

Circuit Court for Montgomery County
Case No. C-15-FM-23-810499

UNREPORTED*

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF MARYLAND

No. 2407

September Term, 2024

SYED SAQIB ALI

v.

SUSAN ALI

Friedman,
Zic,
Kenney, James A., III
(Senior Judge, Specially Assigned),

JJ.

Opinion by Zic, J.

Filed: June 10, 2026

* This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Maryland Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B).

Syed Saqib Ali appeals the grant of an extended final protective order (“FPO”) by the Circuit Court for Montgomery County for the benefit of his ex-wife Susan Ali and the parties’ eldest daughter (“Daughter”). Mr. Ali presents the following questions for our review, which we have condensed and rephrased for clarity:^{1, 2}

¹ Mr. Ali presented the following questions in his appellate brief:

- I. Whether the [c]ircuit [c]ourt abused its discretion in extending the [FPO] without a hearing or notice to [Mr. Ali] pursuant to Maryland Code, [Family Law] Art. § 4-507[.]
- II. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in granting [Ms. Ali’s] [a]mended [c]omplaint for [e]xtension of [f]inal [p]rotective [o]rder on behalf of [Daughter.]
- III. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding that [Mr. Ali’s] conduct constituted “mental abuse of a child[.]”
- IV. Whether the trial court erred in finding that [Mr. Ali’s] conduct placed [Ms. Ali] in fear of imminent serious bodily harm.
- V. Whether the trial court erred in allowing allegations of subsequent abuse without prior notice of these accusations.

² We do not address Mr. Ali’s argument concerning the circuit court’s admission of “allegations of subsequent abuse” because this issue is not preserved for appellate review. *See* Md. Rule 8-131(a) (“Ordinarily, an appellate court will not decide any other issue unless it plainly appears by the record to have been raised in or decided by the trial court[.]”); *see also Peterson v. State*, 444 Md. 105, 126 (2015) (recognizing that “the [preservation] rule exists to prevent sandbagging and to give the trial court the opportunity to correct possible mistakes in its rulings”) (quotation omitted). On appeal, “[a] party cannot complain about the court’s failure to rule on a pending motion unless it has brought [it] to the attention of the trial court.” *Malarkey v. State*, 188 Md. App. 126, 156 (2009). *See Braxton v. State*, 123 Md. App. 599, 650 (1998) (holding that an issue was not preserved when the court reserved ruling and appellant never asked the court to rule).

At the underlying hearing, Mr. Ali moved to “dismiss” the extension petitions because he had no notice “on what [he was] supposed to be defending[.]” Following a lengthy discussion, the court stated that it would take Mr. Ali’s position under advisement. Mr. Ali neither contemporaneously objected to the admission of “allegations of subsequent abuse” during the hearing nor, at any point thereafter, re-raised his oral

(continued)

1. Did the circuit court err in extending the FPO without a hearing?
2. Did the circuit court err in extending the FPO on behalf of Daughter?
3. Did the court err in extending the FPO as to Ms. Ali?

For the following reasons, we affirm in part, and vacate in part.

BACKGROUND

Mr. and Mrs. Ali were married in 1999. Together they have two daughters: one born in May 2006 (previously, “Daughter”), and one born in 2009.³ In 2022, the parties separated, and Mr. Ali moved out of the marital home. Ms. Ali subsequently filed for divorce⁴ and custody of the two children. Mr. Ali filed a counterclaim.

On September 7, 2023, while the divorce proceedings continued, Ms. Ali filed a petition for a protective order in the circuit court, seeking protection for herself and Daughter against Mr. Ali. Ms. Ali indicated that, on or about September 5, 2023, and “many times previously,” Mr. Ali had engaged in “mental injury of a child,” “stalking,” and “harassment[.]” She then wrote that Mr. Ali “has a history of driving past our house playing loud music and shining his car headlights into the windows of the house despite being told it scares my child and myself and being asked to stop[.]” Ms. Ali explained

motion to dismiss. Therefore, although Mr. Ali initially complained of admission of “allegations of subsequent abuse[.]” his failure to ask the court to rule on the oral motion or otherwise object to specific evidence presented during the hearing renders the issue unpreserved for appellate review. *See Malarkey*, 188 Md. App. at 156.

³ The parties’ younger daughter is not a subject of this appeal.

