Circuit Court for Frederick County
Case No.: C-10-FM-25-807035

UNREPORTED

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF MARYLAND*

No. 2277

September Term, 2024

GABRIEL RUIZ

v.

ANNE RUIZ

Reed,
Zic,
Hotten, Michele D.
(Senior Judge, Specially Assigned),

JJ.

Opinion by Hotten, J.

Filed: October 3, 2025

*This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B).

Appellant, Gabriel Ruiz ("Husband"), appeals the grant by the Circuit Court for Frederick County of a final protective order ("FPO") sought by appellee, Anne Ruiz ("Wife"). Husband presents four questions for our review,[1] which we have rephrased, as follows:

1. Did the trial court err in finding that Husband's conduct met the statutory definition of stalking under Maryland law?

2. Did the trial court violate Husband's due process rights by allowing Wife to testify about alleged prior acts of abuse?

3. Did the trial judge exhibit judicial bias, thereby denying Husband a fair hearing?

4. Did the trial court improperly admit prior resolved or dismissed protective orders, pending criminal charges, and other documents demonstrating alleged prior acts of abuse?

For the reasons that follow, we affirm the circuit court's grant of the FPO.

BACKGROUND

Husband and Wife have been married since June 20, 2015. Together they have three minor children: C.R., born in 2009; G.R., born January 3, 2015; and E.R., born July 24,

[1] Husband presented the following questions on appeal:

1. Whether the trial court erred in finding that the appellant committed stalking on January 9, 2025, based on conduct that did not meet the statutory definition of stalking under Maryland law.
2. Whether the trial court violated the appellant's due process rights by allowing extensive and prejudicial evidence unrelated to the January 9 incident, contrary to the court's stated intention to limit the hearing scope.
3. Whether the trial judge exhibited judicial bias, including publicly disparaging the appellant's counsel's closing argument, thereby denying the appellant a fair hearing.
4. Whether the trial court improperly admitted prior resolved or dismissed protective orders, pending (later dropped) criminal charges, and unverified documents, including an alleged forged motion to rescind.

2021 (collectively "the minor children"). Although still married during the underlying events, the parties were living separately as of December 1, 2024, when Wife moved out of the marital home with the minor children, and were in the midst of a separate divorce and custody case.

On January 10, 2025, Wife filed a petition for a protective order against Husband in the Circuit Court for Frederick County. She alleged that on January 9, 2025, Husband "broke a court order and came to the house @ 4526 Seths Folly Dr by hopping the fence and getting in the back door. He tried to lure the children to him but they clung to me, we fled while I called the cops." Wife requested protection for both herself and the minor children. Following an *ex parte* hearing on January 10, 2025, the circuit court granted a seven-day temporary protective order ("TPO") and scheduled an FPO hearing for January 17, 2025. The court later extended the TPO through January 27, 2025, and set a new FPO hearing for that date.

On January 27, 2025, the circuit court heard testimony from both parties and, after considering all the evidence, granted an FPO against Husband. The court found that Wife "is a person who is eligible for relief" as a current spouse who shares children with Husband. The court also found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Husband engaged in stalking. As a result, the court directed the following orders at Husband:

> The respondent shall not abuse, threaten to abuse Anne Ruiz, [C.R.], [G.R.], or [E.R.]. Respondent shall not attempt to contact, contact, or harass in person Ms. Ruiz, [C.R.], [G.R.], or [E.R.] except to facilitate visitation. No going to the house on Seths Folly Road [sic]. Stay away from Linganore. Stay away from Green Valley Elementary. Stay away from the childcare provider located on Piedmont Road in Clarksburg. Stay away from Ms.

> Ruiz's place of employment at Fort Meade and Fort Detrick. Vacate the home.

In addition to the foregoing restrictions, the FPO also granted primary custody of the minor children to Wife for the duration of the FPO, with Husband only being allowed supervised visitation every other weekend. The terms of the FPO were made effective through June 27, 2025.

Following a hearing on April 21, 2025, the circuit court modified the FPO to further restrict Husband's access with the minor children to therapeutic supervised visitation as provided by the Frederick Mental Health Association. Then, following another hearing on June 27, 2025, the circuit court extended the FPO through December 27, 2025.

