

UNREPORTED*

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF MARYLAND

No. 0708

September Term, 2024

CHERYL L. ZIEGLER RAGLAND

v.

EDWARD A. RAGLAND, JR.

Graeff,
Ripken,
Eyler, Deborah S.
(Senior Judge, Specially Assigned),

JJ.

Opinion by Ripken, J.

Filed: November 19, 2025

*This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B).

In October of 2018, following a judgment of absolute divorce, the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County ordered Cheryl L. Ziegler Ragland (“Ziegler”), appellant, to pay Edward A. Ragland, Jr. (“Ragland”), appellee, a \$44,750.00 marital award. Within ten days, Ziegler filed a revisory motion, which was never ruled upon. Almost four years later, in May of 2022, the trial court dismissed the case for lack of prosecution after notifying the parties and receiving no response from either party. Nearly two years after that, in April of 2024, Ragland filed a motion to enforce the 2018 marital award. Shortly thereafter, the trial court entered two orders, one related to Ziegler’s federal Thrift Savings Plan, the other related to her Federal Employees Retirement System benefits (hereinafter the “retirement orders”).¹ Ziegler then filed several motions and a response to Ragland’s motion.² Without referencing Ziegler’s motions or response, the trial court granted Ragland’s motion to enforce the judgment, noting that “no opposition” was made. Ziegler subsequently filed a motion to vacate and stay the grant of enforcement, as well as a separate motion to vacate or stay the retirement orders. Ziegler then noted this appeal. The trial court granted Ziegler’s motion to stay.

Ziegler presents the following issues for our review:

I. Was the [2018] memorandum a final judgment?

¹ Ragland filed both retirement orders as proposed lines two days before filing his Motion to Enforce.

² Ziegler titled her response “Preliminary Response to Plaintiff’s ‘Motion for Enforcement of Monetary Award, Entry of Money Judgment, and Other Relief[,]’” purporting to “reserve[] the right to supplement [her] Response” following adjudication of her other pending motions.

- II. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by granting the motion to enforce and issuing [Ragland] a money judgment for the monetary award?
- III. Did the trial court err by not adjudicating the timely filed motion to revise when it learned of the motion in the year 2024?
- IV. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by issuing the May 15, 2024, money judgment against [Ziegler] *nunc pro tunc*?
- V. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by providing [Ragland] with a \$47,500.00 monetary award?

Because we must ensure appellate jurisdiction before deciding an appeal, we first address the following issues:

- I. Whether the 2018 memorandum is a final judgment and, if so, whether Ziegler’s appeal of it is timely.
- II. Whether Ziegler’s appeal of the 2022 dismissal is timely.
- III. Whether the circuit court erred in granting the May 2024 motion to enforce the judgment.

For the reasons to follow, we answer the first two questions as to timeliness in the negative and the third in the affirmative; however, finding any error to be harmless as to the May 2024 motion, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Ragland and Ziegler were married in a 2004 religious ceremony in Prince George’s County. In 2017, after the parties cross-filed for divorce, the circuit court issued a Judgment of Absolute Divorce that ordered Ziegler to pay Ragland a \$53,500.00 marital award. Ziegler timely appealed, asserting that the trial court abused its discretion in calculating the award. *Ragland v. Ragland*, No. 2666, Sept. Term 2016, 2018 WL 2688117, at *10–11 (Md. Ct. Spec. App., June 5, 2018). This Court agreed, vacating the award and remanding

the case to the circuit court to “reassess and explain its findings regarding the marital award[.]” *Id.* at *23 n.17. Specifically, we instructed the trial court to “prov[ide] a value for [Ragland’s] scuba and photography equipment” because the previous judgment had failed to do so. *Id.* at *23 n.17.

