Circuit Court for Prince George's County
Case No. CAD19-00655

CHILD ACCESS

UNREPORTED

IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS

OF MARYLAND

No. 1387

September Term, 2020

KIOMA RENAUD

v.

GERALD STIGGONS BENNETT

Leahy,
Ripken,
Wright, Alexander, Jr.
(Senior Judge, Specially Assigned),

JJ.

Opinion by Leahy, J.

Filed: September 16, 2021

Kioma Renaud ("Mother"), appellant, and Gerald Bennett ("Father"), appellee, are the parents of a 4-year old daughter, K.B. Mother, proceeding *pro se*, appeals from an order entered by the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, which found that she unjustifiably interfered with Father's court-ordered access to K.B. and modified the terms of the governing custody order. Mother presents three multi-part questions,[1] which we have condensed and rephrased as two:

> I. Did the circuit court abuse its discretion by modifying the custody order to ensure future compliance pursuant to Maryland Code (1984, 2019 Repl. Vol.), Family Law Article ("FL"), § 9-105, upon a finding that

[1] The questions as posed by Mother are:

"1. Did the circuit court err in following the best interest of a minor child?

   a. Did the circuit court appropriately consider Appellant's defenses to the allegations of contempt for failure to provide visitation?

   b. Did the circuit court err in disregarding the lack thereof parent-child relationship when determining Father's visitation schedule?

   c. Did the circuit court err in Father's disregard of responsibilities led to the destruction of the parent-child relationship?

2. Was the Mother given a fair and just opportunity to be heard on the issue?

   a. Was the Circuit Court's conclusions of fact supported by a preponderance of the evidence?

   b. Did Circuit Court err in disregarding father's compliance to court order?

3. Did the Circuit Court err by ordering the Mother to pay travel fees to Father without evidence of travel?"

Mother had unjustifiably interfered with Father's court-ordered access to K.B.?

II. Did the circuit court abuse its discretion by ordering Mother to either partially reimburse Father for his verified travel expenses incurred in returning K.B. to Mother, or make the return travel arrangements for K.B. herself?

The record affords no basis to second-guess the circuit court's factual determination—which we review for abuse of discretion—that Mother unjustifiably interfered with Father's access to K.B. Consequently, we also conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in modifying the governing custody order to ensure Mother's compliance with that order. Finally, we discern no abuse of discretion in the court's requirement that Mother either partially reimburse Father for his travel expenses associated with K.B.'s return trips to Mother or arrange K.B.'s return trips on her own. Accordingly, we affirm the order of the circuit court.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

K.B. was born in Texas, where Mother and Father then both resided, separately. Mother now lives in Washington, D.C. with K.B. and her son from a previous relationship, and Father lives outside of Atlanta, Georgia with his three sons from a previous relationship - ages 11, 15, and 16.

On April 13, 2018, when K.B. was a year old, the District Court for the 245th Judicial District in Harris County, Texas ("Texas Court") entered "Agreed Temporary Orders" that appointed Mother and Father as "Temporary Joint Managing Conservators" of K.B.; granted Mother the "exclusive right to designate" K.B.'s primary residence; established a

graduated access schedule between Father and K.B.; and ordered Father to pay child support to Mother. By the time the order was entered, Mother had moved to Bowie, Maryland, along with K.B.

The Texas Court held a hearing on November 26, 2018 at which Father appeared in person and Mother appeared through counsel. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court entered a final order designating the parties joint managing conservators of K.B., with Mother retaining the right to determine K.B.'s primary residence and Father being awarded regular weekend, weeknight, holiday, and summer access to K.B.

A little over four months later, when K.B. was 2 years old, Mother, who was then living in Fort Washington, Maryland, filed a complaint for custody in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County. She asked the court to grant her sole legal and primary physical custody of K.B. and to order Father to pay child support.

Father, by then living in Georgia, moved to dismiss Mother's complaint and for contempt. He attached copies of the temporary orders and the final order entered by the Texas Court.

On September 23, 2019, Mother, through counsel, filed an amended complaint to enroll the Texas custody and visitation order and to modify custody and child support. She alleged several material changes of circumstance since entry of the Texas order, including Mother's and Father's relocation and Father's failure to exercise any visitation with K.B.

