

Circuit Court for Montgomery County  
Case No.: 06-I-21-000010

UNREPORTED  
IN THE APPELLATE COURT  
OF MARYLAND\*

No. 746

September Term, 2023

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IN RE: J.B.

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Arthur,  
Beachley,  
Eyler, Deborah S.,  
(Senior Judge, Specially Assigned),

JJ.

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Opinion by Eyler, Deborah S., J.

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Filed: November 15, 2023

\*This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B).

In this child in need of assistance<sup>1</sup> (“CINA”) case, K.B. (“Mother”), the appellant, challenges an order entered by the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, sitting as a juvenile court, that decreased the frequency of her supervised visitation with her two-and-a-half-year-old son, J.B. (“J”), from four hours per week to two hours per week, as recommended by the Montgomery County Department of Social Services (“the Department”), the appellee. Through counsel, J filed a line with this Court stating that he does not oppose the relief requested by Mother. J’s father, D.B. (“Father”), did not file a brief in this Court.<sup>2</sup>

Mother presents one question, which we have rephrased slightly:

I. Did the juvenile court err or abuse its discretion by denying Mother’s request for an evidentiary hearing and by reducing Mother’s visitation?

For the following reasons, we shall affirm the order of the juvenile court.

## **FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS**

### **The CINA Petition**

On January 27, 2021, the Department filed a petition in the juvenile court, which it later amended, alleging that J, then 6.5 weeks old, was a CINA based upon neglect. It alleged the following facts. In 2011, the Department investigated Mother for neglect of her

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<sup>1</sup> A “child in need of assistance” is a child who requires court intervention because the child has been abused or neglected, or has a developmental disability or mental disorder, and whose parents, guardian, or custodian cannot or will not give proper care and attention to the child and the child’s needs. Md. Code (1974, 2020 Repl. Vol.), Cts. & Jud. Proc. (“CJP”) § 3-801(f), (g).

<sup>2</sup> Although sharing the same last initial, Mother and Father never were married and do not share a surname.

older son after she left him home alone at age 2. In 2012, she again was investigated for inadequate supervision of her older son. That son presently is in the custody of his paternal grandmother under court order.

In December 2020, Mother gave birth to J at Holy Cross Hospital. He was born prematurely, at 34.5 weeks gestation, and suffered some seizure activity after birth. Mother used alcohol and cocaine during her pregnancy. She received treatment at Mountain Manor, was briefly incarcerated, and soon before giving birth had been transferred to Avery House, a halfway house for women and children located in Rockville. Mother is cognitively impaired. She has been diagnosed with fetal alcohol syndrome, Fragile X syndrome,<sup>3</sup> anxiety, and depression. She has been prescribed an antidepressant.

Five days after J was born, the Department’s Child Welfare Services (“CWS”) division began a “risk of harm assessment” based upon “suspected caregiver impairment” and J’s exposure to substances while *in utero*. After Mother and J were discharged from the hospital to Avery House, the Department held a Family Team Decision Making meeting with Mother and staff at Avery House. Mother agreed to receive family preservation services from CWS and to continue receiving outpatient mental health services. Mother claimed not to know the identity of J’s father. She provided the Department with the name of her ex-husband as the putative father, but he later was ruled out by DNA testing.

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<sup>3</sup> Fragile X syndrome is a genetic condition that causes significant intellectual disabilities, particularly among males.

Soon after, Avery House staff reported concerns about Mother’s parenting to the Department. They advised that Mother did not bathe J regularly, did not dress him appropriately for the weather, co-slept with him despite explicit instruction not to do so, did not change her shirt or wash her hands after smoking cigarettes prior to holding J, and did not give J his medication for thrush. Mother either did not respond to or became easily angered by guidance offered by Avery House staff.

On January 26, 2021, Avery House discharged Mother for noncompliance with program rules. At that time, Mother had no plan for housing. The Department determined to shelter J and filed the CINA petition the following day.

### **Adjudication and Disposition**

On February 24, 2021, the juvenile court held an adjudication and disposition hearing. Mother was living in a women’s shelter. She agreed that the Department could prove the allegations of the CINA petition and waived her right to contest those allegations but did not admit them. The court sustained the allegations and found that J was a CINA. It ordered that J be committed to the custody of the Department for placement in foster care and that the Department facilitate a minimum of two visits per week between Mother and J, one in person and one virtual, unless staffing and COVID protocols allowed for both visits to be in person.