On remand, Ziegler filed a “Verified Memorandum Regarding Calculation of [the] Marital Award[.]” which outlined the couple’s finances and assets to “assist in [the circuit court’s] determination of the appropriate calculation of the marital award[.]” On October 30, 2018, the circuit court filed a “Memorandum” announcing its marital award determination (the “2018 Memorandum”). The circuit court found that, upon review of the trial proceedings, there was no testimony regarding the scuba equipment and therefore valued it at \$0. Without further explanation, the court modified the marital award to \$44,750.00. The 2018 Memorandum was not accompanied by a separate order, however it was docketed in November 2018 as “Memorandum Opinion and Order.”³

Sixteen days later, Ziegler filed a timely Motion to Amend the Marital Award Judgment (“2018 Motion to Amend”) under Maryland Rule 2-535, asserting that the 2018 Memorandum did not properly calculate the marital award. Additionally, as required by the Judgment of Absolute Divorce, Ziegler filed a Proposal to Satisfy the Monetary Award outlined in the 2018 Memorandum. The circuit court never ruled on the 2018 Motion to Amend.

³ Ziegler contends that the 2018 Memorandum is referenced only as a “memorandum” on the Maryland Judiciary Case Search public database; however, the relevant page has the filing listed as a “Memorandum Opinion and Order.”

Almost four years later, on May 5, 2022, the clerk of court filed a Notice of Contemplated Dismissal for the case based on lack of prosecution. The notice was mailed to both parties and their attorneys of record. Neither party responded to the notice. On June 13, 2022, more than thirty days after issuing the notice of proposed dismissal, having received no response, the clerk of court dismissed the case.

Almost two years later, on April 15, 2024, Ragland filed, in the form of a line to the court, a court order acceptable for processing in connection with Ziegler’s Federal Employees Retirement System benefits. Two days later, he filed a proposed retirement benefits order related to Ziegler’s federal Thrift Savings Plan, also in the form of a line to the circuit court. On April 18, 2024, Ragland additionally filed a “Verified Motion for Enforcement of Monetary Award, Entry of Judgment, and Other Relief” (the “Motion to Enforce”) based on Ziegler’s lack of payments under the 2018 Memorandum. The circuit court signed the retirement orders, which were entered into its electronic system; however, the court had not yet ruled on Ragland’s Motion to Enforce when Ziegler filed several motions: a motion to revive her 2018 Motion to Amend; a motion for judgment or an order memorializing the 2018 Memorandum; a motion to stay adjudication and extend the period to respond to the Motion to Enforce; and a preliminary response to the Motion to Enforce. On May 15, 2024, the circuit court granted the Motion to Enforce (“May 2024 Judgment”) without reference to any of Ziegler’s filings, indicating that the enforcement was without opposition.

Nine days later, on May 24, 2024, Ziegler filed a motion to vacate and stay the order granting the Motion to Enforce under Maryland Rules 2-534 and 2-535. On June 5, 2024,

Ziegler additionally filed a motion to vacate or stay the retirement orders. On June 7, 2024, Ziegler appealed the May 2024 Judgment and “all orders pursuant to” the 2018 Memorandum.

Less than one month later, the circuit court issued an order granting Ziegler’s motion to stay pending a decision from this Court (the “July 2024 Order”). The circuit court did not specify which motion to stay was granted; nor did it make any ruling on the motions to vacate. The circuit court acknowledged that Ziegler’s 2018 Motion to Amend was filed with the court, however it was “never received or reviewed by Chambers.”

DISCUSSION

I. ZIEGLER’S APPEAL OF THE 2018 MEMORANDUM IS UNTIMELY.

A. Party Contentions

Ziegler contends that the 2018 Memorandum is not a final judgment because it lacked the “separate document” required under Maryland Rule 2-601(a).⁴

Ragland asserts that the 2018 Memorandum is a final judgment because it was docketed as “Memorandum and Order[.]” Alternatively, Ragland argues that Ziegler accepted the 2018 Memorandum as final by treating it as such in her 2018 Motion to Amend or otherwise failing to object to the Memorandum.

