Circuit Court for Talbot County
Case No. C-20-FM-19-000054

UNREPORTED

IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS

OF MARYLAND

No. 2479

September Term, 2019

---

SHAUN BARRINGER

v.

LYNN BARRINGER

---

Arthur,
Shaw Geter,
Ripken,

JJ.

---

Opinion by Ripken, J.

---

Files: May 10, 2021

This case is before us on appeal from the Circuit Court for Talbot County where appellant, Shaun Barringer ("S. Barringer"), challenges the December 4, 2019 Memorandum Opinion and Judgment of Absolute Divorce ("Memorandum Opinion"), the December 4, 2019 Judgment of Absolute Divorce ("Order"), and the January 8, 2020 Order to Amend the Judgment ("Amended Order"), which (1) granted Lynn Barringer ("L. Barringer")[1] an absolute divorce on the grounds of cruelty, (2) divided marital assets and granted a monetary award to L. Barringer, and (3) prescribed custody and visitation of the parties' three minor children. S. Barringer raises three issues on appeal. First, he contends the trial court erred in placing work-related restrictions on his visitation with the minor children. Second, he contends the trial court erred in its valuation and division of the parties' retirement benefits. Finally, he contends the trial court erred in granting L. Barringer a monetary award. For the reasons discussed below, we shall affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

## FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On June 21, 2014, S. Barringer and L. Barringer were married. During the marriage, the parties had three minor children together—A.B., born July 3, 2015, and twins J.B. and W.B., born January 20, 2018. The parties separated on January 1, 2019, due to an incident of domestic violence. L. Barringer filed a complaint for absolute divorce on February 15, 2019, and S. Barringer filed an answer on March 20, 2019. On May 14, 2019, a *pendente*

[1] Lynn Barringer is occasionally referred to by her middle name, "Renee," in certain documents. For the purposes of consistency, any record extract or brief references in this opinion to "Lynn," "Renee," or "Mrs. Barringer" will be amended to "L. Barringer."

*lite* hearing was held to address custody, access, and child support prior to trial. A trial on the merits of the complaint commenced on August 21, 2019, and continued to October 22 and 23, 2019. On December 4, 2019, by way of the Order and the Memorandum Opinion, the Circuit Court for Talbot County granted L. Barringer a judgment of absolute divorce from S. Barringer.

The circuit court considered the required best-interest-of-the-child factors to determine legal and physical custody. The court awarded the parties joint legal custody of the minor children, with final decision-making authority to L. Barringer. The court awarded sole physical custody to L. Barringer, outlining a visitation schedule for S. Barringer which read as follows:

> The minor children will have overnight visitation with [S. Barringer] on Weekend nights, starting Friday at 3:30pm and will be returned on Monday morning to the children's day care provider or school, if and only if [S. Barringer] does not work a 24-hour shift on that Friday, Saturday, or Sunday.

The court explained its decision regarding custody and visitation in the Memorandum Opinion. The court made twenty-one factual findings to determine what custody award and parenting time would be in the best interests of the children.[2] Relevant to this appeal, the circuit court found the following under the "demands of parental employment" factor as it relates to S. Barringer:

> [S. Barringer] is a paramedic [who] works for Talbot County, Maryland. [S. Barringer's] current schedule is a 24-hour shift, followed by 72 hours off from work, unless he picks up an additional shift. [S.

[2] In its Memorandum Opinion, in addition to making factual findings under the best-interest-of-the-child factors, the circuit court also noted, "[S. Barringer] is at best insouciant about his responsibilities . . . . His mother and former girlfriend watch the children for him. In short, he seems to feel that it is incumbent on others to take care of his responsibilities."

> Barringer's] schedule is pre-determined by his work and can be extrapolated from when he would typically work. [S. Barringer] can get coverage for his shifts in the event he is required for the care of the children. Previous visitation schedules have provided that all visitations would conform to [S. Barringer's] work schedule. The Court finds that [S. Barringer's] employment does not interfere with his ability to provide care to the minor children.