### **J’s Progress in Foster Care**

J was placed in foster care with the M. family, where he continues to reside. He has since been diagnosed with Fragile X syndrome and is being monitored for developmental delays and other sequelae of that condition. He suffers from severe acid reflux and eczema,

both of which require a special diet, medications, and frequent medical monitoring. He was diagnosed with a speech delay as a toddler and received services at the Infants and Toddlers Program to address that and other behavioral concerns. His sleep is dysregulated, with frequent nighttime wakings that require the foster parents to sooth him.

### **Mother’s Progress and Visitation with J**

Under CJP § 3-816.2, the juvenile court was required to hold review hearings. At the first such hearing, on June 16, 2021, it adopted a permanency plan of reunification with Mother. The court characterized Mother’s visitation with J up to that point as “inconsistent” because she had participated in 18 visits but had missed nine visits, either by failing to show up virtually or in person or by cancelling the visit. The court granted her supervised visitation “for a minimum of twice weekly for a minimum of one hour[.]”

At the next review hearing, on December 3, 2021, the juvenile court found that Mother had been more consistent with visitation. It continued the permanency plan of reunification with Mother and maintained the visitation order.

At the March 2022 review hearing, the court found that Mother continued to make some progress but had been inconsistent with attending her supervised visits with J. She was living in a halfway house and no longer was employed. She recently had tested positive for cocaine and alcohol during routine urinalysis. The permanency plan and the visitation order were continued.

In July 2022, the Department recommended a change in J’s permanency plan from reunification with Mother to adoption by a non-relative, namely J’s foster parents. It alleged that Mother was using alcohol and cocaine, her housing remained unstable, she had

failed to maintain employment, and she was continuing to miss visits with J. From March through July 2022, Mother had missed 16 of 25 visits offered to her.

Following a contested hearing on September 6, 2022,<sup>4</sup> the juvenile court modified the permanency plan from reunification to a concurrent plan of reunification and adoption by a non-relative. It found that Mother was struggling with her sobriety, testing positive for cocaine and alcohol. She did not have stable housing or employment. She had missed two-thirds of the visits offered to her during the review period. When she did attend visits, they went well, and she was appropriate with J. The supervised visitation schedule of twice weekly visits for a duration of one hour was continued.

At the end of October 2022, Mother was admitted to Chrysalis House, an in-patient substance abuse treatment center in Crownsville.

On October 31, 2022, the Department moved for paternity testing to determine if D.B.<sup>5</sup> was J’s father. In January 2023, DNA testing confirmed his paternity. Consequently, on February 6, 2023, the Department recommended that the concurrent permanency plan of adoption by a non-relative and reunification with a parent be modified to a sole plan of reunification so that Father would have “the opportunity to reunify with [J].”<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> The hearing originally was scheduled to go forward on July 29, 2022, but Mother failed to appear. The court granted her attorney’s motion to postpone, which the Department and J’s counsel did not oppose.

<sup>5</sup> D.B. reached out to the Department after he was shown a photograph of J and “believed [J] was his child.” Around that time, the juvenile court had ordered a different putative father, C.R., to submit to DNA testing.

<sup>6</sup> The Department had filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights, but it withdrew that petition after Father was identified.

At the February 24, 2023 review hearing, one of J’s foster parents reported to the court that J’s sleep was deteriorating after visits with Mother and that he was presenting with “extreme anxiety” after visits. Mother’s counsel argued that J should be transitioned to Mother’s care at Chrysalis House in their supportive housing unit. The Department, J’s counsel, and Father, through counsel, opposed that plan. Mother also argued that her in-person visits should be extended to allow her bond with J to grow. The Department responded that although it did not oppose increasing visitation with Mother, understaffing made it impossible for the Department to facilitate longer, supervised visits. Mother’s counsel suggested one 4-hour visit each week at Chrysalis House under the supervision of its staff. The court was amenable to that suggestion so long as Chrysalis House had an appropriate location for the visits to take place.

The juvenile court found that J remained a CINA and that it was in his best interest to modify the permanency plan to reunification with Mother and/or Father. The court ordered the Department to facilitate one supervised visit each week between Mother and J at Chrysalis House for 4 hours and directed that “Chrysalis House shall assist the Department with supervision of th[o]se visits[.]” It further ordered the Department to facilitate one supervised visit per week with Father for a minimum of one hour. Mother was ordered to continue to follow the recommendations of her substance abuse treatment providers and to participate in a parenting capacity evaluation.