⁴ Ziegler additionally avers that the 2018 Memorandum is not a final judgment because the court did not address costs as required by Maryland Rule 2-601(a)(2). The Maryland Rule Ziegler cites does not discuss the cost requirement for judgments, so we understand Ziegler to be referring to Maryland Rule 2-602(a)(1)’s requirement that “each judgment. . . should include a statement of an allowance of costs[.]” Even so, the committee note under that rule specifies that the failure to include costs “does not preclude the document from constituting a final and appealable judgment.” Md. Rule 2-601(a)(1) note (citing *Mattison v. Gelber*, 202 Md. App. 44 (2011)).

B. Analysis

i. Finality of the 2018 Memorandum

“With exceptions not relevant here, a ruling of a circuit court is not appealable unless it constitutes a final judgment.” *Rohrbeck v. Rohrbeck*, 318 Md. 28, 41 (1989). *See also Silbersack v. AC & S, Inc.*, 402 Md. 673, 678 (2008); Md. Code (1974, 2020 Repl. Vol.), § 12-301 of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJP”). A judgment is final if it determines and concludes all the rights involved or denies the appellant means of further prosecuting or defending their interests in the proceeding. *Rohrbeck*, 318 Md. at 41 (citation omitted); *Remson v. Krausen*, 206 Md. App. 53, 71–72 (2012) (citation omitted). “Moreover, the ruling must ‘leave nothing more to be done in order to effectuate the court’s disposition of the matter.’” *Remson*, 206 Md. App. at 72 (quoting *Rohrbeck*, 318 Md. at 41). *See also id.* at 72 (dismissing an appeal for lack of jurisdiction where there was no final judgment because the circuit court did not consider the merits of an outstanding motion to vacate).

Neither party argues that the 2018 Memorandum does not meet the substantive final judgment requirements. We agree that the 2018 Memorandum concluded all substantive rights involved in the proceeding. However, the issue is whether the 2018 Memorandum is, procedurally, a final judgment.

Under Maryland Rule 2-601, a judgment must be set out in a document separate from the memorandum, docket entry, or oral ruling. *Hiob v. Progressive American Ins. Co.*, 440 Md. 466, 478–79 (2014). The purpose of the separate document requirement is to eliminate confusion about the timing for appeals and, therefore, to facilitate appellate

review. *Hiob*, 440 Md. at 480, 497 (citations omitted). “Rule 2-601 . . . is to be applied ‘mechanically’ and its requirements relaxed only when doing so would *preserve* an appeal.” *Id.* (citation omitted) (emphasis added). In Maryland, the separate document requirement cannot be waived to make an appeal untimely; however, it may be waived where no party objects to the absence of the separate document, the circuit court clearly intended the entry on the docket to be a final judgment, and applying waiver preserves the right to appeal. *Suburban Hospital, Inc. v. Kirson*, 362 Md. 140, 156 (2000); *URS Corp. v. Fort Myer Constr. Corp.*, 452 Md. 48, 67 (2017); *Taha v. S. Mgmt. Corp.*, 367 Md. 564, 569–71 (2002). *See also Bankers Tr. Co. v. Mallis*, 435 U.S. 381, 386 (1978) (finding waiver where the parties did not object to the lack of a separate document and waiver allowed for appealability rather than facilitated loss of the right to that appeal).

In *Suburban Hospital*, the Supreme Court of Maryland refrained from “setting the outer limits of the availability of waiver of the separate document requirement” however found waiver where: 1) there was a recorded verdict on the docket without a separate document; 2) no party objected to the absence of the separate document on appeal; and 3) finding waiver preserved the appeal rather than prejudiced the appeal. 362 Md. at 156. The Court compared the case to *Byrum v. Horning*, 360 Md. 23 (2000). In *Byrum*, the parties disagreed as to whether Maryland Rule 2-601(a)’s separate document requirement was waived where appellants failed to appear at trial or answer a motion to dismiss. *Byrum*, 360 Md. at 32–33. The Court declined to apply waiver there because doing so would make the appeal untimely, and prejudicing appellate review is contrary to the nature of Rule 2-601. *Id.*; *see also Suburban Hospital*, 362 Md. at 156–57.

