

Circuit Court for Harford County
Case C-12-CR-24-000478

UNREPORTED*
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF MARYLAND

No. 2510

September Term, 2024

MARTIN JESSE FELTER

v.

STATE OF MARYLAND

Graeff,
Friedman,
Raker, Irma S.
(Senior Judge, Specially Assigned),

Opinion by Raker, J.

Filed: July 16, 2026

*This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B).

Appellant, Martin Jesse Felter, entered a conditional plea of guilty in the Circuit Court for Harford County to the criminal offense of possession of a controlled dangerous substance, to wit, cocaine.

Appellant presents the following questions for our review:

- “1. Did the motions court err in finding that the traffic stop was ongoing at the time of the K-9 scan?
2. Did the motions court err in finding that police had independent reasonable articulable suspicion to extend Mr. Felter’s detention for a K-9 scan?”

Finding no error, we shall affirm.

I.

Appellant was charged in the District Court for Harford County with possession of a controlled dangerous substance, to wit, cocaine. He prayed a jury trial and the case was transferred to the Circuit Court for Harford County, where he entered a conditional guilty plea to preserve his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress the evidence. The court accepted his guilty plea and imposed a sentence of thirty days incarceration, to be served on consecutive weekends.

The issues in this case arise out of a traffic stop that occurred on February 3, 2024. Senior Trooper Bracken works for the Maryland State Police primarily as a K-9 handler, and, on February 3 around 6:00 p.m., Trooper Bracken observed “a vehicle stopped in the lane of travel.” The car was parked in the middle of a driving lane on a dark and windy back country road. Trooper Bracken described why he considered the car a “suspicious vehicle”: “Just because the vehicle stopped on roadway, no hazard lights on. Obviously,

there was nothing around there that for any reason somebody, you know, would be stopped there for any reason.” Trooper Bracken observed two people in the vehicle, a man in the driver’s seat and a woman in the passenger seat. Trooper Bracken identified appellant as the driver of the car and asked for the licenses of both appellant and the passenger. Trooper Bracken testified that appellant handed over his driver’s license and, when it looked like the passenger was going to hand over hers as well, appellant “immediately prevented her from doing that by telling her she did not have to give her ID to me.” Trooper Bracken returned to his vehicle to run appellant’s license. This first encounter lasted approximately one minute. In his vehicle, Trooper Bracken input appellant’s license details into the ticket reporting system, which, Trooper Bracken explained, requires cross-checking:

“ . . . one of the—I don’t want to say issues, but one of the issues with that system is that fact of they are so heavily loaded with information, anything—if his name is close with what they call a sound-alike, it will give me that. If there’s been any alias used similar to his name, it will give me that. Birthdates, it will give me that information. There’s a lot to kind of go through right now. But I’m kind of going back and comparing, make sure who I’m typing in is who I’m looking at on that screen.”

At this point, Trooper Bracken testified, he decided to conduct a K-9 scan, and consistent with police policy, he messaged on-duty troopers to ask if anyone was close to enable a second unit to assist with the scan, even though Trooper had his dog with him in the vehicle. Another officer, Corporal Mott, responded that he was on the way.

Trooper Bracken testified that he observed three criminal indicators which led him to decide to conduct a K-9 scan: (1) appellant seemed excessively nervous, (2) there were multiple “air masking agents in the vehicle,” and (3) the vehicle was a third-party vehicle,

meaning it did not belong to appellant. Trooper Bracken elaborated on these indicators and on appellant's nervousness:

“So there are multiple air fresheners in the vehicle. And it's just one of those things—the whole idea with the criminal indicators is the fact that not, you know, a single one of those indicators doesn't constitute a crime. None of them by themselves do. But most people don't have multiple air fresheners just all around their vehicles. So when I saw that with the nervousness, with it not being his vehicle, it's a tell that made me seem like, okay, I need to investigate this further.

So the big thing was his was his lack of eye contact with me. And the bigger one of him kind of—when the passenger attempted to talk to me and give me her ID and he immediately intervened so that she would not identify herself to us was sort of a red flag. You know, in almost 14 years of doing hundreds upon hundreds of traffic stops, I kind of have a good idea of how most people respond to me normally. And then when something is not normal.”