**The June 12, 2023 Review Hearing**

*The Court Report*

Ten days in advance of the next review hearing, the Department filed its court report. As pertinent, the Department recommended that Mother’s visitation be reduced from 4 hours per week to 2 hours per week and be supervised by the Department going forward.<sup>7</sup> Olivia Yonga, the social worker assigned to J’s case, provided the following reasons for that recommendation.

Mother remained at Chrysalis House and was participating in programming there and weekly random urinalysis, which had been negative for illicit substances. Her counselor, Melvina Smith, reported that Mother was behaving disrespectfully, defensively, and defiantly. As a result, she had lost privileges and was moved to a higher level of care. Mother recently had expressed a desire to move out of Chrysalis House to a less structured program, against her treatment providers’ advice.

As ordered by the juvenile court, the weekly 4-hour visits between Mother and J were taking place at Chrysalis House, in its child development center. Chrysalis House had not permitted Ms. Yonga to observe any of those visits. The Department had requested visit summaries or progress notes from Chrysalis House staff but none had been provided. On May 5, 2023, during a visit between Mother and J, Ms. Yonga received a telephone call from Ms. Smith, who informed her that Mother had taken J out of the child development center “on several occasions and disregarded the staff’s requests to come back in the center

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<sup>7</sup> It also recommended that Father’s visitation be increased from 1 hour per week to 2 hours per week.



since the visit must be supervised.” On one occasion, a Chrysalis House staff member found Mother and J in the living room area and directed her to return to the child development center. Upon learning this information, Ms. Smith contacted her supervisor and they agreed that Mother’s visits with J at Chrysalis House “would be ended if she continued to not follow instructions.”

On June 1, 2023, Ms. Yonga spoke to Mother’s individual therapist at Chrysalis House.<sup>8</sup> The therapist reported that she had observed “a few” of the visits between Mother and J. During those visits, “on a few occasions, [Mother] took [J] out of the child development center and had to be reminded to stay in the center.” Also on a few occasions, Mother “left the room leaving [J] with staff.”

J’s foster parents had asked Mother not to give J juice. Despite this, Mother gave J two cups of juice during a visit at the end of March 2023. As a consequence, he experienced loose stools that irritated his sensitive skin.

Attached to the court report was a status update on J from the Infants and Toddlers Program, which reflected similar behavioral concerns as reported by the foster parents, and three status reports on Mother from Chrysalis House, which detailed Mother’s recent behavioral issues in treatment.

### *The Review Hearing*

At the hearing, J’s foster mother reported that J continued to suffer from “extreme sleep problems” and had begun experiencing “irrational phobias,” including a fear of water

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<sup>8</sup> It is unclear from the court report if Mother’s “counselor” and “individual therapist” are the same person.

that was affecting their ability to bathe him. The foster parents also had observed an “uptick in aggression and violence[,]” which was reported by J’s daycare providers as well. J’s daycare noted that he had particular difficulty napping after visits. His mood and affect after visits were “solemn” and he would not speak. J’s behavior changes were more pronounced after visits with Mother.

The Department recommended continuation of the permanency plan of reunification and an equalization of visitation time by reducing Mother’s visits from 4 to 2 hours each week and increasing Father’s visits from 1 hour to 2 hours each week.

J’s counsel opposed the reduction in Mother’s visitation, arguing that because reunification remained the goal, the extra hours were “advantageous.”

Mother’s counsel argued that Mother’s visits with J should be extended, not reduced, and should be unsupervised going forward. She asked the court to make a finding under Md. Code (1999, 2019 Repl. Vol.), section 9-101 of the Family Law Article (“FL”)<sup>9</sup> that there was “no likelihood of further child abuse or neglect” if she were granted

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<sup>9</sup> FL § 9-101 provides:

(a) *Determination by court.* – In any custody or visitation proceeding, if the court has reasonable grounds to believe that a child has been abused or neglected by a party to the proceeding, the court shall determine whether abuse or neglect is likely to occur if custody or visitation rights are granted to the party.