On December 13, 2019, the circuit court held a custody hearing at which Mother appeared with counsel and Father represented himself. On January 9, 2020, the court

entered a modified custody and visitation order ("Custody Order"). The court granted sole legal custody and primary physical custody of K.B. to Mother and established an access schedule for Father. Father was allowed one 5-day access period with K.B. each month during the school year, from Wednesday at 4 p.m. until the following Monday at 4 p.m.[2] In January and February of 2020, the access period only could be exercised in Maryland, but thereafter there was no set location for the access. Father could unilaterally schedule the monthly access period but was obligated to notify Mother at least one week in advance of his chosen dates. Father also was granted weekly telephone access on Saturdays and access to K.B. for every spring break, during alternating Christmas breaks, for Father's Day weekend, and for two 2-week periods each summer. The court ordered Father to pay $386 per month in child support *pendente lite*[3] and made him responsible for all the travel costs associated with exercising his access periods. Neither party appealed from the Custody Order.

Just over four months later, Father, through counsel, filed a petition for contempt and to modify the Custody Order. He asserted that Mother had "failed and refused to provide any access" since the entry of the Custody Order, alleging that she had not responded to his phone calls or emails when he attempted to schedule his monthly access period in January, February, and March 2020. Father further alleged that on March 29,

[2] If K.B. was enrolled in school, however, the access period would commence at the end of school on Wednesday and end at the beginning of school on Monday.

[3] The court later held a child support hearing and ordered Father to pay $668 per month, plus $50 per month toward his arrears balance of $6,556.

2020, Mother wrote to him by email advising that she would not allow him any access to K.B. during the COVID-19 emergency. He responded by advising Mother that he would drive to Maryland to see K.B. the next day. Father alleged that when he arrived, he repeatedly knocked on Mother's door, but she did not answer. He asked the court to find Mother in contempt of the Custody Order and to order her to purge her contempt by providing additional access to Father during the summer of 2020 and by transporting K.B. to Georgia to visit with him for the next three access periods.

On December 14, 2020, the circuit court held a hearing on Father's motion at which both parties were represented by counsel. Mother and Father both testified in their cases, and Father was recalled in rebuttal.

Father testified that he contacted Mother by "text and telephone call" to notify her of his chosen dates for access periods, which were January 8-13, 2020, February 19-24, 2020, and March 18-23, 2020, but she did not answer or respond.[4] He contacted her by "text message, telephone call and [e]mail" to schedule his April visit, which he testified was scheduled to begin on April 22, 2020. Father traveled to Maryland by airplane on that date. He went to Mother's house but did not see a car in the driveway or any "sign that

[4] The phone number that Father was using was provided to him by Mother at a previous hearing. It is a "Google Voice" number, which allows calls, text messages, and voicemails.

Mother testified that she elected to use a Google Voice number because that application maintained a record of all calls and messages sent and received. Father obtained Mother's cell phone number in July 2020 and began communicating with her via that number thereafter.

anyone was there[.]" He knocked on the door and then waited outside for over an hour before leaving. Father returned to the airport and flew back home to Georgia.

Father introduced into evidence an email he sent to Mother and her attorney on February 27, 2020 informing her of his planned visitation with K.B. over spring break (March 26, 2020 through April 6, 2020); for his regular April access period (April 6, 2020 through April 13, 2020); and for his two summer access periods (June 17, 2020 through July 5, 2020 and July 29, 2020 through August 12, 2020).

Father also contacted Mother on June 9, 2020 to confirm his summer visitation period beginning June 17th. He received no response. He then notified her and her attorney by email that he planned to exercise the two-week visitation period beginning July 29, 2020. One day in advance of that date, Father traveled by airplane to Maryland. The next day, he went to Mother's house. Initially, she would not open the door and was exchanging text messages with Father. Father called the police. While he waited for the police, Mother's mother, father, and brother arrived.

The police responded and attempted to negotiate with the parties. Mother still refused to let Father take K.B. with him but agreed to drive K.B. to Georgia to visit with him. By then, Father had missed his return flight home. He rented a car and drove himself back to Georgia. Father claimed, however, that Mother did not drive K.B. to Georgia as promised.

In September 2020, Father began having video calls with K.B. via Facetime twice weekly. According to Father, Mother interrupted those video calls, behaving in an "irate" manner and denigrating Father in front of K.B.