After confirmation that another officer was coming, and approximately 4 minutes after returning to his vehicle, Trooper Bracken provided dispatch with appellant's license plate number and name. Dispatch reported no issues. Trooper Bracken returned to appellant's car and asked for the vehicle registration, which he received, and he returned to his vehicle. Because the vehicle did not belong to either appellant or his passenger, Trooper Bracken was “confirming the fact that the registration plate that was displayed on the vehicle . . . matched to the vehicle.”

Trooper Bracken testified that while he often requests the license and registration at the same time, he proceeded differently during this encounter because the stop initially began as more of a welfare check than a traffic stop:

“. . . when this happens, most times, you know, probably 80, 85 percent, I will always ask for the license and registration. When I started this whole

encounter, it wasn't a traffic stop. I was merely checking on the fact of one, everything was okay with the car on the road, so I didn't go through the normal traffic stop procedures."

Trooper Bracken later elaborated as follows:

"STATE: So you went back and asked for the registration?

TROOPER BRACKEN: Yes.

STATE: And why did you go back and ask for the registration?

TROOPER BRACKEN: Just so that if the license plate that was being displayed on the vehicle didn't match up with the registration car[d] that they could produce. Or at least the registered owner's information was different, then it could be more avenue to investigate.

STATE: So, it's safe to say that the traffic stop was not done, even though dispatch said that the driver was valid. And the registration that you read, that was displayed on the car, came back clean?

TROOPER BRACKEN: Correct. When the dispatcher coming back to you is—does not indicate the conclusion of a traffic stop.

STATE: And is it fair to say that once you received the registration card, you were still investigating that card on your system when an additional unit showed up?

TROOPER BRACKEN: Yes.

STATE: So, the traffic stop did—had not been concluded when that additional unit showed up?

TROOPER BRACKEN: Correct."

After receiving the registration, Trooper Bracken returned to his car, where he remained for approximately 3 minutes until Corporal Mott arrived. At that point, Trooper Bracken ordered appellant and his passenger to exit their vehicle, and Trooper Bracken conducted a K-9 scan. Sixteen minutes had elapsed between the initial stop and when the

K-9 scan was conducted. The K-9 alerted, and Trooper Bracken searched appellant's car. He found suspected drugs in a purse on the passenger floorboard. Trooper Bracken then searched appellant, and he found more drugs. Trooper Bracken charged appellant with possession of cocaine, and he issued a traffic citation.

Appellant filed a pre-trial motion to suppress all evidence, alleging an illegal search and seizure. At the suppression hearing, defense counsel argued that Trooper Bracken intentionally stalled the search by asking for appellant's license and registration separately and that, when Trooper Bracken conducted the K-9 scan, the initial stop had concluded and an unjustified second stop began. The State argued that the encounter was a single justified stop, which did not conclude until Trooper Bracken issued the traffic citation, or in the alternative, the criminal indicators created reasonable, articulable suspicion justifying a second stop.

At the suppression hearing, Trooper Bracken elaborated on whether the stop began as a traffic stop:

“TROOPER BRACKEN: So initially, it was a 10-30, a suspicious vehicle I observed, but now it's kind of—had turned into you're stopping in the roadway, which is illegal. So you know, there's a reason to stop that with the vehicle. And now it's coming into it to a CDS investigation or at least an investigation of the vehicle.

STATE: And you testified that this was not a traffic stop—

TROOPER BRACKEN: Initially.

STATE: —when you originally made contact.

TROOPER BRACKEN: Yes, sir. Exactly.”

On cross-examination, Trooper Bracken further discussed the evolution of the stop:

“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay. And so when you approached the vehicle, you’re just trying to find out why it’s sitting there?”

TROOPER BRACKEN: Sure, that’s—

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Because your testimony was, there’s clearly a traffic infraction happening.

TROOPER BRACKEN: There was. But my initial reason for even approaching the car was to investigate why the vehicle was just stopped in the roadway. That’s not—

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay.

TROOPER BRACKEN: —a normal thing to do.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Understood. But there could have been any number of reasons why.