(b) *Specific finding required.* – Unless the court specifically finds that there is no likelihood of further child abuse or neglect by the party, the court shall deny custody or visitation rights to that party, except that the court may approve a supervised visitation arrangement that assures the safety and the physiological, psychological, and emotional well-being of the child.

unsupervised visitation.<sup>10</sup> Counsel reasoned that Mother was complying with the Department’s recommendations, was sober, and generally was making progress. Mother’s only frustration was the Department’s refusal to consider placing J with her at Chrysalis House.

Mother’s counsel proffered that she described her visits with J as “wonderful,” stating that J was happy to see her and was affectionate and content. Counsel suggested that the behavioral changes observed by J’s foster parents might be a developmental stage, since he recently had turned 2, or could reflect J’s sadness after leaving visits with Mother. She argued that Ms. Yonga had failed to arrange to observe a visit between Mother and J at Chrysalis House.

Given the inconsistency between the court report and the proffer by Mother’s counsel, the court asked to hear directly from Ms. Yonga about the visits. Ms. Yonga told the court that despite assurances from Chrysalis House that she would be allowed to observe visits on occasion, she never had been permitted to go past the front desk. She had asked that staff at Chrysalis House provide her with a summary after each visit but had “not received a single summary from any of the visits[.]” Consequently, she could not comment on the quality of the visits between Mother and J. She reiterated the concerns raised by staff at Chrysalis House about Mother’s non-compliance with the rules pertaining to visitation.

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<sup>10</sup> Father also requested a section 9-101 finding. The court determined that no such finding was necessary as to Father because there was no evidence that he had neglected or abused J. Counsel for J, Mother, and the Department did not oppose Father having unsupervised visitation going forward.

The court expressed dismay that Mother’s visits with J were not being observed by anyone from the Department and that Chrysalis House was not cooperating with the Department to provide a qualitative assessment of the visits. It opined that that was not what it had “envisioned” when it ordered that visits could take place there and stated that that could not continue.

Counsel for the Department agreed, noting that observing the visits was “critical” at this stage in the case. He suggested that visits could be moved to a “visitation house” operated by the Department in Rockville. Counsel noted that the most recent status report received from Chrysalis House, dated May 31, 2023, stated that Mother was “approaching the end of her treatment” there, that staff were looking for a new placement for her, and that she was not “approved to continue in [the Intensive Outpatient Program].”

Mother’s counsel argued that Ms. Yonga should have reached out to counsel earlier to try to ameliorate the issues with observation of visits at Chrysalis House. She emphasized that moving the visitation from Chrysalis House to the Department’s visitation house would “diminish the [length of] visits and the quality of the visits.” She maintained that the reports that Mother had left J with child development center staff “for a couple of minutes when she probably went to the bathroom or when she took him to the living room in the same facility” did not warrant a reduction in visitation time, particularly because there was no suggestion that J had been harmed or put at risk of harm.

The court interjected that Chrysalis House was refusing to allow the Department to observe the visits or to provide the Department with summaries of the visits. Mother’s counsel asserted that it sounded to her that “Ms. Yonga just gave up on it” and she requested

a “separate [evidentiary] hearing” where she could take testimony from Chrysalis House staff.

The court denied that request but noted that counsel could move for an evidentiary hearing in the future.

The court found that Mother was looking for a new placement due to behavioral issues at Chrysalis House that resulted in sanctions being imposed and that she was expected to transition out of Chrysalis House by the end of June. It further found that J remained a CINA and should continue in the care of his foster parents. With respect to visitation, the court determined that

due to issues with visits at Chrysalis House that prevent proper supervision by the Department of these visits, visitation between [J] and [Mother] shall be supervised by the Department or its designee and to occur at the Montgomery County visitation house at 150 Maryland Avenue in Rockville, Maryland for a minimum of once weekly for two hours under the direction of the Department.

The court directed the Department to facilitate unsupervised visits with Father of the same frequency and duration as the supervised visits with Mother. The next review hearing was scheduled for November 28, 2023.

The court entered an order encompassing these findings and rulings. This timely appeal followed.

