

UNREPORTED*

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF MARYLAND

No. 0145

September Term, 2025

IN RE: I.Y.

Leahy,
Ripken,
Albright,

JJ.

Opinion by Ripken, J.

Filed: July 21, 2026

*This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B).

In December of 2024, appellant I.Y., a juvenile, entered a plea of involved to a count of unauthorized removal of a motor vehicle in violation of section 7-203 to the Criminal Law Article of the Maryland Code (2021 Repl. Vol.) (“CR”). The Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, sitting as a juvenile court, accepted I.Y.’s plea. A restitution hearing was conducted in February of 2025, and a judgment was entered requiring I.Y. to pay restitution to the victim encompassing the victim’s rideshare expenses which he incurred as a result of I.Y.’s unauthorized use of the vehicle. I.Y. appealed the restitution order, presenting the following issue for our review:¹

Whether the juvenile court erred in ordering restitution.

For the reasons to follow, we shall affirm the judgment of the juvenile court.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Delinquent Act and Plea Hearing

On August 5, 2024, the State filed a juvenile petition alleging that I.Y. was delinquent and charging her with being involved in six crimes² arising from the theft of a Chevrolet Malibu (“the Chevrolet”) from Zion Edwards (“the victim”) on July 22, 2024. It

¹ Rephrased from:

Did the juvenile court err in ordering restitution for losses that were not a direct result of the delinquent act to which [I.Y.] admitted?

² The crimes were (1) motor vehicle theft under CR section 7-105; (2) theft of property valued between \$1,500 and \$25,000 under CR section 7-104; (3) unauthorized removal of property under CR section 7-203; (4) being in a motor vehicle with the intent to commit theft under CR section 6-206(b); (5) conspiracy to commit motor vehicle theft; and (6) conspiracy to commit theft of property valued between \$1,500 and \$25,000.

was alleged that on that date, the Washington D.C. Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”) Aerial Unit advised the Prince George’s County Police Department (“PGCPD”) that it was following a Chevrolet, that had previously been reported stolen, out of Washington, D.C. and into Prince George’s County, as that vehicle had been used in multiple armed robberies in the District of Columbia earlier that day. Officers from the PGCPD followed the vehicle in police cruisers, and the driver—who was not I.Y.—attempted to evade police before striking a curb, at which time the vehicle became disabled. I.Y. and her two juvenile associates exited the vehicle and fled on foot; however, they were apprehended and arrested. Officers from the MPD responded to the scene and recovered the stolen Chevrolet.

At a December 4, 2024, adjudication and disposition hearing, I.Y. pled involved to Count 3 of the juvenile petition, which charged that:

On or about July 22, 2024 in Prince George’s County, Maryland, [I.Y.] did without permission, take and carry away from the use of [the victim] a motor vehicle, to wit: 2020 Blue Chev[rolet] Malibu with the intent to temporarily deprive [the victim] of the use and possession of said property, in violation of [CR section 7-203]^[3] of the Annotated Code of Maryland, against the peace, government[,] and dignity of the State.

(Capitalization and bolding omitted).

³ That statute states in relevant part:

Without the permission of the owner, a person may not take and carry away from the premises or out of the custody of another or use of the other, or the other’s agent, or a governmental unit any property, including . . . (2) a motor vehicle[.]

CR § 7-203(a).

The State proffered the following facts in support of I.Y.’s plea. On the afternoon of July 22, 2024, the MPD Aerial Unit advised the PGCPD that it was following the Chevrolet out of Washington, D.C. and into Prince George’s County. The MPD reported that the vehicle “was used in multiple incidents in Washington, D.C. earlier that day and the occupants were still, potentially, armed.” The Chevrolet had been reported stolen. Several PGCPD officers began following the Chevrolet in their police cruisers. The driver of the vehicle attempted “to evade police by speeding and committing multiple other traffic violations.” The Chevrolet “struck a curb . . . and became disabled.” Two PGCPD officers observed the three occupants “get out of the vehicle and begin to flee on foot towards the wood line.” I.Y. and the second passenger were immediately apprehended, and the driver was apprehended shortly thereafter.

The juvenile court found that the State had provided a sufficient factual basis and accepted I.Y.’s plea. Consistent with the plea agreement, the court placed I.Y. on ten months of supervised probation with special conditions. The State reserved the right to request restitution and indicated that the victim’s vehicle had not yet been released by the police in D.C., and the victim had therefore not yet been able to access the vehicle or ascertain the amount of restitution. A restitution hearing was scheduled.