⁴ On April 11, 2025, Ms. Ali was granted an absolute divorce. Mr. Ali subsequently filed a notice of appeal to this Court, which is currently pending.

that the parties had been engaged in divorce and custody litigation since 2022, and that she was granted an FPO in July 2022, which had expired several weeks earlier on July 1, 2023.

Following a hearing, the court entered a temporary protective order (“TPO”) for Ms. Ali, effective until October 13, 2023, on which date the court also scheduled an FPO hearing. On Mr. Ali’s motion to postpone the FPO hearing, the court extended the TPO until, and set a new FPO hearing for, October 25, 2023.

On October 25, 2023, the court entered an FPO for Ms. Ali and Daughter by consent, effective through July 25, 2024. Mr. Ali did not admit the allegations in the petition. The court ordered Mr. Ali not to abuse or threaten to abuse Ms. Ali; not to contact or harass Ms. Ali or Daughter; not to enter the cul-de-sac where they lived; and to stay away from Mother’s work and Daughter’s school.

On July 22, 2024, three days before the FPO was set to expire, Ms. Ali filed a petition on behalf of herself and Daughter to extend the FPO for two years. In the space to describe the events, Ms. Ali wrote “harassment” next to the “other” box. She wrote that Mr. Ali had violated the [FPO] multiple times[,]” and referenced a June 28, 2024, finding of guilt by the District Court for Montgomery County of Mr. Ali for violating the FPO. The next day, on July 23, 2024, the court entered an order temporarily extending the FPO from July 25, 2024, to July 26, 2024. On July 25, 2024, Ms. Ali filed an amended petition to extend the FPO, which was identical to her initial petition to extend the FPO, except that the amended petition sought a six-month extension instead of a

two-year extension. We shall refer collectively to the petition to extend and amended petition to extend as the “petitions to extend.”

On July 26, 2024, the court held a hearing and entered an order extending the FPO, and the hearing on the petitions to extend the FPO, until September 27, 2024. Nine days before the hearing date, Mr. Ali moved for a continuance of the hearing and, with Ms. Ali’s consent, the court re-scheduled the hearing for January 24, 2025.

On that date, the circuit court held a contested evidentiary hearing on Mother’s petitions to extend the FPO. Both Ms. Ali and Mr. Ali, as well as Mr. Ali’s mother, testified. After hearing testimony and arguments, the court granted Ms. Ali’s petitions. The court found by a preponderance of the evidence that during the term of the FPO, Mr. Ali had committed further acts of abuse that placed Ms. Ali “in fear of imminent bodily harm” and “with regard to [Daughter],” caused “mental harm to a child.” The court ordered Mr. Ali not to abuse, threaten to abuse, harass, or contact by any means Ms. Ali or Daughter. Additionally, Mr. Ali was ordered not to enter the cul-de-sac on which Ms. Ali and Daughter live, and to stay away from Ms. Ali’s and Daughter’s places of work. The extended FPO was given effect for 18 months, or until July 25, 2026. Mr. Ali timely appealed the grant of the extended FPO.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

When reviewing the issuance of a final protective order, we accept the trial court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Md. Rule 8-131(c). Moreover, we “consider evidence produced at the trial in a light most favorable to the prevailing party[.]” *Ryan v. Thurston*, 276 Md. 390, 392 (1975) (citations omitted). We leave the

determination as to credibility to the circuit court, as it has “the opportunity to gauge and observe the witnesses’ behavior and testimony during the [hearing].” *Barton v. Hirshberg*, 137 Md. App. 1, 21 (2001) (quotation omitted). We make our own appraisal as to the law. *In re Yve S.*, 373 Md. 551, 586 (2003).

A trial court’s disposition, when founded upon sound legal principles and based upon factual findings that are not clearly erroneous, “should be disturbed only if there has been a clear abuse of discretion.” *In re Cadence B.*, 417 Md. 146, 155 (2010) (quotation omitted). An abuse of discretion occurs when a “ruling is clearly untenable, unfairly depriving a litigant of a substantial right and denying a just result, when the ruling is violative of fact and logic, or when it constitutes an untenable judicial act that defies reason and works an injustice.” *Alexis v. State*, 437 Md. 457, 478 (2014) (quotation and internal marks omitted). “[A]n abuse of discretion should only be found in the extraordinary, exceptional, or most egregious case.” *Wilson v. John Crane, Inc.*, 385 Md. 185, 199 (2005).