### **STANDARD OF REVIEW**

We review CINA proceedings under three distinct but interrelated standards. *In re Yve S.*, 373 Md. 551, 586 (2003). First, “[w]e review legal questions without deference, and if the lower court erred, further proceedings are ordinarily required unless the error is

harmless.” *In re Adoption/Guardianship of H.W.*, 460 Md. 201, 214 (2018) (citing *In re Adoption of Ta’Niya C.*, 417 Md. 90, 100 (2010)). Second, we review the juvenile court’s findings of fact for clear error. Md. Rule 8-131(c); *In re Yve S.*, 373 Md. at 586. “A finding of a trial court is not clearly erroneous if there is competent or material evidence in the record to support the court’s conclusion.” *Lemley v. Lemley*, 109 Md. App. 620, 628 (1996). Finally, we review the court’s ultimate decision for abuse of discretion. *In re Yve S.*, 373 Md. at 585-86.

### DISCUSSION

Mother contends the juvenile court erred for two reasons. First, it improperly rejected her request for an evidentiary hearing to take testimony from Chrysalis House staff about the visits she had had with J. Second, the court erred by reducing her visitation time by half and moving the location for visitation farther away from her residence.

The Department responds that Mother was afforded a hearing and did not avail herself of the opportunity to put on evidence. Because she was put on notice ten days before the review hearing that the Department was recommending that visitation be reduced and the reasons for that recommendation, she waived her entitlement to a contested case hearing by not requesting one earlier. The Department maintains that the court did not abuse its discretion by reducing Mother’s visitation to accommodate the Department’s need for supervision of those visits and in the face of evidence that J was experiencing significant behavioral problems after visits with Mother.

“Generally, decisions concerning visitation are ‘within the sound discretion of the [juvenile] court,’ and we accordingly will not disturb such decisions ‘unless there has been

a clear abuse of discretion.” *In re G.T.*, 250 Md. App. 679, 698 (2021) (quoting *In re Billy W.*, 387 Md. 405, 447 (2005)). In a CINA case, it is up to the juvenile court to decide the appropriate amount of visitation, with input from the Department about conditions that the agency believes should be imposed. *In re Justin D.*, 357 Md. 431, 450 (2000). Because the juvenile court is required to make such a determination in the best interests of the child, visitation may be restricted or even denied when the child’s health or welfare is threatened. *In re J.J.*, 231 Md. App. 304, 347 (2016), *aff’d*, 456 Md. 428 (2017).

**a.**

We begin with Mother’s procedural challenge to the denial of her request for an evidentiary hearing. At the review hearing, after Mother’s counsel argued that the Department had not proffered any evidence that her violations of the rules surrounding visits had put J at risk of harm and therefore the evidence did not warrant “diminish[ing] her visits[,]” this colloquy took place:

THE COURT: Well, here’s a reason that I see is that *where she is now*[, *i.e.*, Chrysalis House,<sup>11</sup>] is refusing to allow anyone to observe these visits other than themselves and then they refuse to summarize the visits for us. So I am not - -

[MOTHER’S COUNSEL]: We don’t know that.

THE COURT: I know it because Ms. Yonga said it.

[MOTHER’S COUNSEL]: Well, I would ask for a separate hearing that and we can bring them in and ask them if that is true because it sounds more to me like Ms. Yonga just

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<sup>11</sup> In her brief, Mother includes an excerpt of this quote beginning with “she is now,” implying that the court suggested that *Mother* rather than the facility where she was being treated was “refusing to allow” the Department to observe the visits.

gave up on it and decided oh, well. I got the Laurie Center anyway. So I will just find out what the Laurie Center says. I don't need to observe the visits.

THE COURT: Okay.

[MOTHER'S COUNSEL]: So I would like to hear from the Chrysalis House.

THE COURT: Well, you can certainly motion to court for that, Ms. Long, but I am not doing that today and I am not going to halt this hearing today or make changes today based on what I heard.

As the above makes clear, the sole issue on which Mother requested an evidentiary hearing concerned Ms. Yonga's efforts to observe the visits at the Chrysalis House, which Mother argued were insufficient. She did not request an evidentiary hearing to challenge the Department's proffer that Mother had violated the rules pertaining to visits or to present evidence about the quality of the visits.<sup>12</sup>

Mother relies upon this Court's decision in *In re M.C.*, 245 Md. App. 215 (2020). There, the juvenile court adjudicated a child, M, to be a CINA and, as part of an agreed disposition, granted M's parent unsupervised visitation with him so long as she continued to test negative for illicit substances. A month and a half later, the local department moved to amend the disposition order. It supported its motion with a police report and an unsworn memorandum from a social worker, claiming that the parent had violated a protective order, failed to complete weekly drug tests, and tested positive for cocaine. The parent opposed the motion, requested disclosure of the "actual drug test results[,]” proffered testimony the