In regards to the parties' retirement accounts—two belonging to L. Barringer and one to S. Barringer—the circuit court ordered as follows: "this judgment shall remain open for the purpose of a Qualified Domestic Relations Order ("QDRO") to allocate distributions from [L. Barringer's] and [S. Barringer's] retirement accounts in accordance with the Memorandum accompanying this Judgment." In the Memorandum Opinion, the circuit court explained that the parties' retirement accounts would be equitably distributed using "if, as, and when" distribution pursuant to Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law ("FL") § 8-204 (2019 Repl. Vol.), also known as the *Bangs* formula. The circuit court then applied the *Bangs* formula to L. Barringer's retirement accounts to determine S. Barringer's marital interest. In doing so, the court used L. Barringer's account values, initially provided to it during trial in August 2019, rather than the updated account values, which were provided during trial in October 2019. Pursuant to the court's calculations, S. Barringer was found to have a marital interest in L. Barringer's two retirement accounts amounting to $16,800.00. Nevertheless, the circuit court ordered that the parties' martial interests in their respective retirement accounts were to be calculated using the *Bangs* formula in a future QDRO.

In accordance with FL §§ 8-202–05, the court identified the parties' marital property, valuated each item, and equitably distributed the property. In dividing the parties' marital property, the court considered a list of equitable factors in compliance with FL § 8-205(b)(1)–(11). Upon consideration of the requisite factors and the distribution of physical property, the court ordered S. Barringer to pay a "monetary award in the amount of $11,950.00 to [L. Barringer]. As [L. Barringer] is currently found to owe $3,350.00, [S. Barringer] only owes $8,600.00 to satisfy the monetary award."[3]

Following the circuit court's Memorandum Opinion and Order, both parties filed Motions to Alter or Amend Judgment. In their respective motions, both parties sought, among other things, clarification of the visitation schedule. According to L. Barringer, S. Barringer alleged that he was entitled to every weekend unless he was working, and implied he would change his work schedule if assigned to work on a weekend so that L. Barringer would never have the children on a weekend. However, L. Barringer interpreted the Order to mean that if S. Barringer was scheduled to work a 24-hour shift between Friday at 3:30 p.m. and Monday morning, he would not have visitation at all that weekend. Upon consideration of the motions, to provide clarification on the visitation schedule, the court issued the Amended Order as follows:

> ORDERED, that parenting time between [S. Barringer] and the minor children shall occur on Weekend nights, starting Friday at 3:30pm until Monday morning when the children are returned to either school or daycare, if and only if [S. Barringer] does not work on that Friday, Saturday, or Sunday–meaning that if [S. Barringer] is to work a 24-hour shift on Friday,

[3] L. Barringer's debt of $3,350.00 results from her award of possession of a shed and trailer, in both of which S. Barringer held one-half interest. L. Barringer was directed to pay to S. Barringer $3,350.00, his total share of the shed and trailer.

> the minor children will remain with [L. Barringer] from Friday at 3:30pm to Monday morning; if [S. Barringer] is to work a 24-hour shift on Saturday, the minor children will remain with [L. Barringer] from Friday at 3:30pm to Monday morning; and if [S. Barringer] is to work a 24-hour schedule on Sunday, the minor children will remain with [L. Barringer] from Friday at 3:30pm to Monday morning; and it is further
>
> ORDERED, that any manipulation of [S. Barringer's] work schedule for the intended purpose of circumventing any order of this Court to increase parenting time with [S. Barringer] need not be accommodated by [L. Barringer] . . . .

The circuit court denied all remaining claims in L. Barringer's motion and denied S. Barringer's motion. Following the court's Amended Order, S. Barringer filed this timely appeal. Additional facts will be provided as needed.

## ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

On appeal, S. Barringer presents the following issues for our review:

1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in placing work-related restrictions upon the children's visitation with S. Barringer?[4]

2. Did the trial court err with regard to the valuation and division of the parties' retirement benefits?

3. Did the trial court err in granting [L. Barringer] a monetary award?

For the reasons discussed below, our conclusion as to each issue is as follows. First, we shall vacate the visitation order and remand with instructions to clarify in accordance with this opinion. Second, we note the court's decision to use the *Bangs* formula to distribute the parties' retirement accounts is correct, but we shall vacate the order regarding the distributions from the parties' retirement accounts with instructions to clarify the

[4] Rephrased from: Are the restrictions upon the children's visitation with [S. Barringer] related to his work schedule in their best interests?

distribution as to the valuation of S. Barringer's interest in L. Barringer's retirement accounts in accordance with this opinion. Last, we shall affirm the trial court's grant of a monetary award to L. Barringer.

## DISCUSSION

### I. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Tailoring S. Barringer's Visitation Rights to His Work Schedule

S. Barringer first contends that the trial court abused its discretion in placing a work-related restriction on his visitation with the minor children. He asserts the restriction does not rest upon any findings related to his work schedule and has no relationship to any announced objective; therefore the restriction is unfair and unjust. In response, L. Barringer argues that the trial court was in the best position to evaluate the best interests of the minor children in determining custody and visitation and that evidence presented at trial supported the restriction. Aside from the validity of the work restriction, during oral argument both parties voiced confusion as to the Amended Order's meaning and functionality.

#### A. Standard of Review

"Generally, orders concerning custody and visitation are 'within the sound discretion of the trial court, not to be disturbed unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion.'" *Gizzo v. Gerstman*, 245 Md. App. 168, 199 (2020) (quoting *Barrett v. Ayres*, 186 Md. App. 1, 10 (2009)). A court abuses its discretion when "no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court, or when the court acts without reference to any guiding rules or principles, or when the ruling is clearly against the logic and effect of

facts and inferences before the court." *Id.* at 201. "This standard of review accounts for the trial court's unique 'opportunity to observe the demeanor and the credibility of the parties and the witnesses.'" *Santo v. Santo*, 448 Md. 620, 625 (2016) (quoting *Petrini v. Petrini*, 336 Md. 453, 470 (1994)). We will not set aside the factual findings of a court unless they are "clearly erroneous or there is a clear showing of an abuse of discretion." *Gordon v. Gordon*, 174 Md. App. 583, 637–38 (2007).

B. Visitation Restrictions

The best interests of the children are the primary focus of any child custody or visitation determination. *See Boswell v. Boswell*, 352 Md. 204, 219 (1998); *Taylor v. Taylor*, 306 Md. 290, 303 (1986); *Montgomery Cnty. v. Sanders*, 38 Md. App. 406, 419 (1977). Given the unique circumstances of each family, it is necessary for a trial court to craft custody and visitation orders reflecting the best interests of the particular child. *See Taylor*, 306 Md. at 303. Visitation of a noncustodial parent at reasonable times is not an absolute right, but one which must yield to the good of the child. *North v. North*, 102 Md. App. 1, 12 (1994). In determining visitation, the court must evaluate the best interests of the child using a multifactor approach.[5] *Taylor*, 306 Md. at 307–11; *Sanders*, 38 Md. App. at 420–21.

[5] The best-interest-of-the-child standard "involve[s] a multitude of intangible factors that are oftentimes ambiguous . . . [and] is an amorphous notion, varying with each individual case . . . ." *Sanders* and *Taylor* both offer a non-exhaustive list of factors to be considered when evaluating the child's best interest. *Taylor*, 306 Md. at 307–11; *Sanders*, 38 Md. App. at 419. The *Sanders* factors are as follows:

> 1) fitness of the parents; 2) character and reputation of the parties; 3) desire of the natural parents and agreements between the parties; 4) potentiality of maintaining natural family relations; 5) preference of the child; 6) material

S. Barringer argues the work-related restriction is analogous to the improper visitation restrictions in *Boswell*. In *Boswell*, a trial court restricted a noncustodial parent's right to visitation by prohibiting the parent to partake in overnight visitation with the children when the parent lived with "anyone having homosexual tendencies or such persuasions, male or female" in a nonmarital relationship. *Boswell*, 352 Md. at 211. In reversing, the Court of Appeals determined that the trial court must find actual or potential harm when restricting visitation based on the children's exposure to a parent's nonmarital sexual relationship. *Id.* at 228.