DISCUSSION

I. THE CIRCUIT COURT DID NOT ERR IN EXTENDING THE FPO WITHOUT HOLDING A HEARING.

We begin by outlining the relevant statutory framework. This matter concerns several provisions of the Maryland Domestic Violence Act (“Act”), which was enacted in 1980 and later codified as amended at §§ 4-501 through 4-515 of the Family Law (“FL”) Article of the Maryland Code (1984, Repl. 2019, Supp. 2024). Relevant to the facts before us, the Act provides that FPOs may be granted for the protection of specific

individuals, or “persons eligible for relief[,]” which include, among others, a current or former spouse of the respondent, a relative related by blood, a child of the respondent, and a vulnerable adult. FL § 4-501(m)(1), (3)–(5). Following a hearing, a court may grant an FPO if it finds by a “preponderance of the evidence” that certain acts of “abuse” have occurred. FL § 4-506(c)(1)(i)–(ii). “Preponderance of the evidence means more likely than not.” *C.M. v. J.M.*, 258 Md. App. 40, 56-57 (2023) (cleaned up) (quotation omitted).

A. The Parties’ Arguments

Citing to *La Valle v. La Valle*, 432 Md. 343 (2013), Mr. Ali argues that the circuit court erred in entering the July 23, 2024 order that temporarily extended the FPO until July 26, 2024. He argues that he was “neither notified of—nor present at—a hearing . . . on July 23, 2024[,]” in violation of FL § 4-507(a). Ms. Ali responds that this argument is entirely misplaced.

B. Analysis

Section 4-507 of the Act provides for extensions of FPOs for up to two years. Pursuant to FL § 4-507(a)(2)–(3), a court may extend an FPO for up to six months if “good cause” is shown, or up to two years if the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that during the term of the FPO, the respondent “committed a subsequent act of abuse against a person eligible for relief named in the protective order[.]” Regardless of which period of extension is requested, two requirements must be fulfilled before an FPO is extended: notice must be given to all affected persons, including the respondent, and a hearing must be held. FL § 4-507(a)(1)(i)–(ii). A court “shall” hold a hearing on a

motion to extend within 30 days after the motion is filed. FL § 4-507(a)(4)(i). If a hearing “is not held before the original expiration date of the final protective order, the order shall be automatically extended and the terms of the order shall remain in full force and effect until the hearing on the motion.” FL § 4-507(a)(4)(ii). Thus, by operation of law, an FPO shall extend past the original expiration date of the FPO, until the hearing on the extension request, if a request to extend is filed prior to the expiration of the original FPO. *Id.*

Applied here, the temporary extension granted by the circuit court on July 23, 2024, was not the result of a hearing that Mr. Ali was unaware of, but rather, occurred by operation of law. As explained above, FL § 4-507(a)(4)(ii) contemplates the possibility that an extension hearing may not take place between the timely filing of an extension petition and the original expiration date of the FPO. In this circumstance, FL § 4-507(a)(4)(ii) provides that the FPO “*shall be automatically extended* and the terms of the order *shall remain in full force and effect until the hearing* on the motion [to extend.]” (Emphases added.) The unamended petition to extend was filed by Ms. Ali on July 22, 2024—before the FPO’s original expiration date of July 25, 2024—and Mr. Ali was personally served with the petition on the same day it was filed. On July 26, 2024, the parties appeared for a hearing on petitions to extend, but the hearing was rescheduled for a new date selected and agreed to by both parties. Considering that all procedural steps required by the Act were fulfilled, the extension granted on July 23, 2024, was not improper.

We further note that Mr. Ali’s reliance on the decision in *La Valle* is misplaced. In *La Valle*, the Supreme Court of Maryland held that FL § 4-507 did not permit a court to extend an *expired* protective order, even if an extension petition was timely filed during the term of the FPO. 432 Md. at 358-59. We note that in 2020, seven years after *La Valle* was decided, the General Assembly amended the Act to include the pertinent language in FL § 4-507(a)(4)(ii) that automatically extends the terms of an FPO until a hearing on the petition to extend. Chapters 134 and 135, Laws of Maryland 2020. Accordingly, the language in *La Valle* upon which Mr. Ali relies is no longer viable.

For these reasons, we hold that the circuit court did not err in temporarily extending the FPO without holding a hearing.