Restitution Hearing

The parties appeared for the restitution hearing on February 28, 2025. The victim testified that he owned the Chevrolet and that it was stolen from him on July 15, 2024. He explained that after the vehicle was stolen, it was not returned to him, as it remained in the custody of the MPD until early January of 2025; he further explained that he was informed

in early January of 2025 by an officer with the MPD that he could then retrieve the vehicle, but that it was not drivable due to the damage.⁴ The victim incurred out-of-pocket expenses as a result of his loss of access to the Chevrolet because he had to use Uber⁵ and, later, a local and less expensive rideshare service called “Empower”⁶ to travel to school and to work. The victim indicated that he had incurred a total of \$1,108.94 in rideshare costs from the Empower service, which were reflected in part by bank records that were admitted into evidence. The victim further indicated that he had incurred “almost maybe \$1,000 more” on rideshare transactions using Uber.

I.Y. called her mother as a witness.⁷ She testified that she did not encourage I.Y., who was then sixteen years old, to work during the school year because work could

⁴ The victim was not seeking restitution from I.Y. for the damage to his vehicle. In response to questioning from I.Y.’s counsel, the victim explained that a MPD detective contacted him at the beginning of January 2025 to inform him that “it was okay for me to come back and get it, but with the damage that was done to it, it was just undriveable and I didn’t necessarily have the funds to repair it, even if I wanted to.” The victim subsequently relinquished the vehicle to the lienholder.

⁵ Uber is “a technology company specializing in rideshare services. Uber’s smartphone application . . . connects riders needing transportation with local drivers available to drive them to their destinations for a fare.” *In re Grice*, 974 F.3d 950, 954 (9th Cir. 2020).

⁶ Empower is the business name of Yazam, Inc., “a private vehicle-for-hire company” that sells digital software to drivers, which in turn enables drivers “to connect with passengers and give them rides in private vehicles for hire.” *Yazam, Inc. v. Dist. of Columbia Dep’t of For-Hire Vehicles*, 343 A.3d 906, 909 (D.C. 2025) (quoting *Yazam, Inc. v. Dist. of Columbia Dep’t of For-Hire Vehicles*, 310 A.3d 616, 619 (D.C. 2024)).

⁷ Most of I.Y.’s mother’s testimony concerned her own finances. Because the juvenile court ultimately ordered I.Y., and not her mother, to pay restitution, we need not recount that testimony.

negatively impact her grades. I.Y. had a job for the summer, however, and would earn \$10 per hour.

The State asked the juvenile court to find that the victim incurred \$1,108.94 in Empower rideshare expenses and a reasonable amount of Uber expenses based on the victim's testimony and to order I.Y. to pay restitution.

Defense counsel argued that the delinquent act to which I.Y. admitted involvement was unauthorized use of the stolen Chevrolet on July 22, 2024, and that she was only a passenger on that date. Counsel argued that I.Y.'s delinquent act was therefore not the direct cause of the victim's rideshare expenses before or after that date. Counsel maintained that the reason the victim could not drive the vehicle was because he did not have insurance, which counsel asserted could have covered some of the expenses. Counsel subsequently claimed that the reason the victim could not drive the vehicle was because it had been damaged, and as I.Y. was only a passenger in the stolen vehicle and did not directly cause the damage, she should not be ordered to pay restitution.

The State responded that I.Y. took part in the unauthorized removal of the vehicle from the victim's possession and that "taking part in the unauthorized removal of the vehicle from the victim is what caused him to then incur these . . . ride[]share expenses[.]" The State reiterated that the victim was seeking restitution for his out-of-pocket rideshare expenses based on the unauthorized removal rather than for repairs or damage to the vehicle itself.

The juvenile court ruled as follows:

So in this case, I have had the opportunity to hear from the victim He indicated that he was the owner of the 2020 Chev[rolet] Malibu which is what was involved in this case. The vehicle was stolen from him. He testified with regard to out-of-pocket expenses that he incurred from Empower as well as from Uber. He indicated that the vehicle was, unfortunately, not insured at the time that the vehicle was stolen from his possession. He needed the vehicle to get from home to school to work, back and forth. So, therefore, once the vehicle was removed from his possession, he had to utilize Uber and other ride[.]share apps in order to facilitate those things that he would normally have done had he retained possession of his vehicle.