According to Father, the next time he attempted to exercise his visitation rights was on October 28, 2020, when he again traveled to Maryland by airplane. He went to a community center in Washington, D.C. where he had arranged to meet Mother and K.B. Mother arrived three hours later and did not bring K.B. with her. Instead, K.B. was outside the center in a car with Mother's mother and brother, as well as K.B.'s half-brother. Mother's sister also was present in a third car. Mother retrieved K.B. and, while holding her, called Father a "rapist" and an "asshole." When Father tried to take K.B., Mother "grabbed [K.B.], put her in her car and . . . left." Father spent the night in a hotel and flew home the next day.

Two days later, Father received a text message from Mother stating that she was coming to his house. Mother and her sister arrived at Father's home in Georgia with K.B. Father visited with K.B. in the entryway of his house for about an hour. Mother returned the next day with K.B. and stayed for a few hours. Father and his three sons were present, as were Mother, Mother's sister, and her sister's daughter.

In her case, Mother testified that she was currently living in Washington, D.C. with K.B. and her son. K.B. was enrolled in pre-kindergarten at a charter school in Washington, D.C.

Mother denied that Father had made any attempt to arrange visits with K.B. until July 2020. She also denied that Father came to her house in April 2020. She introduced into evidence a printout from her Google Voice account that she claimed showed all the phone calls placed by Father and did not reflect any communication from January 2020 through June 2020.

She testified that when Father came to her house in July 2020 for his first visit, K.B. began "crying and screaming" and was "uncooperative." According to Mother, she and Father agreed that it would "make sense" for K.B. to drive with Mother to Georgia because K.B. was "fearful of [Father]." Mother drove as far as Richmond, but K.B. was very upset. Mother's mother spoke to Father by telephone and an agreement was reached that Mother would stay in a hotel with K.B. that night and the next morning they would "play it by ear" based upon how K.B. felt. The next morning, Mother contacted Father by Facetime, and they agreed to reschedule the visit for the end of August in Maryland for Father to "meet" K.B. Father was unable to come in August, however, because one of his sons had to have a medical procedure.

When Father came to Maryland in October 2020, Mother testified that she arrived at the agreed meeting spot at 4:05, which was just five minutes late under the terms of the Custody Order. Father had said he would be there earlier, around 2 p.m., but Mother did not come then because K.B. "ha[d] school." When Father tried to take K.B., she became distraught and clung to Mother. Mother and Father decided to "come up with a better

plan." The next day, Mother booked a rental property in Atlanta and drove there with K.B. for the weekend.

During Mother's testimony, but not during Father's, the circuit court judge made or received several phone calls. This is reflected in the record only by breaks in the trial transcript marked with the following text: "(Whereupon, Bench phone call conducted during hearing.)" This text appears in the transcript at seven different points in Mother's testimony. The record is unclear about whether Mother's testimony continued during the phone calls or if the testimony was paused until the calls were finished.

In rebuttal, Father testified that the Google Voice record Mother introduced into evidence did not reflect all the phone calls he had placed between January and July 2020. He explained that it was not feasible for him to visit K.B. in Maryland, as Mother wished, because he was a single father of three children who live with him in Georgia.

In closing argument, Father's counsel argued that Mother had "flagrantly violated" the terms of the Custody Order. He asked the court to order that Mother produce K.B. for visits on specified dates from January 2021 through July 2021, including a four-week summer visit to make up for missed time. He also argued that the court should order Mother to reimburse Father for travel expenses he incurred for the missed visits.[5]

Mother argued that Father's testimony that he attempted to arrange visits from January through June 2020 was not credible and that he had not produced any documentary

[5] Father also was seeking a retroactive suspension of his child support for a 4-month period during which he had been furloughed from his job due to the COVID-19 emergency. The court denied that request and that issue is not before us on appeal.

evidence backing up his claims. She argued that the evidence showed that K.B. was traumatized by the abrupt reintroduction of Father into her life and asked the court to modify the Custody Order to create a gradual access schedule to permit K.B. to acclimate to this change.

The court took a brief recess and then ruled from the bench. The trial court emphasized that it had listened to the parties' contradictory testimony and "observe[d] their demeanor[.]" The court found that Mother's testimony "lack[ed] some credibility." For example, the court found that in July 2020, Mother only agreed to bring K.B. to Georgia to visit with Father while in the presence of the police because she realized that the Custody Order would be enforced if she did not agree. Once the police were gone, however, she did not follow through on her agreement. The court found Mother's testimony that Father later consented to Mother not bringing K.B. to Georgia "inconsistent with logic and reason" and unsupported by the testimony. In the court's view, that incident was indicative of Mother's routine interference with Father's court-ordered access to K.B.