II. THE CIRCUIT COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT MR. ALI COMMITTED MENTAL HARM TO DAUGHTER PURSUANT TO FL § 4-507(e).

A. The Parties’ Arguments

Next, Mr. Ali argues that the circuit court erred in extending the FPO as to Daughter; specifically, he argues that: (1) the court lacked jurisdiction to extend the FPO on Daughter’s behalf because she turned 18 years old in May 2024, and therefore, was an adult when Ms. Ali filed the petition to extend the FPO in July 2024; and (2) the court erred in finding that his conduct constituted mental harm to child because Daughter was not a child, and there was no evidence that the alleged abuse occurred when Daughter was younger than 18 years old.

In response, Ms. Ali contends that: (1) because Daughter was under 18 years of age when the FPO was granted, she was properly included in the petition to extend; and

(2) Mr. Ali has not “preserved” his argument that the circuit court erroneously found he committed mental abuse of a child.

B. Legal Framework

As explained above, the Act provides for protection for specified individuals through an FPO, including individuals “related to the respondent by blood, marriage, or adoption” as well as “a parent, stepparent, stepchild, or child” of the respondent. . . .” FL § 4-501(m)(3)–(4). “If the person for whom relief is sought is a child, the [Act] provides for an additional form of abuse to include abuse of a child, as defined in Title 5, Subtitle 7” of the Family Law Article. FL § 4-501(b)(2)(i). In relevant part, FL § 5-701(b)(1)(i) defines such abuse as “the physical or *mental injury of a child* under circumstances that indicate that the child’s health or welfare is harmed or at substantial risk of being harmed by . . . a parent[.]” (Emphasis added.) Although the Act does not explicitly define “child,” the term is defined in FL § 5-701(e) as “any individual under the age of 18 years.”

C. Analysis

We conclude that the plain language of the Act authorized Ms. Ali to petition on behalf of Daughter. Section 4-501(m)(4) describes those individuals eligible for protection in relation to the respondent—not by age. Because there is no dispute that Daughter is, in relation to Mr. Ali, *his* child, there is no merit to the argument that the petition to extend the FPO needed to be filed before Daughter turned 18 years of age for Daughter to be eligible for relief under the Act. FL § 4-501(m)(4).

That said, “mental injury of a child” is a kind of abuse only listed in Title 5, Subtitle 7 of the Family Law Article. FL § 5-701(b)(1)(i); *see* FL § 4-501(b)(2)(i) (“If the person for whom relief is sought is a child, the [Act] provides for an *additional form of abuse* to include abuse of a child, *as defined in Title 5, Subtitle 7[.]*”) (emphases added); *see also* FL § 5-701(e) (defining “[c]hild” as “any individual under the age of 18 years”). Thus, for a court to make a “mental injury of a child” abuse finding, the allegedly abusive act or acts must have occurred when the person eligible for relief (as defined under the Act) was “under the age of 18 years[.]” FL § 5-701(b)(1)(i), (e).

Based on our understanding of the record, the circuit court found that Mr. Ali’s conduct toward Daughter only constituted “mental harm to a child.”⁵ We commend the court on its thorough consideration of the testimony provided, and do not express judgment on whether the record supports that Mr. Ali committed any alternate form(s) of abuse against Daughter. Because neither party cites to evidence that Mr. Ali’s conduct

⁵ After the circuit court gave its oral ruling extending the FPO, Mr. Ali’s trial counsel argued that the court did not have “jurisdiction to include [Daughter] in the [extension] order.” The court disagreed, reasoning that Daughter’s “status is that of a child, even if she’s not a minor child.” Although Mr. Ali did not raise the specific sufficiency argument regarding “mental injury of a child” that he now raises on appeal, he was not required to do so to preserve the issue for appellate review. *See* Md. Rule 8-131(c) (“When an action has been tried without a jury, an appellate court will review the case on both the law and the evidence. It will not set aside the judgment of the trial court of the evidence unless clearly erroneous[.]”); *see also* *Slick v. Reinecker*, 154 Md. App. 312, 349 (2003) (after a bench trial, a party need not move for judgment at the close of evidence to preserve a claim of evidentiary sufficiency).

toward Daughter occurred when she was not over the age of 18 years, and our review of the record does not reveal any, we vacate the extended FPO as to Daughter.⁶

III. THE CIRCUIT COURT DID NOT ERR IN EXTENDING THE FPO AS TO MS. ALI.

A. The Parties' Arguments

Mr. Ali next argues that the circuit court erred in extending the FPO as to Ms. Ali because there was no evidence presented that his conduct placed her “in fear of imminent serious bodily harm[.]” and because the court did not assess his conduct as required by FL § 4-507(a)(3)(iii)(1)–(4). Again, Ms. Ali responds that these arguments are “wholly without merit.” We address each of Mr. Ali’s arguments in turn.