TROOPER BRACKEN: It could have been a medical emergency. That was my primary thing. I even said to the female, when she went to for her license, I said, you know, I’m making sure you’re not being kidnapped.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Understood.

TROOPER BRACKEN: My intent wasn’t to make a traffic stop on the car.”

Trooper Bracken discussed again on cross-examination his decision to take appellant’s license and registration separately:

“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Now you testified also that you usually ask for license and registration at the same time. But you did not in this instance?”

TROOPER BRACKEN: Correct.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Because it was a suspicious vehicle?

TROOPER BRACKEN: Correct.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: But if you were trying to check that something was correct, wouldn't you want both?

TROOPER BRACKEN: Not initially. Again, because of my whole approach of this vehicle was not for a traffic stop. For every traffic stop that I do . . . I get their documents, and we go from there.”

On cross-examination, Trooper Bracken discussed whether he had reason to continue stopping appellant after dispatch did not identify any issues:

“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And in that time, you also called the information into your dispatch team. Right?

TROOPER BRACKEN: Yes.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And they verified that there was nothing wrong. Correct?

TROOPER BRACKEN: Nothing wrong with his license or the vehicle.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And there's no outstanding warrants?

TROOPER BRACKEN: Correct.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: So at this point you've determined there is nothing there to hold him longer?

TROOPER BRACKEN: Correct.

THE COURT: Sorry. What was that question? You had determined what?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: There's nothing there to hold him any longer.

THE COURT: At what point?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: When he received the information from dispatch.

THE COURT: That's the question?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes. And that's what he said.

THE COURT: And the answer is?

TROOPER BRACKEN: So based on what the information that dispatch had, yes. But with it though, when I called it out, I didn't have the vehicle's registration which is why I had to go back up and get that."

Trooper Bracken addressed the duration of the stop when clarifying that he was still conducting his search of the registration when Corporal Mott arrived:

"TROOPER BRACKEN: No, what was making my judgment on what was too long or not was the fact of had I gotten through and gotten through all his stuff, and the backup hadn't arrived yet, or wouldn't be there. Which is why I had asked hey, is anybody close or how far, you know, how far away are you? Then I, you know, if it was going to be too long, I would have done the stop. I would have said disregard.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: You did get through all his stuff. You went through dispatch; you went through all the systems. You ran the license and registration. Right?

TROOPER BRACKEN: No, at the end I was still going through those screens. When you see me get out of my car because Trooper—or Corporal Mott had then pulled up behind me."

Trooper Bracken testified that he noticed the three criminal indicators previously described. He discussed why he did not conduct the K-9 scan earlier in the interaction:

"So, primarily due to officer safety. There's two people in the vehicle. Obviously on that roadway there was no safe place to put them. And I can't run the dog and concentrate on the dog while I'm watching two people that, you know, that would also be present on the scene that aren't controlled."

On cross-examination, Trooper Bracken additionally discussed the timing of the K-9 scan:

"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: . . . that you sent the request because that was when you wanted the K-9 to come—or that's when you wanted to do, the K-9 sniff. Correct?

TROOPER BRACKEN: Yes. That's when I had determined that I wanted to do one on the vehicle.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: So, your basis for this at this point was just after retrieving the license that you decided that?

TROOPER BRACKEN: So, per federal law, there's no basis needed to conduct a free air sniff of any vehicle at any time. Maryland State Police policy is that we have to have RAS, which could be, you know, they usually want a minimum of three of those criminal indicators to conduct a scan of a vehicle. So, by the time I went to his vehicle and made contact with him and got back in my car, I had already had the three criminal indicators to—

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay.

TROOPER BRACKEN: —say okay, I want to do a scan of this vehicle.”

Trooper Bracken testified that the traffic stop did not end when dispatch responded to him, and that when Corporal Mott arrived, he assisted with the continuation of the stop.

The court denied the motion, explaining as follows:

“The Court has reviewed the body camera footage, and finds the following. The trooper had every right to approach the vehicle. And the parties agree. Still yet, have the—has the testimony revealed why the car was stopped there? It is an unexplained circumstance which frankly troubles the Court. Troubles the Court, like it troubled the officer. And I understand why the officer approached the vehicle. It was the right thing to do. Figure out if somebody's sick, somebody's hurt, somebody's trapped.