Husband timely noted this appeal on January 27, 2025.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A trial court may grant an FPO if it finds "by a preponderance of the evidence that the alleged abuse has occurred[.]" Maryland Code (1984, 2019 Repl. Vol., 2023 Supp.), Family Law Article ("FL"), § 4-506(c)(1)(ii). This Court recently provided the appellate standard of review for a circuit court's grant of an FPO in *Hripunovs v. Maximova*, 263 Md. App. 244, 261-62 (2024):

> [W]e accept the circuit court's findings of facts, unless they are clearly erroneous. *See* Md. Rule 8-131(c) and *Barton v. Hirshberg*, 137 Md. App. 1, 21 (2001). We "must consider evidence produced at the trial in a light most favorable to the prevailing party[.]" *Friedman v. Hannan*, 412 Md. 328, 335 (2010) (quotation marks and citation omitted). We defer to the trial court's credibility determinations because it "has the opportunity to gauge and observe the witnesses' behavior and testimony during the trial." *Barton*, 137 Md. App. at 21 (quotation marks and citation omitted). It is "not our role, as an appellate court, to second-guess the trial judge's assessment of a witness's credibility." *Gizzo v. Gerstman*, 245 Md. App. 168, 203 (2020). As to the

> circuit court's ultimate conclusion, "we must make our own independent appraisal by reviewing the law and applying it to the facts of the case." *Piper v. Layman*, 125 Md. App. 745, 754 (1999).

Hripunovs, 263 Md. App. at 261-62 (quoting *C.M. v. J.M.*, 258 Md. App. 40, 58 (2023)).

In other words, we accept all factual findings of the circuit court that are not clearly erroneous, and we review whether those facts are legally sufficient to constitute a ground for an FPO without deference.

DISCUSSION

I. The Circuit Court did not Err in Finding, by a Preponderance of the Evidence, that Husband Committed Stalking

A. The Parties' Contentions

Husband first contends that the circuit court erred in finding that he committed stalking on January 9, 2025. He claims, without any citation to law or the record, that "[t]here was no course of conduct, threat, or intent to harass." Therefore, Husband argues, his conduct "did not meet the statutory definition" of stalking. Wife, relying on *Schiff v. State*, 254 Md. App. 509 (2021), disagrees, arguing that the evidence was sufficient to find the essential elements of stalking by a preponderance of the evidence. Specifically, Wife points to an "agreement previously reached in open court barring [Husband] from the marital home[,]" as well as "testimony regarding prior tracking of [Wife], and other incidents such as [Wife]'s testimony that [Husband] texts her from random numbers and appeared at [Wife]'s mother's home and recorded in windows." In his reply brief, Husband argues that the circuit court improperly relied on "unrelated, unverified allegations" of past conduct, and that without those allegations, the evidence at trial did not establish a

malicious course of conduct because Wife's petition alleged only a single isolated incident on January 9.

B. Analysis

A hearing judge may issue an FPO if the judge finds by a preponderance of the evidence that abuse has occurred. FL § 4-506(c)(1)(ii). "[A] preponderance of the evidence means such evidence which, when considered and compared with the evidence opposed to it, has more convincing force and produces in your minds a belief that it is more likely true than not true." *Mathis v. Hargrove*, 166 Md. App. 286, 310 n.5 (2005) (quoting *Coleman v. Anne Arundel Cnty. Police Dept.*, 369 Md. 108, 127 n.16 (2002)). Preponderance of the evidence is a lower burden of proof than "clear and convincing evidence," and even lower than "beyond a reasonable doubt." *Id.* at 311-312.

For purposes of the domestic violence statute, "abuse" includes "stalking under § 3-802 of the Criminal Law Article[.]" FL § 4-501(b)(1)(vi). In Section 3-802 of the Criminal Law Article, "stalking" is defined as follows:

> (1) "stalking" means a malicious course of conduct that includes approaching or pursuing another where:
>
> (i) the person intends to place or knows or reasonably should have known the conduct would place another in reasonable fear:
>
> 1. A. of serious bodily injury;
>
> B. of an assault in any degree;
>
> C. of rape or sexual offense as defined by §§ 3-303 through 3-308 of this title or attempted rape or sexual offense in any degree;
>
> D. of false imprisonment; or

E. of death; or

2. that a third person likely will suffer any of the acts listed in item 1 of this item; or

(ii) the person intends to cause or knows or reasonably should have known that the conduct would cause serious emotional distress to another; and

(2) "stalking" includes conduct described in item (1) of this subsection that occurs:

(i) in person;

(ii) by electronic communication, as defined in § 3-805 of this subtitle; or

(iii) through the use of a device that can pinpoint or track the location of another without the person's knowledge or consent.

Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law ("CR") § 3-802(a). Additionally, "course of conduct" is defined as "a persistent pattern of conduct, composed of a series of acts over time, that shows a continuity of purpose." CR § 3-801.

In *Hackley v. State*, the Supreme Court of Maryland held that "any malicious course of conduct intended to place another person in reasonable fear of serious bodily injury or death or that a third person likely will suffer such harm constitutes stalking." 389 Md. 387, 397 (2005). In *Hackley*, however, the Court was interpreting an older version of the stalking statute that defined stalking as "a malicious course of conduct that includes approaching or pursuing another person with intent to place that person in reasonable fear: (i) Of serious bodily injury or death; or (ii) That a third person likely will suffer serious bodily injury or death." *Hackley*, 389 Md. at 392 (quoting Maryland Code, Art. 27, § 124 (1996 Repl. Vol., 2001 Supp.)) (emphasis removed).

The statute has since been amended several times. In 2003, the statute was amended to clarify that the malicious course of conduct may be committed "where the person *intends* to place or *knows* or *reasonably should have known* the conduct would place another in reasonable fear[.]" 2003 Md. Laws Ch. 313 (H.B. 593) (emphasis added). The 2003 amendments also added additional "acts" of which a person could be placed in reasonable fear. In addition to "serious bodily injury" and "death," the amendments added "an assault in any degree," "rape or sexual offense as defined by §§ 3-303 through 3-308 of this article or attempted rape or sexual offense in any degree," and "false imprisonment." 2003 Md. Laws Ch. 313 (H.B. 593). Then, the statute was amended again in 2016 to include the provision for causing serious emotional distress now codified as CR § 3-802(a)(1)(ii). 2016 Md. Laws Ch. 544 (S.B. 278); 2016 Md. Laws Ch. 545 (H.N. 155).

In *Schiff v. State*, this Court analyzed a stalking conviction under CR § 3-802(a)(1)(ii) and held that "the distress reasonably caused by the malicious course of conduct in CR § 3-802(a)[(1)(ii)] need not result from express physical threats—or even any type of express threat."[2] 254 Md. App. 509, 530 (2022). Rather, this Court held that "the critical metric in CR § 3-802(a)[(1)(ii)] is the objective knowledge that the perpetrator's conduct would cause another person severe emotional distress." *Id.* at 531. As for the intent element of the statute, this Court held that "[r]egardless what the actor actually *intends* to do, if a reasonable person would know his or her conduct would cause

[2] At the time this Court decided *Schiff*, the provision for causing serious emotional distress was codified as CR § 3-802(a)(2). Following subsequent amendments, the provision is now codified as CR § 3-802(a)(1)(ii).

another person serious emotional distress, then the intent element of CR § 3-802(a)[(1)(ii)] is satisfied." *Id.* at 532 (emphasis in original).

From this, we glean two essential elements of stalking that a petitioner for a protective order must prove. First, the petitioner must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the respondent engaged in "a persistent pattern of conduct, composed of a series of acts over time, that shows a continuity of purpose." CR § 3-801. Second, the petitioner must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) the respondent "intend[ed] to place or kn[ew] or reasonably should have known the conduct would place another in reasonable fear" that they or a third person would likely suffer any of the acts listed in CR § 3-802(a)(1)(i)(1); *or* (2) the respondent "intend[ed] to cause or kn[ew] or reasonably should have known that the conduct would cause serious emotional distress to another[.]" CR § 3-802(a)(1).

Here, the facts found below were more than sufficient to find that Husband committed the act of stalking against Wife. First, the evidence was sufficient to find that Husband engaged in "a persistent pattern of conduct, composed of a series of acts over time, that shows a continuity of purpose." CR § 3-801.