The court also was troubled by Mother's decision to allow multiple family members to be present during visits and exchanges. That conduct created an "atmosphere" that was disruptive to visitation and was designed to make the exchanges more difficult.

The court found it unsurprising that K.B. displayed distress during exchanges because of her natural attachment to her primary caregiver, Mother. There was no evidence, however, that visitation with Father would be "detrimental or harmful" to K.B.

To the contrary, the court found that Father had a "supportive, loving relationship" with his older children and wished to include K.B. in his family.

The trial judge then turned to FL § 9-105, governing an unjustified denial or interference with visitation.[6] The court found that the threshold criteria under that statute were met because Mother had unjustifiably interfered with Father's access to K.B. under the terms of the Custody Order. Consequently, the court was empowered to reschedule missed visitation, modify the Custody Order to "ensure future compliance," or assess costs or counsel fees against Mother. FL § 9-105. The court emphasized that its modification of the Custody Order would be consistent with the best interests of K.B., as determined by the court, and would not be designed to punish Mother for past misconduct.

The court reasoned that it was in K.B.'s best interest to spend time with Father, emphasizing that she was just 4 years old and had time to "develop a strong, loving, supportive relationship" with him. The court noted that the distance between the parties'

[6] The judge stated that she was referring to Maryland Rule 9-105, but it appears that she simply misspoke, because it is clear from context that she was referring to FL § 9-105. The statute provides:

> In any custody or visitation proceeding, if the court determines that a party to a custody or visitation order has unjustifiably denied or interfered with visitation granted by a custody or visitation order, the court may, in addition to any other remedy available to the court and in a manner consistent with the best interests of the child, take any or all of the following actions:
>
> (1) order that the visitation be rescheduled;
>
> (2) modify the custody or visitation order to require additional terms or conditions designed to ensure future compliance with the order; or
>
> (3) assess costs or counsel fees against the party who has unjustifiably denied or interfered with visitation rights.

homes was a "unique" factor that had persuaded the court to order a non-standard access schedule under the Custody Order. The court found that the provision in that order permitting Father to choose when to exercise his access period each month, with notice to Mother, was not working because the parties were not communicating. Consequently, the court determined to set the start and end dates for Father's access periods for the following nine months (December 2020 through August 2021) ("the initial period"). The court access did not change the length of the access periods but did move the start and end time from 4 p.m. to 5 p.m. during the initial period. Father was ordered to notify Mother of his travel plans before each access period, and Mother was ordered to reply to Father's communication within 24 hours. After the initial period, Father's access would revert to the procedure outlined in the Custody Order.

The court ordered Mother to contribute up to $150 per visit to the cost of K.B.'s return travel during the initial period. Alternatively, Mother could choose to transport K.B. herself. The court declined to order Mother to reimburse Father for his past travel expenses because it concluded that he did not produce reliable evidence of those expenses.

In addition to these temporary modifications, the court made other minor modifications to the Custody Order. First, the court ordered that Mother and Father each would have K.B. in their custody on Mother's Day and Father's Day weekend, respectively, from Friday at 5 p.m. until Monday at 5 p.m. and that that access superseded the schedule in the modified custody order. Second, the court modified the Custody Order to make spring break access alternate year to year. Third, the court granted Father

additional telephone access on Wednesdays for 30 minutes, which was consistent with the schedule the parties had been following informally. Fourth, the court ordered Mother and Father not to disparage each other in K.B.'s presence. Fifth, Mother was ordered to provide Father with access to K.B.'s medical records no later than December 18, 2020. Mother was ordered to share her home address, email address, and phone number with Father.

The court entered an order consistent with the oral ruling on January 11, 2021. This timely appeal followed. We supplement these facts in our discussion of the issues.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review child custody and visitation determinations utilizing three interrelated standards of review. *In re Yve S.*, 373 Md. 551, 586 (2003). The Court of Appeals has described these standards as follows:

> We point out three distinct aspects of review in child custody disputes. When the appellate court scrutinizes factual findings, the clearly erroneous standard of [Rule 8-131(c)] applies. [Second], if it appears that the [court] erred as to matters of law, further proceedings in the trial court will ordinarily be required unless the error is determined to be harmless. Finally, when the appellate court views the ultimate conclusion of the [court] founded upon sound legal principles and based upon factual findings that are not clearly erroneous, the [court's] decision should be disturbed only if there has been a clear abuse of discretion.

