree, I would orally request that you issue a declaratory judgment consistent with the ruling that you just made that would be generally applicable to those who get knowledge of this and then present themselves on February 12<sup>th</sup>.

MR. SNYDER: I would join that.

THE COURT: I will accept the oral amendment and that is why, quite candidly, I see now as I look at it more closely that it was not drafted in that way but, I guess, it was in my assumption all along that it was a declaratory judgment that you are seeking. So, I will declare as I stated and I don't know if you want to -- I am going to be around at least part of the afternoon until my health gives out to the point I go home. But, if you want to spend the next hour or so during your lunch break and hash out an order and I will be happy to take a look at it and if you all can work out a mutually agreeable order that says what you think I said, I will stand by it.

MR. SHURBERG: Your Honor, given the oral request for the declaratory judgment, I think we should be clear before we break so we don't end up coming back and having to debate the point. My client requests that I make this request not only on behalf of himself and affiliated voters but on behalf of unaffiliated voters as well. He feels very strongly about it and he has asked me to make that request to the extent they are registered. Now, some of them may not be because they were discouraged by things, there is nothing we can do about those. We are not asking the Board to register anybody but those that are registered and do come forward to vote in the non-partisan primaries be allowed to

do so and I would ask just that you include that in your ruling and we are going to have a debate about that, I guess, I would say let's perhaps do that now rather than later.

THE COURT: Well, let's have the debate now.

MR. DAVIS: We object Your Honor, it is certainly beyond the scope of the pleadings. It is 11 days before the election. These people are not in the poll books. It would create an administrative nightmare to do it. Let me have a minute here to confirm my understanding.

THE COURT: I realize I am throwing a lot of monkey wrenches at you, it is all right.

MR. DAVIS: Can we have a minute to just confirm this fact?

THE COURT: Sure. All right, let's take a minute.

THE CLERK: All rise.

(Whereupon, a brief recess was taken.)

THE CLERK: All rise.

THE COURT: Thank you. Be seated please. I need to call the case again, it is Clifford Snyder, et al. versus State Board of Elections, C-08-128760 and Richard Boltuck, et al. versus State Board of Elections, C-08-128755 and the same parties and counsel are still present in the Courtroom. Mr. Davis, I think you made a phone call to find out what the problems would be.

MR. DAVIS: Apparently it is not as I thought that

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these individuals are in the poll book so we would have no objection to expanding the scope of the order to include the unaffiliated individuals.

THE COURT: Okay, so the unaffiliated 17½ year olds, so to speak, could vote in the non-partisan portions of the election, correct?

MR. DAVIS: Right, by provisional ballot.

THE COURT: Okay, by provisional ballot.

MR. DAVIS: Yes.

MR. SHURBERG: Just to clarify, when we say unaffiliated we mean, I don't know how many 17 year olds might be Libertarian of Green Party members that registered as not just unaffiliated but as some other party other than Democrat or Republican.

THE COURT: Right, other than the Democrats or Republicans.

MR. DAVIS: Correct.

MR. SHURBERG: That was easy.

THE COURT: Sure, nothing to it. Now, if you have the where with all to go down to the law library and crank out an order or however you want to do it or get back to me. I don't know whose office is around the corner, I would be happy to sign it as soon as somebody gives me an order and I think it would be behoove of all of you to make sure that you work on it together so that it says what you think I said,

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okay? I am going to have lunch in my office and I will be here until at least the mid afternoon. MR. SHURBERG: Thank you, Your Honor. MR. SNYDER: Thank You, Your Honor. Thank you, Your Honor. MR. DAVIS: THE CLERK: All rise. (Whereupon, the hearing was concluded.) 

# $\underline{\mathsf{C}}\ \underline{\mathsf{E}}\ \underline{\mathsf{R}}\ \underline{\mathsf{T}}\ \underline{\mathsf{I}}\ \underline{\mathsf{F}}\ \underline{\mathsf{I}}\ \underline{\mathsf{C}}\ \underline{\mathsf{A}}\ \underline{\mathsf{T}}\ \underline{\mathsf{E}}$

CompuScribe, hereby certifies that the attached pages represent an accurate transcript of the duplicated electronic sound recording of the proceedings heard on February 1, 2008, in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County in the matter of:

Civil Nos. C-08-128755 and C-08-128760

CLIFFORD E. SNYDER, JR., and RICHARD BOLTUCK,

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STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS

By:

Michelle L. Smiroldo, Transcriber

Date

# 00 FB-1 P 2.5

# IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY, MARYLAND

### ORDER

UPON CONSIDERATION of Plaintiff RICHARD BOLTUCK's Complaint, Plaintiff CLIFFORD E. SNYDER, JR.'s Complaint, the Motion to Dismiss/Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS, the oppositions/cross-motions filed by both Plaintiffs, and the oral Motion for Declaratory Judgment filed by both Plaintiffs, it is this 15 day of February, 2008,

DECLARED that the voter eligibility requirements of Article I, § 1 of the Maryland Constitution do not apply to non-partisan elections for Boards of Education, municipal elections, and local ballot questions that are not mandated by the Constitution and, accordingly, it is further

ORDERED, that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss/Motion for Summary Judgment be, and the same hereby is, DENIED; and it is further

ORDERED, that the Motions for Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiffs be, and the same hereby are, GRANTED IN PART; and it is further

ORDERED, that the oral Motions for Declaratory Judgment be, and the same hereby are, GRANTED; and it is further

ORDERED, that this Court declares that all 17-year old voters, whether or not affiliated with any political party, who will be 18 on or before the November 4, 2008 general election, shall be entitled to vote in both the partisan and non-partisan primary elections on February 12, 2008, and it is further

ORDERED, that Defendant State Board of Elections may use provisional ballots in the February 12, 2008 primary elections for all 17-year old voters, whether or not affiliated with any political party, who will be 18 on or before the November 4, 2008 general election.

Paul A. Hackner

Circuit Court Judge

# IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY, MARYLAND

| CLIFFORD E. SNYDER, JR. on behalf of  | *             |                               |
|---------------------------------------|---------------|-------------------------------|
| Carl Philip Snyder, his son           | *             | Civil Action Nos. C-08-128760 |
| PLAINTIFF<br>v.                       | *             |                               |
| STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS<br>DEFENDANT | *             |                               |
| * * *                                 |               |                               |
| RICHARD D. BOLTUCK on behalf of       | *             |                               |
| Sarah Elizabeth Boltuck, his daughter | *             |                               |
| PLAINTIFF                             | *             |                               |
| v.                                    | *             |                               |
| STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS              | *             | Civil Action No. C-08-128755  |
| DEFENDANT                             | *             |                               |
| ********                              | * * * * * * * | * * * * * * * * * *           |

# NOTICE OF APPEAL

Defendant State Board of Elections hereby notes an appeal of the Order of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County pursuant to Election Law Article §12-203.

Respectfully Submitted,

DOUGLAS F. GANSLER Attorney General of Maryland

Mark J. Davis Assistant Attorney General 200 Saint Paul Place

Baltimore MD 21202 (410) 576-6356 fax (410) 576-7036

# CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this day of February, 2008 a true and accurate copy of defendant's Notice of Appeal was mailed first-class postage prepaid and transmitted by email to: Clifford E. Snyder, Jr., Esquire, 4964 Flossie Avenue, Frederick MD 21703, plaintiff; and Jonathan S. Shurberg, Esq., 8720 Georgia Avenue, Suite 700, Silver Spring MD 20910, attorney for plaintiff Richard Boltuck.

Mark J. Davis

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