At the FPO hearing, Wife testified about several prior acts of abuse demonstrating a pattern of behavior. For example, she testified that on November 7, 2024, Husband "propositioned [her] for sex." After she replied, "No," Husband "grabbed [her] behind." This made Wife feel "[s]cared that [Husband] was going to . . . force [her] to sleep with him[,]" which he had done in the past. Then, on November 17, 2024, Wife put the youngest child in a "toddler bed" approximately two feet from her own bed and went to sleep. Later,

while Wife was sleeping with the toddler nearby, Husband came into the room and "was naked, stroking himself." He "kept asking [Wife] to help him[,]" and after she refused, he "finished. Kept going, finished right there." Then, on December 1, 2024,

> [Husband] was bothering [the] oldest child, [C.R.], picking at her, like, aggravating her. And he swiped her phone from her, and she tried to get it back. Got upset. He took his shirt off, and cocked his hand back, and acted like he was going to hit her.

Wife also testified about several prior acts of alleged stalking. For example, she testified that after moving back to her mother's house with the minor children, Husband would come to the house and "knock on the door[,] . . . record in our windows[,] . . . walk around the house. He walked around to the back like basement door, recording the whole time, knocking, not leaving." Another time, Wife was driving to Hyattstown for a custody exchange of Husband's oldest daughter from another marriage when Husband "decided to follow [Wife.] . . . [H]e showed up at the exchange, opened his window. He's recording. He's yelling at everybody vulgar things." Wife also testified about how Husband "calls [her] work all the time." One time, Husband "called [Wife] and told [her she is] fat." Another time, he called asking to "talk to [her] boss." And another time, he called "telling [Wife] that he's deathly ill." She testified that he "just keeps calling[.]"

This pattern of behavior ultimately culminated in the events of January 9, 2025. At the FPO hearing, the circuit court admitted into evidence a hearing worksheet from January 7, 2025, which showed that the parties entered into an interim consent agreement requiring Husband to "stay away from [the] marital home." Despite this agreement being in place,

Husband admitted that he went to the marital home just two days later, on January 9, 2025, to "pick up belongings[.]"

Husband testified that he was "[v]ery surprised" to see Wife in the marital home because it was "mid-morning" on a Thursday and Wife "normally works – the kids, you know, [E.R.] usually watched by her mom and then [G.R.] is usually in school." Husband testified that when he saw Wife, he "sat down at the – in the dining room table[,] . . . notified her that [he] had already spoken with the sheriff, that [he] just needed to pick up some things, and then that was it." Wife offered a different version of events. She testified that when Husband came into the house, the two minor children who were present "came over – one was on each side of me, like hugging each side of me. And [Husband] attempted to lure them to him, talk to them[.]" Then, she testified,

> He kept asking [the children] for a hug. He kept asking to see my son's phone or asking questions about his phone. He told them that he won and he's going to – he can take them, and there's no order in place, and that he can show up at my mother's house anytime he wants to.

Husband denied most of the allegations contained in Wife's testimony, and now argues that the circuit court erred in considering what he characterizes as "unrelated, unverified allegations" of past conduct. However, as will be explained *infra*, the circuit court was permitted to consider "allegations of a prior history of abuse" under *Coburn v. Coburn*, 342 Md. 244, 262 (1996).[3] "The trial judge, most aptly situated to determine the

[3] Critically, in *Coburn*, the Court stated, "We do not believe the legislature intended to limit the evidence at a protective order hearing to the specific allegation of abuse that led to the filing of the *ex parte* petition." *Coburn*, 342 Md. at 262. This finding cuts against Husband's argument that the circuit court could only consider the single isolated incident on January 9 when deciding whether to grant the FPO.

credibility of witnesses, was entitled 'to accept—or reject—*all*, *part*, or *none* of the testimony of any witness, whether that testimony was or was not contradicted or corroborated by any other evidence.'" *Hripunovs*, 263 Md. App. at 269 (quoting *Omayaka v. Omayaka*, 417 Md. 643, 659 (2011)) (emphasis in original). Viewing the "evidence produced at the trial in a light most favorable to the prevailing party," *id.* at 261 (quoting *Friedman*, 412 Md. at 335), we conclude that there was enough evidence to find that Husband "more likely than not" committed the act of stalking.