I found the officer's testimony on that point and in general to be credible. And it is uncontradicted. And I say that because I include in the credible testimony from the officer, the officer's explanation that he was working in his car to sort out the circumstance having some trouble getting all the information digested by the computer. I credit and believe the officer's testimony that there were multiple air fresheners in the car. As well as his assessment, based on his training and experience, that the Defendant was nervous for the reasons that he explained. There were a number of factors which gave the officer pause after he approached the vehicle and determined that no one was at risk or hurt, including and beginning with the car was oddly parked without any explanation other than I didn't have anywhere else to go or something to that. Still makes no sense to me. I accept the officer's testimony that the Defendant was nervous in a number of ways. The air fresheners in the car.

The driver had every right to tell the passenger whatever he wanted to tell the passenger to do, and there was nothing illegal about telling the passenger to hold on to your license or to not give it to the trooper. But it was just odd. Not a big deal. Not an illegal deal. Just unusual. I agree. And I don't exactly know what relevance not owning the vehicle bears to the case other than the trooper put all that together and decided to press on.

So what we have is in the first instance a welfare check that morphed into a traffic check. Because all the activity back in the car was checking out what law enforcement check out when they're thinking somebody has violated the traffic laws. And of course, the Defendant allegedly did violate the traffic laws by parking his car in the middle of the travelled roadway without any excuse. So, the first approach of the vehicle I'm fine with.

The inquiry in the Defendant's license, I'm okay with that too, because there was a traffic violation. There appeared to be a traffic violation there on the road. The return to get registration because it became a traffic case makes sense. That was the uncontradicted testimony of the trooper, where he may have gotten driver's license when he was checking on somebody's welfare when he got into the traffic stop part of it, he would go back and check the registration.

I believe it took a while. It didn't take that long on all these second stop cases that I've read, because usually law enforcement's criticized for taking too much time. And it didn't take much time at all for the trooper to get to the check by the dog. The trooper provided reasonable explanation for why he called for backup, so to speak, because he was concerned about his safety on a dark road solo, trying to walk the dog around a car while he was managing two people who he had just come upon. I'm at peace with that.

In other words, I find first, that the approach to the car, the welfare check, was lawful. Nobody disputes that. Second, I find that when the welfare check turned into a traffic stop, the traffic stop had not concluded some 16 or fewer minutes later, when the backup arrived and the scan of the car by the dog occurred. The traffic stop had not concluded, the ticket had not been written. All the information perhaps had not been gathered. The trooper's back up arrived, and they scanned the car. And then of course the next activity was dealing with what the scan revealed before the trooper got eventually back to the traffic ticket which he wrote. And I don't think anybody disputes that the car was unlawfully parked on the roadway. So there was a reason to perform a traffic stop and write the ticket. I'm all right with that.

Was there a second stop that would not be Constitutionally permitted? I find that there was good reason that is reasonable, articulable suspicion that

criminal activity was afoot by all the circumstances which the trooper considered to press on and conduct the K-9 search.

The Defendant mightily argues through Counsel that any of the indicia of criminal activity which caused the trooper to continue what he was doing standing alone are not enough. The Defendant likewise argues that all of the factors together, discounting some and rejecting some, argues the Defendant, are not enough. I simply disagree. I think the trooper credibly explained why he did what he did. It made sense to me to believe the law supports his actions. The Motion to Suppress for the reasons stated in open Court is denied.

For clarity, I believe the stop or the approach the vehicle initially was lawful. I believe the inquiry into the traffic matters was lawful. I don't find that there was a quote, "second stop." I believe the dog search was a part of the traffic stop. But if the Court—a review in Court were to disagree, I believe that if it were considered to be a second stop, there was a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity afoot and would justify it themselves."

As noted, appellant entered the conditional guilty plea, the court imposed sentence and this timely appeal followed.

II.

