Circuit Court for Baltimore City
Case No. 24-D-18-003927

UNREPORTED*

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF MARYLAND

Nos. 952 & 1366

September Term, 2025

REIKO ASANO

v.

MOLEFI ASANTE

Wells, C.J.,
Arthur,
Woodward, Patrick L.,
(Senior Judge, Specially Assigned),

JJ.

Opinion by Wells, C.J.

Filed: January 20, 2026

*This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B).

This case involves two consolidated appeals that appellant Reiko Asano ("Mother") filed challenging the Circuit Court for Baltimore City's decisions denying her motions to modify the supervision requirement for her visitation with the parties' minor twin daughters ("Children"). These appeals follow this Court's two prior affirmances of the circuit court's custody and visitation orders in *Asano v. Asante* (*Asano I*), No. 486, Sept. Term 2022, 2022 WL 17547044 (2022), *cert. denied*, 483 Md. 271 (2023), and *Asano v. Asante* (*Asano II*), No. 965, Sept. Term, 2022, and Nos. 1920, 2015, and 2367, Sept. Term, 2024, 2025 WL 1982861 (filed July 17, 2025). In *Asano I*, this Court affirmed the circuit court's order granting appellee Molefi Asante ("Father") primary physical custody and sole legal custody of the Children. *Asano I* at *4. In *Asano II*, this Court affirmed the circuit court's Order Regarding Visitation and Parenting Time, which required Mother's visitation with the Children to be supervised. *Asano II* at 34.

In this set of consolidated appeals, Mother challenges the circuit court's denial of two motions seeking removal or modification of the supervision requirement: (1) her April 28, 2025, Motion for Pendente Lite Unsupervised Custody and Request for Hearing, and (2) her July 26, 2025, Emergency Motion to Modify Supervision of the Children's Visits and Request for Hearing. The circuit court denied both motions without holding hearings. Mother contends these denials violated Maryland Rule 2-311(f) and her Due Process rights.

In this appeal, Mother presents two questions for our review, which we have slightly rephrased:

1. Did the circuit court err by denying Mother's pendente lite and emergency motions to remove the supervision of her parental access without holding evidentiary hearings?

2. Did the circuit court violate Maryland Rule 2-311(f) and the Due Process Clause by failing to provide Mother with hearings on her motions despite her requests for hearings in both motions?

For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The basic facts and procedural history of this case are discussed in detail in *Asano I* and *Asano II*, but we provide additional background necessary for this appeal.

Prior Proceedings

Mother and Father were in a relationship from 2015 to 2018 but never married. The Children were born in 2016. *Asano I* at *2. After years of contentious custody litigation, the circuit court entered an "Immediate Order Regarding Modification of Custody and Visitation and Attorney's Fees" on April 7, 2022, granting Father primary physical custody and sole legal custody of the Children. *Asano I* at *4. The April 7, 2022, Order required Mother to "participate in therapy to address the change in the custodial arrangement and Mother's belief that Father and/or his nannies are abusing Minor Children."

On August 14, 2024, after multiple days of review hearings to determine Mother's fitness for visitation and parenting time with the Children, the circuit court issued an "Order Regarding Visitation and Parenting Time." The Order granted Mother a schedule of regular supervised visits with the Children, including holidays, but required all visits to be monitored by private supervisors paid by Mother. The Order also required Mother to

"enroll and participate in cognitive behavioral therapy for no less than six months with a trauma-informed therapist" who would be provided certain materials and would have specific qualifications.

Significantly, the circuit court stated on the record during the August 14, 2024, hearing:

> Additionally, the Court finds that Mother is not defined as a person or a parent by mental health issues. There are many parents who successfully raise and co-parent their children and manage their mental health concerns. Unfortunately, mental health issues are often very cyclical for folks who suffer from them. With that said, if after Mother participates in cognitive behavior therapy that is trauma informed, **the Court encourages Mother to seek a modification for unsupervised access**.

(emphasis added). The August 16, 2024, Order Regarding Visitation and Parenting Time stated that "this [c]ourt retains continuing jurisdiction over Minor Children" and the order was subject to "further order of this court."

We affirmed the August 16, 2024, Order in *Asano II*. The Supreme Court of Maryland denied Mother's petition for writ of certiorari. *Asano v. Asante*, No. 258, Sept. Term, 2025, 2025 WL 3522671 (Nov. 26, 2025).