Even if Husband did not intend to place Wife in fear of physical or emotional harm, he reasonably should have known that his actions would have that effect given her history of (1) refusing his unwanted sexual advances; (2) moving out of the marital home to get away from him after he allegedly tried to hit one of the minor children; and (3) filing multiple petitions for protective orders against him. This background, coupled with the fact that a consent agreement was entered just two days earlier prohibiting Husband from entering the marital home, should have put him on reasonable notice that any further contact with Wife would likely put her in fear of physical or emotional harm.

II. Husband Waived his Due Process Argument, and Even if not Waived, the Circuit Court did not Violate Husband's Due Process Rights by Admitting Evidence of a "Prior History of Abuse"

A. The Parties' Contentions

Husband argues that the circuit court violated his "due process rights" by allowing an "expansive evidentiary scope" at the FPO hearing. Husband does not, however, explain which "due process rights" were violated, nor does he cite any law supporting his argument in his principal brief. Rather, he claims without citation to the record that the circuit court

"allowed [Wife] to testify at length about alleged conduct from October 2023, June 2024, and other periods that were not part of the incident at issue." He adds that "[t]he court admitted evidence about prior protective orders that had been rescinded or dismissed, and also admitted inflammatory personal text messages that were irrelevant to the claim of stalking."

Wife responds by arguing that Husband's failure to provide legal support for his argument operates as a waiver of that argument. Additionally, Wife argues that if the due process argument was not waived, it still fails because allegations of a prior history of abuse are admissible at a protective order hearing. We agree that Husband's due process argument was waived, and that regardless, Husband's due process argument fails on its merits.

B. Analysis

"It is not our function to seek out the law in support of a party's appellate contentions." *Anderson v. Litzenberg*, 115 Md. App. 549, 578 (1997). Thus, where a party "cite[s] no authority for their position, their contention [is] deemed waived." *Id.* Here, Husband fails to cite any authority in support of his due process argument in his principal brief. In his reply brief, Husband does cite one case, *Suggs v. State*, 87 Md. App. 250, 260 (1991), for the proposition that the right to due process includes fair notice and a meaningful opportunity to defend. However, "appellate courts ordinarily do not consider issues that are raised for the first time in a party's reply brief." *Gazunis v. Foster*, 400 Md. 541, 554 (2007); *see also Fearnow v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co.*, 342 Md. 363, 384 (1996) (explaining that appellate courts retain the discretion to consider arguments raised

for the first time in a reply brief but that they do not abuse their discretion in refusing to do so). Thus, Husband's due process argument is waived for failure to cite any authority for that argument in his principal brief.

Even if it was not waived, however, Husband's argument would be without merit. In *Coburn v. Coburn*, 342 Md. 244, 262 (1996), the Supreme Court of Maryland held that "allegations of a prior history of abuse are admissible at a protective order hearing regardless of whether such allegations were sufficiently pleaded in the original petition for protection." The Court reasoned that "[e]vidence of past abuse is often the most indicative evidence of the likelihood of future abuse[,]" and that to exclude such evidence would "be directly contrary to the remedial and preventive purpose of the statute." *Id.* Thus, Husband's argument that the circuit court erred in admitting evidence of alleged conduct from "periods that were not part of the incident at issue" is meritless. The circuit court was not, as Husband argues, required to limit the FPO hearing to the January 9 incident.

III. Husband Failed to Preserve his Claims of Judicial Bias for Appellate Review

A. The Parties' Contentions

Husband argues that the trial judge exhibited judicial bias that "denied the appellant a neutral arbiter." As evidence of this alleged bias, Husband points to an instance during his counsel's closing arguments where the trial judge called counsel's remarks "dumb." Husband claims that the "court also demonstrated partiality by sustaining numerous objections by petitioner's counsel while overruling similar objections by the appellant's

counsel." Wife responds by arguing that Husband failed to preserve his claim of judicial bias for appellate review. We agree that Husband's claim of judicial bias is not preserved.

B. Analysis

Litigants in both civil and criminal cases are guaranteed the right to "a judge who is, and has the appearance of being, unbiased and impartial." *Harford Mem'l Hosp., Inc. v. Jones*, 264 Md. App. 520, 541 (2025). A violation of this right "constitutes a deprivation of the party's right to due process and an abuse of discretion by the judge." *Id.* However, litigants must overcome a high bar to prove judicial bias, given "Maryland's 'strong presumption' that 'judges are impartial participants in the legal process.'" *Id.* (quoting *Balt. Cotton Duck, LLC v. Ins. Comm'r of the State of Md.*, 259 Md. App. 376, 402 (2023)). "Bald allegations and adverse rulings are not sufficient to overcome this presumption of impartiality." *Id.* at 541-42.