Before this Court, appellant argues first that the trial court erred in finding that the traffic stop was ongoing when police conducted the K-9 scan. Appellant maintains that Trooper Bracken prolonged the traffic stop improperly by taking appellant's license and registration separately. Appellant asserts that the nature of the encounter demonstrates that the stop was investigatory from the start, countering Trooper Bracken's statement that the stop began as a welfare check. Moreover, appellant asserts that the stop beginning as a

welfare check does not provide reasonable justification for the manner in which Trooper Bracken conducted the stop.

Second, appellant argues that the trial court erred in finding reasonable articulable suspicion to justify the K-9 scan, which is required if, as appellant argues, the first stop had ended and a second stop began when the K-9 scan was conducted. Appellant disputes all of Trooper Bracken's criminal indicators. Appellant argues that his demeanor, the presence of air fresheners and the car's third-party status were not indicative of criminal activity in the context of this stop. Taken together, the three criminal indicators do not amount to reasonable articulable suspicion to extend the stop.

Addressing appellant's motion to suppress, the State argues that the circuit court denied the motion to suppress correctly because the K-9 scan was conducted before traffic-related tasks were, or reasonably should have been, completed. When Corporal Mott arrived, Trooper Bracken was in the process of investigating the car's registration, and Trooper Bracken had not yet issued the traffic citation when the K-9 scan was conducted. The stop was not concluded until the scan was complete and the citation was issued. The State credits Trooper Bracken's explanation for why he asked for the license and registration separately.

As to whether the initial stop was completed and appellant was detained anew, the State argues that, if there was a second stop, Trooper Bracken had reasonable articulable suspicion to support it. Trooper Bracken articulated three observations that aroused his suspicion: appellant's telling the passenger not to provide her identification was unusual, appellant was nervous and abrasive, and the presence of multiple air fresheners. Highly

significant was the presence of the vehicle parked in a driving lane. Taken together, these facts reasonably justified Trooper Bracken’s suspicion that criminal activity was afoot.

III.

In reviewing a motion to suppress, we look only to the record made at the suppression hearing and consider the facts in the light most favorable to the State, as the prevailing party. *State v. Wallace*, 372 Md. 137, 144 (2002). We afford great deference to the facts found by the motions court and accept those facts unless clearly erroneous, giving due regard to the suppression court’s opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses. *State v. Brooks*, 148 Md. App 374, 396-97 (2002). The ultimate conclusion as to whether appellant was stopped once or more by law enforcement, although fact based, is a question of constitutional analysis and law, thus not entitled to appellate deference. *Munafu v. State*, 105 Md. App. 662, 672 (1995).

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const., amend. IV. As is so often said, the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness. *Riley v. California*, 573 U.S. 373, 381 (2014).

A traffic stop is constitutionally permissible when a law enforcement officer has either reasonable articulable suspicion or probable cause to believe that the driver has committed a traffic violation. *Arizona v. Johnson*, 555 U.S. 323, 327 (2009); *State v. Williams*, 401 Md. 676, 690 (2007); *Ferris v. State*, 355 Md. 356, 369 (1999). The officer’s purpose in an ordinary traffic stop is to enforce the laws of the roadway, and ordinarily to

investigate the manner of driving with the intent to issue a citation or warning. Once the purpose of that stop has been fulfilled, the continued detention of the car and the occupants amounts to a second detention. *See Florida v. Royer*, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983); *Ferris*, 355 Md. at 372. Thus, once the underlying basis for the initial traffic stop has concluded, a law enforcement officer may continue to detain the person only if either (1) the driver consents to the continuing intrusion or (2) the officer has, at a minimum, a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. *Ferris*, 355 Md. at 372 (citing *United States v. Sandoval*, 29 F.3d 537, 540 (10th Cir. 1994)). Continued detention, absent independent justification, constitutes an illegal seizure under the Fourth Amendment. *Id.*

In *Terry v. Ohio*, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the United States Supreme Court explained that, to temporarily detain a person for an investigative stop, officers need only reasonable suspicion, i.e., articulable suspicion, that a person has committed or is about to commit a crime. *Crosby v. State*, 408 Md. 490, 506 (2009). Reasonable suspicion requires something “more substantial than inarticulate hunches . . . [or] simple ‘good faith on the part of the arresting officer,’” but it does not require probable cause. *Terry*, 392 U.S. at 22. As relevant here, *Terry* explained the basis of this standard:

“Street encounters between citizens and police officers are incredibly rich in diversity. They range from wholly friendly exchanges of pleasantries or mutually useful information to hostile confrontations of armed men involving arrests, or injuries, or loss of life. Moreover, hostile confrontations are not all of a piece. Some of them begin in a friendly enough manner, only to take a different turn upon the injection of some unexpected element into the conversation. Encounters are initiated by the police for a wide variety of purposes, some of which are wholly unrelated to a desire to prosecute for crime.”