He indicated that Empower was . . . 20 percent less than Lyft or Uber, so he endeavored to utilize that app in order to continue to get around. He indicated that he incurred thousands in expenses with Uber, at least a thousand. So[,] the Court does find that the \$1,000 charge from Uber is reasonable with regard to this case.

Additionally, \$1,108.94 incurred from Empower is also reasonable. This restitution amount will be entered as far as [I.Y.] only. She is now [sixteen] and is about to be [seventeen] in August. She is able to work. I understand that she has a 4.0 GPA and I do commend her on that, however, this restitution amount will be her responsibility, not jointly with her mother. It will be jointly and severally with any co-respondents in this case.

The juvenile court entered an order reflecting the judgment. I.Y. noted this timely appeal on March 24, 2025.

DISCUSSION

THE JUVENILE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ORDERING RESTITUTION.

A. Party Contentions

I.Y. contends that the juvenile court erred in ordering restitution because the victim's losses were not a direct result of I.Y.'s delinquent act. She asserts that because she pled involved to unauthorized use of the Chevrolet as a passenger on a single day—July 22, 2024—the juvenile court erred by ordering her to pay restitution to compensate the

victim for rideshare expenses incurred before and after that date. With respect to the period following her arrest, she argues that costs incurred by the victim stem from damage to the vehicle that made it inoperable and not from her involvement in the unauthorized use of the vehicle as a “passive passenger[.]” With respect to the period prior to July 22, 2024, she emphasizes that the State’s proffer at the plea hearing did not include any facts about the original taking eight days earlier.

The State contends that there was neither error nor abuse of discretion in the juvenile court’s decision to order restitution. The State claims that I.Y.’s conduct was greater than that of a mere passive passenger; moreover, I.Y. was found to be involved in the unauthorized taking and carrying away of the victim’s vehicle, which directly caused the victim to incur out-of-pocket rideshare expenses. The State asserts that there was a factual basis from which the juvenile court could reasonably infer that the claimed damages were a direct result of I.Y.’s actions, and thus, there was no error in the award of restitution.

B. Standard of Review

“Several standards” govern appellate review of a juvenile court’s restitution order. *In re A.B.*, 230 Md. App. 528, 531 (2016). Where the juvenile court’s order involves “an interpretation and application of Maryland statutory and case law,” that legal question is reviewed *de novo*. *In re G.R.*, 463 Md. 207, 213 (2019) (quoting *Goff v. State*, 387 Md. 327, 337–38 (2005)) (brackets and further citations omitted). An order requiring restitution, as well as the amount of such, is reviewed for abuse of discretion. *In re A.B.*, 230 Md. App. at 531; *see also In re Cody H.*, 452 Md. 169, 181 (2017) (citing *Wiredu v. State*, 222 Md.

App. 212, 228 (2015)) (further citations omitted). Factual findings are reviewed for clear error. *In re A.B.*, 230 Md. App. at 531; *Goff*, 387 Md. at 337–38.

C. Analysis

A juvenile court may enter a judgment of restitution against a child in a juvenile delinquency proceeding as provided in Title 11, Subtitle 6 of the Criminal Procedure Article. Md. Code, Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article § 3-8A-28. Under section 11-603 of the Criminal Procedure Article to the Maryland Code (2025 Repl. Vol.) (“CP”), in addition to any other penalty for the juvenile’s commission of a crime or delinquent act, a court may enter a judgment of restitution if, “as a direct result of the crime or delinquent act,” the victim incurred a “direct out-of-pocket loss[.]” CP § 11-603(a)(2)(ii).

As acknowledged by both I.Y. and the State, “this case turns on the meaning and scope of the term ‘direct result’ in CP [section] 11-603(a).” *In re G.R.*, 463 Md. 207, 214 (2019). Although the term “direct result” is not defined in the statute or in the accompanying definitions, the meaning of that phrase has been the focus of numerous appellate decisions. *See id.* at 215. The Supreme Court of Maryland has analyzed the ordinary meaning of that phrase and relied on the dictionary definition and principles of common sense in determining that “direct” means “stemming immediately from a source, as in direct result proceeding from one point to another in time or space without deviation or interruption marked by absence of an intervening agency, instrumentality, or influence.” *Id.* at 218 (quoting *Goff*, 387 Md. at 344 n.9 (in turn quoting Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 327 (10th ed. 2001))) (brackets and ellipses omitted). The Court has reiterated that “something is a ‘direct result’ where there is no intervening agent or occurrence

separating the criminal act and the victim’s loss.” *Id.* (quoting *In re Cody H.*, 452 Md. at 195) (further citation omitted).