The facts articulated in *Boswell* are without a doubt not analogous to the facts herein. Unlike the improper visitation restriction in *Boswell*, which restricted the noncustodial parent's right to see his children when a nonmarital partner resided in the parent's home, S. Barringer's visitation restriction is limited to weekends that he is working a 24-hour shift. In support of this limitation, after considering all of the evidence at trial, the court

---

> opportunities affecting the future life of the child; 7) age, health, and sex of the child; 8) residences of parents and opportunity for visitation; 9) length of separation from the natural parents; 10) prior voluntary abandonment or surrender.

*Sanders*, 38 Md. App. at 420 (citations omitted). The *Taylor* factors, which in part are derived from *Sanders*, are primarily used to evaluate whether joint legal custody is in the best interest of the child. The *Taylor* factors are summarized as follows:

> 1) capacity of the parents to communicate and to reach shared decisions affecting the child's welfare; 2) willingness of parents to share custody; 3) fitness of parents; 4) relationship established between the child and each parent; 5) preference of the child; 6) potential disruption of the child's social and school life; 7) geographic proximity of parental homes; 8) demands of parental employment; 9) age and number of children; 10) sincerity of parents' request; 11) financial status of the parents; 12) impact on state or federal assistance; 13) benefit to parents; and 14) other factors as appropriate.

*Taylor*, 306 Md. at 304–11.

made twenty-one factual findings to determine what type of custody and visitation arrangement would be in the best interests of the children. Moreover, the court noted in the Memorandum Opinion that all previous visitation and custody orders conformed to S. Barringer's work schedule and found it appropriate to follow suit.

S. Barringer's argument would require us to apply *Boswell*'s requirement of finding "actual or potential harm" whenever there are any restrictions placed on visitation. We decline to extend *Boswsell* in this manner, particularly because the circuit court is already required to consider the demands of parental employment as a factor under *Taylor*. Based on the circuit court's findings of fact regarding the best interests of the children, we hold the court did not abuse its discretion in tailoring the visitation schedule to S. Barringer's work schedule.

While the court did not abuse its discretion in tailoring visitation to S. Barringer's work schedule, we nonetheless vacate the Amended Order only as it relates to the visitation schedule and remand for clarification on the schedule. An order constitutes "a command or decree of the court." *In re Adoption/Guardianship of Dustin R.*, 445 Md. 536, 555–56 (2015) (quoting *Prince George's Cnty. v. Vieira*, 340 Md. 651, 661 (1995)). This court has emphasized—and the Court of Appeals has endorsed—the importance of specific orders. *Droney v. Droney*, 102 Md. App. 672, 684 (1995); *see In re Adoption/Guardianship of Dustin R.*, 445 Md. at 556. In reference to an order of contempt, we have stated that "the order must be sufficiently definite, certain, and specific in its terms so that the party may understand precisely what conduct the court requires." *Droney*, 102 Md. App. at 684.

Such specificity is likewise necessary for custody and visitation orders. Parties with shared custody and visitation benefit from clear instructions on when the children will be with which parent. A clear and specific visitation order likewise benefits the children, as it can provide consistency and predictability.