April 28, 2025, Pendente Lite Motion

On April 28, 2025, Mother filed a "Motion for Pendente Lite Unsupervised Custody and Request for Hearing." The motion sought pendente lite custody, return of the Children to Maryland, and removal of the supervision requirement. Mother's verified motion alleged several material changes in circumstances:

1. She had "fully complied" with the court-ordered cognitive behavioral therapy requirement, having participated in weekly therapy sessions beginning September

24, 2023, with Amy Meldau, LCSW-C, and had "met all the established treatment goals."

2. The Children had completed nineteen (19) supervised visits with Mother, and supervision reports established that "her behaviors and conduct in the presence of the children have been exemplary."
3. She had paid $29,558 for supervision thus far, with projected costs exceeding $38,200 just for the summer, and lacked the resources to continue paying these amounts.
4. Ten witnesses at the review hearing, both expert and fact witnesses, provided unrebutted testimony "that she was and is a loving, appropriate, and well-regarded parent."

Mother's motion included a section entitled "Request for Hearing" and requested a hearing under Rule 2-311(f).

On May 13, 2025, the circuit court issued an order denying Mother's pendente lite motion without a hearing. The order stated: "ALL SUBJECT TO FURTHER ORDER OF THIS COURT."

Mother's Motion to Reconsider

On May 23, 2025, Mother filed a Motion to Amend and/or Reconsider the Order denying her pendente lite motion. She argued that the court's decision "was temporary and thus did not 'conclusively settle a matter,'" as noted in the circuit court's subsequent order.

On June 9, 2025, the court denied Mother's motion to reconsider. The order again stated it was "ALL SUBJECT TO FURTHER ORDER OF THIS COURT" and included a footnote indicating that "the Court's decision denying the initial Motion for Pendente Lite Custody was temporary and thus did not 'conclusively settle a matter.'"

On July 7, 2025, Mother timely noted her appeal in ACM-REG-0952-2025.

Scheduling Conference and Mother's July 26, 2025, Emergency Motion

On July 15, 2025, a magistrate conducted a scheduling conference on Mother's June 17, 2022, Complaint to Modify Custody. Mother's counsel requested a pendente lite hearing. The magistrate instructed her to submit another motion for such relief. The magistrate set the matter for an eight-day trial beginning March 16, 2026.

On July 26, 2025, less than two weeks after the trial date was set, Mother filed an "Emergency Motion to Modify Supervision of the Children's Visits, and Request for Hearing." This motion provided additional evidence:

1. The Children had now completed twenty-five (25) supervised visits with Mother, totaling 42 days and approximately 530 hours of supervised time, and "all completed SVI reports . . . show that Mother's conduct and behaviors are loving and appropriate."
2. Mother had paid $42,608.00 for supervision thus far using loans and financial assistance.
3. Supervised Visitation and Investigations ("SVI") required advance payment of $12,700.00 for a seven-day vacation in August 2025, $2,275.00 for one Maryland

weekend visit in August 2025, and $6,970.00 for a North Carolina weekend visit in August 2025, plus travel and housing expenses for SVI personnel.

4. Mother lacked the ability to pay these amounts and therefore must "forego their vacation and second visit in August 2025."
5. Members of Mother's Catholic parish church had volunteered to supervise visits without charge, and the Children's maternal grandmother, a retired schoolteacher, had also volunteered to provide supervision.

The motion included a section titled "Request for Hearing" and requested a hearing pursuant to Rule 2-311(f).

On August 28, 2025, the court denied Mother's emergency motion without a hearing. Unlike the prior orders, this order did not state that it remained "subject to further order."

On August 29, 2025, Mother timely noted her appeal in ACM-REG-1366-2025. On September 12, 2025, this Court granted the parties' joint motion to consolidate ACM-REG-0952-2025 and ACM-REG-1366-2025.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

"[A]n appeal from the denial of a motion asking the court to exercise its revisory power is not necessarily the same as an appeal from the judgment itself." *Green v. Brooks*, 125 Md. App. 349, 362 (1999). The scope of review for a denial of a motion to reconsider is "limited to whether the trial judge abused his [or her] discretion in declining to reconsider the judgment." *Grimberg v. Marth*, 338 Md. 546, 553 (1995). "Except to the extent that

they are subsumed in [the question whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion for reconsideration], the merits of the judgment itself are not open to direct attack." *Sydnor v. Hathaway*, 228 Md. App. 691, 708 (2016) (citations omitted).