To preserve a claim of judicial bias for appellate review, a litigant "must 'generally' move for relief 'as soon as the basis for it becomes known and relevant.'" *Id.* at 542 (quoting *Braxton v. Faber*, 91 Md. App. 391, 406 (1992)). Specifically, "a litigant must identify the conduct to which they object and the relief they want during the trial, among other requirements." *Id.* "This preservation requirement ensures that allegations of judicial bias and partiality are not weaponized to avoid unfavorable rulings or otherwise disrupt trial." *Id.* at 543.

Here, neither Husband nor Husband's counsel raised the issue of judicial bias during the FPO hearing. In fact, after the trial judge referred to the beginning of counsel's closing argument as "dumb," counsel apparently accepted the remark as constructive criticism,

saying, "It's all right. It's a learning opportunity for me." After the trial judge apologized for "being mean," Husband's counsel responded, "It's a learning opportunity for me, Your Honor. I always want to know what the Court is looking for." Thus, Husband failed to preserve his claim of judicial bias for appellate review. Additionally, even if preserved, Husband's contention that the circuit court demonstrated partiality by sustaining numerous objections by Wife's counsel while overruling similar objections by his counsel also fails because "adverse rulings are not sufficient to overcome th[e] presumption of impartiality." *Harford Mem'l Hosp., Inc.*, 264 Md. App. at 542.

IV. The Circuit Court did not Err in Admitting Testimony About Certain Prior Allegations of Abuse, and Husband's Arguments to the Contrary were Waived

A. The Parties' Contentions

Husband's final appellate contention is that the circuit court "improperly admitted prior resolved or dismissed protective orders, pending (later dropped) criminal charges, and unverified documents, including an alleged forged motion to rescind." He argues that "[t]he inclusion of these materials misrepresented the nature of the underlying facts and contributed to an erroneous finding of abuse." Husband does not provide any record citations in his principal brief for the materials that he argues were improperly admitted, nor does he provide any legal citations. Wife responds that Husband waived his argument by failing to provide any legal support for it. Alternatively, she argues that the evidence at issue "was properly admissible" as evidence of a "prior history of abuse."

B. Analysis

First, as with other issues he raises on appeal, Husband's "failure to provide legal support for [his] argument on appeal[] constitutes a waiver of that argument." *Hripunovs*, 263 Md. App. at 262 n.4. Relying on *Anderson v. Litzenberg*, 115 Md. App. 549, 578 (1997), Husband argues in his reply brief that Maryland law does not require pro se litigants to cite legal authority to preserve objections. However, *Anderson* says no such thing. The passage to which Husband cites reads as follows:

> In *Oroian v. Allstate Ins. Co.*, 62 Md. App. 654 (1985), appellants contested the admissibility of a computer printout, which was unsigned, unverified, and unauthenticated. We held that because appellants, in their brief, cited no authority for their position, their contention was deemed waived. *Id.* at 658. It is not our function to seek out the law in support of a party's appellate contentions. *See von Lusch v. State*, 31 Md. App. 271, 282 (1976), *rev'd on other grounds*, 279 Md. 255 (1977). Accordingly, we shall not address the potential merits of Cramaro's appellate contention.

Anderson, 115 Md. App. at 578.

Even if his argument was not waived, however, it would still fail. Prior resolved or dismissed protective orders are admissible in subsequent protective order hearings as "allegations of a prior history of abuse[.]" *Coburn*, 342 Md. at 262. Additionally, the "alleged forged motion to rescind" that Husband now complains of on appeal was admissible as evidence of a "prior history of abuse," since Wife testified that Husband would not let her take a new job unless she agreed to rescind the prior protective order. Wife added that when she does not "appease" Husband, he "gets mean, controlling, vindictive, irrational." Finally, on cross-examination of Husband, Wife's counsel asked whether he had been charged with stalking and harassment in a separate criminal case.

These charges were also admissible in the FPO hearing as "allegations of a prior history of abuse[.]" *Coburn*, 342 Md. at 262.

JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR FREDERICK COUNTY IS AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.