In contrast, the Supreme Court of Maryland found waiver of the separate document rule in *URS Corporation*, stating that the case “[ell] squarely into the framework identified in *Suburban Hospital*[.]” 452 Md. at 70. The Court considered dispositive that the judgment was entered on the docket alongside other related judgments that did have separate documents, leading to the conclusion that the trial court clearly intended the one without a separate document to be a final judgment as well; additionally, no party objected to the absence of the separate document. *Id.*

Here, the 2018 Memorandum was memorialized in the written narrative and filed on the docket as “Memorandum Opinion and Order.” The only party that objected to the finality of the 2018 Memorandum based upon the separate document rule is Ziegler, an assertion that would prejudice her own appeal. Ziegler challenged the 2018 Memorandum’s finality for the first time in her 2024 filings, five years after filing her post-judgment motion to amend the 2018 Memorandum.

As in *Suburban Hospital* and *URS Corporation*, the written memorandum and the clerk’s entry of it on the docket made clear that the court intended the 2018 Memorandum to be a final judgment in this matter. *See Suburban Hospital*, 362 Md. at 156; *URS Corp.* at 70. *See also Balt. Cnty. v. Fraternal Ord. of Police Lodge No. 4*, 439 Md. 547, 561–66 (2014). Where the previous cases differ from this case is in the objections. A party here—Ziegler—objects to the 2018 Memorandum’s lack of a separate document. Despite this, applying Ziegler’s objection as the obstacle here is antithetical to the purpose of waiver and therefore contrary to Maryland Rule 2-601. *See Hiob*, 440 Md. at 497. Further, Ziegler’s filing of the 2018 Motion to Amend treated the 2018 Memorandum as a final

judgment. Accordingly, Ziegler’s objection is inapposite to the waiver analysis here; she was the only party that objected to waiver, yet is the party that benefited by it, and the waiver occurred three years after she acquiesced to the judgment as final by filing post-judgment motions. Finally, unlike in *Byrum*, applying waiver here preserves the judgment for appeal; therefore, doing so is in line with previous findings on waiver. *See id.*; *Byrum*, 360 Md. at 32–33; *Suburban Hospital*, 362 Md. at 156; *URS Corp.*, 452 Md. at 70. For those reasons, the separate document rule was waived in the case *sub judice* because the facts at hand fall “squarely into the framework” identified in *Suburban Hospital*. *See URS Corp.*, 452 Md. at 70.

ii. Impact of the 2022 Dismissal

We next examine the effect of the 2022 dismissal upon the 2018 Memorandum. “An action is subject to dismissal for lack of prosecution at the expiration of one year from the last docket entry[.]” Md. Rule 2-507(c). When an action is subject to dismissal under 2-507(b), the clerk “shall serve notice on all parties” and if no responsive motion is filed within thirty days the clerk shall enter “[d]ismissed for lack of. . . prosecution without prejudice[.]” *Id.* § 2-507(d). A dismissal for lack of prosecution, when entered, dismisses any pending motions but does not affect previous final judgments in the case. *See Reed v. Cagan*, 128 Md. App. 641, 645 (1999) (where other defendants in the case were granted summary judgment or dismissed by stipulation, a 2-507(b) dismissal of pending motions in the case did not dismiss their judgments).