Under the abuse of discretion standard, this Court will not reverse a trial court's decision to decline to exercise its revisory power "unless there is grave reason for doing so." *Hossainkhail v. Gebrehiwot*, 143 Md. App. 716, 724 (2002) (citing *Northwestern Nat. Ins. Co. v. Samuel R. Rosoff, Ltd.*, 195 Md. 421, 434 (1950)). In this context, "even a poor call [in denying a motion to reconsider] is not necessarily a clear abuse of discretion." *Stuples v. Balt. City Police Dep't*, 119 Md. App. 221, 232 (1998). The denial of a motion to revise a judgment should be reversed only if the denial "was so far wrong—to wit, *so egregiously wrong*—as to constitute a clear abuse of discretion." *Id.* "It is hard to imagine a more deferential standard than this one." *Est. of Vess*, 234 Md. App. 173, 205 (2017).

DISCUSSION

Preliminarily, we deny Father's motion to dismiss. He argues that because all orders here are temporary or pendente lite, these are not dispositive final orders and not appealable. We disagree. The denial of pendente lite relief is appealable under Md. Code, Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (CJP) § 12-303(3)(x) which allows parties to appeal from certain interlocutory orders issued by circuit courts in civil cases. Among these appealable interlocutory orders are those "[d]epriving a parent . . . of the care and custody of [their] child or changing the terms of such an order." CJP § 12-303(3)(x). Consequently, we deny Father's motion to dismiss.

I. The Circuit Court Did Not Violate Maryland Rule 2-311(f) by Denying Mother's Motions Without a Hearing.

A. Parties' Contentions

Mother contends the circuit court violated Maryland Rule 2-311(f) by denying both her pendente lite motion and emergency motion without holding hearings despite her explicit requests for hearings in both motions. She argues the plain language of Rule 2-311(f) required the circuit court to provide hearings because both denials were "dispositive" of her claims for interim relief. Mother asserts that the denials subjected her and the Children to continued costly and damaging supervision for months until the scheduled trial, and that "every day of childhood [is] irreplaceable" as the Children "lack the maturity and judgment at eight years old to wait" until their childhood ends.

Mother distinguishes two cases cited by the circuit court in its denial of her motion to reconsider. First, she argues *Pelletier v. Burson*, 213 Md. App. 284, 292–93 (2013), addressed an untimely motion to reconsider a foreclosure ratification six months after judgment, not a timely response to the court's explicit encouragement to seek modification after completing therapy. Second, she contends *Garner v. Garner*, No. 2395, Sept. Term 2013, 2015 WL 5821659 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. May 4, 2015), is an unreported decision forbidden from citation by Rule 1-404 and, even if considered, is distinguishable because it addressed a second motion to modify child support the day before trial.

Mother relies on *Bond v. Slavin*, 157 Md. App. 340 (2004), arguing this Court held that where "(1) the order denying appellant's motions was dispositive of appellant's claim, and (2) [appellant] requested a hearing on the motions, the circuit court erred in denying

the motions without holding a hearing." *Id.* Mother also cites *Phillips v. Venker*, 316 Md. 212 (1989), which held summary judgment—a dispositive ruling—requires a hearing when requested under Rule 2-311(f).

Father responds that Rule 2-311(f) applies only to dispositive rulings, and the orders here were not dispositive because they denied only "temporary, interim relief" while the underlying custody dispute remains scheduled for a full evidentiary hearing on the merits of Mother's Complaint for Modification. Father argues "dispositive" is defined as "one that conclusively settles a matter," *Pelletier*, 213 Md. App. at 292–93, and the circuit court correctly held that its decisions denying the pendente lite and emergency motions "were temporary and thus did not conclusively settle a matter."

Father contends *Phillips v. Venker* and *Bond v. Slavin* are distinguishable because both involved rulings that conclusively resolved claims. Summary judgment disposes of an entire claim, and the banking records disclosure in *Bond* conclusively determined the party's entitlement to protection of those records. By contrast, Father argues, denying a temporary modification while a modification action is pending does not resolve any claim and therefore is not dispositive.

