

Circuit Court for Baltimore City
Case No. 123172005

UNREPORTED*
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF MARYLAND

No. 2396

September Term, 2023

NATHAN SHAWN SHIELDS, Jr.

v.

STATE OF MARYLAND

Wells, C.J.
Leahy,
Beachley,

JJ.

Opinion by Wells, C.J.

Filed: April 28, 2025

*This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B).

The Circuit Court for Baltimore City denied appellant Nathan Shawn Shields, Jr.’s motion to suppress evidence seized from his person following a stop and frisk by officers with the Baltimore Police Department. Shields then entered a conditional guilty plea for possession of a regulated firearm and filed a timely appeal of the court’s denial of the motion to suppress. Shields presents one question for our review, which we slightly rephrase:

Did the court err in denying Shields’ motion to suppress?

We hold that the motion court did not err in denying Shields’ motion to suppress and affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The Grand Jury for Baltimore City indicted Shields on seven counts related to illegal possession of a firearm, but he was only tried for one count of possession of a regulated firearm after a previous conviction for a crime of violence. Prior to trial, Shields filed an omnibus motion, which he later supplemented, to suppress evidence obtained during the search of his person. On January 16, 2024, the court held a hearing on the motion to suppress and denied the motion, finding Shields was subjected to a *Terry* stop,¹ supported by reasonable, articulable suspicion that he was carrying a handgun. Shields entered a conditional guilty plea on February 15, 2024, and was sentenced the same day to a term of incarceration of five years without parole.

¹ *Terry v. Ohio*, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

In his motion to suppress, and his later supplemental motion, Shields argued the police illegally seized him because they lacked adequate suspicion that he was carrying a handgun to justify the seizure. He argued the encounter with the police rose to an arrest because police cannot automatically handcuff someone during a *Terry* stop merely because they were believed to be armed.

We glean the following facts from the suppression hearing. On May 31, 2023, Officer Hastings of the Baltimore Police Department, while at the Baltimore City Intelligence Center, observed Shields via CitiWatch cameras. Ofc. Hastings testified at the motion to suppress hearing that he was monitoring the “high crime area” of Curley Street and conducting what he described as “sweeps to where when [he’s] monitoring a certain area I’ll just kind of check everybody to where I can establish -- what I’m observing that I’ll focus on one particular individual until I can try to gather more information.”

The CitiWatch footage showed Ofc. Hastings zooming in on the midsections of two men, including Shields. Around 8:03 pm, Ofc. Hastings saw what he described as the “baseplate of a magazine” of a handgun on Shields’ “right side pelvis region.” Ofc. Hastings said he saw “printing,” which he explained meant an outline of an object inside someone’s clothing, of a handgun. Shortly after, he observed Shields step forward and “raise” his right leg, allowing Ofc. Hastings to observe the “hard angle of where the baseplate would be on a magazine protruding from his right hip area, the front of his hip area.” He described the “hard angle” as a “hard crease to where it would be a 90 degree angle around the baseplate of a magazine.” Ofc. Hastings testified that the handgun shape

was “facing the right side” of Shields, so that Shields could easily grip it with his “dominant” hand. He also stated Shields was wearing compression shorts to likely secure the firearm “closer and more tight to the body,” but admitted this was not “characteristic of an armed person.”

Based on his observations, Ofc. Hastings testified he believed he had “reasonable, articulable suspicion” that Shields was “armed with a handgun,” and he notified a detective unit to respond to Shields’ location. Ofc. Hastings observed the CitiWatch footage of the interaction between Shields and the detectives. Ofc. Hastings testified that, when the police vehicle arrived at the scene, Shields took “his hand, cup the area to where [Ofc. Hastings] believe the hand -- the firearm to be and perform a -- an adjustment. So trying to put it back into place to secure it to avoid detection.”

Detective Nolte, an officer with the Baltimore Police Department, approached Shields and recorded the arrest with his body camera. Det. Nolte testified that Ofc. Hastings notified him of what he saw, and Det. Nolte notified other units in the area. Det. Nolte testified that Shields adjusted his front waistband area as Det. Nolte approached him. Det. Nolte stated, “so he sees the police presence, immediately goes to see where the firearm is and adjust it to where he believes it will be the best concealed if we were to -- to look over at him.”