Here, in accordance with Maryland Rule 2-507(f), the clerk of court entered the case’s dismissal on the docket more than thirty days after notifying the parties of the

contemplated dismissal, having received no response from either party. Because the 2018 Motion to Amend was pending at the time, the 2022 dismissal dismissed that motion. *See id.* In contrast, because the 2018 Memorandum was a final judgment, *see supra*, the 2022 dismissal did not dismiss that order. *Id.*

iii. Timeliness of Appeal of the 2018 Memorandum

We next examine timeliness with respect to the appeal of the 2018 Memorandum. Generally, a notice of appeal must be filed within thirty days of the entry of judgment from which it is taken. Md. Rule 8-202(a). *See also* Kevin F. Arthur, *Finality of Judgments and Other Appellate Trigger Issues* § 7 (4th ed. 2025) (noting that an appellate court is authorized to dismiss an untimely appeal on its own motion or on the motion of the opposing party (citing Md. Rule 8-602(b))). The 2018 Memorandum was entered on November 11, 2018. Ziegler noted this appeal on June 7, 2024—almost six years later. That is well beyond the thirty-day notice requirement. Therefore, although the 2018 Memorandum is a final judgment, we dismiss Ziegler’s appeal as untimely.

II. APPEAL OF THE 2022 DISMISSAL IS UNTIMELY.⁵

A. Party Contentions

Ziegler asserts that, in 2022, the trial court erroneously dismissed the case for lack of prosecution because the 2018 Motion to Amend was still pending before the court at that time.

⁵ We recognize that Ziegler does not directly address the 2022 dismissal in her notice of appeal. Nonetheless, we discuss it as it is encompassed by her appeal of all “orders issued pursuant to the [2018 Memorandum].” [RE 119] Moreover, this Court may raise issues of appellate jurisdiction *sua sponte*. *See Johnson v. Johnson*, 423 Md. 602, 605–06 (2011);

Ragland contends that the 2022 dismissal was not erroneous because Ziegler failed to make any filings or show any “formal pleading of intention to proceed” for more than three years. Ragland adds that Ziegler then had the opportunity to object to the dismissal once the Notice of Contemplated Dismissal was served in 2022. Thus, Ragland contends, without any such action, the 2022 dismissal became final when it was entered in the docket.

B. Analysis

Maryland Rule 2-507(c) governs dismissal for lack of prosecution. Under the Rule, an action is subject to dismissal if a year has passed since the last docket entry without further action. Md. Rule 5-507(c). As noted above, Maryland Rule 2-507(d) requires that the clerk “shall serve a notice on all . . . that an order of dismissal for lack of . . . prosecution will be entered after the expiration of 30 days unless a motion is filed under section (e) of this Rule.” If, within thirty days after service of the notice, no party files a motion to defer dismissal, Maryland Rule 2-507(f) then instructs the clerk to enter on the docket “Dismissed for lack of prosecution without prejudice.” A dismissal under Rule 2-507 is a final, appealable, judgment. *See Reed*, 128 Md. App. at 645; *Spencer v. Est. of Newton*, 227 Md. App. 154,160–61 (2016).

Here, regardless of the merits of the dismissal, the 2022 dismissal for lack of prosecution was procedurally proper because the requirements of Maryland Rule 2-507(f) were satisfied. More than a year had passed since the last docket entry, the clerk of court

Eastgate Assocs. v. Apper, 276 Md. 698, 701 (1976); *Biro v. Schombert*, 285 Md. 290, 293 (1979).

notified the parties of the contemplated dismissal, and the clerk entered the judgment on the docket after more than thirty days passed without a response. Because the 2022 dismissal is a final judgment,⁶ it was appealable for thirty days following entry on the docket on June 13, 2022. Md. Rule 8-202(a). Ziegler noted this appeal on June 7, 2024—almost two years later. Based on the parties’ failure to properly challenge the 2022 dismissal—with either a motion following the notice of contemplated dismissal or a timely appeal—we likewise, under Maryland Rule 8-602(b)(2), dismiss Ziegler’s appeal of the 2022 dismissal as untimely.

III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE MAY 2024 JUDGMENT; HOWEVER, THE ERROR WAS HARMLESS.