Father further argues any contention that a hearing was required is now moot because "the matter is already scheduled for a full evidentiary trial on the merits, which will provide precisely the process she claims to have been denied."

B. Applicable Legal Standards

Maryland Rule 2-311(f) provides:

> A party desiring a hearing on a motion, other than a motion filed pursuant to Rule 2-532, 2-533, or 2-534, shall request the hearing in the motion or response under the heading "Request for Hearing." The title of the motion or response shall state that a hearing is requested. **Except when a rule expressly provides for a hearing, the court shall determine in each case whether a hearing will be held, but the court may not render a decision that is dispositive of a claim or defense without a hearing if one was requested as provided in this section.**

(emphasis added).

Our appellate courts have defined a "dispositive decision" for purposes of Rule 2-311(f) as "one that conclusively settles a matter." *Pelletier*, 213 Md. App. at 292–93. This interpretation is consistent with the broader principle that Rule 2-311(f) applies only to dispositive rulings. *Lowman v. Consolidated Rail Corp.*, 68 Md. App. 64 (1986).

In *Lowman*, this Court explained that an order denying a motion to reconsider a prior judgment or order is not itself the dispositive decision under Rule 2-311(f):

> If the possibility that the court might reconsider or revise its decision would prevent that decision from being dispositive of a claim or defense, then even final, i.e. appealable, judgments could be said not to be dispositive, because even they may be subject to revision. See Md. Rule 2-535. We do not believe Rule 2-311(f) should be so construed.

Id. at 76. Similarly, in *Pelletier*, this Court held the dispositive action was "the ratification of the [foreclosure] sale itself, not the denial of appellant's motion to re-open." *Pelletier*, 213 Md. App. at 293. We reasoned that the denial of a motion for reconsideration does not itself dispose of a claim when the underlying judgment has already been entered.

The purpose of pendente lite relief is "to maintain the status quo of the parties pending the final resolution," *Speropulos v. Speropulos*, 97 Md. App. 613, 617 (1993), and such relief is "based solely upon need," *Komorous v. Komorous*, 56 Md. App. 326, 337 (1983). Pendente lite relief "is not intended to have long-term effect and therefore focuses on the immediate, rather than on any long-range, interests of the child." *Frase v. Barnhard*, 379 Md. 100, 111 (2003).

In *Garner v. Garner*, No. 2395, Sept. Term 2013, 2015 WL 5821659, at *2 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. May 4, 2015), this Court held "a motion to modify child support amounts to a motion to alter or amend a judgment pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-534, and therefore, a hearing on such a motion is not required unless the court grants the motion." This Court concluded "the court's denial of appellant's second motion to modify was not a 'dispositive decision' and, accordingly, the court was not required to hear argument on the motion, unless it intended to grant it." *Id.*

C. Analysis

We hold the circuit court did not violate Rule 2-311(f) by denying Mother's pendente lite and emergency motions without hearings. The orders denying these motions were not "dispositive" within the meaning of Rule 2-311(f) because they did not "conclusively settle" any matter. *Pelletier*, 213 Md. App. at 292–93.

As Father correctly argues, Mother's motions sought only temporary, interim relief. The underlying custody dispute—Mother's June 17, 2022, Complaint for Modification of Custody—remains pending and is scheduled for a full evidentiary hearing on the merits

beginning March 16, 2026. At that hearing, Mother will have the opportunity to present all the evidence and arguments she raised in her pendente lite and emergency motions, including evidence of her compliance with court-ordered therapy, the supervision reports, her financial circumstances, and expert testimony regarding her fitness as a parent. The trial court will then make a final determination on the merits of whether modification of the supervision requirement is warranted.

The circuit court explicitly recognized the temporary nature of its denials. The May 13, 2025, order stated: "ALL SUBJECT TO FURTHER ORDER OF THIS COURT." The June 9, 2025, order denying reconsideration went further, stating in a footnote that "the Court's decision denying the initial Motion for Pendente Lite Custody was temporary and thus did not 'conclusively settle a matter.'" These statements plainly indicate the court viewed its decisions as interlocutory and subject to revision, not as final dispositive rulings.