For example, in *Goff v. State*, the defendant was found guilty of assault. 387 Md. at 331. In the course of the assault, the defendant pushed and struck the victim repeatedly, culminating in pinning the victim in the shower of the residence, where the defendant continued to strike him. *Id.* at 332. The shower insert was broken during the assault. *Id.* At a restitution hearing, the victim provided evidence regarding the estimated cost to repair the shower, and restitution was ordered. *Id.* at 333–36. On appeal, the defendant argued in part that the property damage to a shower was not the direct result of the crime of assault. *See id.* at 343–44. The Supreme Court of Maryland, interpreting the term “direct result” with its ordinary meaning, determined that the damage to the shower occurred during the assault and was not caused by an intervening agent or occurrence, and therefore, the restitution ordered was proper. *Id.* at 344.

In *Williams v. State*, the Supreme Court of Maryland considered whether out-of-pocket expenses constituted a direct result of a defendant’s theft of motorcycles. 385 Md. 50, 58 (2005). The motorcycles were recovered and secured at a police impound lot; however, the victim did not have the vehicles properly titled, and could not demonstrate proof of ownership to have the motorcycles released to him. *Id.* at 52. The circuit court awarded the victim restitution in the amount of \$1,500. *Id.* at 54. On appeal, the Court noted that the victim’s inability to reclaim the vehicles from the impound lot, and the source of the victim’s expenditure, was the victim’s inability to produce proof of ownership of the motorcycles. *Id.* at 62. The Court indicated that although there was “undeniably a causal

link” between the defendant’s theft and the vehicles’ placement in the impoundment lot, that nexus was not the direct result required under CP section 11-603. *Id.* In other words, although the motorcycles would not have been at the impound lot but for the defendant’s theft, it was the victim’s failure to title the vehicles or otherwise prove his ownership that prevented release of the vehicles. *See id.* The Court determined that based on the facts in that record, the loss the victim suffered was not directly caused by the theft. *Id.* at 63. The Court concluded that to hold otherwise would make the defendant liable for the victim’s failure to title the vehicles and was inconsistent with the statute. *Id.*

In *In re G.R.*, a juvenile committed a robbery in which he took another child’s backpack that contained, among other items, keys to three residences associated with the victim. 463 Md. at 210–11. The keys were missing from the backpack when it was subsequently recovered. *Id.* at 211. G.R. was later arrested and found in possession of several of the stolen items, including the set of housekeys. *Id.* However, the keys were not properly inventoried and were instead held with G.R.’s personal property at the juvenile detention facility. *Id.* The victim’s family members, unaware that the keys were in police custody, had the locks of their homes rekeyed. *Id.* G.R. pleaded involved to robbery, second-degree assault, and openly carrying a dangerous weapon. *Id.* at 212. The circuit court, sitting as a juvenile court, granted a request for restitution that included the cost of re-keying the houses. *Id.* On appeal, the Appellate Court of Maryland determined in an unreported opinion that the cost associated with re-keying the locks was not a direct result of the robbery because the decision to rekey the locks was an intervening occurrence that precipitated the associated decrease in value or out-of-pocket costs. *See id.* at 220–21. The

Supreme Court of Maryland reversed this Court, explaining that “although the locks were not directly damaged by the underlying robbery and theft of the corresponding keys, their value as protectors of household security and sanctity was substantially decreased.” *Id.* at 222. Distinguishing the case from *Williams*, the Court observed that

the substantial decrease in the value of the locks could only be remedied by return of the keys without them being copied, or by rekeying the locks. Here, there is neither an indication that the victim was culpable to any degree nor that the cost associated could have been avoided independently of the underlying theft.

Id. at 221 (citing *Williams*, 385 Md. 50). Because the rekeying was necessary to restore the value performed by the locks prior to the robbery, “the decision to rekey the locks was not an intervening event” and the cost to restore their value was directly attributable to G.R.’s delinquent act. *Id.* at 222.