Id. (cleaned up).

A trial court abuses its discretion if "'no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the [trial] court' or when the court acts 'without reference to any guiding rules or principles.'" *Santo v. Santo*, 448 Md. 620, 625 (2016) (quoting *In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 3598*, 347 Md. 295, 312 (1997)) (alterations in original). "This

standard of review accounts for the trial court's unique 'opportunity to observe the demeanor and the credibility of the parties and the witnesses.'" *Id.* (quoting *Petrini v. Petrini*, 336 Md. 453, 470 (1994)).

DISCUSSION

I.

Custody

Mother contends the trial court failed to consider the evidence she presented, failed to show empathy or compassion for K.B., was aloof, and improperly engaged in personal phone calls and conversations during the trial. She maintains that the evidence established that Father, by his own choice, had not been "a consistent parental figure in [K.B.'s] life," emphasizing her testimony that he did not exercise visits until July 2020, as well as other facts not in evidence, and argues that the evidence supported a finding that Father was unfit. Alternatively, she contends that the court should have ordered a "transitional/buildup schedule to help establish a parent-child relationship between the Father and child."[7] Mother maintains that the circuit court ruled as it did to punish her.[8]

[7] Mother also argues that the court did not address certain best interest factors set out under Md. Rule 9-204.1(c). That Rule governs "Parenting Plans" and requires that, in a custody or visitation case, the court advise the parties during their "first appearance in court" in a case involving a modification of custody or visitation "that they may work separately, together, or with a mediator to develop a parenting plan they believe is in the best interest of their child." Md. Rule 9-204.1(b). That Rule was adopted in November 2019 and took effect on January 1, 2020, which was after the parties' initial custody hearing in Maryland. The Rule has no applicability here.

[8] Mother cites several unreported decisions of this Court in her brief. By Rule, we may not consider those cases. Md. Rule 1-104.

Father responds that the trial court did not clearly err or abuse its discretion by finding that Mother unjustifiably interfered with Father's visitation under the Custody Order and by modifying the Custody Order to ensure future compliance, consistent with the best interests of K.B. He emphasizes that Mother presented no evidence at the modification hearing to show that Father was unfit or that it was not in K.B.'s best interests to spend time with him.[9]

We find insufficient support in the record for Mother's contention that the trial judge was biased against her or was distracted or disinterested in Mother's testimony. To the contrary, the court demonstrated its attentiveness to Mother's testimony by asking clarifying questions and responding to objections. The trial court's lengthy oral ruling reflects a detailed knowledge of the facts, including the testimony given by both parties. We see no impropriety in the record as it has been presented to us.

Furthermore, there is no indication that Mother's trial counsel ever objected to the court's behavior. A party normally may not raise an issue on appeal if it was not "raised in or decided by the trial court." Md. Rule 8-131(a). We see nothing in the trial court's

[9] Father asks this Court to strike Mother's entire statement of facts pursuant to Md. Rule 8-504(a)(4) because she includes facts that are "not supported by the record below[.]" Though we decline to strike the statement of facts, we will not consider any facts set out by Mother that occurred after the modification hearing or that were not before the trial court at the modification and contempt hearing.

conduct here that would justify consideration of the issue despite the trial counsel's failure to preserve it for appeal.[10]

Turning to Mother's substantive contentions of error, we emphasize that "[w]eighing the credibility of witnesses and resolving any conflicts in the evidence are tasks proper for the fact finder"—here the trial court. *J.A.B. v. J.E.D.B.*, 250 Md. App. 234, 263-64 (2021) (quoting *State v. Smith*, 374 Md. 527, 533-34 (2003)). As the trial court emphasized in its ruling, Mother and Father, at times, presented contradictory versions of events. It was for the trial court to determine which version of events was more credible. The court credited Father's testimony about his attempts to contact Mother and the circumstances of his attempted visitation exchanges in July and October 2020. It rejected as not credible Mother's contrary testimony. We will not second-guess the first-level factual findings of the trial judge, who was able to observe the witnesses' demeanor and make a firsthand assessment of their credibility.