Mother's cited authorities are distinguishable. In *Phillips v. Venker*, 316 Md. 212, 219 (1989), the Supreme Court of Maryland held summary judgment—a ruling that disposes of an entire claim—requires a hearing when requested. Summary judgment is, by definition, a dispositive ruling that conclusively resolves a claim on the merits. The denial of temporary relief pending a full trial does not share this characteristic.

Bond v. Slavin, 157 Md. App. 340 (2004), likewise involved a dispositive ruling. There, the circuit court denied motions seeking to protect private banking records from disclosure. *Id.* at 349. This Court held "the order denying appellant's motions was dispositive of appellant's claim" because it conclusively determined the party's entitlement

to protection of those records. *Id.* at 355. The order at issue in *Bond* finally resolved the question of whether the records would remain protected—there was no further proceeding scheduled to address that issue. Here, by contrast, the question of whether supervision should be removed or modified remains subject to full adjudication at the scheduled March 2026 trial.

Mother's argument that the denials are dispositive because "every day of childhood is irreplaceable[,]" and the Children "lack the maturity and judgment at eight years old to wait" conflates the significance of the issue with the legal definition of "dispositive" under Rule 2-311(f). While we do not minimize the importance of parent-child relationships or the passage of time in a child's development, the temporary nature of pendente lite relief means denials of such motions do not "conclusively settle" the underlying claims. If Mother's interpretation were correct, every denial of temporary relief in a custody case would require a full evidentiary hearing under Rule 2-311(f) regardless of the proximity of a scheduled trial on the merits. This would undermine the purpose of pendente lite proceedings, which is to maintain the status quo pending final resolution, not to provide an alternative pathway to final relief.

We also agree with Father in that the issues Mother raises can be fully examined at the merits hearing, but the issues are not moot, as he argues. This case is scheduled for a full evidentiary trial in less than three months from the date of oral argument. Generally, pendente lite relief exists chiefly to maintain the status quo until a trial on the merits. *Guarino v. Guarino,* 112 Md. App. 1 (1996). As Father stated in his brief: "When Mother

filed her initial Pendente Lite Motion, no merits trial had been set. However, a full evidentiary hearing on Mother's Complaint for Modification is now scheduled to begin in only a matter of months. Accordingly, there is no ongoing need for interim relief, and the temporary issues raised will be fully addressed at that trial."

Finally, we note Mother's motions were appropriate responses to the court's retention of jurisdiction and Judge Tipton's statement encouraging Mother to seek modification after completing the required therapy. However, the court's encouragement to seek modification and retention of jurisdiction does not transform the denial of a motion for temporary relief into a dispositive decision under Rule 2-311(f). The court's invitation for Mother to seek modification will be fully realized at the scheduled trial, where the court will make a final determination based on a complete evidentiary record.

Accordingly, we conclude the circuit court did not violate Rule 2-311(f) by denying Mother's pendente lite and emergency motions without holding hearings.

II. The Circuit Court Did Not Violate Mother's Due Process Rights.

A. Parties' Contentions

Mother contends the circuit court's failure to provide hearings violated her constitutional Due Process rights. She argues that "[b]efore a court abrogates a parent's liberty interest in the raising of her children, she must be afforded Due Process." Mother cites cases involving termination of parental rights and other fundamental intrusions on parental rights to support her position. She argues that fundamental parental rights are at stake and she was denied the process she was due.

Father responds that this Court already held in *Asano II* that "Mother suffered no Due Process violation" with respect to the supervision requirement. *Asano II* at 24. Father argues the cases Mother cites involve "extraordinary, permanent, or constitutionally significant intrusions on parental rights," including *In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 6Z000045*, 372 Md. 104 (2002) (termination of parental rights); *Troxel v. Granville*, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (unconstitutional third-party visitation statute); and *In re Mark M.*, 365 Md. 687 (2001) (improper delegation of judicial authority to therapist). Father contends "Mother's situation bears no resemblance" to these cases because "[s]he received full Due Process in the custody proceedings and during the trial, determining her access to the Children." Those proceedings resulted in supervised visitation, which this Court upheld in *Asano II*. Father argues Mother's "disagreement with the denial of temporary, pendente lite relief does not implicate the heightened constitutional protections in the cited cases."

B. Applicable Legal Standards

The fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. *Troxel*, 530 U.S. at 65. However, the State has a substantial interest in protecting the welfare of children, and courts may restrict parental rights when necessary to protect children from harm. *In re Yve S.*, 373 Md. 551, 565 (2003).