A. Party Contentions

In seeking appellate review in this matter, Ziegler does not directly address the issue of this Court’s jurisdiction over such an appeal. However, Ziegler contends that the circuit court abused its discretion by issuing the May 2024 Judgment prior to the expiration of the thirty days given to her to respond to the Motion to Enforce. Ziegler posits that the circuit court additionally erred by noting that the May 2024 Judgment was without opposition, despite her filing a response to the motion, and doing so before her thirty days to respond had expired.

⁶ As above, a final judgment “leave[s] nothing more to be done in order to effectuate the court’s disposition of the matter.” *Remson*, 206 Md. App. at 72 (quoting *Rohrbeck*, 318 Md. at 41). The 2022 dismissal determined Ziegler and Ragland’s rights in the matter, effectively concluding all pending issues, and was therefore a final judgment. *See id.* (citation omitted).

Ragland also does not directly address the issue of appellate jurisdiction; however, he does note that this appeal was filed while several issues remain unsettled at the trial level and asserts that “[r]ejection of [Ziegler’s] claims in these proceedings would not foreclose future resolution of enforcement. . . at later time[] in proceedings before the trial judge.” As to the May 2024 Judgment, Ragland contends that the judgment “should be affirmed” without putting forth any reasons why we should do so.

B. Analysis

Where post-judgment motions filed within ten days of the judgment remain pending, appellate jurisdiction cannot be acquired until the post-judgment motions are resolved.⁷ See *Sieck v. Sieck*, 66 Md. App. 37, 41–42 (1986) (citing *Unnamed Att’y v. Att’y Griev. Comm’n.*, 303 Md. 473, 494 (1985)). See also *Edsall v. Anne Arundel Cnty.*, 332 Md. 502, 507–08 (1993); *Shoemaker v. Smith*, 353 Md. 143,165 (1999); *Doe v. Sovereign*

⁷ In Maryland, there are three exceptions to this rule:

appeals from interlocutory rulings specifically allowed by statute (Maryland Code, § 12-303 of the Cts. & Jud. Proc. Article), immediate appeals permitted under Maryland Rule 2-602(b), and appeals from interlocutory rulings allowed under the common law collateral order doctrine.”

Smith, 386 Md. at 21 (citation omitted). See also *Waterkeeper All., Inc. v. Md. Dept. of Agric.*, 439 Md. 262, 286 (2012) (citations omitted). Here, the orders at issue do not fall under those enumerated in Maryland Code § 12-303, hence the first exception is inapplicable. Likewise, the second and third exceptions do not apply because this appeal concerns the merits of the case, and the circuit court did not make any express finding of “no just reasons for delay” of the appeal. See *Waterkeeper All., Inc.*, at 288–89. As an additional note, neither the Rule 8-602(f) nor the Rule 8-602(g) savings provision applies under the circumstances *sub judice*. See *Bussell v. Bussell*, 194 Md. App. 137, 154 (2010); *Smith*, 386 Md. at 26; Kevin F. Arthur, *Finality of Judgments and Other Appellate Trigger Issues* § 7 (4th ed. 2025).

Grace Ministries, Inc., 217 Md. App. 650, 668 (2014); Md. Rule 8-202(c). In contrast, “appellate jurisdiction attaches” to a judgment, even if a post-judgment motion is pending in the case, if the post-judgment motion was “filed more than ten days after a judgment but within thirty days of the judgment, under Rule 2-535(a)[.]” *Unnamed Att’y*, 303 Md. at 486.

In addressing the issue of finality here, we note that Ziegler’s motions to vacate are still pending at the circuit court. Subsequent to the May 2024 Judgment granting Ragland’s Motion to Enforce, Ziegler filed two motions: 1) a motion to vacate and stay enforcement of the May 2024 Judgment, and 2) a motion to vacate or stay the retirement orders. It is unclear whether the trial court ruled on all the outstanding motions in the July 2024 Order. After articulating the case history, the circuit court wrote

ORDERED, that Defendant’s Motion to Stay pending an opinion from the Appellate Court of Maryland is GRANTED.