After the circuit court filed its Memorandum Opinion, both parties filed motions to clarify the visitation schedule. During oral argument before this Court, neither party was able to articulate when or for how many days S. Barringer would have visitation with the minor children. Both sides indicated that the circuit court's Amended Order, in response to the parties' motions seeking clarification, did not provide sufficient clarity on the visitation schedule. Instead, the parties were further confused by the subjectivity of the Amended Order regarding any "manipulation" of S. Barringer's work schedule affecting his visitation.

We do not conclude that the circuit court erred in making its findings under the best-interest-of-the-child factors, nor do we conclude that a court is prohibited from formulating a visitation schedule based on a parent's employment if appropriate under the particular circumstances. Rather, we conclude that a visitation schedule must be sufficiently definite, certain, and specific in its terms so the parties may understand when a parent is to have visitation with the children. On remand, as guidance to the trial court, clarification is needed for two aspects of the Amended Order in accordance with the principles discussed herein. First, the visitation schedule itself should provide clear direction on which days S. Barringer will have visitation and which weekends there will be no visitation due to S.

Barringer's work schedule. Second, the portion of the Amended Order that reads, "any manipulation of [S. Barringer]'s work schedule for the intended purpose of circumventing any order of this Court to increase parenting time with [S. Barringer] need not be accommodated by [L. Barringer]" should provide a clear and objective standard for determining whether a variation in the standard visitation schedule is appropriate. If, as a result of this opinion, the circuit court determines it is appropriate to reformulate a more functional visitation schedule, we leave that to the trial court's discretion. We vacate the circuit court's Amended Order and remand for clarification as specified.

## II. The Trial Court Erred in Its Specific Valuation of S. Barringer's Marital Interest in L. Barringer's Retirement Benefits, But Not in Its Decision to Utilize the *Bangs* Formula for Division of Retirement Benefits

S. Barringer next contends the trial court erroneously valuated his marital interest in L. Barringer's retirement accounts by failing to use the updated retirement account values in its projected marital interest calculation in the Memorandum Order.[6] Furthermore, S. Barringer contends the trial court erred in utilizing an "if, as, and when" formula to divide L. Barringer's retirement accounts, rather than immediately dividing the accounts via "a simple balancing" through a QDRO. Pursuant to S. Barringer's calculations, he would be entitled to one-half the difference in the value of the parties' retirement accounts, which amounts to $25,104.53, rather than the court's finding of $16,800.00 in the Memorandum Order.

[6] It is undisputed that the three retirement accounts, L. Barringer's two and S. Barringer's one, are marital property subject to division pursuant to FL § 8-203.

In response, L. Barringer contends the valuation of the retirement funds is inconsequential in light of the court's utilization of "if, as, and when" distribution, and any error in the court's valuation was harmless.[7] Additionally, L. Barringer notes that S. Barringer waived any objection to the utilization of this formula by failing to file written notice pursuant to FL § 8-204(b), and alternatively, evidence presented at trial supports the court's determination to use an "if, as, and when" distribution as to the retirement accounts.

A. Standard of Review

Maryland appellate courts "have consistently shown great respect for the judgments of trial courts in choosing methods for valuing pension benefits in divorce proceedings" and have never "required a trial court to utilize a particular method of pension valuation." *Imagnu v. Wodajo,* 85 Md. App. 208, 215–16 (1990). Our review of a trial court's factual findings relating to retirement accounts is limited to whether such finding is clearly erroneous. *See* Md. Rule 8-131(c). A trial court's factual finding is generally not clearly erroneous so long as there "is competent or material evidence in the record to support the court's conclusion." *Gizzo,* 245 Md. App. at 200.