The CitiWatch footage and Det. Nolte’s body worn camera footage showed three officers surrounded Shields. Det. Nolte and another officer then grabbed each of Shields’ arms, while the third placed him in handcuffs. Det. Nolte testified he placed Shields in

handcuffs because “we believed that he was armed with a firearm. Therefore, for the safety of everyone in the situation it’s -- it’s safest and easiest for the situation if we secure him in handcuffs while we conduct our investigation.” Det. Nolte conducted a pat-down of Shields’ front waistband, and after feeling the weapon, went into Shields’ pants and underpants to pull out the firearm.

In closing arguments, Shields’ counsel argued the officers’ observations did not amount to reasonable suspicion Shields was armed because the gun was not as visible on the CitiWatch camera as Ofc. Hastings claimed during his testimony. Additionally, the other factors supporting the officers’ reasonable suspicion—wearing compression shorts, being right-handed, and adjusting his waistband—were innocent actions that were not indicative of an armed individual.

Shields’ counsel also argued the officers elevated the stop to an arrest when they handcuffed Shields, so his seizure was subject to the probable cause standard. The court said: “so address arrest versus Terry stop because as counsel points out, I look at the totality of the circumstances and certainly the fact that someone has been handcuffed does not by itself changes something from a Terry stop into an arrest.” Shields’ counsel argued that, in other cases, the officers were “warned that the suspects were dangerous” or “close by and at-large.” However, Shields was “not engaging in any overtly dangerous or illegal behavior.” Shields’ counsel stated “[j]ust because someone is believed to be an armed -- armed doesn’t give them an automatic right to handcuff . . . he’s not suspected of any kind of violent crime. He’s not making furtive movements. He’s not resisting. He’s not running.

He's not threatening anyone else." Thus, Shields' counsel concluded, there were no "aggravating factors that would . . . have justified the handcuffing" in this case.

The circuit court denied Shields' motion to suppress, concluding CitiWatch footage showed "a hard object, hard L-shaped object tucked in the waistband above and to -- to the center of the pocket." The court stated as follows:

[T]here's one time it really stands out is when it's at about 18 minutes in where he takes a step forward and his legs aren't even and his body is kind of turned and you can really see the outline of the gun. And there's a couple of other shots where I saw what seemed to me I mean pretty obviously the out -- the outline of some hard -- hard edged L-shaped object, not a piece -- a part of the anatomy, not a cell phone. He has his cell phone in his hand.

Then you couple that with the fact that he is wearing compression shorts which in and of itself is perfectly innocuous. There's absolutely -- there's no reason why seeing someone wearing compression shorts would give anyone, the police or anyone else the right to accost him and accuse him of carrying a gun . . . There's no way he could be holding something that heavy because it would fall down, but he's wearing compression shorts and so that would tend to corroborate the belief that this object that he sees is a gun and not something else.

Then when we see the police car actually pull into the space, it looks to me like he's adjusting an object in the center of his pants that happens to pull up his pants leg. It may have been that he was -- that he was indeed just scratching his leg and pulled up his pants leg. It didn't look like that to me, but at that point I think the police already had at least reasonable, articulable suspicion to make -- to make the stop.

And so for those reasons I would deny the Defense motion. I want to go onto say that if this was an arrest and the question is whether there was probable cause or not, my holding would not be any different. I think in this particular case it -- again, the police had -- not just an articulable suspicion, but probable cause to believe that there was a gun in his pants. And so, therefore, even if I'm wrong about this being a *Terry* stop, my ruling would be the same.

In short, the court denied Shields’ motion to suppress and found the distinct outline of what appeared to be a handgun constituted reasonable, articulable suspicion to conduct a *Terry* stop. Shields filed this timely appeal for our review.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

When reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, we ordinarily consider only the record at the suppression hearing. *Rodriguez v. State*, 258 Md. App. 104, 114 (2023). We accept the circuit court’s factual findings unless clearly erroneous and otherwise “review the evidence and the inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the prevailing party.” *Id.* at 114-15 (internal citation omitted). We review legal conclusions *de novo* and independently determine whether police conduct violated the defendant’s constitutional rights. *Id.* at 115.