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<sup>12</sup> As the Department points out, Mother also did not seek to testify at the hearing, choosing to rely on her attorney's proffers.



parent would offer disputing the social worker’s proffer, and asked the court to address the issue at the next review hearing, scheduled in about a month. *Id.* at 222, 230. Three days later, the juvenile court granted the local department’s motion without a hearing and modified the visitation to supervised visits. On appeal from that order, we reversed, holding that because the local department “sought to change the *status quo*,” it bore the burden of proof and the juvenile court abused its discretion in the face of conflicting proffers by not “receiving testimony as to material, disputed allegations[.]” *Id.* at 231-32.

Here, in contrast, Mother was afforded a hearing before the juvenile court determined to reduce her supervised visitation, returning to the *status quo* that had existed before the juvenile court allowed Chrysalis House to assist in supervising visits. Significantly, the Department put Mother on notice that it was recommending a reduction in the length of her supervised visitation when it filed its court report ten days in advance of the review hearing, as required by CJP § 3-826(a).<sup>13</sup> That report explained the bases for the Department’s recommendation, which included Ms. Yonga’s inability to supervise the visits taking place at Chrysalis House, Chrysalis House’s failure to provide summaries of the visits, Mother’s alleged violations of the rules governing visitation at Chrysalis House, and Mother’s intention to leave Chrysalis House against the advice of her treatment providers. Despite being on notice of the recommendation and the reasons for it, Mother did not move for a contested evidentiary hearing or seek to subpoena Chrysalis House staff

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<sup>13</sup> That statute provides, in pertinent part, that “[u]nless the court directs otherwise, a local department shall provide all parties with a written report at least 10 days before any scheduled disposition, permanency planning, or review hearing under § 3-819 or § 3-823 of this subtitle.” CJP § 3-826(a).

to appear for the June 12, 2023 review hearing. On this record, the juvenile court did not err or abuse its discretion by denying Mother’s belated motion for an evidentiary hearing.

**b.**

On the merits of the juvenile court’s decision to reduce Mother’s visitation, we perceive no error. When, as here, a child has been declared a CINA because of neglect, the juvenile court is constrained by the requirements of FL § 9-101, which expressly prohibits the court from granting visitation, except for supervised visitation, to a party who has neglected a child unless the court specifically finds that there is no likelihood of further neglect. *In re Yve S.*, 373 Md. at 587. If the court determines, as an exception, that supervised visitation is appropriate, the court must assure, at a minimum, that such visitation will not jeopardize the safety and well-being of the child. As mentioned, Mother asked the juvenile court to make a finding under FL § 9-101 that there was no likelihood of further neglect on her part. It declined to do so, a ruling she does not challenge on appeal. Consequently, the court was obligated to fashion a visitation schedule that “assure[d J’s] safety and [his] physiological, psychological, and emotional well-being[.]” FL § 9-101(b).

At the prior review hearing in March 2023, the juvenile court agreed to permit lengthier visits between Mother and J at the Chrysalis House because the Department could not supervise visits of that length at its own visitation centers. It was implicit in the court’s prior ruling that the visits still would be supervised, however, with Chrysalis House staff standing in place of the Department when it could not directly supervise the visits. The Department’s court report and the proffers made at the June 12, 2023 hearing revealed that although the visits were occurring at the child development center at Chrysalis House, the

Chrysalis House staff was not allowing the Department to observe the visits or any part of them and was not providing the Department with any feedback on the quality of the visits, except for information about Mother's infractions. This alone justified the juvenile court's decision to order that visits be moved to a location where appropriate supervision could be achieved even though the amount of time for visitation would be reduced. It was critical that the Department be able to observe Mother's visitations with J. There also was evidence before the court that Mother was violating rules governing visits at Chrysalis House, that J was experiencing significant behavioral dysregulation following the visits, and that Mother was in the process of transitioning out of Chrysalis House to a new facility, all of which also justified moving the visits to a new location. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by relocating Mother's visits with J and reducing their length to accommodate the Department's supervision capabilities when doing so was in J's best interests.

**ORDER OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR  
MONTGOMERY COUNTY AFFIRMED.  
COSTS TO BE PAID BY THE APPELLANT.**