B. Analysis

1. There was sufficient evidence that Mr. Ali’s conduct placed Ms. Ali “in fear of imminent serious bodily harm[.]”

Beginning with relevant statutory language, the Act defines “abuse” in part as “an act that places a person eligible for relief in fear of imminent serious bodily harm[.]” FL § 4-501(b)(1). The proper standard to determine whether an eligible person was in “fear” “is an individualized objective one—one that looks at the situation in the light of the circumstances as would be perceived by a reasonable person in the petitioner’s position[.]” *Katsenelenbogen v. Katsenelenbogen*, 365 Md. 122, 138 (2001). “[A] belief as to imminent danger is necessarily founded upon the [petitioner’s] sensory and ideational perception of the situation that he or she confronts, often shaded by knowledge

⁶ This disposition does not inhibit Daughter from filing a new request for an FPO against Mr. Ali or seeking other legal relief, as appropriate.

or perceptions of ancillary or antecedent events.” *Id.* at 139 (quotation and internal marks omitted). The issue is “not whether those perceptions were right or wrong, but whether a reasonable person with that background could perceive the situation the same way.” *Id.* We recap the relevant evidence and then turn to our analysis.

At the hearing on Ms. Ali’s petition to extend the FPO, she alleged that Mr. Ali’s repeated violations of the existent FPO amounted to subsequent acts of abuse that caused her to be placed in fear of imminent serious bodily harm. She testified that during the term of the FPO, Mr. Ali, repeatedly made “anonymous” phone calls to her and Daughter’s phones, calling her or Daughter from a private phone number and sometimes playing music, including the Star-Spangled Banner and Jingle Bells, whistling, clearing his throat, or coughing. Ms. Ali explained that often, one of Mr. Ali’s family members would call after the anonymous call ended. Ms. Ali also testified that Mr. Ali called Daughter, and, using text-to-voice to modify his voice, said that he was “sorry [he] put [his] hands around [Daughter’s] neck.” Ms. Ali stated that the calls were “very, very upsetting” and made her “very scared” because she believed he was “trying to figure out where we [were] by making the phone calls.”

Ms. Ali also testified that Mr. Ali would drive by her house “blast[ing] music,” and that on two occasions, she had seen him waiting in his car immediately outside of her cul-de-sac. The first time occurred in March 2024, when Ms. Ali’s friend called shortly after leaving her house to inform her that Mr. Ali was sitting in a car just outside of her cul-de-sac. Ms. Ali had planned to return misdelivered mail to her neighbors, but then waited about 15 minutes after receiving her friend’s call to do so. Upon exiting her house

and driving down her driveway, she saw Mr. Ali stopped in his car at the corner of the street. Ms. Ali testified that as soon as Mr. Ali saw her, he started driving backwards to get out of her line of sight. She waited several more minutes thinking Mr. Ali would leave her neighborhood, but when she pulled out of her cul-de-sac and onto the street, he was still there. She explained that Mr. Ali then drove toward her, and as they passed each other, he “made sure to go very close to my lane[.]” Ms. Ali testified that this made her “very scared” because he had previously tried to “run [her] off the road” in 2023.

The second time Ms. Ali saw Mr. Ali outside of her cul-de-sac, which she alleged occurred in late summer of 2024, was while driving from her home to court. Ms. Ali testified that she saw Mr. Ali sitting in his car in the neighborhood around her house, and as she drove by, he “came out [from where he had been waiting] and zoomed past [her] and got in front of [her car] to leave the neighborhood.”

Mr. Ali testified that since the parties had separated in May 2022, he had lived with his parents about a half of a mile from the marital home, where Ms. Ali and Daughter continued to live. Contrary to Ms. Ali’s testimony, however, he denied ever driving into the cul-de-sac because doing so would violate the FPO.