DISCUSSION

I. The Court did not Abuse its Discretion in Denying Shields’ Motion to Suppress the Firearm.

A. Parties’ Contentions

Before this Court, Shields’ arguments appear to change from his argument at the suppression hearing. Shields does not dispute the officers had reasonable, articulable suspicion he possessed a gun. Instead, Shields argues now that the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress for two reasons: (1) a *Terry* frisk requires proof of dangerousness beyond handgun possession, and (2) firearm possession alone no longer provides reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity or probable cause to arrest,

and therefore, Shields was illegally seized. Shields asks whether “police may stop and frisk someone suspected to be armed absent any other indicia of dangerousness or whether, given the constitutional right to carry guns for self-defense, police must articulate some evidence of dangerousness beyond simple possession to support the intrusion.” In arguing *Terry* frisks require suspicion that a suspect is both armed and dangerous, and because being armed is a constitutional right, Shields asserts reasonable, articulable suspicion that a person is armed and dangerous must precede any frisk of a person. Shields argues there was no evidence he was dangerous, thus the frisk and confiscation of the firearm were unconstitutional. Shields posits the Second Amendment arguments offered in his brief are not new, and suspicion of being armed would not have justified the search and seizure.

Shields raises what he characterizes as “a related but analytically distinct, question . . . does suspected handgun possession give the police reasonable articulable suspicion that crime is afoot or probable cause to arrest and search someone in the context of a constitutional right to carry a firearm for self-defense and expanded access to licenses to carry?” Shields asserts his arrest was unconstitutional because the police lacked probable cause that a crime was being committed when they arrested him.

The State argues Shields’ request for this Court to analyze how Fourth Amendment standards interact with the Second Amendment are unpreserved as they are raised for the first time in this appeal. The State asserts the scope of Shields’ appeal is limited to the issues litigated at the suppression hearing because Shields is appealing a suppression ruling through a conditional guilty plea. The State argues this is not a situation where Shields

simply shifted his argument on appeal, but he is instead raising an entirely new theory of suppression that is unpreserved.

On the merits, the State argues the circuit court correctly determined that police had reasonable suspicion to stop Shields. Under Maryland law, the State asserts, reasonable suspicion of handgun possession generally justifies a *Terry* stop.

In his reply brief, Shields argues his conditional guilty plea does not prohibit raising additional legal arguments on appeal in support of the stop and frisk issue. Shields argues the State incorrectly framed his argument as a new, unpreserved theory of suppression. However, his arguments about “evolving Second Amendment law” were raised at the motion to suppress hearing because his defense counsel argued during the hearing that “the officers violated [Shields’] Fourth Amendment rights by handcuffing, frisking, and searching him, even if they believed he was armed.” From this argument, Shields asserts his Second Amendment contentions are supplemental to the argument that the officers violated Shields’ Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure. Shields concedes that his defense counsel, at the suppression hearing, focused mainly on arguing police did not have reasonable suspicion that Shields was armed. But, at the hearing, Shields’ counsel also argued that mere suspicion of being armed was not sufficient to justify the actions of the officers, which opens the door to the discussion of the change in Second Amendment jurisprudence.

B. Analysis

1. Shields’ Second Amendment Arguments were not Preserved for Review.

We turn first to Shields’ primary argument before this Court: the Second Amendment arguments raised for the first time in this appeal. Ordinarily, this Court will not decide any issue unless it plainly appears by the record to have been raised in or decided by the trial court. Md. Rule 8-131(a); *accord Ray v. State*, 435 Md. 1, 20 (2013) (Rule 8-131(a) requires that the issue “plainly appear” in the record to be raised in, or decided by, the circuit court). Appellate review is limited to preserved issues as “a matter of basic fairness to the trial court and to opposing counsel, as well as being fundamental to the proper administration of justice.” *In re Kaleb K.*, 390 Md. 502, 513 (2006) (quoting *Medley v. State*, 52 Md. App. 225, 231 (1982)).

In *Huffington v. State*, the Maryland Supreme Court held that, under Rule 4-252(a), “Where the claimed defect is not jurisdictional, it must be seasonably raised before the trial court or it is waived . . . It follows, therefore, that any constitutional claim is waived because there was not a motion filed within the time limited by the rule.” 304 Md. 559, 586 (1985). In order to be seasonably raised, Shields’ motion, as it relates to the Second Amendment claims, was still required to comply with the requirements for motions set out in Rule 4-252(e):

A motion filed pursuant to this Rule shall be in writing unless the court otherwise directs, *shall state the grounds upon which it is made*, and shall set forth the relief sought. A motion alleging an illegal source of information as the basis for probable cause *must be supported by precise and specific factual averments*. Every motion shall contain or be accompanied by a statement of points and citation of authorities.