Turning to the case *sub judice*, I.Y. pleaded “involved” to the taking and carrying away of the victim’s car on July 22, 2024 in violation of CR section 7-203, which provides that “[w]ithout the permission of the owner, a person may not take and carry away from the premises or out of the custody of another or use of the other, or the other’s agent, or a governmental unit any property, including . . . a motor vehicle[.]”⁸ Following a pursuit of the stolen vehicle (in which I.Y. was a passenger and not the driver), the vehicle struck a curb in Prince George’s County and became disabled, and I.Y. and her associates fled but were quickly apprehended and arrested. As elicited at the restitution hearing, the vehicle

⁸ The Supreme Court of Maryland has explained that to violate this statute, an individual may take and carry property in two ways: “First, one may enter the premises of another and take property away. Second, one may take property from wherever it is located.” *Allen v. State*, 402 Md. 59, 69 (2007) (internal citations omitted).

was not returned to the victim at that time. Instead, it was taken to an impound lot in the District of Columbia, where it remained for over five months until early January of 2025, when the victim was informed by an MPD officer that he could collect his vehicle.⁹ In the interim, as a result of being without a vehicle, the victim incurred a total of over \$2,108.94 in rideshare costs to get to school and work. I.Y.'s delinquent act of unauthorized use of the victim's car directly caused the victim not to have access to his car for over five months, forcing the victim to temporarily remedy the situation by incurring rideshare costs. Similar to *In re G.R.*, here, there was neither an indication that the victim was culpable to any degree nor that the associated rideshare costs could have been avoided independently of the underlying theft.¹⁰ See 463 Md. at 221. As there was no intervening agent or occurrence separating I.Y.'s delinquent act and the victim's loss, the loss is the direct result of the delinquent act. *Id.* at 221 (citation omitted).

I.Y. asserts that even if losses which accrued after July 22, 2024 qualify as the victim's loss, they are not attributable to her because she was not the driver of the stolen vehicle. Relying on *In re Levon A.*, 762 Md. 626 (2000), I.Y. claims that the reason the

⁹ At that time, according to the victim's testimony, the victim was informed by an MPD detective that the vehicle was not drivable. The victim did not seek restitution from I.Y. for the value of repairs to the vehicle.

¹⁰ I.Y. argued before the juvenile court that an intervening cause of the victim's loss was his failure to maintain insurance coverage on the vehicle. I.Y. did not make that argument before this Court, and thus we do not address it. We note that unlike in *Williams*, where the victim's failure to demonstrate proof of ownership prevented him from securing the release of his impounded vehicles, in the case *sub judice*, there was no link demonstrated between the victim's lack of required minimum insurance coverage and MPD's retention of the stolen vehicle. See 385 Md. at 62.

vehicle could not be released to the victim was because of the damage caused when I.Y.’s associate crashed the vehicle—which she also contends is an intervening cause. We disagree. The testimony provided at the restitution hearing was that the vehicle was held by MPD until early January of 2025. Although the vehicle was undrivable after its release to the victim, the victim did not seek restitution for rideshare costs after that point, as he relinquished the car to the lienholder.

Moreover, *Levon A.* is distinguishable from the case at hand. *Levon A.* involved delinquent acts by two juveniles. The first, Antonio, acting alone, stole a car by breaking a window and tampering with the ignition device. 361 Md. at 629. Later in the day, as he was driving the stolen car, Antonio saw Levon walking and offered him a ride. *Id.* Police encountered the vehicle, and Antonio attempted to elude police, ultimately running into shrubbery and a fence. *Id.* at 629–30. The juveniles were apprehended, and the car was recovered. *Id.* at 630. The car was damaged in the collision, with the window and ignition also being broken in the original theft. Items from the vehicle were also missing. *Id.* Levon was found involved in unauthorized use in taking and carrying away the stolen vehicle. *Id.* Restitution was ordered as to both juveniles. *Id.* at 631.¹¹

¹¹ The juvenile court initially ordered Levon to pay restitution for both the value of the missing items and, jointly with Antonio, to pay for repairs to the vehicle, which included both the damage from the initial theft and from the collision. 361 Md. at 630–31. The Appellate Court of Maryland, in an earlier iteration of the appeal, determined that Levon could not be ordered to pay restitution for damages for the stolen items since it had been found that Levon did not commit the theft; in addition, this Court determined that Levon could not be required to pay restitution for damages to the window and ignition, as those occurred during the initial theft in which Levon was not involved, rather than the unauthorized use. *Id.* at 632–33 (citing 124 Md. App. 103, 136–37 (2000)).