As to the specific March 2024 allegation, when Ms. Ali’s friend notified her of Mr. Ali’s presence after leaving the marital home, he testified that he was subsequently arrested and charged with violating the FPO and stalking. Mr. Ali explained that to defend against these charges, he subpoenaed the police officer’s body camera for footage capturing Ms. Ali’s complaint to law enforcement. Mr. Ali confirmed that in the video, Ms. Ali never claimed that he “tried to drive her off the road or anything to that effect[.]”

The FPO violation and stalking charges were later nol prossed. **[Id.]** Regarding the allegation that he tried to run Ms. Ali off the road on their way to court, which Mr. Ali testified occurred during 2023, he stated that he and his mother were in his car when he and Ms. Ali began driving parallel to each other on the same street at the same time. He testified that he did not try to drive Ms. Ali off the road. Mr. Ali also denied making phone calls to Ms. Ali and to Daughter. Mr. Ali’s mother separately testified that Mr. Ali did not try to run Ms. Ali off the road when they were driving to court.

Mr. Ali’s appellate arguments concerning sufficiency urge us to draw different inferences from the evidence. This is not our role. Instead, trial courts are “most aptly situated” to assess credibility of witnesses, and thus are “entitled to accept—or reject—all, part, or none’ of their testimony, ‘whether that testimony was or was not contradicted or corroborated by any other evidence.’” *Hripunovs v. Maximova*, 263 Md. App. 244, 263, 269 (2024) (quoting *Omayaka v. Omayaka*, 417 Md. 643, 659 (2011)). See Md. Rule 8-131(c) (providing that reviewing courts “will give due regard to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses”).

The record before us reveals that Ms. Ali testified that she felt harassed and frightened by Mr. Ali’s many “anonymous” phone calls to her and to Daughter. She further testified that she was scared on two occasions when Mr. Ali waited in his car and then drove past her in a manner that frightened her—particularly considering an earlier encounter in which she felt he had tried to run her off of the road. The court also noted during the hearing that, while Ms. Ali was testifying, Mr. Ali was “glaring, smiling, laughing, [and] shaking his head” at her. Given these pieces of evidence, the court was

entitled to conclude that Mr. Ali’s actions, shaded by Ms. Ali’s knowledge or perceptions of “ancillary or antecedent events[,]” placed her in fear of imminent serious bodily harm under the individualized objective standard. *Katsenelenbogen*, 365 Md. at 139.

2. *The circuit court properly considered the factors in FL § 4-507(a)(3)(iii)(1)–(4) to determine the duration of the extended FPO.*

To determine the period of extension when a two-year extension of an FPO is requested, a court “shall” consider: (1) the nature and severity of the subsequent act of abuse; (2) the history and severity of abuse in the relationship between the respondent the person(s) eligible for relief; (3) any pending criminal charges against the respondent; and (4) the nature and extent of the injury or risk of injury caused by the respondent. FL § 4-507(a)(3)(iii)(1)–(4). Although these factors must be considered, we presume trial courts know the law and apply it correctly. *Wasylyuszko v. Wasylyuszko*, 250 Md. App. 263, 284 (2021). As such, trial courts are not required to “go through a detailed check list of the statutory factors, specifically referring to each[.]” *Malin v. Miniberg*, 153 Md. App. 358, 429 (2003) (quotation and citation omitted).

Applied here, we discern no error in the circuit court’s decision to grant an 18-month extension. The court made relevant factual findings addressing the nature and severity of the subsequent acts of abuse by Mr. Ali, the severity of his prior abusive conduct, and the nature of the injuries to Ms. Ali and to Daughter. Additionally, because no pending charges against Mr. Ali were presented during the hearing, none were discussed by the court in its ruling. The court was not otherwise required to expressly link its relevant factual findings to the mandatory statutory factors. *See Malin*, 153 Md.

App. at 429. Discerning no error, we hold that the court did not abuse its discretion granting the 18-month extension as to Ms. Ali.

CONCLUSION

We hold that the circuit court did not err in temporarily extending the FPO without holding a hearing or in extending the FPO for 18 months as to Ms. Ali. For the reasons explained above, we vacate the court's grant of the extended FPO as to Daughter.⁷

**JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT
FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY
AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN
PART; COSTS TO BE PAID 2/3 BY
APPELLANT AND 1/3 BY APPELLEE.**

⁷ We reiterate that our disposition regarding the extension of the FPO as to Daughter does not preclude Daughter from seeking a new FPO or other legal relief, as available.