Rule 4-252(e) (emphasis added). “The obvious and necessary purpose of that requirement is to alert both the court and the prosecutor to the precise nature of the complaint, in order

that the prosecutor have a fair opportunity to defend against it and that the court understand the issue before it.” *Denicolis v. State*, 378 Md. 646, 660 (2003). In *Denicolis*, the Court observed that “some defense counsel” file omnibus motions “presumably in the belief that if the motion complies with the time requirement of Rule 4-252(b), compliance with Rule 4-252(e) is unnecessary.” *Id.* The Court rebuked this position, stating: “That is not the case. If a motion fails to provide either a factual or legal basis for granting the requested relief, it cannot be granted.” *Id.*

Additionally, as both parties discuss, “[p]reservation analysis distinguishes between new issues and mere shifts in argument[,]” citing to *In re D.D.*, 250 Md. App. 284 (2021), *rev’d on other grounds*, 479 Md. 206 (2022), as instructive of this point. In *In re D.D.*, the appellant challenged his stop under the Fourth Amendment, arguing in the trial court that “the odor of marijuana that [the police officer] testified he smelled did not establish reasonable suspicion because [the police officer] could not distinguish between the odor of marijuana and hemp, which is legal.” *Id.* at 297. On appeal, the appellant raised two different arguments: (1) “the odor of marijuana does not provide reasonable suspicion because that odor does not indicate possession of a criminal amount of marijuana,” and (2) “even if the smell of marijuana can support a stop, no evidence tied the smell to D.D. . . .” *Id.* The Court held that the first appellate argument was preserved, acknowledging the argument “shifted” from the trial court to appeal but “the gist of the argument is the same, i.e., that when an officer smells the odor of what the officer believes is marijuana, that odor does not provide reasonable suspicion to support a stop because that odor, by itself, does

not indicate criminal behavior, as opposed to noncriminal behavior.” *Id.* at 297–98. The second argument, however, was not preserved because it was not argued in the trial court. *Id.* at 298.

Turning to the present case, Shields raises his Second Amendment argument for the first time on appeal. His arguments to the contrary are unavailing and unpersuasive.

Shields did not sufficiently raise his Second Amendment arguments in his written suppression motion or hearing, as required by Maryland Rules 4-252, 8-131(a), and relevant case law. Shields filed an “omnibus motion” and later filed a supplemental motion to suppress evidence before the originally scheduled pretrial hearing. In the supplemental motion, Shields’ arguments made it clear he was challenging his stop and frisk under standard Fourth Amendment grounds, stating: “[w]arrantless searches are presumptively invalid, and the State is effectively on notice that the search in this case would be challenged.” Shields asserted “the Constitutional issues here are not novel or complicated.” Nowhere in his omnibus motion or his supplemental motion did Shields assert Second Amendment arguments or even cite the Second Amendment. He focused only on the lack of justification for a warrantless search under the Fourth Amendment.

Additionally, Shields’ Second Amendment arguments are not mere “shifts” from his arguments at the suppression hearing. Shields first argued at the suppression hearing that, if Shields was stopped, the stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion he possessed a gun. This is different from Shields’ appellate argument that possession of a handgun alone cannot provide reasonable suspicion to effectuate a stop. We agree with the

State that this is the inverse of the preservation problem from *In re D.D.*, where the appellant’s argument in the trial court—officers smelling marijuana did not legally indicate criminal behavior—did not preserve the second appellate argument—the officers smelling marijuana could not tie the crime of marijuana possession to the appellant. Shields’ appellate argument is new and distinct because it argues Shields’ possession of a gun cannot indicate criminality, rather than the facts did not link Shields to the crime of gun possession.

During the suppression hearing, Shields also argued the officers elevated the stop to an arrest when he was handcuffed because there was no danger to the officers’ safety that would justify handcuffing him during a mere stop. In the context of this argument, Shields said there was no danger to the officers’ safety because possession of a handgun alone did not mean he was also “engaging in overtly dangerous or illegal behavior.” The court pointed out case law supported the notion that handcuffing did not automatically elevate police encounters from a stop to an arrest. Shields’ counsel attempted to distinguish case law, stating that other cases involved situations where officers were warned the suspect was dangerous or “at-large,” whereas officers here had no information or “aggravating factors” to show he was dangerous. This argument is also more than a simple “shift” from Shields’ argument on appeal. Although Shields argued handgun possession does not mean he was also dangerous at the suppression hearing, it was in relation to whether he was arrested—and his seizure was therefore subject to the heightened probable cause

standard—rather than merely stopped. Shields never argued, as he does on appeal, that firearm possession alone can never justify a stop.