B. Division of Retirement Benefits

The trial court may delay valuation of pension, retirement, profit sharing, or deferred compensation plans on an "if, as, and when" basis until the primary beneficiary receives the proceeds. FL § 8-204(b)(1). This approach avoids "a decretal award which is so harsh

[7] During oral argument, L. Barringer indicated she was concerned about potential confusion arising from the future distribution of her retirement benefits under the Memorandum Order.

as to force a wage earner spouse to liquidate his or her pension interest in order to satisfy it." *Deering v. Deering*, 292 Md. 115, 131 (1981). However, if a party objects to this approach, they may present evidence as to the value of the benefits at trial if they give 60 days' written notice before the required filing of the joint statement of the parties concerning joint marital and nonmarital property. FL § 8-204(b)(2). In the event notice of valuation is not given, "any objection to a distribution on an 'if, as, and when' basis shall be deemed to be waived unless good cause is shown." *Id.* Ultimately, it is within the trial court's discretion to select an appropriate approach for the distribution of the parties' retirement accounts. *Deering*, 292 Md. at 131.

Under the "if, as, and when" basis, "it is unnecessary to determine the value of the pension fund at all. The court need do no more than determine the appropriate percentage to which the non-employee spouse is entitled." *Id.* Once it is appropriate to divide the retirement accounts through a future QDRO, the following formula is to be used: one-half times a fraction, the numerator of which is the total number of years married while participating in the pension and the denominator of which is the total number of years participating in the plan, times the amount to be paid to the recipient party if, as, and when payments are made. *See Bangs v. Bangs*, 59 Md. App. 350, 356 (1984).

S. Barringer failed to file the requisite notice contesting "if, as, and when" valuation of the parties' retirement accounts, as required by FL § 8-204(b)(2). Additionally, he failed to demonstrate or offer good cause for his untimely objection. We see no reason or need to call this method of division into question. We hold that the trial court did not err in its

determination to utilize the *Bangs* formula to distribute the parties' retirement accounts in a future QDRO, and we do not disturb this determination.

C. Valuation of Retirement Benefits

While not required pursuant to FL § 8-204(b)(1), the trial court applied the *Bangs* formula to the values of L. Barringer's retirement accounts at the time of trial in the Memorandum Opinion to determine S. Barringer's marital interest. However, the trial court used L. Barringer's retirement account values provided in August 2019 rather than the updated account values provided in October 2019, when applying the formula. Notably, the trial court did not apply the *Bangs* formula to the values of S. Barringer's retirement accounts, but instead indicated the formula would be applied through a subsequent QDRO "if, as, and when" distribution occurred. The last two sentences of the Memorandum Opinion relating to retirement distribution read as follows: "In consideration of the above factors, each party is entitled to distributions from the other's retirement accounts in accordance with the *Bangs* formula. This judgment shall remain open for the parties to submit a [QDRO] to finalize the distribution."

Upon review of the record, it is unclear to us why the trial court calculated S. Barringer's marital interest in L. Barringer's retirement accounts. Regardless of whether the trial court used the August or October account values (or the account values as of the date of divorce), any application of *Bangs* prior to the total life of the pension being known (the denominator in the *Bangs* formula) would be premature. The last two sentences in the Memorandum Opinion lead us to believe the trial court's intention was for all three

retirement accounts—L. Barringer's two and S. Barringer's one—to be distributed pursuant to *Bangs* through a subsequent QDRO, when such account values and total life of the pension would be known. Had the trial court stopped its analysis after explaining that the *Bangs* formula would be used for distribution rather than going on to apply the formula prematurely, there would be no error. While the premature calculation of S. Barringer's marital interest in L. Barringer's retirement accounts would likely be remedied when the future QDRO is filed, we conclude the court's calculation may lead to confusion during the future distribution. We hold the trial court's early calculation under the *Bangs* formula was clearly erroneous. Therefore, we vacate the court's specific application of the formula to L. Barringer's retirement accounts in the Memorandum Opinion. While the intent of the trial court seems clear, both parties expressed concern regarding the calculation done by the trial court. We remand for clarification as to the division of retirement benefits.

## III. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Granting a Monetary Award to L. Barringer

Finally, S. Barringer contends the trial court erred in its calculation and application of marital debt in valuing marital property and in its use of this calculation as a basis to grant L. Barringer a monetary award. S. Barringer's argument rests upon the belief that the trial court's grant of a monetary award was solely based on the value of the tangible property retained by each party. L. Barringer asserts such belief is inaccurate, and instead, the trial court properly considered the requisite factors in evaluating whether a monetary award was appropriate.