The court did not legally err or abuse its discretion in its application of FL § 9-105. As noted earlier, upon a finding that "a party to a custody or visitation order has

[10] We recognize the difficult position attorneys are put in when deciding whether to object to a judge's personal behavior, and we are aware of cases in other states forgiving a party's failure to object in such situations. *Commonwealth v. Hammer*, 494 A.2d 1054, 1059 (Pa. 1985) ("[T]he possibility exists that counsel's objection will be viewed as a source of annoyance and may well aggravate the situation."); *Collins v. Sparks*, 310 S.W.2d 45, 48-49 (Ky. 1958). Here, however, the alleged inattentiveness by the trial judge is far from the level of misbehavior we would need to see to consider applying such an exception. *Cf. Hammer*, 494 A.2d at 1061-62 (forgiving a criminal defendant's lack of objection when the trial judge repeatedly asked the defendant questions in front of the jury that expressed doubt about his innocence and the truthfulness of his testimony).

unjustifiably denied or interfered with visitation granted by a custody or visitation order[,]" section 9-105 empowers a court to "order that the visitation be rescheduled," to "modify the custody or visitation order to require additional terms or conditions designed to ensure future compliance with the order," or to impose costs or fees on the non-compliant party, consistent with the best interests of the child. Recently, this Court explained that the plain language of the statute gives the trial court discretion to order "make-up" visitation or otherwise modify a custody or visitation order in the best interests of the child but is not intended to "make whole" the party who was unjustifiably denied visitation. *Alexander v. Alexander*, __ Md. App. __, No. 1320, September Term 2020, slip op. at 16 (filed July 28, 2021).

Here, the trial court found that Mother unjustifiably interfered with Father's access to K.B. by not allowing Father to take K.B to Georgia in July 2020 and again in October 2020; by not driving K.B. to Georgia as agreed in July; and by allowing multiple family members to disrupt the attempted exchanges. Those findings were amply supported by Father's testimony and the documentary evidence he introduced and were not clearly erroneous. The court's limited modification of the terms of the Custody Order to specify Father's access dates for a 9-month period was "designed to ensure future compliance" because Mother had refused to respond to Father's attempts to schedule past access periods. In ruling, the trial court explicitly stated that it was not punishing Mother for her past misconduct. This was evidenced by the fact that the trial court did not order extra "make

up" access and modified the Custody Order to give Mother access to K.B. during spring break in alternating years and on Mother's Day weekend every year.

The court's focus was upon K.B.'s best interests. It found that Father was fit, was a loving Father to his other children, and, if given a chance to spend time with K.B., could develop the same relationship with her. The trial court did not ignore the evidence that K.B. was distressed during the attempted visitation exchanges, but rather, found that K.B.'s behavior was normal and natural and did not reflect that visitation would be harmful to her. To the contrary, the court found that K.B.'s long-term best interests would be served by promoting a stable and loving relationship with Father, even if that caused her some distress in the near term. *See Boswell v. Boswell*, 352 Md. 204, 222 (1998) (explaining that the preference of a very young child is not entitled to great weight in the best interest analysis). The trial court's ultimate determination to continue the same access schedule, but with the dates specified, was not an abuse of its broad discretion.[11]

II.

Reimbursement for Travel Expenses

Mother contends the court abused its discretion by ordering her to reimburse Father for travel expenses because he did not present any evidence documenting his past travel

[11] Mother's argument that the trial court should have created a transitional visitation schedule to better acclimate K.B. to Father is not well-taken. The Custody Order was entered in January 2020 following a full custody trial. It granted Father access to K.B. for a 5-day period every month. Though it specified that first two of those access periods would occur in Maryland, it did not otherwise include a transitional period. Neither party appealed from that order, and Mother did not subsequently move to modify the Custody Order.

expenses. She also suggests that the court should have considered that Father owed child support arrears. We perceive no abuse of discretion.

Mother's argument might be persuasive if the court had ordered her to reimburse Father for *past* travel expenses, but that is not what happened. In fact, the court denied Father's request for reimbursement of past travel expenses for the reason Mother identifies: that he failed to provide any documentation of the costs he incurred. Instead, the court modified the Custody Order to require reimbursement of Father's future travel expenses incurred on behalf of K.B.'s return as they are incurred moving forward, through the initial period ending on August 11, 2021. Specifically, Mother was permitted, in her discretion, to either arrange K.B.'s return travel herself or to reimburse Father for his documented expenses, up to $150. In light of the multiple failed attempts at visits that have occurred so far, redistributing the travel costs associated with future visits was not an abuse of the broad discretion the trial court is afforded under FL § 9-105.

ORDER OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY AFFIRMED; COSTS TO BE PAID BY THE APPELLANT.