Finally, Shields notes we have discretion to consider new issues raised for the first time on appeal. *Kelly v. State*, 262 Md. App. 295, 301, n.3 (2024). We decline to do so in this case. In *Kelly*, the Court determined the appellant’s arguments were preserved for review despite his entering a conditional guilty plea that limited his appellate issues to those actually litigated in the circuit court. *Id.* Kelly’s situation is far different from that of Shields. Kelly could not have raised his issue at trial because the statute in question did not become effective until after he was convicted and sentenced. *Id.* In contrast, the Second Amendment concerns raised on appeal by Shields are not based on a new statute or recent Supreme Court decision, as Shields intimates. Shields’ Second Amendment arguments are based on *New York Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen*, 597 U.S. 1 (2022).² Since *Bruen* was decided in 2022, and the suppression hearing was in January 2024, Shields had ample opportunity to raise, assert, brief, and argue at the suppression hearing his concerns about any changes in the legal interpretation of the Second Amendment and implications for the

² In his reply brief, Shields posits his argument relies on *United States v. Rahimi*, 602 U.S. 680 (2024), and several other federal cases outside the Fourth Circuit, which were decided after the January 2024 suppression hearing. In his appellant brief, Shields briefly cites *Rahimi* to argue an inference that supports his reading of *Bruen*. Likewise, Shields relies on what he characterizes as presumptions from other court cases—which are not binding on this court—that he claims supports his reading of *Bruen*. His argument is still based on *Bruen*, and the fact that other more recent cases would be tangentially cited to bolster his *Bruen* argument does not persuade us that this case is more similar to the situation in *Kelly*. Accordingly, we do not need to exercise our discretion to consider Shields’ Second Amendment arguments.

“armed and dangerous” requirement of a *Terry* stop and frisk. Shields made no reference to *Bruen*, or any other more recent Second Amendment cases, in his supplemental motion to suppress, and Shields does not list such cases among the cases and authorities he relied on in making the suppression motion. The Second Amendment arguments are not preserved for our review, and we decline to exercise discretion to review them.

2. *The Officers had Reasonable Suspicion to Stop and Frisk Shields.*

The State points out, correctly, that Shields does not contest the police had reasonable, articulable suspicion to believe Shields was armed with a gun. In the State’s brief, however, it goes on to address the validity of the stop and frisk. For that reason, we shall address the issue.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. *Robinson v. State*, 451 Md. 94, 108 (2017). “In analyzing the reasonableness of warrantless encounters between the police and members of the public, we have generally compartmentalized these interactions into three categories based upon the level of intrusiveness of the police-citizen contact: an arrest; an investigatory stop; and a consensual encounter.” *Trott v. State*, 473 Md. 245, 255 (2021). This case first involves a *Terry* stop or investigatory stop, “which is less intrusive than a more formal custodial arrest, and correspondingly, requires a less demanding level of suspicion than probable cause.” *Id.* (footnote omitted). The Fourth Amendment requires that a “*Terry* stop ‘must be supported by reasonable suspicion that a person has committed or is about to commit a crime and permits an officer to stop and briefly detain an individual.’” *Id.* at 256 (quoting *Swift v. State*, 393 Md. 139, 150 (2006)). A police officer generally has reasonable

suspicion to conduct a *Terry* stop when the officer has a particularized and objective basis for suspecting a person of criminal activity. *Navarette v. California*, 572 U.S. 393, 396 (2014) (quoting *United States v. Cortez*, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981)).

Reasonable suspicion may be based upon circumstances and conduct that alone appear innocent yet collectively warrant further investigation. *Washington v. State*, 482 Md. 395, 422 (2022). It is a commonsense assessment that requires “something more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch.” *Sellman v. State*, 449 Md. 526, 543 (2016) (quoting *Crosby v. State*, 408 Md. 490, 507–08 (2009)).