A. Standard of Review

We review a trial court's granting of a monetary award for abuse of discretion. *Innerbichler v. Innerbichler*, 132 Md. App. 207, 303 (2000). "This means that we may not substitute our judgment for that of the fact finder, even if we might have reached a different result." *Id.*

B. Grant of Monetary Award

The purpose of a monetary award "is to provide a means for the adjustment of inequities that may result from distribution of certain property in accordance with the dictates of title." *Alston v. Alston*, 331 Md. 496, 506 (1993). The grant of a monetary award occurs in a three-step process. FL § 8-205. First, the court must determine which property is marital property. *Id.* Second, the court must value all marital property. *Id.* Last, the Court may elect to "make a monetary award as an adjustment of the parties' equities and responsibilities, whether or not alimony is awarded." FL § 8-205; *Bangs*, 59 Md. App. at 358. If the court elects to make a monetary award, eleven equitable factors are to be considered pursuant to FL § 8-205. *See Bangs*, 59 Md. App. at 357.[8] A trial court need not

[8] The eleven factors under FL § 8-205, derived from *Bangs*, 59 Md. App. at 357, are summarized as follows:

1) Monetary and nonmonetary contributions of each spouse,
2) The value of all property interests of each party,
3) Economic circumstances of the parties at the time of the transfer,
4) Circumstances leading to estrangement,
5) Length of marriage,
6) The parties' ages,
7) Physical and mental condition of each spouse,
8) How and when any property to be transferred was acquired and each party's effort in obtaining the property,

"enunciate every factor [it] considered on the record," rather, it is "sufficient for the [trial court] merely to state on the record that [it] considered the required factors." *Randolph v. Randolph*, 67 Md. App. 577, 585 (1986).

The circuit court carefully followed the three-step process. Prior to granting a monetary award, in the Memorandum Opinion, the circuit court evaluated the parties' assets to determine which were marital and valued each asset pursuant to FL § 8-205. The circuit court listed the eleven equitable factors in FL § 8-205(b) and enumerated its corresponding factual findings, which supported its distribution of marital property and grant of the monetary award. Several of the findings are particularly pertinent. "[L. Barringer] was the main provider for the family . . . she would cover all the bills of the home, including the mortgage, taxes, insurance, utilities, and most day care expenses." Additionally, "[t]he key event which lead to the separation of the parties was the domestic violence that occurred in early 2019, which lead to a final protective order being put in place against [S. Barringer]." The court then distributed the property "in consideration of the above factors," indicating no one factor—such as the assets and debts of marital property—was dispositive. Further considering the distribution of property, the court determined that a monetary award in favor of L. Barringer was necessary to affect an equitable distribution.

9) The contributions of either party of property in acquiring real property held as tenants by the entirety,
10) Any award of alimony or provision for family use property, and
11) Other factors the court may consider necessary or appropriate to arrive at a fair and equitable monetary award.

S. Barringer's contention of error rests on the assumption that the court granted L. Barringer a monetary award only to equalize the value of distributed marital property. According to S. Barringer, the court's aggregation of marital assets and marital debts erroneously led to the monetary award. We do not see any basis in the record to conclude that the circuit court was guided by an aim to equalize value rather than affect an equitable distribution of marital property. S. Barringer does not raise any issue with the circuit court's analysis of the equitable factors supporting the monetary award. In light of the trial court's consideration of all appropriate factors in determining whether to grant a monetary award to L. Barringer, we hold the circuit court did not abuse its discretion.

**JUDGMENTS OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR TALBOT COUNTY AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED FOR CLARIFICATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS OPINION; COSTS TO BE EVENLY SPLIT BETWEEN APPELLANT AND APPELLEE.**