The plain language of that July 2024 order addresses only one of Ziegler’s motions to stay and does not address either motion to vacate. Despite this, neither of Ziegler’s revisory motions bar appellate jurisdiction over the matter. *See Unnamed Att’y*, 303 Md. at 486. The circuit court entered the order granting the Motion to Enforce on May 16, 2024. Ziegler then filed the motion to vacate and stay that order nineteen days later, on June 4, 2024. Ziegler’s motion to vacate the Motion to Enforce therefore does not bar appellate jurisdiction because it falls into the category of motions “filed more than ten days after a judgment but within thirty days of the judgment, under Rule 2-535(a)[.]” *Id.* Likewise, the circuit court entered the retirement orders on April 24, 2024, and Ziegler filed the motion

to vacate or stay those orders forty-two days later, on June 5, 2024. Because the motion to vacate or stay the retirement benefits was filed more than thirty days after entry of the order it seeks to revise, the portion of the motion seeking to vacate is untimely; and the request to stay was addressed in the circuit court’s July 2024 Order. Md. Rule 2-535(a). Having therefore acquired jurisdiction, we now turn to the merits of Ziegler’s appeal of the May 2024 Judgment.⁸

On May 14, 2024, twenty-five days after she was served a summons to respond to the Motion to Enforce within thirty days, Ziegler filed a motion to extend the time to respond and file a “preliminary response” to the Motion to Enforce. Despite this clear opposition and time remaining for Ziegler to respond, the circuit court granted the Motion to Enforce, noting “no opposition[,]” on May 16, 2024. This grant was in error; however, for the reasons set forth below, we conclude that the error was harmless.

In civil cases, this Court “will not reverse a lower court judgment if the error is harmless [*sic*].” *Flanagan v. Flanagan*, 181 Md. App. 492, 515 (2008) (quoting *Flores v. Bell*, 398 Md. 27, 33–34 (2007)). “The burden is on the complaining party to show prejudice as well as error.” *Id.* (citation omitted). In determining prejudice, and therefore, whether an error is harmless or not, “depend[s] upon the facts of each individual case.” *Id.* (citation omitted). “[A]n error that does not affect the outcome of the case is harmless error.” *Id.* at

⁸ For the reasons discussed *supra*, we cannot reach Ziegler’s appeal of the 2018 Memorandum or 2022 dismissal and therefore only discuss the merits of her appeal of the May 2024 Judgment.

516 (citing *Crane v. Dunn*, 382 Md. 83, 91 (2004); *Beahm v. Shortall*, 279 Md. 321, 331 (1977)).

Here, although the circuit court failed to note Ziegler’s opposition, or wait to rule until after her allotted response time, any opposition Ziegler had or has to the Motion to Enforce is without merit, and therefore those failures were harmless. *See Flanagan*, 181 Md. App. at 515. Ziegler’s opposition to the Motion to Enforce, both in her preliminary response and her appellate briefs, centered upon the 2018 Memorandum’s lack of finality, and that because “[t]he Motion to Enforce [was] improperly filed” there was “no order to enforce.” As discussed *supra*, that argument holds no merit because the 2018 Memorandum was a final judgment. Even had the circuit court noted Ziegler’s opposition to the Motion to Enforce, or waited until the filing period had expired, the outcome of the case *sub judice* would be the same. *See Flanagan*, 181 Md. App. at 516–17. Moreover, the Motion to Enforce was simply enforcing a pre-existing duty. Ziegler owed Ragland the marital award under the final 2018 Memorandum; the May 2024 enforcement of that award did not change Ziegler’s legal obligations to Ragland.

Thus, any error made by the circuit court in granting the May 2024 Motion to Enforce was harmless.

**JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT
FOR PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY
AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY
APPELLANT.**