In determining whether a law enforcement officer acted with reasonable suspicion, we consider the totality of the circumstances. *Id.* We give deference to law enforcement officers’ experience and specialized training, which enable officers to make inferences and judgments that might elude civilians. *Norman v. State*, 452 Md. 373, 387 (2017). Under these standards, a “factor that, by itself, may be entirely neutral and innocent, can, when viewed in combination with other circumstances, raise a legitimate suspicion in the mind of an experienced officer.” *Sellman*, 449 Md. at 544 (quoting *Ransome v. State*, 373 Md. 99, 105 (2003)). When investigating suspicions, officers do not need to rule out innocent explanations for suspicious conduct before conducting a *Terry* stop.

Important here, “[t]he purpose of the *Terry* frisk, by diametric contrast [to the purpose of the *Terry* stop], is not directly crime-related at all but is exclusively concerned with officer safety, with safeguarding the life and limb of the officer[.]” *Norman*, 452 Md. at 424 (quoting *Ames v. State*, 231 Md. App. 662, 673 (2017)). The test is objective: “the

validity of the stop or frisk is not determined by the subjective or articulated reasons of the officer; rather, the validity of the stop or frisk is determined by whether the record discloses articulable objective facts to support the stop or frisk.” *Ransome*, 373 Md. at 115 (Raker, J., concurring). An “officer has reason to believe that an individual is armed and dangerous if a reasonably prudent person, under the circumstances, would have felt that he was in danger, based on reasonable inferences from particularized facts in light of the officer’s experience.” *Bailey v. State*, 412 Md. 349, 367 (2010).

The motions court found the officers had reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop Shields and conduct the frisk. We agree.

Ofc. Hastings and Det. Nolte testified to, and the CitiWatch camera and body worn camera footage supported, specific facts to provide reasonable, articulable suspicion that Shields was carrying a handgun and was armed and dangerous. Ofc. Hastings testified that, as he monitored the “high crime area” of Curley Street via the CitiWatch system, he saw “printing” on Shields’ clothing consistent with the shape of a handgun and that it was positioned towards the middle of Shields’ body.³ Ofc. Hastings testified he was involved in fifteen or twenty arrests involving “obvious printing.” Ofc. Hastings also observed Shields adjust the object as if to secure it to avoid detection. Ofc. Hastings observed more than Shields adjusting his waist area and could see an outline consistent with that of a

³ Md. Code Ann., Criminal Law § 4-203(a)(1)(i) (2023 Supp.), generally prohibits wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun, “whether concealed or open, on or about the person.”

handgun before he alerted the patrolling unit. This was sufficient for reasonable, articulable suspicion to engage in a *Terry* stop.

Det. Nolte testified that, as he approached, Shields adjusted his waist area in a manner that appeared to be concealing something. Det. Nolte’s observations, in addition to Ofc. Hastings’ observations via the CitiWatch cameras, provided enough support for Det. Nolte to place Shields in handcuffs and engage in a *Terry* frisk. *See Norman*, 452 Md. at 387 (“A law enforcement officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion that a person is armed and dangerous where, under the totality of the circumstances, and based on reasonable inferences from particularized facts in light of the law enforcement officer’s experience, a reasonably prudent law enforcement officer would have felt that he or she was in danger.”). These actions were consistent with Det. Nolte protecting himself and others from potential harm. *See Sellman*, 449 Md. at 542 (identifying the purpose of a *Terry* frisk “is not to discover evidence, but rather to protect the police officer and bystanders from harm.”).

From this testimony and evidence, the court found the video footage showed “there’s a couple of times where it’s especially obvious that there is something that looks a lot like the butt of a -- of a gun . . . And there’s a couple of other shots where I saw what seemed to me I mean pretty obviously the out -- the outline of some hard -- hard edged L-shaped object, not a piece -- a part of the anatomy[.]” Shields’ presence in a high crime area, frequent adjustments to his waistband area, positioning of a hard, L-shaped object near the center of his waist, and the “printing” being in the shape of a handgun are sufficient

articulable facts to give rise to reasonable suspicion to justify the *Terry* stop. The nature of the concealed weapon was sufficient for the detective to perform a *Terry* frisk for his safety and the safety of others. The court did not err in denying Shields’ motion to suppress. Accordingly, we affirm.

**JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT
COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY
AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY
APPELLANT.**