On review, the Supreme Court of Maryland determined that the damage to the vehicle resulting from the collision was not a direct result of Levon's delinquent act of unauthorized use, as there was not evidence that he was more than a passive passenger. *Id.* at 640–41. In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied on several other cases illustrating that restitution is not warranted simply because damage results from a delinquent act—rather, to award restitution, the damage must causally flow from the child's delinquent act. *See id.* at 639–40 (citing *In Re Jason W.*, 94 Md. App. 731 (1993) (restitution could not be ordered for repairs to police vehicle damaged during police chase, as such damages did not ensue from the sole delinquent act of operating an unregistered vehicle) and *In Re Jose S.*, 304 Md. 396, 400–01 (1985) (restitution over \$300 could not be ordered against juvenile solely found delinquent of theft of goods under \$300; where a second juvenile was found involved of the sole offense of breaking and entering and where there was no evidence that he stole anything, no restitution could be ordered)).

The restitution orders that were vacated in *Levon A.*, *Jason W.*, and *Jose S.* each required the juveniles to pay restitution for damage outside the scope of their delinquent acts. Conversely here, the restitution order requires I.Y. to pay restitution for the victim's out-of-pocket costs incurred for transportation while his car remained out of his possession following I.Y.'s unauthorized use. The restitution order here is thus within the scope of I.Y.'s delinquent act. The analysis may have been different if, for example, the victim sought restitution for damage to the vehicle caused by the collision itself when I.Y. was not the driver; or, if instead of awaiting release from police impound, the victim could not drive the vehicle because it was undergoing repairs or evaluation by a mechanic, due to the

damage caused by I.Y.'s associate. As neither circumstance is present here, this case bears no resemblance to the vacated restitution orders in *Levon A.*, *Jason W.*, and *Jose S.*, and the victim's out-of-pocket transportation expenses remain the direct result of I.Y.'s delinquent act.

Finally, I.Y. asserts that the juvenile court's restitution order required her to pay for costs that preceded the date of her delinquent act. To make this argument, I.Y. reconstructs the juvenile court's order as subdividing the costs into costs that pre-dated and post-dated the delinquent act. However, the court's order does not make such a distinction, and the evidence admitted does not reflect costs from the victim that predate the delinquent act. The victim indicated that he had incurred a total of \$1,108.94 in rideshare costs from the Empower service, which were reflected in part by bank records that were admitted into evidence, and none of the dates of those transactions preceded the date of I.Y.'s delinquent act. The victim initially also sought a sum of restitution in the range of \$2,500 in Uber transactions, which included transactions between the date the victim's car was originally taken and the date of I.Y.'s delinquent act. However, the juvenile court sustained I.Y.'s objection to the exhibit with the Uber transactions, and it was not admitted into evidence. The victim then testified that he had incurred "almost maybe \$1,000 more" on Uber trips. When explaining the restitution order, the juvenile court found the following:

[The victim] needed the vehicle to get from home to school to work, back and forth. So, therefore, once the vehicle was removed from his possession, he had to utilize Uber and other ride[share] apps in order to facilitate those things that he would normally have done had he retained possession of his vehicle.

He indicated that Empower was 20 percent off[,] or 20 percent less than Lyft or Uber, so he endeavored to utilize that app in order to continue to get around. He indicated that he incurred thousands in expenses with Uber, at least a thousand. So[,] the Court does find that the \$1,000 charge from Uber is reasonable *with regard to this case*.

Additionally, \$1,108.94 incurred from Empower is also reasonable.

(Emphasis added).

Nothing in the court's statement suggested that the ruling included the victim's out-of-pocket costs for rideshare expenses incurred before I.Y.'s delinquent act.

Seeing neither error nor abuse of direction in the restitution order, we therefore affirm the judgment of the juvenile court.

**JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT
COURT FOR PRINCE GEORGE'S
COUNTY, SITTING AS A JUVENILE
COURT, AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE
PAID BY APPELLANT.**