Id. at 13. Although, typically, seizures require a warrant or probable cause, there are times when, under the “entire rubric of police conduct,” to include “necessarily swift action predicated upon [] on-the-spot observations of the officer,” police conduct “historically has not been, and as a practical matter could not be, subjected to the warrant procedure.” *Id.* at 20. In a later case, the Supreme Court further elaborated:

“The predicate permitting seizures on suspicion short of probable cause is that law enforcement interests warrant a limited intrusion on the personal security of the suspect. The scope of the intrusion permitted will vary to some extent with the particular facts and circumstances of each case . . . [A]n investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.”

Royer, 460 U.S. at 500.

The case *sub judice* is similar to *United States v. Smith*, 952 F.3d 642 (5th Cir. 2020). In that case, police stopped a driver with an improper license plate and checked the driver’s license. Police questioned the driver about his itinerary and passengers. After becoming suspicious with the answers of the driver and his passengers, police ran a background check and discovered an outstanding warrant for one of the passengers. When the driver declined to consent to search the vehicle, police deployed a K-9 unit to sniff for narcotics. After a positive indication from the dog, police searched the vehicle. The court held that the missing license plate provided reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle. *Id.* at 648. The court concluded that police were justified in extending the stop to conduct a narcotics investigation and that there was no unreasonable delay in waiting to have the K-9 conduct this investigation:

“The record does not suggest that [the officer] unreasonably dragged the investigation out. Rather, during the ten-minute interval Smith challenges,

the record shows that [the officer] was waiting for in-depth background checks on all three men, as well as trying to secure consent to search the vehicle.”

Id. at 650-651.¹

Here, the Trooper saw appellant’s car stopped in the middle of a traveled roadway. That, by itself, provided Trooper Bracken with reasonable suspicion to stop and investigate, similar to that in *Smith*. While waiting for the K-9 to arrive, Trooper Bracken acted as did the police in *Smith*, running his license and registration checks. Trooper Bracken was conducting a welfare check and he asked for this information. He did not prolong the stop improperly. And, the community caretaking exception is an additional permissible basis for the traffic stop. *See Wilson v. State*, 409 Md. 415, 428-39 (2009); *U.S. v. Touzel*, 409 F. Supp. 2d 511, 519 (Vt. 2006).

Commendably, the motions judge provided a detailed analysis following an evidentiary hearing, setting forth findings of fact, credibility determinations, and his conclusions of law. As to his conclusions, we agree with the motions judge. We hold that the encounter consisted of one continuous stop. When the K-9 scan was conducted, the initial traffic stop was ongoing, and Trooper Bracken had not completed his investigation into why this car was parked in the roadway. He was waiting to hear from dispatch when he requested back-up assistance to perform the K-9 scan. A K-9 scan conducted during a lawful traffic stop, which this was, does not require additional reasonable, articulable,

¹ The Community Caretaking doctrine validates many warrantless searches and seizures when police act in a manner to protect the public. *Olson v. State*, 208 Md. App. 309, 338-50 (2012).

suspicion. *Illinois v. Caballes*, 543 U.S. 405, 409-10 (2005). Trooper Bracken wrote his citation after he finished checking appellant’s license and registration and the scan was completed. The entire encounter lasted 16 minutes. It was at this point that the stop ended. In concluding that the entire interaction consisted of a single stop, we need not address appellant’s second argument that there was a “second stop” or if that second stop was supported by reasonable, articulable suspicion. Accordingly, the circuit court did not err in denying the motion to suppress.

**JUDGMENTS IN THE CIRCUIT COURT
FOR HARFORD COUNTY AFFIRMED.
COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.**