Due Process requires that parties receive notice and an opportunity to be heard before being deprived of a protected interest. *In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 6Z000045*, 372 Md. 104 (2002). However, the level of process due varies depending on the nature of

the proceeding and the interests at stake. Not every decision affecting parental rights requires a full evidentiary hearing.

In *Asano II*, this Court held "Mother suffered no Due Process violation" with respect to the circuit court's imposition of supervised visitation. *Asano II* at 24. This Court explained that Mother "received a full and fair trial on her access to the Children, after which the [circuit] court, correctly, and as affirmed by this Court, found that it was in the Children's best interests that 'Mother's visitation/parenting time shall be supervised.'" *Id.*

C. Analysis

We hold the circuit court did not violate Mother's Due Process rights by denying her motions for temporary relief without separate evidentiary hearings.

As an initial matter, this Court's holding in *Asano II* that "Mother suffered no Due Process violation" forecloses Mother's argument here. *Asano II* at 24. Mother received full Due Process in the extensive proceedings that led to the August 16, 2024, Order Regarding Visitation and Parenting Time, which this Court affirmed. Those proceedings included multiple days of review hearings spanning March 2023, June 2023, October 2023, and July 2024. *Asano II* at 8. The circuit court heard testimony from numerous expert witnesses, including court-appointed evaluator Dr. John Lefkowits, psychologist Dr. Stephanie Wolfe, Mother's therapist Dr. Sandra Jones, dialectical behavior therapist Dr. Kerstin Youman, and Drs. Stephanie Wolf and Stephanie DeBoard-Lucas, psychologists Mother hired. *Asano II* at 29–30. The court considered the best interests of the Children under the factors outlined in *Montgomery Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Sanders*, 38 Md. App. 406,

420 (1978), and made extensive factual findings supporting its determination that supervised visitation was necessary. *Asano II* at 33–34.

Mother's renewed request for temporary relief, based largely on the same evidence presented at those proceedings, does not entitle her to another full evidentiary hearing before the scheduled trial on the merits. The cases Mother cites to support her Due Process argument are inapposite. *In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 6Z000045*, 372 Md. 104 (2002), involved the termination of parental rights—the most severe deprivation of parental rights possible—where the court proceeded despite learning that the parent wished to contest the termination. *Troxel v. Granville*, 530 U.S. 57 (2000), struck down a third-party visitation statute that unconstitutionally infringed on a fit parent's fundamental child-rearing rights by allowing courts to order visitation over a fit parent's objection without any showing of harm. *In re Mark M.*, 365 Md. 687 (2001), involved the improper delegation of judicial authority where the court allowed a therapist, rather than the judge, to decide whether visitation could occur.

As Father correctly argues, "[e]ach of these cases concerns extraordinary, permanent, or constitutionally significant intrusions on parental rights. Mother's situation bears no resemblance." Mother has not been permanently deprived of her parental rights or custody of the Children. Rather, her visitation is supervised—a restriction this Court has already upheld as being in the Children's best interests. *Asano II* at 34–35. Her disagreement with the circuit court's refusal to grant her temporary relief from that restriction, while a final determination on the merits remains pending, does not implicate

the heightened Due Process protections applicable in termination proceedings or other cases involving permanent deprivation of parental rights.

Mother will receive full Due Process at the March 2026 trial, where she will have the opportunity to present all relevant evidence regarding her fitness for unsupervised visitation, her compliance with court-ordered therapy, the supervision reports documenting her appropriate parenting, expert testimony, and any other evidence supporting her request for modification. The circuit court will then make a final determination based on a complete evidentiary record developed through direct and cross-examination of witnesses and consideration of all relevant evidence. Accordingly, we hold the circuit court did not violate Mother's Due Process rights.

D. Conclusion

In light of the foregoing, we conclude the circuit court acted within its broad discretion in determining that Mother failed to present sufficient evidence to warrant modification of the supervision requirement on a temporary basis. The court properly determined such issues should be fully adjudicated at the scheduled March 2026 trial based on a complete evidentiary record. Accordingly, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mother's pendente lite and emergency motions.

JUDGMENTS OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY AFFIRMED. APPELLANT TO PAY THE COSTS.